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6. Unless all farmers in an irrigation system, of which they are the beneficiaries, are 
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be effectively managed or to have good performance. 
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Preface 
Nepal is commonly known as an agricultural country. When I was a child, I heard that 
agricultural and forest products were Nepal's main export items. Today, more than 90 
percent of Nepal's citizens live in rural villages. More than 80 percent of them earn their 
livelihood from agriculture. Unlike in the past, national agricultural production is 
currently barely enough to feed the nation. Even though a significant portion of forested 
area has been converted to agricultural land, the growth of the agricultural sector has not 
been able to cope with population growth. As the child of a farmer, agriculture was 
never a new field for me, but I learned as a student of Agriculture that there are always 
innovations to be made in agricultural sector development. Irrigation is one of them. As 
a student of Rural Sociology, I also learned that the magnitude of development has no 
[limit. The definition of development may also differ in time and space, and a number of 
social problems may affect the pace of development in every society. Thus, 
development cannot always be equitably achieved. 
As a student of Legal Anthropology and Development Studies, I came to know that the 
types and magnitude of social problems are culture-specific. Each society has its own 
cultural elements and cultural norms which shape the social order. There is the common 
tendency for such social and cultural norms to simultaneously exist, possibly giving rise 
to social disputes. If such disputes are not handled appropriately in proper time, 
significant social disorder may result. Such social disorder may lead to serious social 
problems, depending upon the type and magnitude of the disorder. 
A society of irrigator farmers may also not be free of such disputes, particularly 
irrigation disputes. Among various other factors, access rights to irrigation water or 
water rights are the prominent factors leading to disputes among the farmers. Most 
social scientists who study irrigation think that irrigation disputes among or between 
farmers and agencies are easily observable "social phenomena". I have in fact found 
something beyond "social". There are many irrigation conflicts (what I prefer to call 
"grievances") that can be observed only through the careful eyes of a social scientist 
who is able to develop a very good social rapport between himself and the irrigator 
farmers' communities, and is also able to invest a significant amount of time and 
patience. Some of the serious cases may not have reached the dispute stage, but they 
icould still be major grievances. These kinds of grievances may have bothered farmers 
and prevented them from participating in development activities. Such phenomena are 
more prevalent in traditional communities strongly dominated by caste, age, sex, or 
religious prescriptive traditions. In such circumstances, people's dispute management 
institutions are appreciated, but not necessarily always effective and enough to solve 
such problems. 
As a result, I have presented a new challenge to government and development agencies 
that favor people's participation in or the strengthening of people's institutions for more 
effective and efficient natural resources management. At the same time, I want to assure 
the readers that I think that the notion of "people's participation in natural resource 
management" is never a wrong approach. But I want to emphasize that we should be 
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very careful about what the characteristics (or field realities) of the target societies are 
before we ask them to assume management responsibilities. 
This book is the output of forty years of cumulative experiences, knowledge, efforts, 
labor, and patience, and the immense contributions of my gurus, starting from my first 
guru, my grandfather, Krishna Bilas Poudel, to my last guru (so far), Prof. Franz von 
Benda-Beckmann. 
The field activities of this research study were carried out during a full agricultural year in 
Nepal, starting in July, 1997, and concluding in June, 1998. An additional six months of 
primary and secondary data collection was also conducted at relevant governmental and 
non-governmental organizations at Rupakot VDC, Tanahun district headquarters (Byas 
Nagar), and Kathmandu (capital city of Nepal). Another two years were taken for the 
analysis of the research findings and the writing of the manuscript. 
All aspects of this research were conducted under the direct supervision of Prof. Franz 
von Benda-Beckmann, Department of Agrarian Law, Wageningen University Research 
Center (WUR), and Prof. Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Significant assistance was also provided by a multi-disciplinary team of agriculture fac-
ulty at the Water Management Study Program (WMSP) of the Institute of Agriculture 
and Animal Science (IAAS) in Rampur, Nepal, who provided the necessary academic 
and logistic supports. 
I would like to express my most heartfelt gratitude and profound appreciation to my 
supervisor Prof. Benda-Beckmann for his guidance, valuable suggestions and time 
devoted throughout for four years, and for providing immense encouragement and 
inspiration during my time at Wageningen. Likewise, I wish to extend my sincere 
gratitude and deep appreciation to my other supervisor, Prof. Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann, for her supervision, constructive comments, and valuable suggestions 
throughout my research and study period in Nepal and the Netherlands. 
Similarly, I am grateful to my research assistants, Ms. Anu Adhikari and Mrs. Ram 
Kumari Adhikari, for their painstaking efforts and labor in the collection of data for this 
research at Rupakot. My sincere thanks and appreciation are also due to Mr. Tulashi 
Adhikari, his mother, and other family members for providing me and my research 
assistants with shelter and social security throughout my stay at Rupakot. I am grateful 
to the Water Users Association and other farmers of Rupakot for their brotherly 
cooperation during my study and stay at Rupakot. I would also like to take this 
opportunity to thank all the youths of Rupakot, and Ms. Charlotte van der Schaaf, 
student at Wageningen University, for their friendly cooperation and company during 
my stay at Rupakot. 
Many thanks to my colleagues in the Water Management Study Program (WMSP) at the 
Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science (IAAS Rampur, Nepal), and Legal 
Research and Development Forum (FREEDEAL) at Kathmandu Nepal for their 
academic and logistic supports for this research and preparation of the first draft of this 
manuscript. I would also like to extend my earnest thanks and appreciation to Dr. Ujjwal 
Pradhan and Ford Foundation/New Delhi, WMSP/IAAS, and WUR for providing me 
with the opportunity to pursue my Doctoral Degree at Wageningen University. I am 
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personally indebted to Dr. Ganesh P. Shivakoti for his continuing moral support and 
personal inspiration to me for irrigation research and studies throughout the last 18 years 
of my professional career. 
I like to extend my earnest thanks to all faculty, staff, and friends at the Department of 
Agrarian Law, WUR, for their warm and friendly cooperation and company during my 
stay at Wageningen. I am especially gratetful to Ellen Wegkamp and Lida Menkman for 
their sincere help and cooperation throughout my stay in the department. 
I am grateful to Michael Price of Wageningen for his painstaking job of editing the 
language and the text of this book, without which it would never have reached this 
form. Thanks to Doortje Wartena for her cooperation on translating the summary into 
Dutch. 
Words are inadequate to thank my parents, Moda Nath and Hari Maya, for their love, 
inspiration, and patience, whom I owe and will owe forever, and my late Uncle Toya 
Nath Mishra, for his dedicated and fatherly support and guidance during my 
undergraduate study at IAAS Rampur, Nepal. 
Last, but never the least, thanks to my beautiful wife Kemika, and our wonderful 
I children Swaroop and Munanchu for their understanding, patience, sacrifice and 
inspiration. 
Rabi Poudel 
June, 2000 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
this book is the product of research I conducted in the Thulotar Kulo irrigation 
system in Ward No. 4 of the Rupakot Village Development Committee (VDC) in 
Tanahun, in the Mid-Hills of Western Nepal during a year-long period during 1997 
and 1998. Ward No. 4 of Rupakot VDC is also known as just Rupakot (Fig. 1). 
Thulotar Kulo is a farmer-constructed and farmer-managed irrigation system (FMIS). 
It was constructed by a group of farmers who manage and use the system as their 
common property. Currently, all farmers who are engaged in the management and 
use of Thulotar Kulo are defined as members of this system and make up the Thulotar 
Kulo Water Users Association (WUA). The Executive Committee of the Thulotar 
Kulo WUA is accountable to its General Assembly, comprised of all the member-
farmers of Thulotar Kulo. 
The special focus of my research is on water rights and dispute management in 
Thulotar Kulo. Although this is a case study of a small FMIS, attention has also been 
given to the wider context of Nepal in terms of the conflicts and the relationships 
between customary laws, state laws, and local laws that pertain to water management. 
I am especially interested in irrigation management and water rights. I am 
emphasizing water rights because, as far as irrigation management is concerned, 
water rights are an especially problematic issue. Emphasis has been given to property 
rights regimes relating to natural resources, particularly to water rights and their 
connections to land rights. The types of water rights granted to the users of an 
irrigation system determine user rights and obligations in water distribution, resource 
mobilization and participation in decision-making activities. Therefore, in order to 
explain water rights and related disputes in Thulotar Kulo, I also describe the context 
of these phenomena in Thulotar Kulo. In connection with these issues, research has 
also been extended to the study of the ecological, hydrological, historical, agricultural 
and socio-institutional characteristics of Thulotar Kulo. Equal attention is also given 
to the situation of legal pluralism and how it relates to water rights and the process of 
dispute management. 
Nepal ranks as one of the poorest countries of the world in terms of per capita income 
as well as other socio-economic indicators. The country has a population density of 
125.6 per square kilometer with an annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent 
(CBS 1997; NPC 1993). The average landholding of Nepalese farmers is only 0.95 
hectares per household. Approximately 49 percent of the total population falls under 
the poverty line (NPC 1992), while 42 percent of the population are fourteen years 
old and younger. The literacy rate of Nepal is only 39 percent. Dependence on 
agriculture is very high (81 percent) with as much as 91 percent of the total 
population living in rural areas. While the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 
agriculture contributes 61 percent of the total national GDP, the growth of 
agricultural production is also either stagnant or discouraging. To illustrate as an 
example, the total agricultural production within Rupakot VDC, where I carried out 
my field research, can support only 40 percent of the total population in Rupakot 
Village Development Committee (DDC Tanahun 1992). 
These data show that Nepal, an agricultural country, is facing a food deficit 
problem. Since the average farm is very small and only about three percent of the 
total farmers own more than five hectares of land, agricultural intensification is seen 
as the only solution to meet current needs. It is estimated that appropriate technology 
supplemented with reliable irrigation could increase crop yields by up to 50 percent 
of current production. To date, only about 32 percent of the total cultivated area in 
Nepal is served by irrigation systems (Shukla et al. 1994). Thus, there is a great need 
to extend irrigation facilities to more land. The mere availability of sufficient 
irrigation water and the building of sophisticated structures cannot fully achieve the 
goal of effective irrigation, however. Probably the most influential factor in ensuring 
success is the proper management of irrigation water. Therefore, the improvement of 
irrigation system management is of paramount importance in Nepal. His Majesty's 
Government of Nepal (HMG/Nepal) and donor agencies have also realized that the 
agricultural productivity of Nepal cannot be increased without a substantial 
improvement in the irrigation sector (NPC 1995; Shukla et al. 1994). 
Any efforts to improve irrigation system management should give primary 
importance to improving the performance of existing FMISs. This is because FMISs 
currently cover as much as 70 percent of the total irrigated area in the country 
(Pradhan and Pradhan 1996; Shukla et al. 1994). As many as 17,700 small to large 
FMISs can be found scattered throughout all of the agro-ecological zones of Nepal. 
Therefore, any efforts to improve the performance of irrigated agriculture in Nepal 
should concentrate on the efficiency of FMISs. FMISs have been recognized as a 
potential cost-effective alternative for the expansion and intensification of irrigation 
development in the country (Shukla et al. 1994). Not all FMISs are necessarily 
managed effectively, however. Many factors may influence the effectiveness of 
FMIS management. 
Most FMISs in Nepal are constructed along small rivers with temporary physical 
structures. Regardless of construction quality, most of the irrigation systems are 
highly vulnerable to floods, landslides, and water seepage. On the other hand, 
although almost all FMISs have set some formal or informal norms for their 
management in terms of management-organization, water distribution and resource 
mobilization, what rules are made and exercised are never enough or fail to offer the 
stability required for flawless management of the irrigation systems. Natural disasters 
not only create physical problems in irrigation systems, but they also become the 
causal factors which deform existing rules and create the need for new rule 
formulations and decisions over the distribution of water1. Such problems ultimately 
lead to the deformation of the original water rights arrangements. Not necessary all 
FMIS have clear water rights provisions that keep irrigation water management 
problems in check. 
Farmer access to and participation in irrigation system repair and maintenance, 
water distribution, and decision-making (or rale making) is defined by the types of 
water rights they enjoy. The concept of water rights is very complex in terms of its 
1 See also F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1996; Poudel 1995. 
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:heory and practice as well. Water rights are based not only on state rales and regu-
lations, but also on the customary and local laws of the irrigators' communities. The 
Water Resources Act (WRA) of 1992 guarantees the ultimate ownership of water in 
Nepal to HMG/Nepal. However, before enacting WRA 1992, there were many water 
rights versions defined in various types of statutory legal documents (Pradhan 2000; 
(EChadka 1997). Some of them are connected to the land rights, some to the initial 
investment in the irrigation systems, some to the participation in the regular operation 
and maintenance activities of the system, some to the regular payment of water taxes 
or irrigation service fees, and so on. Water rights security or access to the withdrawal 
of water directly influences irrigation water management. 
Customary laws and local laws, which are the products of local norms based on 
people's level of knowledge, perception, attitudes, values, and belief systems, differ 
jn space and time. The co-existence of multiple laws makes the study of water rights 
more complicated than expected. Plural normative orders are found in virtually all 
societies. Pluralistic legal situations are more prominent in multi-racial (or multi-caste 
or multi-ethnic) and multi-religious societies (see F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann et 
al. 2000). The prevalence of this situation in Nepal is due to different types of 
pustomary rules based on strong caste and gender-bound normative orders and vari-
ous forms of legislation and government policies declared and implemented at 
different points in time. The pluralistic legal situation is thus affected by many 
institutional, demographic, and socio-economic differences among the members of 
the particular societies. 
One of the characteristics of law is that laws vary in different socio-political 
^paces (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1991). In a situation where legal pluralism 
exists, i.e. where there are also forms of law other than the prevailing government 
law, there may be several local norms related to water use in irrigation systems that 
are not being observed in the same way as the government water regulations. After 
the enaction of WRA 1992, the state has claimed ownership of all forms of water 
resources within its jurisdiction. All the older legal forms and water rights 
arrangements may not necessarily match the new provisions set by the WRA 1992, 
however. A new development in the WRA 1992 is the recognition of the existence of 
iWUAs (Pradhan 2000: 65; MOWR 1994). This strengthens a registered WUA as a 
farmers' organization for the management of an irrigation system. However, little is 
known about the impacts of WRA 1992 on farmer behavior regarding their water 
management and water rights norms. 
This book focuses on challenges the WUAs encounter in addressing the water 
rights issues that are tied with the complex plural laws in each society. In doing so, I 
have tried to identify different types of laws and property concepts that are the 
theoretical basis of the research results and their discussion and analysis in this book. 
This study of local norms and procedures about water use and its management may 
help the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR/N) fulfill its objective of reviewing 
irrigation policies every three years (MOWR/N 1992). 
¡Water disputes and dispute-related problems are also some of the major problems in 
irrigation management. It would be difficult to find examples of irrigation systems 
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where water disputes never occur2. Many studies have shown that the major cause of 
irrigation dispute is the property rights regime that defines access to irrigation water3. 
Disputes in all organizations, if not managed in a proper way, can be one of the major 
factors hindering the effective maintenance and development of social organizations. 
Frequent disputes in farmers' irrigation organizations lead to poor performance4. Poor 
performance may in turn lead to more disputes. Depending upon the actors involved 
in the water disputes, such disputes may range from simple social turmoil to greater 
civil strife (Malla and Khadka 1997; IMC 1990). Thus, there is a need for research 
that could help to produce more insight into how irrigation-related tensions, 
grievances and disputes are managed in FMISs. 
Whatever the general problems in FMISs are, however, they are said to be more 
reliable and efficient than agency- or state-managed irrigation systems (AMIS)5 in 
terms of management and performance (Shukla et al. 1994; Acharya et al. 1993; IMC 
1989). A well-functioning common property regime should have no disputes (or at 
least a rninimum of disputes) to be managed efficiently6. This principle is also 
applicable in an irrigation system that is owned and managed by a community of 
farmers. Thulotar Kulo is an example of such a common property resource managed, 
owned and used by a defined group of farmers, all of whom own land under the 
service area of Thulotar Kulo. 
Conflicts or disputes are virtually inevitable in all societies, not just in irrigators' 
societies7. However, we do not necessarily always need to be afraid of disputes, 
because disputes may have both negative and positive consequences (Malla and 
Khadka 1997; Merry 1992; Barker et al. 1991; Coser 1982; Foster 1973). Since 
disputes are unavoidable in most cases, the positive or negative impacts of disputes 
depend upon how the disputes are managed (Patton and Giffen 1978)8. Rural 
societies usually prefer informal local procedures to manage hostilities among 
themselves. Water Users Associations in Nepal, which are the focus of this book, are 
similar to other farmers' organizations that use negotiation, mediation, or arbitration 
to manage their water disputes (Poudel 2000; Pradhan and Pradhan 1997). Therefore, 
farmers' ability and efficiency in dispute management through prompt, easily 
accessible, and economical means has become one of the major reasons why most 
FMISs in Nepal are said to perform better than the AMIS's. However, is it sufficient 
to consider only the "open" disputes in order to evaluate whether an irrigation system 
manages water disputes efficiently? What about those cases that have been 
experienced as troublesome or as grievances but that never escalated into major 
disputes? Observable disputes are not the only things that hinder social development; 
"unperceived injurious experiences" as well as unreported grievances are equally 
responsible for hindering farmer participation in development activities (Felstiner et 
See also Maash and Anderson 1986, in Tang 1992; Wiber 1992; Coward 1990; Bisno 1988; 
Merry 1982; Patton and Giffin 1978. 
3 See also K. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1997; Khatri-Chhetri and Pradhan 1997; Pradhan and 
Pradhan 1996; Cruz et al. 1987. 
4 See also Gibbs and Bromley 1989. 
5 All irrigation systems which are not managed by the farmers (and managed by the government 
agencies or by other semi-governmental or non-governmental organizations) are categorized 
under AMIS. 
6 See also Gibbs and Bromley 1989. 
7 See also Bisno 1988; Roberts 1979; Gulliver 1969. 
8 See also K. von Benda-Beckmann 1985. 
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ill. 1981). Therefore, I have taken dispute management as a process rather than a 
social event in this book. I have also considered all water-related personal or group 
tensions or problems and grievances as important matters in the study of dispute 
management. 
Farmers' approaches and techniques of dispute management and dispute 
management results also vary according to the types and characteristics of the 
disputing parties (individuals, groups or agencies, and their characteristics) involved 
jn irrigation disputes (Colson 1995; Merry 1982; Gulliver 1979; Rubin and Brown 
|1975). Differences in gender, caste, social relations, age, and the overall social status 
of the disputants may lead to variations in dispute management processes. Although 
FMISs are known for having cheaper, more accessible, equitable, and quicker acting 
institutions for providing social justice than other agencies, not all farmers are 
jiecessarily able to benefit from these procedures. There are various norms that shape 
the behavior of the farmers in each particular setting. In village settings, where there 
are various lineage structures, normative rights, and networks of obligations, it cannot 
t>e said that all disputing parties are able to present their grievances as freely as they 
Want. Therefore, there is always the possibility of injustice in a village setting. This, 
however, may not be easily noticed by observers. These are some of the challenging 
situations that still need to be studied thoroughly in rural settings. To date, little is 
known about such types of research and its output that would be very useful for 
policy makers. 
Policy makers, government agencies and other development organizations, however, 
have also started to realize the importance of these issues and have proposed greater 
Recognition of local communities' customary rights to natural resources9. 
HMG/Nepal has also recognized farmers' customary rights in the recent irrigation-
related statutory laws and has recognized irrigation as a priority input for the long-
term agriculture perspective plan for Nepal (NPC 1995). Currently, most irrigation 
agencies are in favor of, or at least accept, the notion that local irrigation groups 
should be strengthened (Coward 1984). Local groups are accountable to the people in 
the local setting rather than to external agencies. They can also deal flexibly with 
changing local circumstances and adjust to varying micro-settings. Ownership and 
distribution of land and water rights in the locality of the projects are important 
aspects of local structure. As a result, this research project is dedicated to the study of 
Water rights as well as a general background of the land rights, which might have a 
connection to water rights. 
According to the policy of HMG/Nepal, the research sector should have highest 
priority for the development of farming systems suitable to the high-intensity farming 
made possible by well-controlled year-round irrigation, to fertility management, and 
to a few priority commodities. HMG/Nepal, through its Ninth Five Year 
Development Plan, has also emphasized the need for effective implementation of 
contemporary water laws and water rights issues (NPC 1997). In the meantime, it is 
also said that the weaknesses, overlap, and contradictions of those laws will have to 
be corrected in order to make them more clear and transparent. 
In order to improve the management of FMISs in Nepal, many researchers and 
See also K. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1997; Pradhan 1994. 
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organizations were involved in several irrigation management research projects 
through the Department of Irrigation (DOI), International Irrigation Management 
Institute (IJMI), Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science (IAAS), Indiana 
University (IU), Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and many other 
organizations by the 1980s10. They have studied several socio-economic and institut-
ional/organizational characteristics of many FMISs in the country. Nevertheless, the 
improvement in irrigation dispute management has not been satisfactory because of a 
lack of or too little attention being given to dispute management, which could help to 
improve irrigation management through the improvement of the irrigation dispute 
management ability and efficiency of FMISs. On the contrary, research done on 
irrigation dispute management, mostly after the above mentioned researches were 
completed, showed many FMISs struggling with many water disputes problems11. 
Almost all the research which is carried out in the name of "water dispute 
management" in Nepalese FMISs has only given attention to "open" disputes. While 
many problems and grievances related to water management do not have the 
opportunity of being transformed into disputes12, water dispute management 
researchers have so far failed to address such water-related problems and grievances 
in their dispute management research framework. As far as the farmers' participation 
in irrigation management is concerned, especially in decision making, such problems 
and grievances are no less important than the open and easily observable disputes. 
The majority of irrigator-farmers in Nepal have problems and grievances under which 
they suffer but which they cannot express openly. Therefore, in my present research 
on water rights and dispute management, together with a full-fledged inter-system 
dispute, I have given special attention to identifying, explaining and analyzing all 
water-related problems and grievances in Thulotar Kulo. 
The importance of such research on water rights and dispute management is also 
clearly stated by other researchers and agencies in Nepal (Pradhan 1994; MOWR 
1992; Gill and Rai 1991). Other contemporary social scientists studying irrigation 
management in Nepal have stressed the importance of the study of water rights in the 
irrigation systems of Nepal as well13. Additional research is necessary to analyze the 
current situation and the various uses of water, the relationships between customary 
and formal water rights, the nature and scope of the evolving disputes over water use, 
the relationships between eminent domain and existing water rights, and the potential 
for a mechanism for collaboration between sectors, users, the state and local water 
management organizations to ascertain the value of water and what the priorities are. 
Such research on water rights could lead to an understanding of the means for 
accommodating or guaranteeing existing water rights while at the same time ensuring 
that new developments of water resources can occur equitable and productive. When 
water resources are more equitably distributed among the users and more productive 
See Lam 1998; Poudel et al. 1997; Shivakoti et al. 1997; Poudel et al. 1994; Sowerwine et al. 
1994; Shukla et al. 1994; Acharya et al. 1993; Satyal 1993; Shukla et al. 1993; Ostrom 1992; 
Shivakoti 1992; DOI 1991; WECS and ÜMI 1991; Yoder 1991; Ostrom 990; Poudel 1990; 
IMC 1989; Pradhan 1989; Khatri-Chhetri et al. 1987; Martin and Yoder 1987; Shivakoti et al. 
1987; Yoder and Upadhyaya 1987; Shrestha 1982. 
1 1 See Pradhan et al. 2000,1997; Pradhan and Pradhan 1997; Poudel 1995; IMC 1990. 
1 2 See also Felstiner et al. 1981. 
1 3 See also Pradhan et al. 2000, 1997; Benda-Beckmann, F. and K. and Spiertz 1997, 1996; 
Meinzen-Dick and Bruns 1997; Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 1998; Mollinga and Prins 1997; 
Pradhan and Pradhan 1996. 
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in use, water disputes may be reduced. Some authors have also realized the need for 
tnore research on the normative context of irrigation development (Spiertz and Jong 
1992). One of the reasons behind this attention is that rural development programs are 
currently seeking to link up with traditional local concepts, value systems, 
prganizational models, and socio-legal institutions. 
Since the majority of FMISs in Nepal are in the Hills, a study such as this in the 
Hills is more urgently needed than in other parts of the country. Therefore, I was 
particularly interested in working in the Hills. Because one of the major objectives of 
this research was to identify, explain and analyze the water-related problems and 
grievances, due to the nature of the study, it was very difficult to start in an area of the 
Hills where no previous research had been conducted, or where I was completely 
unfamiliar Jef the local settings. I had a general knowledge about the proposed study 
area and North-East part of Tanahun prior to my research due to my previous 
involvement in other types of irrigation studies during the first half of the 1990s (see 
Poudel et al. 1994). 
Because this book is the result of a descriptive and exploratory case study of an 
irrigation system in a specific area in the Hills of Nepal, the findings of this particular 
fesearch may not be generalized for all parts of Nepal14 because of the nature of this 
research and differences in geographic locations with differing characteristics. It 
would be a serious mistake trying to generalize the research findings from one place 
to another place without considering the differentially addressed legally pluralistic 
contexts of the different agrarian communities. However, this study may serve as a 
parting point for further research or for policy-making agencies in similar socio-
economic contexts in Nepal and other South-Asian nations. 
According to the present irrigation policy of HMGTNepal, any new irrigation 
development or rehabilitation projects are to be carried out with the active 
involvement of the farmers' user groups as well (MOWR/N 1996). I am very hopeful 
that the findings of this research may contribute to reduce the tensions and disputes 
^mong the irrigator-farmers, and ultimately lead to better irrigation management in 
many existing and new FMISs, especially in the Hills of Nepal. 
In the meantime, the Department of Irrigation, with the direct support of UNDP-
World Bank Irrigation Sector Project (ISP) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
Irrigation Line of Credit (ILC) project, has been actively involved in accelerating the 
transfer of management from agency-managed irrigation systems to organized and 
registered WUAs in different ecological regions as well as for different sizes of 
irrigation systems (Shukla et al. 1994). Thus, it seems that by transferring the 
responsibilities of irrigation management activities in this sector, the HMG/Nepal is 
going to rely on farmers for the desired green revolution in the near future. Hopefully 
the results of this research will also be a useful input for the examination of current 
irrigation management transfer strategies in Nepal. 
It may not be applicable especially towards the "southern plains of Nepal", or Terai and Inner 
Terai. 
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Research Objectives and Questions 
This study describes and analyzes the socio-economic contexts of Thulotar Kulo with 
respect to the water users' association, water distribution, resource mobilization, rule 
making, and dispute management. The main objective of this research was to uncover 
not only the farmers' definitions of water rights and the arena and processes of water 
dispute management in Thulotar Kulo, but to also discover and describe water-related 
problems and grievances which were never brought to justice, and to shed light on the 
actual reasons for those problems, grievances, and disputes in the village context. 
From this primary objective followed a number of other objectives. One was to 
discover, describe, and explain the types of water management institutions and the 
rules and practices of those institutions, and the rule making processes in terms of 
water distribution and resource mobilization. Another objective was to describe and 
explain the rules and practices of dispute management in terms of the types of 
disputes, the disputing parties, causes of disputes, the process of dispute settlement 
and the consequences of irrigation dispute settlement. In order to explain the process 
of dispute management, I also sought theoretical explanations for most disputes and 
their settlements in Thulotar. 
The general objective of this research was thus to discover and document water 
rights issues in terms of water acquisition, allocation, distribution and appropriation, 
decision-making, resource mobilization, and dispute management processes in 
Thulotar Kulo. The results of this research, however, are also expected to be helpful 
to HMG/Nepal to rethink their policies on transferring irrigation management 
responsibilities from the DOI to farmers' associations. Giving farmers full 
responsibility for irrigation management and development without considering the 
different characteristics of the farmers organizations and their members may cause 
the situation to worsen rather than improve. Since FMISs cover more than 70 percent 
of the irrigated area in Nepal, a policy drawback on FMIS sectors may lead to a 
greater worsening of the agricultural sector, upon which more than 80 percent of the 
Nepalese population is dependent for its livelihood. Therefore, the findings of this 
research are expected to be helpful to HMG/Nepal in considering not only the "open" 
irrigation disputes, but also other water-related problems and grievances in FMIS 
intervention policies or policies governing the transfer of irrigation management from 
the agencies to farmers' organizations. 
To fulfill those objectives, I also had to get some basic information that may not 
have had a direct connection to the stated objectives. In general, this study tries to 
answer many questions about water rights and dispute management in Thulotar Kulo. 
Specifically, I have organized all of my research questions into the following three 
major fields: 
Irrigation Management Organizations 
Irrigation rights do not only pertain to farmer access to water from a particular source. 
Rather, they depend upon whether the same farmers are able to form an irrigation 
organization that is responsible for developing other institutions and rules for the 
management of the irrigation system. Certain types of institutions are responsible for 
management in most irrigation systems. These are the same institutions that serve as 
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tjhe management-decision making arena. This study has sought to understand the 
types of management institutions that Thulotar Kulo has. It was already known that a 
FMIS was in place, but it was not known whether it was a semi-governmental, non-
governmental or farmers' organization. It was also very important to know whether 
this was a formal or informal institution. I was also interested in finding out the 
process and constituents of the formation, the organizational structure, and the 
possible linkages to local and other social or political organizations of the institution, 
l i addition, I was also equally interested in knowing the historical development of 
these institutions, especially before and after the Rana regime. 
Rule-making Process and Practices 
Rule-making process and access: Whether it is through a very informal process or 
through a well developed approach, almost each irrigation system has some rule-
making institutions, places and methods for developing and executing its rules for 
irrigation management. In this particular study, I was interested in knowing about the 
places and institutions where water management rules are developed for Thulotar 
Kulo. I was interested in finding out whether these rules are developed through a 
users' Executive Committee (WUA), a farmers' General Assembly, a group of 
influential farmers, an outside agency, or some other group. It was also equally 
important to know if all water users have access to the decision-making arena in 
lliulotar. One of the general questions regarding decision-making was intended to 
know who makes the decisions surrounding the criteria for resource mobilization and 
water distribution. I was also interested in knowing who has the rights to decide the 
type and magnitude of sanctions against rale violations in Thulotar. The key to 
understanding these issues is knowing how the general procedure for rale making 
vyorks. Topics such as how such decisions are worked out, if they are recorded in 
detail, if they should also be legitimized by other agencies outside the WUA or its 
General Assembly were some of the important issues to be addressed in this study. 
Water distribution rules and practices: This includes questions about water 
distribution, water rights, and property rights of irrigation water. In this study, water 
distribution includes all activities related to how water gets from its source to the 
particular farmer's field. This includes water acquisition, allocation, distribution, and 
appropriation in Thulotar Kulo. This led me to find out what socio-legal practices for 
Water acquisition, allocation, distribution and appropriation in this irrigation system 
are. It was also important to know the types of rales developed in Thulotar. I was 
particularly interested in knowing whether such rales were customary rales of 
Thulotar farmers, whether they were statutory rules for water use and management, 
or whether Thulotar farmers developed their own local rales based on both customary 
and statutory rales. I also wanted to find out which parties were responsible for the 
legitimization of the new rules and directed my research with the following questions: 
were they the water users, the WUA, local administrative units, or another group? 
Were there any restrictive laws or sub-group laws as well15? Were such documents 
limited to the farmer organizations? Did they also reach other governmental and non-
governmental organizations? 
Outsiders may assist farmers in developing management rales in some irrigation 
systems. However, the farmers in some irrigation systems are ahead of other outside 
1 5 See also Ostrom 1992, 1990. 
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agencies in developing appropriate rules for the effective management of their 
irrigation systems. This led me to investigate how Thulotar farmers developed rules 
in the beginning. If farmers in Thulotar Kulo developed their rules by themselves, 
what factors and/or events compelled or encouraged them to develop the rules for 
water management? Is soil type or the location of the service areas or farm plots 
related to water acquisition, allocation, and distribution rules and practices? Are the 
priorities for irrigation water also tied to the types of crops or cropping patterns and 
the seasons in the Thulotar service area? It was also equally important to know if all 
water users of Thulotar Kulo were following the water distribution rules. If not, what 
processes and practices were followed to reinforce these rules and to sanction the 
defaulters? 
In addition to the questions mentioned above, I was also interested in knowing 
whether the water rights in Thulotar were connected with land rights. Other questions 
associated with water distribution were the following: were water distribution policies 
and practices influenced by politics? Had the farmers of Thulotar Kulo known that 
the irrigation water in Thulotar Kulo was a common property resource of all Thulotar 
farmers? Were there any water distribution policy and practice conflicts due to the 
legal pluralistic situations created by the structured or unstructured rules, if any? 
Were all norms regarding water distribution documented in the Thulotar WUA 
records and/or their constitution? To what extent did such norms influence the 
behavior of the farmers in terms of water distribution activities? 
Rules and practices for resource mobilization for the repair, maintenance, and 
operation of Thulotar Kulo: Farmers need cash, kind, and labor resources for regular 
maintenance and emergency repairs almost every year. In response, they have 
developed certain rules for the collection of the necessary resources from among 
themselves and from other external sources. This led me to look into what the criteria 
for resource mobilization are for regular and emergency operation and maintenance 
in Thulotar and to ask the following questions: are they related to the size of 
landholding or household number? Do the criteria differ for labor, cash, or kind 
mobilization? It was also equally important to know who collects the cash and how it 
is utilized. I was also interested in knowing what types of penalties are sanctioned 
against the violators of such rules, if the sanctions are graduated and, if they are, what 
rules determine the degree of sanction. 
Dispute Management 
The major problem of this study is understanding how farmers secure water rights 
and how disputes linked to water rights are managed. I was thus interested in 
knowing how water disputes were resolved in Thulotar. If not resolved, were they 
settled at least temporarily, or were there also attempts to prevent the possible 
aftermath of open disputes. It was also important to know whether all water-related 
tensions were taken as grievances by some farmers. If it was the case, did the 
grievances of the farmers have the opportunity to transform into a dispute and lead to 
a settlement or resolution of the problem? As the study of dispute management lies at 
the heart of this research and water rights are the root cause of the majority of 
irrigation disputes, I have posed many questions associated with water disputes and 
water-related tensions. 
My original intention was to know whether there were any open irrigation 
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disputes in Thulotar. If there were, the second step was to find out the nature and 
narties of these disputes. The third issue was to know the reasons behind the disputes. 
The fourth step was to discover how the disputes were settled and who was involved 
in the settlement of the disputes. Finally, I was also interested in studying the 
consequences of the decisions taken against each irrigation dispute settlement. It was 
also equally important to know whether the farmers of Thulotar or someone else had 
developed rules that could prevent water disputes before they escalated. It was also 
necessary to know whether there were some types of social organizations, function-
aries, or procedures that enhanced dispute prevention. I address the specific questions 
regarding the types and parties of disputes, causes of disputes, dispute settlement and 
its consequences in the following section. 
types and parties of disputes: I was particularly interested in knowing if there were 
disputes between Thulotar Kulo and other irrigation systems or between the farmers 
of Thulotar Kulo. If there were disputes between the farmers of Thulotar, it was 
ixtremely important to know whether these were water-related tensions, grievances, 
or open disputes. Secondly, I was interested in knowing the characteristics of the 
disputing parties, including the location of the service area within Thulotar, the ethnic 
Origins of the disputants, their social relationships to other farmers in Thulotar, and 
their political affiliation, caste groups, age, and overall socio-economic status. Similar 
information were also important for all the disputing parties if there were disputes 
between Thulotar farmers and outsiders. 
pie causes of disputes: If the objective of any study is to find the solutions to a set of 
problems, we first have to know the reasons behind those problems. In Thulotar, I 
wanted to know what the factors were that were responsible for water-related 
tensions, grievances, or disputes, if any. I had to find out whether the reasons behind 
such phenomena were water scarcity, variations on time period for watering, farm 
location within the service area of Thulotar Kulo, social and political influences and 
impacts of some farmers over others, certain forms of external intervention in 
irrigation water management in Thulotar Kulo, conflict between the rules and laws of 
different kinds, impacts of some types of natural disasters, or other factors. It was also 
equally important to know whether the violation of rules was also the cause of water 
disputes. I wanted to know whether the behavior, actions, or non-actions of water 
management officials and authorities were the causes of water disputes and 
grievances among Thulotar farmers. 
Dispute settlement and its consequences: The consequences of water disputes highly 
depend on how the disputes were settled and who the parties involved in dispute 
Settlement were. Because of this, I was interested in knowing what methods, 
procedures and places were used for dispute settlement. I also wanted to know 
yvhether there were "forum shopping" or "shopping forum" behaviors in Thulotar. 
The role, adaptation, consistency and efficiency of all institutions concerned with 
"forum shopping" or "shopping forum" behavior need to be studied separately. The 
key question is the role such organizations play in the management of irrigation 
disputes. It was also important to know under what circumstances the norms for 
dispute management were interpreted and applied for dispute settlement. The 
information that I was interested in knowing after the dispute decisions were made 
was whether the dispute disappeared after it had been settled. I was willing to find the 
explanation of why some disputes were resolved forever, or at least for long periods, 
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and why some reappeared even after they were said to be settled. 
Research Methods 
In this research, I applied different methods and techniques such interview, observa-
tion, case-history analysis, network analysis, and actor-oriented approaches as the 
major tools for data collection16. An important methodological approach was an 
extended case study to study the historical development of the Thulotar irrigation 
system. This approach was also applied to describe and analyze different stages of an 
inter-system dispute between Thulotar Kulo and Ghartiswara Kulo, starting from its 
trouble-free situations to the pre-trial, trial, and post-trial stages17. Additionally, one 
year was spent examining all irrigation management activities together with a study 
of the related disputes and problems through participant and non-participant 
observations, interviews, personal and group discussions involving every category of 
farmer and concerned authorities at the local, district, and national levels. Some of the 
previous studies and government departments were consulted for different types of 
primary and secondary data collection as well. 
Research Team and Organization of the Research Activities 
I had two women research assistants working with me during my field research in 
Rupakot. The senior research assistant was a senior student from the Institute of 
Agriculture and Animal Science (IAAS), Rampur, and a part-time research assistant. 
The junior research assistant was a twelfth year student of the local Higher Secondary 
School in Rupakot. She had completed her class work in the school and was able to 
work in my research project for one full year. Before starting fieldwork, the research 
assistants were informed of the content and objectives of the research. They were also 
trained in different types of interview and data collection techniques, including how 
to take field jottings or codes and how to write field notes by using field jottings. 
They were trained to write their field notes into different codes such as "water 
distribution", "resource mobilization", "rule making", and "dispute management" 
every day. They also helped me in interviewing farmers for both quantitative and 
qualitative data collection. They were especially helpful in discussions with different 
categories of farmers, including women, and for participant and non-participant 
observations of irrigation management activities in Thulotar Kulo. We all used field 
diaries for this purpose. During this period, we made personal field notes. These notes 
were re-written by me into a single notebook with different titles as "water 
distribution", "resource mobilization", "decision-making", "water disputes", 
"farming system", "land tenancy", "drainage system", "marketing", and "women's 
participation" regularly almost every day. I was also in frequent contact with the 
personnel from IAAS, and the Legal Research and Development Forum 
(FREEDEAL) in Kathmandu. 
As far as it was possible, I tried to stay regularly at the research site during the 
whole research period. Whenever I was absent during the less crucial periods, the 
1 6 See also Southwold 1996, 1996a; Yin 1992, 1984; Bernard 1988a, 1988b, 1988c; Mitchell 1983. 
1 7 See also K. von Benda-Beckmann 1985; Felstiner et al. 1981. 
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work of the research assistants was managed in such a way that none of the important 
i information related to this research would be missed. There were practically no days 
Iwhen either I or any of the researchers were absent during the whole fieldwork 
period. Pre-field information about the research site indicated that rice was one of the 
dominant crops in the project area. Although some of the farmers begin planting 
during the second half of June, July is the most common rice-transplanting season in 
Thulotar Kulo. Frequent irrigation disputes are expected during this period when the 
demand for irrigation water is highest because of simultaneous water uses for rice 
jtransplantation and for the first irrigation in the newly transplanted rice fields as well. 
Both the senior and junior research assistants and myself stayed at the research site 
¡ regularly during July 1997. This was the time when both research assistants were 
trained in the field to observe and record data using various approaches. This was 
also a nice opportunity for all of us to talk and become acquainted with many people 
in Thulotar. 
i 
By September 1997, one M. Sc. student from the Department of Agrarian Law at 
;Wageningen University had joined us in Rupakot. She was in Rupakot for her M. Sc. 
Thesis research for about nine months from 1997 to 1998. Her interests were gender, 
land, and water rights. While my research mainly concentrated on Thulotar Kulo, its 
members, and their household characteristics, she was working in the whole Rupakot 
village within Ward No. 4 of Rupakot VDC. Her studies on gender components and 
their relationships to irrigation management have results similar to mine1 . 
Research Methods and Techniques for Data Collection 
This study is an exploratory descriptive study. It does not present any formal 
hypothesis. This study is a case study. All micro-level information is based on 
primary data. However, supporting data were also taken from published secondary 
data. The primary data consist of information collected from the field research, 
directly or indirectly listening to farmers, visits or contacts, direct or indirect observa-
tions, interviews and interactions, and personal visits to government offices. 
[Secondary data were taken from prior documents of social/anthropological studies 
!
md census data. Some of the secondary data were used to compare and scrutinize the 
irimary data. In the following paragraphs, I give an account of the methods and 
echniques I used in this research. 
interviews 
Common interviewing techniques in this research were the combination of structured 
and semi-structured interviews, unstructured and informal interviews. 
Structured and semi-structured interview: This technique was applied to acquire the 
personal quantitative information from all members of Thulotar Kulo, including 
information about their households. Socio-economic variables of the members' 
households and their family members were also elicited with this approach, such as 
Jandholding size, educational status, membership and positions in social, political, 
and other governmental and non-governmental organizations, caste and political 
identities, annual income, etc. An interview schedule was developed to interview all 
67 Thulotar Kulo members in their homes. In the beginning, only my senior research 
—i 
! 8 See also Van der Schaaf 2000, 1999. 
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assistant and myself were involved in the interviews. However, the junior research 
assistant also worked as an interviewer after she had been exposed and trained during 
several interviews. This type of household interview was only started after three 
months of living at the research site so that a better rapport could be built among the 
researchers and the respondents at the time of interviewing. After a few weeks, one of 
the research assistants and myself would conduct the interview while the other person 
was involved in some other kind of research activities. This type of interview was 
supported with an interview guideline consisting of mostly open-ended questions, 
but we were not fully dependent only on such guidelines. 
Unstructured interview: This technique was used to study the qualitative information 
related to this research. It was especially useful in uncovering information on the 
intersystem-dispute between Thulotar Kulo and Ghartiswara Kulo, the historical 
development of Thulotar Kulo, and the types of activities in which different sectors of 
farmers, WUA Executive Committee members and the panipale were involved. It 
was very useful to interview the panipale in order to know his roles, duties, and 
practices in water rotation and water dispute management activities. The respondents 
in these interviews were intentionally selected from different sectors of the society 
such as adults, youth, men, women, and persons belonging to different castes. These 
categories of respondents were chosen from various sectors and included WUA 
working committee members or other water users and local political and 
administrative bodies. For this interview, we were supported with checklists or 
discussion guides that led us to the guided discussions. My senior research assistant 
and I conducted this type of interview with selected respondents. At the same time, 
the junior research assistant worked as the facilitator during the interviewing sessions. 
To find out whether there were water-related disputes in the relevant organizations, 
we visited the offices of the local Village Development Committee, the District 
Irrigation Office (DIO) and the District Development Committee (DDC) to find out if 
dispute cases reported to those institutions were connected to irrigation water 
management at Thulotar Kulo. The information we received from such organizations 
was also useful for knowing the processes of how the political and administrative 
bureaucratic structures in Nepal handle the water dispute management activities. 
These visits also helped us to find out what processes Thulotar Kulo followed to 
acquire external resources for its rehabilitation projects. 
Informal interview: Although this technique was very useful in the collection of all 
types of information, it was found to be especially effective in the study of dispute 
management. The use of this technique was not confined to collecting data on the 
water users of Thulotar Kulo, but it was equally useful during discussions with all 
groups, individuals, and agencies relevant to this study. All of us, including the junior 
research assistant, held individual informal interviews. This technique was very 
useful in the study of the historical analysis of inter-system dispute, and the 
construction and development of Thulotar Kulo. Different types of key-informants 
were consulted using this technique. In order to maximize the information's validity 
and verify the information (especially in the historical information and information 
about the inter-system dispute case), we consulted more than one informant to gain 
information on the same topic. Informal discussions with the residents in their leisure 
time were guided informally to the research agenda while asking specific questions 
about research topics. A brief appraisal on the agricultural services and marketing 
systems in the Thulotar area was also conducted through informal interviews with 
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different farmers of Thulotar, and some shop-keepers and civil servants in 
Sundarbazar area, which is the nearest commercial center of Rupakot. 
Data Collection through Observations 
Much of our information was noted through unstructured observations. Our initial 
arrangement of living in Rupakot permitted us to become part of the local community 
for the rest of our year-long stay in Rupakot. We stayed in Rupakot throughout the 
entire field study period. By doing this, we became familiar with local norms and 
language for effective communication. Although I am of a high class Brahman caste, 
and Rupakot village was also overwhelmingly dominated by the Brahman residents, I 
was reluctant to follow the caste-, gender- and age-based norms that were biased 
against low caste farmers, women, and children and youngsters in favor of Brahman, 
men, and adults. I was also sympathetic to all low class people including the women, 
children, and youngsters, and the low caste people in Rupakot. While living in the 
village, my research assistants and I also tried to become friends with farmers of 
different ages, sex, status, and ethnic representation. We also participated in sports 
and folksongs with some of the farmers. Such activities helped us to become 
acquainted and develop a very good rapport with all the respondents in Thulotar 
Kulo, making our work comfortable and effective. It was also an effective way of 
studying agricultural patterns as well. We also participated with the farmers and the 
panipale in some of the activities related to the research topics such as water 
acquisition, allocation and distribution practices, cleaning of the canals, and so on. 
One of our techniques of participant observation was the "system walkthrough", 
during which time we walked through the water acquisition, allocation, and 
distribution structures throughout the system with key-informants and other farmers 
several times. During the walks, we tried to engage the informants in guided informal 
discussions. Indirectly, it helped make observations more effective because of the 
more familiar and informal relationships we had with the farmers. 
However, some events could be more effectively studied through indirect non-
participant methods than direct participant observations. In some cases we were 
unable to observe the people or activities directly. There were many cases when the 
researchers' direct involvement would affect the behavior of the people we were 
trying to study. In such cases, we followed unobtrusive research methods like indirect 
observation where farmers were not noticed (or did not notice) our intention of 
certain activities that we were involved with. This provided us with clues of past 
behavior that could not be observed directly. We realized that the study of irrigation 
disputes was very effective through indirect observation. One means of indirect 
observations we employed was morning walks and evening walks. We walked the 
entire service area of Thulotar almost every day during the early morning hours and 
evening hours. We traveled along the trails towards Thulotar and its canal systems 
where the grass-cutters and the farmers used the same tracts. The farmers of Thulotar 
never noticed that we were on observation tours, but it was the main techniques we 
utilized to uncover the reasons behind the water-related problems, grievances and 
disputes among the Thulotar farmers. Thus, we became able to regularly conduct all 
of our informal observations during days, morning and evening hours as well. 
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Secondary Data Collection 
The process of handling disputes (defined as dispute management in this research) in 
other irrigation systems in Nepal was reviewed in detail through the literature 
documented by previous researchers and organizations. I visited the Department of 
Irrigation, the Ministry of Water Resources and other concerned agencies and 
libraries both in Nepal and outside of Nepal for the necessary data collection of this 
type. In addition to the study of dispute cases, secondary data collection was also 
carried out to understand the geo-physical characteristics of Thulotar. This approach 
was also applied to gain familiarity with the statutory water laws in Nepal. This was 
also a useful way to review the customary and local laws for water management in 
other irrigation systems in Nepal. The irrigation policies, acts, and regulations of 
HMGTNepal, and their connection to various types of water-related laws were also 
reviewed and studied during this stage. In general, the secondary data collection 
technique was useful in getting information through official and library documents. 
One of the limitations in this research, however, was the unavailability of any 
archival information about the history of Thulotar Kulo. 
Layout of the Book 
This book consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 is intended to provide the readers 
with the background and significance of this research. The theoretical and analytical 
framework of the research is discussed in Chapter 2. It consists of a description of 
how an irrigation system is managed and the connection between irrigation water 
management in general and property rights regimes governing natural resources, 
particularly water rights. It also deals with dispute management process in general 
and the connection of water rights to irrigation disputes in particular. The 
consequences of dispute management is included in Chapter 2 as well. 
Chapter 3 consists of information specific to the Nepalese context. It starts with a 
relevant introduction to Nepal, including the castes and cultures19, land management 
practices, and historical and contemporary laws, regulations, and practices of 
irrigation development and management. The traditional and contemporary public 
institutions and organizations for dispute management in Nepal are described, and 
farmers' laws for the prevention and resolution of irrigation disputes are included as 
well. 
I discuss the relevant historical, geo-physical, socio-economical and 
organizational/institutional characteristics of Thulotar Kulo in the following chapters. 
Chapter 4 begins with an introduction to and discussion of the development of 
Thulotar Kulo, followed by a description of the formation of and roles and duties of 
the Water Users Association and other institutions related to irrigation management. 
Also described are the socio-economic characteristics and background information of 
Thulotar farmers. Also included are the agricultural systems, agricultural services and 
However, I have included caste systems only in the Hills of Nepal. Most of the other information 
in this book is similar to elsewhere in Nepal with the exception of the Terai belt of Nepal. 
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marketing systems in Rupakot and vicinity, followed by the land tenure practices and 
agricultural and non-agricultural income sources of Thulotar members' households. 
In Chapter 5, I give an overview of the rules for water distribution (including 
i water acquisition, water allocation, and water appropriation), and resource 
mobilization in Thulotar Kulo. It also includes a descriptive account of the rule-
making process as well. 
I then focus on dispute management in Thulotar Kulo in Chapter 6. This chapter 
begins with the description and analysis of a dramatic water dispute over prior water 
rights against one of its upcanal-neighbors and its consequences in Thulotar. Then, it 
follows with the description, discussion, and analysis of several water disputes among 
Thulotar farmers recorded during my study period (1997-98). In the final chapter of 
this book, I present my conclusions on water rights and dispute management in 
Thulotar Kulo. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
While the focus of this study is water rights and dispute management in an 
irrigation system, my ultimate goal is to improve irrigation management. Water 
rights and irrigation management are complex topics because of the presence of the 
parallel existence of diverse and multiple legal structures in society. Thus, I shall 
begin by discussing irrigation management in simplified terms to clarify the 
¡fundamental issues behind it. Next will be a discussion of the way such legal 
i structures affect natural resource property regimes, particularly water rights, 
i Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of water disputes. 
Irrigation Management 
Irrigation management, as such, is a very broad field. Just as every social science 
investigation has its own social research boundaries, the limits of such a study of 
irrigation management are set by the objectives of the particular study. The main 
issue of this inquiry is water rights and dispute management. To study this issue, I 
investigated the linkages between land rights and water rights, between social 
organization and the organization of water management, castes and kinship, and the 
role state regulations and local knowledge play and how these are interpreted in local 
contexts. These issues are set against the characteristics of the water source, the 
ecology of the selected irrigation system, and land characteristics and land use 
patterns including agricultural patterns in relation to water use and consumption. 
I In general, water management in an irrigation system can be broadly divided into the 
engineering aspects (the structures and practices), and the social and institutional 
aspects (social structures, norms, and practices). In this case, water management is 
conceptualized as a process of how farmers govern, operate, and maintain an irriga-
tion system (the social/institutional aspects)21. Irrigation system management includes 
how water is acquired from the source (water production), how it gets to the canal 
(water acquisition), how it is allocated to a particular place (water allocation), how it 
is distributed to different field channels (water distribution) and how it is used in 
individual farming plots (water appropriation)22. 
The Complexities of Legal Structures 
Water rights policies and arrangements are, predominantly, the factors most 
See also Martin and Yoder 1987, 1983. 
Here, "water distribution" is used as a specific process of providing water to the field channels. 
In other parts of this book, however, "water distribution" is used to represent all of these five 
processes, in general. See also Ostrom 1992, 1990. 
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responsible for water disputes. Water rights is a product of the customary and 
statutory laws, as well as the local laws of the concerned societies. All types of laws 
are found in almost all societies. Therefore, the legal structure of every society is very 
complex. To clarify what these laws are, I have included an explanation of what these 
laws entail in the following paragraphs. 
Statutory Laws 
A statutory law is a formal decree issued from a government agency. Statutory laws 
in irrigation management will not be effective unless irrigators have a common 
understanding of the rules. Generally, statutory laws are used in the adjudication 
process by the courts as well as the government agencies and functionaries. The 
output of such processes, however, may not be whole-heartedly accepted by the 
concerned societies23. In such situations, neither the customary laws nor the statutory 
laws are perfect in the organization and development of any society. 
Customary Laws 
Customary laws of irrigation management, on the other hand, are the patterned 
traditions of legal practices embedded in irrigation. They are the traditional rules that 
have been used in irrigation dispute management for many years. In other words, 
they are local forms of self-regulation based on the rules and norms that emanate 
from within the community which are based on a long tradition24. The use of such 
traditional institutions, however, is not necessarily always useful in every society, as 
social change is a phenomenon inherent to every society. 
Emergence of New Laws as Local Laws 
Not necessarily all farmers' traditional institutions always behave traditional, 
however25. The farmers' customary laws and the prevalent statutory laws can also be 
modified by the farmers themselves and fitted to modern contexts. Thus, they can be 
made more productive and efficient than their previous forms (Spiertz 1991). Such 
amalgamated and modified laws are called local laws. Local laws developed within 
an indigenous community often result from extended deliberation and experi-
mentation by the members of a community, but often local laws are also regarded as 
part of customary laws. 
Thus, local laws are the new codes, laws, rules, regulations and principles made 
outside the state legal institutions. Rather, they are based on prevailing norms and 
local contexts. They are actually the locally dominant mixture of interpretations and 
transformations of the surrounding universe of plural legal repertoires (F. and K. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1996). Changes in people's knowledge, perception, attitude, and 
value systems assist to formulate these local laws. 
Local village laws, however, also may differ in various interaction settings (F. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1989). Rules adopted by farmers are likely to be more relevant 
to local circumstances than the rules imposed by other, external agencies. Farmers 
who decide to adopt the rules have to bear the consequences of their own decisions. 
However, while the farmers' organizations can play an important role in how an 
irrigation system is governed, they may not always be successful. In some situations, 
See also F. von Benda-Beckmann 1995, 1985; Pradhan and Pradhan 1996; Tang 1992. 
See also F. von Benda-Beckmann 1995, 1985; K. and F. von Benda-Beckmann 1991. 
See also F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1996; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann, 1995. 
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social and cultural differences can inhibit co-ordination among irrigators. Similarly, 
the range of activities a community organization can handle may be limited. 
Legal Pluralism 
The definitions of the types of rights a farmer has over natural resources may differ 
according to the normative and contextual situations, so they are always tied to the 
; farmers' norms, laws, and principles. Sometimes, there are parallel norms attached to 
various institutions within local, administrative and legal institutions. Such different 
kinds of normative frameworks coexist parallel to each other and are alternately 
mobilized when people defend their claim to the use of a water source. This 
coexistence of normative frameworks is called "legal pluralism" (F. and K. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1996, 1991; Merry 1988; Griffiths 1986; K. von Benda-Beckmann 
1985). Such legally pluralistic situations are common in the local legal systems of 
many third world countries where there is coexistence and complexity of legal 
phenomena embedded in a multiplicity of normative or even legal systems26. 
Next, I will address how such complex and plural forms of laws affect the property 
rights regimes of natural resources including water, and what water rights really mean 
in such legally complex situations. 
Property Rights Regimes in Natural Resources and Water Rights 
In general, anything that originates in nature can commonly be called a natural 
I resource. However, the frequently used scientific concept of natural resources means 
those natural objects, which have some use or exchange value. All natural resources 
are the gifts of nature. Not all people, however, are able to access all natural 
resources. Since most natural resources are not readily available for consumption, 
people must manage them in such a way that renders their ultimate products available 
for use. Thus, certain management processes need to be carried out before any natural 
resources can be used. In this sense, a management process means the involvement of 
certain efforts, time, technology, courage, and other resources (kind, labor, or cash) 
by a certain individual, group, some types of authorities, or one of several of human 
factors (cultural, social or institutional). Therefore, depending upon who were 
involved in management, the natural resources could be the property of the individual 
or some defined groups, or it could be used by a larger population. 
Contemporary social scientists have defined property as a relationship between 
people2 . F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann (1996) have defined property as a sanc-
tioned social relationship between persons with respect to material and immaterial 
objects, which are seen to be valuable, and not one between persons and things. Some 
say that a property right is the authority to undertake particular action related to a 
specific domain (Commons 1968, in Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Many authors think 
that a property right can be better analyzed as a bundle of relationships between 
people (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1996; Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Hoogen-
dam (1995) has categorized resources into four groups based on their property 
See also F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1999. 
2 7 See F. von Benda-Beckmann 1999; F. and K. von Benda-Becamann 1999,1996; Ostrom 1992, 
1990; Schlager and Ostrom 1992. 
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relationships: private property, where the stakeholders possess all rights to use, 
manage, and obtain benefit and to sell or pledge; common property, where a group of 
members collectively holds the rights over a resource system, and detailed rights may 
be formulated within the group; public property, where the state or a semi-statual 
institution holds the rights over such a resource or object and; open access property, 
or situations where there are no rules or regulations governing the use and 
management of resources. 
To illustrate property rights in irrigation, I will use the property rights 
arrangements in an irrigation system managed by a defined group of farmers as an 
example. Property rights over irrigation water in an irrigation system are simply 
expressed as water rights. The bundles of water rights are "withdrawal rights" or the 
rights to appropriate part of the water flow, the "canal rights" (or "access rights") or 
the rights to use infrastructure to transport water flow, "management rights" or the 
rights to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improve-
ments, "exclusion rights" or the rights to determine who will have access rights, and 
how and to whom the rights may be transferred, and lastly the "alienation rights" or 
the rights to sell or pledge water (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). 
There are very few cases, however, where natural resources could be specifically 
classified in any of the above categories. Likewise, there are many resources, 
conditioned by social/institutional factors, which do not fall into any of these 
categories. Thus, in most cases, any effort to generalize the definition of natural 
resources may lead to a serious misunderstanding. Water, land, forest, mines, 
rangeland, etc., can be the objects of property relationships28. This relationship 
includes the range of rights, options, and obligations (in relation to the objects) 
limited to the holders that might have rights to control, or supervise them, represent 
them in outside relations, allocate property on the one hand, and rights to use, to 
transfer, to exploit or to appropriate. The sharecropping contract between a 
landowner and tenant, and the resulting sharing arrangements of farm produce may 
be used as an example. This contract may differ not only in different village settings, 
but also case by case, even within a village. Another example would be a farmer who 
owns the trunk of a tree but shares rights to the fodder with several others because of 
local laws which set the sharing arrangement. A final example would be how many 
farmers may share the grass on a rangeland (broader access, if not open), but the 
access to the bushes from the same range might be limited to a few people (limited 
access). 
Just as there are variations in the social as well as situational contexts across 
different societies and legal systems (or sometimes even within a society and a legal 
system), there are in the constructions of the properties or their definitions as well (F. 
and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1996). Instead of categorizing properties as objects, 
properties are instead characterized as the bundle of rights relationships between 
people with respect to the uses or values of those objects. F. and K. von Benda-
Beckmann (1996) suggest that we must deal with three major elements in such 
property relationships: the social entities, the objects of property relationships, and 
the relationship itself. The social entities, which are the holders of such property 
Now, the property relationship of such objects like the ocean, earth itself (as a single legal 
structure), space, planets, etc. is also a relevant issue. However, the social boundary of the 
current issue in this research may not necessarily include those objects. 
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relationships, can be individuals, households, lineage/clan, groups, associations, 
villages, or the state. 
Irrigation water in most FMISs might be categorized as a common property resource 
because, in many FMIS, irrigation systems are owned by a community or a collective 
group with a membership defined by the farmers. There are some FMISs where 
irrigation water is considered to be a marketable object within a defined social 
boundary (Poudel 1996; Martin and Yoder 1987). In some FMISs, access, rights, and 
responsibilities may be defined differently by local laws, and there may be different 
sub-groups of irrigator farmers within a single FMIS. 
Every society has attempted to define the property relationships between users so 
that the properties may be used within the complexities of different legal fields. 
Agrarian societies have developed different types of rules for different types of 
situations. For example, rules during monsoon may differ from rules during the dry 
seasons. Similarly, rules for male-headed households may differ from the rales for 
female-headed households. Situations like abrupt inflation, a natural catastrophe, an 
accident, etc., may force societies to change their norms. In such situations, the old 
property relationships may need to be redefined. New rales may need to be developed 
based on the previous ones. Such repertoires of social, legal, and contextual situations 
pormally invite disputes in the processes of property rights relationships (or the 
property laws). 
In redefining laws, farmers face many challenges in making management more 
systematic and less problematic. A direct connection exists between challenges to the 
water rights regimes and the normative social field. In some cases, water users may 
have all other rights as owner but have no access to canal rights for their private plots 
even though they have withdrawal rights. In such a case, water can enter their field 
only after the neighboring plot has been irrigated. However, this may be applicable 
only when all neighboring plots along the waterways are cropped. This is an example 
of how land rights may restrict the rights to water. Other water rights researchers 
looking at irrigation management also agree that the rights to water may also be 
derived from the rights to land (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmannl996). 
Almost all types of rights relationships are found in the FMIS in Nepal. There might 
even be multiple relationships within one system. Some of these relationships 
exercise the ownership to the share of water (Poudel 1996). The shareowners have 
the right to sell their part of irrigation water to other users among themselves, but not 
to outsiders. 
In general, the rights over water use, or water rights, in FMIS is tied to time, 
Volume, location (i.e., plots of headend or tailend), priority (i.e., first come, first serve 
basis), season, type of crops, type of share (i.e., share of water secured by investment 
or pledged or bought), rotation, prior rights (i.e., those who were involved in 
construction of a canal which was made earlier), free-access, etc. (Poudel 1996; 
Hoogendam 1995; MOWR 1994; Pradhan 1989). In sum, a water right is an 
authorized claim to a benefit from a water source. The source may be a river or 
stream, a tank, a well, or a canal. Thus, there are no single or universal criteria that 
define who should get access to irrigation water. 
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Sometimes, social and political relations also determine how water rights are 
altered (Pradhan and Pradhan 1996). Although rare, local politics may also favor 
small farmers, at least for the access to the usufruct rights. Senior rights of the 
upstream canal are so strong, however, that they are protected even at the expense of 
the downstream ones. In many cases, the local socio-political situation does not favor 
poor, underprivileged, and lower caste farmers (Khatri-Chhetri and Pradhan 1996). 
I took these circumstances surrounding the complexities of water laws and water 
rights into account when I decided to focus this research on investigating what the 
institutions responsible for irrigation management in Thulotar Kulo are. What are 
their organizational structures? How were these organizations formed? What are the 
main activities played by such institutions? What factors determine which farmers 
have access to the water distribution and resource mobilization rule-making arena? 
What is the normal rule making procedure and what types of rules have been 
developed thus far as well as during my research period in 1997-98? 
Dispute Management 
Interactions and relationships between individuals, between groups, or between an 
individual and groups are generally guided and oriented by standard norms in every 
society. However, problems and personal or social dislocations are commonly 
occurred in every society as well; problems and disagreements inevitably arise in any 
social relationship (Bisno 1988; Felstiner et al. 1981; Roberts 1979; Gulliver 1969). 
Such disagreements are commonly defined as conflicts. Some authors also find 
differences between the terms conflicts and disputes. Conflicts do not necessarily 
erupt into a dispute. Disputes are easily observed by the immediate society while a 
conflict could also be an experience perceived to be injurious but not be claimed as 
injurious. Thus, all disputes can be called conflicts, but not all disputes may be 
conflicts. 
Not only are there differences between conflict and disputes, but there are also 
different types of disputes. In this book, I have presented the dispute as a process of 
dispute management. The type of dispute may range from simple hostility, verbal 
exchanges, or social turmoil to physical coercion among the disputing parties29. It is 
also not uncommon to see a dispute develop into bloodshed or even homicide (IMC 
1990; Maash and Anderson 1986, in Tang 1992; Merry 1982). 
Felstiner et al. (1981) have described the process of how disputes emerges in 
society. According to them, troubles, problems, and personal or social dislocation are 
every day occurrences in every society, which is why we observe forms of dispute in 
every society. There might be many antecedents for such disputes. While such factors 
are found in every day life in all societies, they do not necessarily always cause the 
disputes to emerge. This happens when the victims do not perceive the problems that 
may lead to dispute. Felstiner et al. (1981) define these as unperceived injurious 
experiences (unPIE). They describe the different stages of how unperceived injurious 
experiences are transformed into dispute. When victims perceive that they have been 
See also Malla and Khadka 1997. 
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victimized, unperceived injuries are transformed into a perceived injurious experience 
(PIE). This is the first transformation stage, referred to as Naming. The next stage, 
Blaming, is the transformation of perceived injurious experiences into a grievance. 
This occurs when a person attributes an injury to the fault of another entity. The third 
transformation, Claiming, occurs when someone with a grievance voices it to the 
entity believed to be responsible and asks for remedy. Finally, a claim is transformed 
into a Dispute when the demanded remedy is rejected in whole or in part. 
Unperceived injurious experiences could be transformed into perceived injurious 
experiences at any time in any society. Likewise, a perceived injurious experience is 
transformed into a grievance. Someone with such a grievance may claim for remedy 
to the concerned entity. A dispute emerges if such claims are rejected either in whole 
or in part. 
Almost all members of agrarian societies have on-going multiplex relationships 
with one another. Their mutual dependence is utmost and vital for the maintenance 
and development of their livelihood and professions or for the development of 
society. Such relationships can not be maintained in a disturbed, disappointed, 
! hostile, or disputed situation. Therefore, any forms of disputes among the farmers 
should be settled or contained in some fashion by any appropriate manner30. 
I 
Does Dispute Work? 
jSocial change is the pre-requisite for the transformation of societies and technological 
changes. If a dispute in the first place is not allowed to develop into a destructive and 
full-fledgedd dispute, it may function as the catalyst for such social change in many 
cases31. Thus, dispute may provide the opportunity for innovation, creativity, and 
allow for traditional norms and practices to be challenged under certain 
circumstances. Basic problems cannot be resolved without some disputes because of 
the different values, perceptions, and belief systems in the fanners' communities. 
jWhile a healthy social order is vital for smooth and steady social growth, it is equally 
important to note that a healthy social order is one that may also inhibit the 
emergence of grievances and prevent their transformations into claims for redress 
(Felstiner et al. 1981). Coser (1964:154) states: 
"In loosely structured groups and open societies, dispute, which aims at a resolution of tension 
between antagonists, is likely to have stabilizing and integrative functions for the relationships. 
By permitting immediate and direct expression of rival claims, such social systems are able to 
readjust their structures by eliminating the sources of dissatisfaction. The multiple disputes 
which they experience may serve to eliminate the causes for disassociation and to re-establish 
unity. These systems avail themselves, through the toleration and institutionalization of dispute, 
of an important stabilizing mechanism. In addition, dispute within a group frequently helps to 
revitalize existent norms; or it contributes to the emergence of new norms. In this sense, social 
dispute is a mechanism for adjustment for norms adequate to new conditions." 
i Coser's explanation of what he terms "Dispute Functionalism" is also relevant 
(Turner 1982:169): 
"The more primary are relations among the members of respective dispute groups, and the 
more intense is the dispute, the more dispute leads to suppression of dissidents and deviance 
See also Abel 1982a; Colson 1995. 
See also Foster 1973. 
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within each dispute group and forced conformity to norms and values." 
Disputes can also improve the quality of the group decisions when the group 
meets again and again, eventually finding a common decision that is based on the 
additional information that probably would not have been obtained without the 
conflicting views having been expressed (Barker et al. 1991). The dispute then also 
benefits the group by granting an opportunity for the group members to express their 
anger in the discussion, put forth independent resolutions, and find a common 
agreeable solution, thus maintaining group cohesiveness. 
While I believe that dispute may have positive functions, any positive 
consequences of dispute are dependent upon how, where, and when a dispute is 
settled (see also Coser 1982). In this sense, who is involved in dispute settlement is 
very important as well (who, however, may not applicable to all types of disputes). 
Thus, the method by which a dispute is settled is the key to whether it should be 
viewed positively or not. How a case involving dispute is resolved is so important 
that it has direct bearing on whether the resultant of the dispute fulfills the partial or 
full demands of the disputing groups (Patton and Giffen, 1978:86): 
"Hopefully, if group members use a cooperative integrative approach, a genuine integration of 
ideas will be found to meet the full demands of all parties in disagreement, or else a 
compromise may be identified, in which all receive part of what they want." 
In legally pluralistic situations both the disputing parties and the dispute 
resolution parties have multiple alternatives from which to choose one resolution. The 
results of each alternative may differ in terms of its effectiveness toward achieving 
the objectives of the dispute management. All societies have several pre-identified 
bureaucratic organizations and normative institutions for this purpose. Instead of 
covering all of these processes, I am only interested in which circumstances or 
combination of circumstances utilize dispute situations for the further 
improvement/development or underdevelopment of existing social 
institutions/organizations. 
The paragraphs below illustrate the circumstances under which disputes are handled 
that lead to positive or negative impacts to the parties involved. However, as the 
central theme of this book is dispute management in irrigation systems, the 
circumstances presented in this book fit the irrigation system dispute cases of the 
present study. 
As discussed above, the distinctive individual importance of "how", "where", 
"when" and "who" are critical when looking at the dispute resolution process. The 
nature of their interdependence is very important as well, as handling the dispute with 
the right approach at the rights place and rights time through the right institutions (or 
entities) affects whether the outcome of the dispute has positive or negative impacts. 
It is very important to note that disputes have positive as well as negative 
impacts, but for whom? A dispute that concludes with positive results for one 
disputing party may have negative results for another. If disputes are settled in a 
village setting such as the one in this book where there would be different categories 
of disputants including different castes, landowners and sharecroppers, head farmers 
and tail farmers, men and women, elite and illiterates, and so on, there would be 
significant differences in dispute results between stronger and weaker groups. There 
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may also be differences between the day to day disputes over distributing water into 
the fields, and more structural disputes where questions may arise concerning who 
has what kinds of water rights in principle. 
How are disputes managed? 
The dispute in irrigation management does not necessarily always indicate problems 
in irrigation systems management. Although there are always negative consequences 
that affect either one or all disputing parties, there are also positive outcomes 
regardless of the type, direction or intensity of the disputes. However, none of the 
disputing parties benefit in practice if the disputes are not resolved in a proper way 
within a proper time frame. Thus, farmers choose to resolve irrigation disputes 
through the available means. Such means are described in the succeeding parts of this 
chapter. 
When are the disputes managed? 
[Disputes should be managed before they degenerate into verbal assault and 
[irreparable damage to someone's egos (Barker et al. 1991). A popular saying which 
has been adopted in the legal institution societies is: "A justice delayed is the justice 
denied". In other words, if disputes are not managed right at the time when they are 
claimed and if the root causes of the disputes are not taken care of in the process of 
! dispute resolution, then chances are high that the old dispute may generate many 
| more new disputes (see also K. von Benda-Beckmann 1985). Sometimes, delayed 
dispute resolution will have no importance especially when the outcome of the 
dispute has either become worse or if it has already been resolved by various other 
means, or the morale, ego, or property of one or more of the disputing parties has 
sufficiently eroded. This is because water rights relations, which are the focus for 
water disputes, are not usually permanent but are instead provisional and subject to 
further negotiation and dispute (Pradhan and Pradhan 1997). 
However, is it possible to bring all disputes to the negotiating table immediately 
I after it emerges between two or more individuals/groups? Are the litigating 
: institutions informed about such disputes in proper time? Are there institutions in 
every society that seek immediate settlement of the dispute through their own 
negotiation process? There could be many dispute cases that no one dares or cares to 
handle. Many cases never even come into the open. In such cases, justice may be 
delayed forever. There are many cases where even researchers experienced in 
icommunity dispute may not notice many emotional individual disputes that have 
roots going back several years. 
Where are disputes managed? 
The negotiating parties have a psychological advantage if the negotiating arena is on 
I their home territory (Rubin and Brown 1975). These advantages enjoyed by the 
| negotiators benefit both disputing parties if the negotiation process is arranged in the 
| place where the dispute originated. This allows both parties to express their 
! grievances and offer alternative proposals to solve the grievances. 
When a grievance develops into a dispute, at least one of the disputing parties 
may bring it forth as a public complaint. The WUA or its General Assembly would 
be the effective public arena to publicize irrigation disputes for the first and also the 
last times it comes up. In case of an inter-system dispute, negotiating processes 
between two WUA would be effective, however, only when the negotiating arena is 
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arranged near the place where the factor of dispute originated (Gulliver 1979). In 
most cases, such arenas are established in rural societies in appropriate locations, 
such as the square of the village, a farmer leader's home, a public place under a 
convenient stand of the shady trees, and so on. Since a negotiating arena affects the 
patterns of interactions between the negotiating members, it is very important that 
they exercise caution when they select the arena. This problem may not bother 
farmers who have traditionally prescribed arenas for public meetings, however. In 
addition to such psychological social factors, farmers are also unable to participate 
effectively in non-local arenas of negotiation due to several other socio-economic 
factors, especially when such arenas are far from their home territory. 
Who manages disputes? 
The outcome of a dispute, whether it is functional or dysfunctional, is dependent 
upon the person or agency who resolves the dispute. Several institutions or 
organizations in developing countries are involved in the management of different 
types of disputes. Farmers have several alternatives from which to choose. They 
choose those that they think will bring favorable results. However, what might be the 
best choice for one might be the worst for another. One may claim the decision is in 
his or her favor because he or she chose the best alternative. But in many cases, 
results that are favorable for one usually occur at the expense of another. 
Factors Influencing Irrigation Disputes 
Generally, the emergence of disputes and their intensity depend on how a society uses 
and distributes power and resources. Such disputes become more intense when power 
differentials are greater or when resources become scarcer as, in many cases, 
irrigation water is a scarce resource when a large area of cultivated land needs to be 
irrigated by a small amount of water. It is not unusual that many irrigation systems 
share the same water source. Beside irrigation, water also has many other uses like 
drinking, washing, wallowing, duck-keeping, aquaculture, running water mills, etc. 
Disputes may erupt when the acquisition, allocation, distribution, or appropriation of 
water is perceived to be unjust. However, the definition of injustice differs in many 
cultural, economic, political, social, and situational contexts. 
Disputes in farmer managed irrigation systems generally arise due to water use 
activities, resource mobilization, and the dominance of influential members over 
resource poor farmers (Poudel et al. 1994). Other major causes of disputes include the 
shifting of an upstream intake closer to a downstream one, claiming a share of water, 
allowing water to leak from a diversion weir of an upstream system, opposing an 
upstream rightsholder's plan to use a gabon box at the diversion, users' reluctance to 
participate in maintenance and repair activities, inequitable water delivery between 
headend and tailend farmers, and the case of prior water rights. The inter-system 
dispute in irrigation is almost inevitable when more than one system has to share the 
same source of limited water. 
Most irrigation system water disputes are observed when water is limited. 
Disputes generally become more serious when the management aspect becomes 
weaker. Sometimes a dispute also arises when the amount of water is more than 
required. The time and duration of water flow also affect water disputes (Malla and 
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Khadka 1997; Bumalag and Bhuyan 1986). Thus, water distribution is the most 
dominant source of dispute in irrigation. Whenever the demand for water exceeds the 
supply, some kind of allocation process needs to be specified by a set of rules. When 
such rules are formulated and applied, some farmers will obtain less water than they 
desire. As the supply of irrigation water decreases, the temptation for individual 
farmers to break the rules increases. Ultimately, this may lead to the emergence of a 
dispute. Dispute within the system is mainly found to be the result of water allocation 
and distribution methods during water deficit periods. The pilfering of water or the 
violation of water rotation rules are found to occur frequently during periods when 
water becomes a very scarce and competitive resource (Poudel et al. 1994; Shukla et 
al. 1993). 
Although law is regarded as one of the most important means of dispute 
Iresolution, sometimes the laws themselves could be considered to be one of the 
factors leading to water disputes. Law is one of the important sources of power in 
society, as a result, power differentials are created among the members of the water 
luser organization. In such cases, law may not be able to settle a dispute but may 
invite further disputes that are due to power differentiation between certain members 
involved in interaction. Law in these cases becomes both the cause of dispute as well 
as the means of dispute resolution (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1985b; Turk 1978). 
In addition to law functioning as a factor in power differentiation, the 
distribution of wealth and location differences among members of an irrigation 
system affect rule conformance (Tang 1992; Poudel 1990; Bumalag and Bhuyan 
1986). The distribution of wealth is not expected to be uniform in a society, which is 
jmade up of different ethnic, clan, racial and caste groups. If a community of irrigators 
|is divided by ethnic, cultural, clan, racial, caste, or other social differences, there may 
be many clashing interests due to the scarcity of water. Struggle between clans, 
jreligious groups, castes, or races, communities, etc., may affect water rights issues 
jand dispute management. 
Disputes may sometimes arise because of demands made by farmers who have 
no direct intakes to the water canals. New tertiary canals or field channels might be 
demanded in many cases. Thus, land acquisition for such purposes may lead to 
related irrigation disputes. Such cases may also erupt between upstream and 
downstream sectors of irrigated lands. 
Farmers may be influenced by local or national politics. Politics may have a 
impact on water rights issues or dispute management. Similarly, other than the factors 
mentioned above, there might be several other topics of dispute that have effects on 
[water disputes. 
Other socio-economic variables such as agricultural income, family size, 
kinship, and political relationships also affect an irrigator's involvement in irrigation 
disputes (Poudel et al. 1994; Poudel 1990; Pormento and Poudel 1989). F. and K. von 
Benda-Beckmann (1996) summarized some of the reasons why the water disputes 
exist in irrigation. These reasons include natural disasters; development policy and its 
implementation by governmental agencies; new regulations governing access; 
|distribution; operation and management of irrigation water; construction of new 
icanals; introduction of new crops; new crop varieties or new farming systems, and; 
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rehabilitation or extension of existing systems . 
The Processes of Dispute Management 
Although disputes commonly occur in virtually all societies, it is fortunate that every 
society has also developed a range of mechanisms33 to resolve disputes (Merry 1982). 
Most of these mechanisms are informal local institutions. These institutions usually 
guard the local communities against the possibly offensive and disruptive behavior of 
the disputes through mediation, compromise, or conciliation. Social morals and 
shared responsibilities, social pressures and social sanctions are major strengths 
found in rural societies for dispute resolution. 
The cost of the disputing process, power relationships between the disputants, 
and social networks and access to the litigating institutions are the major factors that 
determine the faith in the type of the disputing process chosen by the disputants as 
well as the output of the disputes. These factors are influential to the point that some 
farmers do not want to present their grievances even to their opponents. Some want to 
solve the problem privately within the disputing parties while some may want to 
settle it in a close circle of immediate relatives without allowing the case to become 
public. Others choose to resolve it in their immediate community rather than through 
formal state institutions, while still others do not bring the case to the public forum 
even when there is a high expectation that the decision would favor them (Canter 
1978). Some disputants disregard all informal attempts to settle a dispute in their 
village at the very beginning of the disputing process (Rothenberger 1978), while 
others want it when conciliation fails regardless of the factors involved. However it 
may be, dispute management is one of the major factors that lead to better 
performance in any irrigation system. 
The way in which a dispute is handled in a bilateral dispute management process 
and, consequently, the type of output that is achieved through that process, depends 
on the relationship between the disputants (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1985a)34. 
Generally, disputants in multiplex or continuing permanent social relationships rely 
on the relatively low and informal levels of dispute processing (K. von Benda-
Beckmann 1984). A negotiation process which may lead to compromised outcomes is 
among such practices,, but those in simplex relationships rely on adjudication or 
arbitration, which lead to "win-or-lose" decisions (see Nader and Todd 1978). 
Disputes between the members of two families, but still within the same village, are 
mostly discussed, mediated, and settled by elders within the privacy of the close 
social networks of the disputing members (Witty 1978). Whatever the dispute 
settlement/resolution practice may be, the content and output of each case is unique 
as a result of the different situational factors associated with it (see also Ruffini 
1978). 
Similar factors are also observed in many irrigation systems in Nepal and other South Asian 
countries. See K. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1997; Malla and Khadka 1997; Poudel 1995a; 
Shukla et. al. 1993; Maash and Anderson 1986, in Tang 1992; Wiber 1992; Coward 1990. 
Such mechanisms are discussed in the succeeding parts of this chapter. 
See also Gulliver 1969; Koch 1978; Nader and Todd 1978; Rothenberger 1978; Witty 1978. 
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Negotiation 
Negotiation is one of the most popular approaches to dispute management in rural 
communities. The resolution of an irrigation water dispute initiated by the disputing 
parties themselves are, in most cases, more efficient and effective than when other 
actors or means are involved. The theoretical basis of this statement is backed not 
only by the study of several dispute resolution cases, but it is also apparent that 
attempts to resolve disputes between two parties are more effective if the 
characteristics of the negotiators are the same as those of the disputing parties. This 
principle is also backed by the innovation-adapters' theory of communication35. 
Resolution formulated by the negotiation processes with resolutions formulated 
by the stakeholders in their own front yard can also contribute to more equitable and 
efficient solutions to water disputes. Such negotiated solutions are seldom violated by 
the parties involved (Brans and Meinzen-Dick 1997; Sutawan 1997). Therefore, 
farmers usually prefer negotiation for dispute resolution (Nader and Todd 1978; 
Gulliver 1969). In other words, disputing parties themselves (or their representatives) 
become involved in a bargaining dialogue in which offers and counter-offers made by 
either party may enter the process. Finally, new norms may be developed or the local 
laws may be changed in the process of finding a solution which is acceptable to the 
parties involved in the dispute, leading negotiators to voluntarily commit themselves 
p the course of action they agree upon (Greenhalg and Chapman 1995; Gulliver 
J1979). Bargaining and negotiation are not only emerging as the major mechanisms of 
dispute resolution, but nevertheless have been, and will no doubt continue to be, 
employed in an increasing number and range of dispute situations (Rubin and Brown 
1975). Negotiation is an ongoing process of dispute resolution, but it is not 
necessarily the key to resolving disputes in all situations (Meinzen-Dick and Brans 
'1997). It is a process that cannot simply be deduced from technical specifications or 
through the economic, legal or power exercises. Rather, negotiation involves multiple 
meetings between different claimants. A bargaining relationship exists when two 
parties having a dispute of interest become involved in the continuing discussions in 
respect to one or more different issues. Activity in the relationship involves the 
division of resources and/or reaching a resolution to one or more issues among the 
parties. The activity in a process involves either one or both parties presenting their 
demands, followed by the concessions, thus reaching to a common solution. 
Failure to adequately discuss, negotiate and reach a common consensus on how 
rights and responsibilities will be shared has serious repercussions for the 
sustainability of management improvements in irrigation systems. On the other hand, 
some authors insist that the institutions through which water rights are negotiated and 
renegotiated have a critical influence on the possibility of generating equitable and 
efficient solutions to water disputes. 
Many observations in dispute management have shown that disputants in 
continuing multiplex social relationships generally rely on negotiation in settlement 
attempts, leading to compromised outcomes. In concluding the negotiation process, 
farmers may create new rules that all disputing parties can agree to. Such new rales 
do also work as keys to dispute avoidance in the future. In many cases, negotiation is 
seen to be one of the most effective and efficient practices for the resolution of water 
15 The receivers' ability on adopting the messages is high when the characteristics of the extension 
agents and the receivers are homogenous (Dahama 1982). 
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disputes among rural people. The understandings or agreements adopted during 
negotiation are long lasting and are not likely to reoccur once they are negotiated 
(Gulliver 1979). 
After a long process of considering alternatives from multiple perspectives, the 
negotiation process becomes an integrative situation of dispute settlement in which 
the disputants combine their resources and work toward a common goal. In such 
situations, all disputing parties have the opportunity to benefit either by compromise, 
where mutual concessions are sought in a situation where no one completely wins 
and no one completely loses, or by consensus, or solutions that meet the objectives 
required by all parties. It is also an opportunity for the group members, or at least a 
significant number of their representatives, to be the part of the dispute resolution 
process. Such processes ultimately achieve the group objectives and conform to 
group opinions, surrendering the individual differences of opinion. 
Any benefit to be gained from the dispute will be realized only if the dispute 
resolution process is carried out through the direct participation of the disputing 
parties. Many scholars who studied water disputes in the late '90s claimed that 
negotiated approaches are essential to allocate water equitably and efficiently in the 
face of emerging demands (Meinzen-Dick and Bruns 1997). 
The Use and Effectiveness of the Negotiating Process 
The negotiation process cannot be considered to be the best approach in all 
circumstances. However, it may be the most effective approach to dispute settlement 
in agricultural communities if a combination of factors come into play, as described 
below. 
The procedural property of negotiation: The procedural property of negotiation and 
bargaining is in itself an important factor in dispute resolution. When the negotiating 
process starts, negotiators try to develop a voluntary relationship with the disputing 
parties (Rubin and Brown 1975). Bargainers come together in an attempt to resolve 
their dispute not because they have to, but because they choose to. Each can make a 
variety of proposals/offers and counter offers, and each is free to leave the 
relationship or threaten it at any time. Each bargaining party is dependent upon the 
other for the quality of the outcome that each party expects. A division of the 
resource, after all, can be reached only by mutual consent. Even though negotiations 
can take place in the absence of a third party, the process becomes more effective if a 
third party is present to facilitate the negotiation process. 
Type of dispute: While disputes may range from simple hostility to social tension, 
and sometimes to homicide, the approaches to and the means of handling disputes 
also depend on the types of disputes being addressed. Gulliver (1979, 1969) insists 
that negotiation occurs in all kinds of disputes and in all societies regardless of the 
social relationships between the disputants, but cases like serious abuse, rape, suicide, 
and homicide are seldom managed through the negotiation processes. Since each 
society differs in terms of its norms, beliefs, and value systems, and thus their social 
and legal structures (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1985a, 1985b; Kramer and Messick 
1995; Thompson et al. 1995), the effectiveness of negotiation is not viewed in the 
same ways in all societies and in all types of the disputes (Merry 1982). 
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The leadership characteristics: Leaders of disputing parties that have strong will 
power, a commanding presence, and are able to be convincing, have strong positive 
mpacts on the resolution of irrigation disputes (Merry 1982). The will-power of the 
eaders to resolve a dispute is stronger when the leaders are convinced that the results 
pf the resolution have at least some positive consequences for them personally and 
:br their immediate extended family, neighbors, or friends (Gulliver 1979). 
| Disputes stand a good chance of being resolved through negotiation if the 
leadership of all disputing parties have practically equal influence among their 
subordinates. Success also stands a better chance if the leaders have more or less 
fcqual socio-economic status relative to the immediate locality of the disputants and 
kmong one another. The presence of the lineage leaders also influences whether a 
negotiation process is conducted in a reasonable and effective manner more than the 
presence of any others or the disputants themselves unless the leaders are insensitive 
to the importance of the dispute settlement (Colson 1995). Therefore, any attempts to 
settle a dispute through negotiation between the leaders of unequal status may 
negatively impact one of the disputing parties. 
Social relationships: Social relationships, social structures, and social networks play 
a vital role in the study of disputes (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1985a; Nader and Todd 
1978; Witty 1978). The social relationships between and among the disputing parties 
play a vital role in dispute processing and its outputs. The power of the leaders of the 
disputing parties in negotiating process becomes high if the leaders have strong social 
lies to their opponents and to their co-members or subordinates through heredity or 
other types of social relationships (Gulliver 1979; Merry 1982). A relationship, in the 
context of negotiation, involves a set of cognitive values that determines the focal 
negotiator's posture toward the other party (Greenhalgh and Chapman 1995). Such 
relationships might be due to heredity, family ties, fictive kinship, friendship 
obligations, peer group relationships, organizational affiliation, or, in the case of 
Thulotar, mitra saino*. 
Social relationships among the negotiators allow for a wide set of options and 
issues from that the actors can draw upon as bargaining tools (Polzer et al. 1995). 
Such relationships also influence disputing parties' preferences and expected benefits 
of outcomes. Because humans are social animals, economic interests at the cost of the 
Social relationships can rarely be afforded. Many of the negotiators work voluntarily 
in order to control the dispute situation before it becomes a community problem. The 
social nature of human beings facilitates the reaching of a common solution that is in 
the interests of both parties. However, some researchers have observed that 
individuals may rank disputed scarce resources higher than they rank their 
relationship with the members of the disputing party. In such circumstances, the 
disputants may also sacrifice their social relationships with their opponents in order to 
gain the exclusive use of the resource (Nader and Todd 1978). 
The social context: Social context is very important in negotiation (Kramer and 
Messick 1995). A social context may include negotiating parties, social knowledge 
and goals, social norms of the organizations, and communication mechanisms. The 
meaning of the social context of a disputing process includes both situational as well 
For detailed information about mitra saino, see "Social Relationships among Thulotar 
Members" later in Chapter 4. 
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as institutional/organizational factors within and around the immediate society of the 
disputants. Foremost among them are social, economic, and cultural factors. 
Primarily this includes socio-economic status, coping capacities, the proximity and 
timing of the disputants, and the dispute cases. In a legally pluralistic society, a 
number of social contexts are responsible for disputes. An effective resolution of the 
disputes in those societies is possible only through the participation of the disputing 
parties themselves. Negotiation is a tool that involves the participating parties. 
Power differences: Negotiation is usually conceptualized as a bilateral process that is 
particularly suitable for parties of relative equal strength. However, many disputes 
involve unequal parties in contexts of social and economic inequality. F. von Benda-
Beckmann once remarked (Personal communication May 1999): 
"Much of the literatures on negotiation, especially the one which promotes negotiation, is 
rather naive in its assumption about community, and the possibilities to have something like 
"equal" negotiating strength. It tends to forget differences in political, social and economic 
power; and that successful negotiation will usually tend to be more favorable to the more 
powerful. That is good for the maintenance of the powerful, but less for the powerless." 
The individual differences among bargainers in terms of their social 
characteristics (like caste, age, sex, education, economic standing and other factors 
governing social status) and differences in personality (like an aptitude for 
bargaining, inherent cooperativeness, authoritarianism, cognitive complexity, etc.) 
may selectively shape the course of bargaining (Rubin and Brown 1975). While there 
is no question about the effectiveness of negotiation between parties which are equal 
socio-economically, it is not an appropriate dispute resolution tool in other situations, 
especially when one of the parties is significantly weaker in its socio-economic status 
relative to that of the opponent. This problem is aggravated when leaders of unequal 
power represent the parties. A negotiation between two unequal leaders may lead to 
negative and socially unjust results for the weaker one. The dispute may be settled 
momentarily, but the humiliation may remain in the heart of the weaker one for 
longer and the disputes remain unresolved. One of the opponents in such cases may 
momentarily agree to an idea proposed by his/her opponent not because he/she likes 
it, but because the status relationship between the two has had greater influence than 
the leadership. Thus, while it is expected that the negotiation process might be 
beneficial to all disputing parties (Gulliver 1969), it may not be true in many of the 
social contexts; it all depends on the different social contexts that the disputing parties 
are facing. 
Mediation 
Strijbosch (1985) identified the two foremost advantages of dispute settlement by 
folk institutions (i.e., outside the courts). First, dispute cases are settled in proper time 
so that there is time to implement the decision in the real situation. Second, folk 
institutions are relatively cheaper alternatives because of time, space, and informality. 
The informality, accessibility, and familiarity are additional properties of traditional 
legal institutions in the rural areas (see also Meschievitz and Galanter 1982). Many 
authors also believe that farmers prefer to choose the informal rural institutions to 
settle disputes because such informal justice is mostly unofficial, non-coercive, non-
bureaucratic, decentralized, relatively undifferentiated, and nonprofessional. The 
substantive and procedural rules are flexible and particularistic. However, as none of 
the institutions have all of these characteristics (Abel 1982b), farmers must choose 
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one of the several available institutions which is best suited for their expected 
outcomes. 
Generally, mediators are respected and influential community members with 
experience and acknowledged expertise in settling disputes (Merry 1982). Such 
outputs are not always accounted for in terms of economic values. Mostly, the leaders 
gain very high social value from their active roles in dispute management. In 
mediation, almost all mediators are chosen because they have high prestige in the 
traditional structures. However, the choice of a particular one among several high-
class individuals may depend on the ethnicity, kinship, or other social ties with the 
disputants. Mediation would be an appropriate tool among equals (Rothenberger 
11978), but it is also common in intra-lineage disputes. 
The principle importance of dispute resolution by the WUA or the immediate 
Community lies in the contextual importance of the dispute. Since most water 
disputes are within or around the field of water rights issues, the way in which water 
rights issues addressed varies according to the social context. In other words, there 
are legally pluralistic situations in almost all farmer communities. In such situations, 
the understanding of water rights needs to be asserted by the local perspectives of 
those who use the water, their daily experiences, the ways in which they conceive of 
water and rights, and the options they have available for acquiring water and 
defending their access to the water resource. This job may not be easily and 
effectively carried out by any agencies other than the farmers' immediate 
pommunities like WUA, farmer leaders, and farmer's assemblies (Meinzen-Dick and 
Brans 1997). Generally, WUA members and farmer leaders have a proven ability to 
ponvince the disputants to take a compromised dispute settlement (MDC 1996). 
The usefulness of mediation also depends on the conditions under which it is 
applied (P. Caplan 1995). There are substantial differences in mediation processes 
practiced in the differentiated legal structures. Because of this, any studies in dispute 
management should not forget to consider the roles (positive as well as negative) the 
jnediators and mediating situations play in the outcome of the mediating process and 
its impacts, importance, and effectiveness on the future scenarios of the concerned 
societies. Therefore, not necessarily all mediated dispute settlements are resolved 
permanently. 
It is also very important to note that a mediated dispute settlement between 
unequal disputants mostly result in unequal outcomes (Merry 1982). In these 
situations, the characteristics of the mediators may play a very important negative 
role. Some mediators may lean toward one of the parties because they have closer 
social ties to the one than the other. A mediator who strongly identifies with his 
Igroup and its demands/proposals is more competitive than a mediator who identifies 
less with his group (Rubin and Brown 1975). 
It is the intention of mediators to work without bias toward either of the parties 
and to be cautious in the preservation of harmony and cooperation among the 
villagers (Gulliver 1969). Even so, the intangible impacts of their intention to settle 
the disputes in the village might impose the disputing party/parties to agree on the 
mediators' proposal even though it does not satisfy their claims (Koch 1978; Merry 
1982). Some of the main factors that enforce the acceptance of the mediator's 
iproposals include the threat of banishment (or ostracism), disclosing/reporting the 
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case to the public or public agencies, and fear of moral retribution. In such cases, the 
dispute settlement does not necessarily uphold the social norms (Merry 1982). 
However, in most community mediation processes, everyone present is freely 
allowed to argue, contradict, elaborate, and put forth tentative solutions, but some of 
the heavyweights among them may dominate many promising mediators. The weaker 
mediators lose in the majority of such cases (see also Canter 1978). 
There are also many cases of gender discrimination during public dispute 
settlement processes of villages. Women in many rural societies are either passive or 
required by their normative orders to be passive in comparison to the male 
participants (Rothenberger 1978). It is also disappointing that women rarely get the 
chance to participate in such a public arena. The claims of the rare female participants 
are hardly heard by the rest of the participants. In an irrigator's community, the elder 
male member of the household usually represents the household members in an 
irrigation system. Women are granted official membership in irrigation systems only 
if their husband is working far from the village or if they are widow and their male 
children are not yet of working age (see "Sex" in Annex-JJ). They cannot act as 
independent parties in disputes. 
Ethnicity or the caste system, driven by strong cultural or religious laws, is also 
an important factor in determining the nature of the dispute management process and 
its output. Caste systems are tied to social and residential networks. These networks 
may identify the so-called low caste members in an irrigators community and safely 
keep them out of sight in front of the so called higher caste members (see also Canter 
1978). 
As shown above, regardless of the timely, cheap, and easily accessible dispute 
settlement processes of folk institutions (L. Caplan 1995; Gulliver 1979), we can 
never say that they are always the best and operate perfectly (Strijbosch 1985). 
Although the resolutions do contribute to folk laws, they cannot immediately be 
included in the national legal codes because of their varied utility and reference to 
several contextual situations. It is also not guaranteed that the folk judging systems 
are always fair and accessible (Merry 1982); mediators are not always unbiased. 
Sometimes dominant village leaders, landlords, or higher class/caste leaders may not 
agree to mediate the disputes between the low class/caste families. Even if the request 
of the lower class parties is accepted, the higher class leaders may not become closely 
involved on that person's behalf, but may act instead to settle the dispute for the sake 
of village peace and harmony (Rothenberger 1978). Since mediators are usually 
powerful and influential, they mostly think that the disputants' noncompliance to 
their settlement proposal may challenge their own dignity and prestige in the 
village37. 
Although the mediators lack the de-jure authority to impose a judgment, they are 
mostly able to exercise their de facto authority through their influence38. Merry 
(1982) believes that dispute settlements in rural communities are sometimes backed 
by coercion39. In many cases, the key mediators as well as the community itself exert 
See also Abel 1982a, 1982b; Santos 1982. 
See Ortrom 1992, 1990. 
Although it would be the rare case, just how serious the coercion applied by the community 
leaders is exemplified here by one of the wood-stealing cases in a rural village of Nepal few years 
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pressure on the disputing parties to settle the case as soon as possible before it 
threatens the amicable harmony between the villagers. Although the disputants in 
s|uch cases may agree on the leaders' solutions momentarily, the dispute in any real 
sense has not yet been settled and the chances of recurrence are always high (L. 
Caplan 1995). 
Arbitration and Adjudication 
tjJnlike disputants in multiplex relationships, disputants in simplex relationships 
mostly rely on adjudication that leads to a win-or-Iose situation (Nader and Todd 
1978). If the dispute is over scarce resources, disputants in multiplex relationships 
may also sacrifice their social relationships in order to gain resources, so they may 
choose one of the alternatives to adjudication. In the third circumstance, if the 
negotiation becomes unsuccessful, either party may seek adjudication (Gullive 1979). 
The adjudication process involves a third party to act as adjudicator. The adjudicator 
dan be an individual or be the formal or informal representative of an institution. Both 
parties express their reasoning behind their stand in the presence of the adjudicator, 
vpo ultimately grants a decision to be followed by both parties. The adjudicators use 
nprms (of any type) as a reference point when making such decisions. These 
adjudication strategies are quite common in all societies with the courts functioning 
ds the major adjudicating bodies. There are also several local, regional, and central 
administrative bodies besides the courts that are frequently involved in dispute 
management processes40. However, water disputes resolved in any of the external 
institutions ultimately end up in the village to be implemented. Not even the handling 
of a case by the supreme national litigating institutions necessarily guarantees 
compliance by the respective disputing parties (Pradhan and Pradhan 1997) '. 
Opting out or doing nothing 
Opting out may not count as one of the commonly practiced dispute resolution 
processes, but it certainly is one of the main ways some grievances are managed, 
particularly in rural agrarian societies. It is also one of the ways the weaker segments 
of society escape involvement in a long and costly dispute management process. In 
many cases, farmers with grievances may not see the rationale of adopting any of the 
dispute resolution processes described in the preceding parts of this chapter. They 
rationalize not getting involved in any dispute processes because they view the social 
ahd/or economic cost of dispute resolution by any processes as potentially more 
expensive than doing nothing. Thus, the grievances remain unclaimed. The situation 
of opting out of any of the dispute management practices is more common in 
societies where strongly patterned caste, sex, age, or religious norms are found. These 
norms are stronger in rural agrarian societies than in other societies. Thus, the rural 
poor and lower caste, women, children and tenants may choose this method of self-
help over any other form of dispute management. 
back. In this case, the suspects were presented at a public meeting in the village and seriously 
beaten several times until they conceded that they had stolen the wood. After accepting, they also 
had to pay a heavy fine to be collected for the public fund. Non-compliance to the solution would 
mean more serious consequences. It was a pity that few poor and lower caste villagers had to 
comply with whatever sanctions were proposed by rest of the community. 
See also Fitzpatrick 1985. 
See also Canter 1978. 
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The Significance of Dispute Settlement 
Dispute resolution is conceptualized in this book as a process rather than a decision or 
verdict. The decision or verdict on a dispute case does not necessarily end the dispute 
process (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1985). Once a final decision has been made, the 
disputing parties think about what to do (or not to do) next. The events occurring in 
the period following the decision generally do not necessarily follow the specific 
directions contained in the final decision, whether it is a courts' judgment or an 
mediated agreement. Other factors may come to bear on whether the involved parties 
behave in accordance with the decision, while the fact that a decision is not adhered 
to does not necessarily mean that it is without social significance. The latter event, 
however, depends on who loses and who gains. In some cases, the irrigation dispute 
might also have political connotations and both disputing parties have supporters. The 
linkages between the disputing parties and their supporters may go beyond their 
political affiliation and many social and economic factors may affect the post-trial 
behavior of the disputing parties. A loser with a large number of supporters and a 
high and well-off socio-economic status may choose to knock on the door of yet 
another institution in an attempt to convert the decision in his favor. Generally, such 
institutions are the higher level institutions on the ladder of their organizational 
structures. Not all losers, however, can carry on the lengthy and costly dispute 
process. They may try to negotiate with their opponents and come to modified 
versions of the original decisions. 
How the disputing parties react to the decisions or verdicts may also depend on 
how long it took the dispute process to result in the decision? It is possible that many 
changes in the socio-economic structures of their immediate societies occurred since 
the original decision if it took a long to decide. Social relations between the disputing 
parties might even have improved because of changes and adjustments made in the 
course of their social life. Even if both parties want to settle the dispute after the 
verdict is made, they may not necessarily follow the same decisions made by the 
dispute management agency. The real settlement of the dispute occurs through a 
process of post-trial negotiation in the arena where the dispute case originated. 
In many of the cases, decisions are given without even identifying or knowing 
the root cause or causes of the dispute. The real problem that caused the dispute to 
arise may not have dealt with at all. Thus, although a certain decision has been given, 
either one or all of the disputing parties may not have been satisfied to accept the 
decision. In such situations, the dispute may have been settled for the time being due 
to various social and contextual factors, but the real problem remains unresolved. In 
such cases, the dispute management process becomes in vain. Disputes undergo a 
post-decision transformation in a semi-autonomous social field like a farmer's water 
users association (WUA). Even disputes settled by the WUA itself are occasionally 
rejected and filed in court (Malla and Khadka 1997). Therefore, finding the cause of 
the dispute is more important than what happened during the dispute process. 
Shopping for Dispute Resolution 
The discussions presented in the earlier chapters show that there are multiple 
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institutions and agencies for dispute management in virtually all societies. The 
disputing parties may choose those among them that would be expected to be the 
most useful to the disputant who seeks it. This strategic behavior of selecting the 
institution with the most favorable legal system is referred tb as "forum shopping" 
(K. von Benda-Beckmann 1984). Sometimes it is these institutions that may pay 
attention to dispute cases and not the farmers. In such situations, the institutions that 
handle disputes may win social or the economic benefits. Forums with such behavior 
are known as "shopping forums" (see also Pradhan and Pradhan 1996; K. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1984). Such phenomena, however, go unnoticed in many cases, 
even though they are very important in maintaining law and order in every society as 
well as for the change and development of every society. 
the Supremacy of the Rule of Law and Alternative Approaches 
The de-jure meaning of the "rule of law" may indicate a social order maintained in 
accordance to the state laws and in which all state agencies are subject to law. But, as 
I have presented in the second page of Chapter 2, "law" in this book does not 
necessarily include only state laws; there are also other types of laws in agrarian 
Communities. Social scientists may call them customary laws and local laws. In other 
words, these are also the normative orders in the farmers' communities. The 
recognition of prior rights, rights for prior investors, or the riparian rights exercised 
Í>y the traditional rural dispute management institutions are examples of how farmers 
have also recognized the official state laws. On the other hand, state laws have also 
never completely disregarded the community norms; rather, they have recognized 
Jnany of them and included them in the national codes (Pradhan 2000; Khadka 1997; 
p. Caplan 1995; Pradhan 1994). Such intermixing of the customary laws, state laws, 
£nd local laws is found in virtually all rural societies where farmer irrigator 
Communities (WUA) operate. In this chapter I have asserted that whatever practices 
are followed in the management of water disputes in rural societies, one way or 
another, all institutions mostly follow the rules of law of the society. 
Given the nature of these dispute management contexts, my research focuses 
primarily on finding out whether Thulotar farmers faced any irrigation disputes. In 
cases where disputes did exist, I was interested in the nature of the disputes, 
^specially whether there were disputes between Thulotar and any of its neighboring 
irrigation systems, or between the farmers of Thulotar Kulo. I also gave primary 
importance to discovering the causes of irrigation disputes and the nature of the 
disputing parties involved in the internal water disputes within Thulotar Kulo. The 
next step was to find out how disputes in Thulotar Kulo were managed, resolved, or 
hot resolved. In addition to finding out the processes and mechanisms of dispute 
management, I strove to give the explanations of why the disputing parties choose the 
particular means for dispute resolution, and why they chose the opting out route over 
other dispute resolution processes. I was also interested in knowing what factors 
inspired or compelled farmers to choose or listen to certain institutions, agencies or 
individuals over others for dispute resolution. 
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Fig. 2 Map of Egharhasayatar Kulo showing Egharhasayatar, Rupakot village 
and forest areas. 
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CHAPTER3 
SOCIO-LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF LAND AND WATER 
MANAGEMENT IN NEPAL 
the general socio-economic environment of Nepal affects domestic socio-legal 
dimensions of land and water management. This chapter begins with a general 
description of the country's geo-political conditions, its caste systems, and the 
impacts these systems have on socio-cultural development. Considering that access 
to irrigation water is tied to access to land in Nepal, it is necessary to look at how land 
ownership and land management systems are defined and practiced before water 
rights and irrigation management are discussed. After a brief examination of those 
issues, I shall present a brief historical account of irrigation development and 
management in Nepal. This will be followed by a description of contemporary 
provisions and practices at both state and farmer levels. The last part of this chapter 
covers dispute management institutions and farmer practices, as well as quasi-judicial 
and judicial state agencies in Nepal. 
Geo-Political Position of Nepal 
Nepal is a mountainous, developing kingdom in South Asia, between latitudes 26° 
22" to 30° 27" north and longitudes 80° 4" to 88° 12" east. This small Himalayan 
kjingdom is landlocked between two giants, China to the north and India to the south, 
east, and west. Elevations range from about 70 m (in the southern plains) to 8,848 m 
(Mount Everest). There are four distinct climatic zones comprised of alpine, 
temperate, sub-tropical and tropical, from north to south, respectively. Similarly from 
north to south, there are also five different geographical zones: the Himalayas, 
Mountains, Hills, Inner-Terai42 and Terai. The Mountain and Hill regions together 
comprise about 86 percent of Nepal's total 147,480 square kilometers 3 . For political 
apd administrative purposes, Nepal is divided into five Development Regions, 14 
2tones, 75 Districts, and more than 4000 Village Development Committees (VDC, 
Qaun Bikas Samiti) and municipalities (Nagarpalika). Since the boundaries of the 
development regions stretch from north to south, they all include almost all climatic 
apd ecological zones. Nepal has been bestowed with dozens of snow-fed rivers 
originating from the high Himalayan Mountains in the Hindu Kush region. These 
rivers are perennial sources of the country's vast water resources. Nepal's water 
resources are the second richest in the world after Brazil. So far, only about 32 
percent of the total cultivated land44 is under irrigated agriculture, however. 
Inner-Terai consists of the relatively plain inner valleys close to the foothills and Terai represent 
the outer plains towards the southern belt along the Indian border, 
i See also Parajuli 1999; CBS 1998a; K. von Benda-Beckmann et. al. 1997, and Shukla and Sharma 
1994. 
' Only about 20 percent of the total geographical land is under cultivation. More than 90 percent of 
the total cultivated land is in the mountains or hills. 
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Political History of Nepal: A Quick Glance 
Land is one of the most important natural resources of Nepal. The patterns of land 
ownership in Nepal have been shaped by the patterns of state governance. To develop 
a better understanding of the historical development of land ownership patterns in 
Nepal, I will present a brief history of governance in Nepal. As the topic of this study 
is not the political history of Nepal, I shall only briefly present it here and in other 
sections of this book whenever it is necessary. 
Nepal was ruled by many principalities (known as Rajya45) before 1768 (1825 B. 
S.), at which time Great King Prithvi Narayan Shah ultimately united Nepal into a 
single kingdom. Prior to this unification, Nepal consisted of many small kingdoms 
ruled by many generations of the Kirat (before 464), Lichhavi (464-782), Malla (782-
1768), and Shah dynasties (Khadka 1997)46. Malla Rajas47 ruled Kathmandu valley 
and the rest of Eastern Nepal for several years, while Shah Rajas simultaneously 
ruled western Nepal. The Shah dynasty moved from Gorkha to Kathmandu in 1768 to 
rule the united Nepal. Although kings were the absolute monarchs, they always 
seemed to be concerned with their people and kingdom, and therefore were accepted 
by the people of Nepal as the unquestionable leaders of the nation. Jung Bahadur 
Kunwar (later known as Jung Bahadur Rana), however, was able to seize power in 
1846 through a surprise coup d'etat, now known as the KotparbaA%. Before the coup, 
Jung Bahadur was the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the army. 
Although he maintained the kingship as a symbol of unity, he usurped all authority of 
the state and declared himself the Prime Minister of Nepal for the rest of his life. The 
Rana dynasty ruled the country through succeeding Prime Ministers until 1950, when 
it was overthrown by a popular people's movement. It was an absolute autocratic 
family rule for 104 years. Rana, one of the family names, is still common in Nepal. 
By 1856, Jung Bahadur was able to confer a Royal Charter from King Surendra Bir 
Bikram Shah that limited the right of succession to the Prime Ministership, which 
was to be for life, to the senior most members in each generation of the Rana family, 
that is, of the families of Jung Bahadur and his six brothers (Regmi 1988). The post 
of Prime Minister was consequently rotated among the brothers and sons of the Rana 
Prime Ministers. Nepal was then a feudal state during the Rana regime. Rana Prime 
Ministers used to keep influential farmer leaders49 in the countryside happy in order 
to maintain their rule. Rana rulers were known as the most unpopular dictators in the 
Kingdom. Most people could not present their grievances in front of the Ranas and 
their ruling partners, and their local representatives could almost do whatever they 
Several small and scattered kingdoms. 
The history of the present Shah Dynasty in Nepal comes through Lamjung, from which they 
moved to Gorkha. Before Gorkha was concurred by one of the brothers of the King of Lamjung, 
it was ruled by Ghale Raja (Raja means king). Thus, there might be other dynasties like Ghale in 
addition to these four dynasties. See also Geller et al. 1997; Khadka 1997. 
Malla kings; in this case, kings of the divided principalities. 
Jung Bahadur Kunwar killed or arrested many members of royal family and other loyalists of the 
palace during a royal address in the courtyard of the Royal Palace through a surprise movement 
and declared himself Prime Minister of Nepal. Since he became the Prime Minister through war 
(known as "Rana" in Nepali), he also changed his title from "Kunwar" (Chhetry) to "Rana" 
(Thakuri). Some writers also believe that Jung Bahadur intended to upgrade his title to "Rana" 
because Rana is one of the titles of Thakuri, the ruling class, See also Gellner et al. 1997. Shah, 
Malla, Shahi, and Rana are the common families under the broad title of Thakuri. 
The landowning elite who are commonly known as Jiminaar, Jimidar, Jimdar or Jamindar. 
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Ranted as long as their masters in Kathmandu satisfied. Kings of the Shah dynasty at 
this point were regarded as the supreme head of the country but had no ruling power. 
They rarely had opportunities to interact with the people of their own country50. 
The Rana regime was overthrown by popular revolt in 1950 after the liberation of 
India in 1945. Several transitional governments ruled for another eight years before 
the first democratically elected government was institutionalized in 1958 under a 
rtiulti-party democratic system. This was dissolved in 1960 with the introduction of 
the one party Panchayat system through an unpopular move by King Mahendra Bir 
Bikram Shah Dev. However, a very popular people's movement was able to 
reintroduce the multiparty democratic system once again in 199051. 
Brahman-Dominated Cultural and Educational Dimensions: A 
Historical Legacy of Hindu Ideology52 
Up to 1950, the Rana rulers of Nepal were against educating its people for the fear of 
an uprising or people's movement against their rule. During this period, there were 
very few secondary schools accessible to the public in Kathmandu. A few elementary 
schools were established outside Kathmandu Valley. For the most part, the children 
of the rulers (Rana family), their civil servants (bhardars53) and a few Brahmans had 
relatively better access to the limited schools in the capital. 
The caste system has probably been invented by the dominant class over 
thousands of years. Some of the literature shows that, in the beginning, only three 
caste categories existed: Brahman, Chhetry, and Baisya. These castes were assigned 
special responsibilities in the kingdoms. The principle responsibility of Brahman 
families was to play the role of guru (teacher, pandit, puroh.it or priest). This is how 
Brahmans came to be in the highest ranked position in every Hindu society. The main 
responsibility of Chhetry (or Chhetriya) was to rule the kingdom and protect it from 
invaders (i.e., government and security). Thus, in most Hindu societies, even now, 
kings are from Chhetry (or Thakuri, which broadly falls under Chhetry) families. 
Historically, almost all warrior heroes of Nepal have been Chhetry. Many Chhetry 
men are still working in Nepalese, Indian, and British military services. Baisya 
became involved in commercial activities to manage and supply food and other 
necessary things to the palace and its civil servants, military men, and the people. 
According to ancient history, there were frequent wars between the many small 
kingdoms. Every society had the strong belief that Brahmans should not be killed. 
The killing of Brahmans was believed be equal to the killing of cows, which is the 
most sacred animal in Hindu societies. It is possible that, as a result, the Brahman 
community was spared in many of the wars between kingdoms. Thousands of years 
after the caste and class systems were first introduced, some of the dominant 
Brahmans reclassified the caste and class systems among themselves, which led to 
ttie provision of a forth category, the Sudra. Keeping the role of the upper three castes 
;° See also Regmi 1988. 
5 1 See also Gellner et al. 1997. 
f See also Gellner et al. 1997. 
| 3 The civil servants of the Rana palaces. 
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the same, the Sudra were assigned the four major services for mankind, such as 
tailoring (working with clothing), shoe making (or working with skins) and smiths (or 
working with iron and ornaments). Thus, Damai, Sarki, Kami, and Sunars were called 
occupational castes. Since they were seen and also behaved as the lower and weakest 
caste, they were commonly grouped as the schedule castes, the so-called 
untouchables. Thus history shows that Brdhmans were always dominant - socially 
and culturally. Since they have been the most favored caste from ancient times and 
their main role was to work as Guru or teacher, it is not surprising that the Brahman 
are better educated than the other groups in Hindu societies. 
The socio-economic status of rural farmers is very important in every aspect of the 
farmer's life. Relatively higher-class farmers are considered to be the farmer leaders 
for the implementation of local laws based on the norms and traditions of the 
localities and cultural groups. Many factors determine the type of social status an 
individual farmer has in his/her locality. 
The Caste Systems in Contemporary Nepal 
Nepal is the only constitutional Hindu country in the world. Similar to the ancient 
caste systems in Hindu communities, castes are usually classified into four 
categories- Brahman, Chhetry, Baisya, and Sudra, expressed in order of superiority, 
respectively, in contemporary Nepal. The Great King Prithbvi Narayan Shah54 of 
Nepal in the 18 th century said: "Nepal is a common garden of four Jat and 36 Barna " 
55'. These four castes and many tribes are still living together in different regions of 
Nepal. There are no outright social problems due to the existence of multi-caste 
groups. Nepal is also the common garden of a multi-ethnic population. People enjoy 
diverse lifestyles, even in the countryside. 
Brahman: Both vertical and horizontal status differences exists for Brahman families 
in Nepal as a consequence of their place from early settlement (immigration) in Nepal 
and the types of marriage systems they practiced. Most of the Brahman families in 
the Hills of Nepal immigrated from across the western borders of Nepal in ancient 
times56, while the rate of internal migration continued even during and after the 
unification of Nepal in the second half of the 18 th century. A group of Brahmans 
eventually continued to the eastern border of Nepal, but most migrants settled near 
the western border in the Kumaun area. As a result, the migrants who settled in the 
Kumaun area are commonly known as Kumai. Kumai Brahmans perceive themselves 
as the most superior families among Brahmans. Other people of Nepal have a general 
perception that the Kumai Brahmans are very clever and that they can dominate all 
other people in Nepal. The Brahman immigrants who came into Nepal from the west 
but later settled in the east57 are called Poorbia. 
5 4 The King of Gorkha, and the first king, and the founding father of united Nepal. 
55 Jat means four major caste categories- Brahman or Bahun, Chhetry or Chhetria, Baisya, and 
Sudra, while Barna means different family groups or tribes in one Jat. See also Gellner et al. 
1997, where it is incorrectly presented the other way around as four Barna and thirty-six Jat. 
5 6 See also Gellner et al. 1997. 
5 7 The Nepali word for east is poorba. Later, regardless of their ancestors, many migrants slowly moved 
to the eastern mountains from the early settlements in the western mountains. 
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There are also two classes among Brahmans, classified according to their types 
Of marriage systems. Those Brahmans who follow the traditionally prescribed 
cultural practices for marrying Brahman girls are called Upadhyaya Brahmans, while 
those who married Brahman girls without observing the prescribed practices were 
called Jaisi Brahmans. Traditionally, the hierarchical status of Jaisi Brahmans ranks 
second after Upadhyaya Brahmans. Only Upadhyaya Brahmans can work as pandit 
(religious leaders, priests). Jaisi Brahmans have no such opportunities available to 
them. However, Poorbia Brahmans also perceive themselves to superior to Kumai 
Brahmans. In practice, however, Kumais are seen as being socially dominant over all 
Other types of people in Nepal. 
In Nepal, children generally inherit the title of their father, but the progeny of all 
types of Brahmans who marry girls from other castes have to adopt the title of the 
Jower caste of the girls they marry. If the girls come from so-called untouchable 
Scheduled castes, all progeny of such combinations follow the caste of their mother, 
ffowever, the children of girls from castes other than those categorized as 
jintouchable are called Chhetry. Adhikari, Poudel or Poudyal, Mishra, Tiwari, Pandit, 
Koirala, Neupane, and many other families are examples of Poorbia Brahman. 
Similarly, Joshi, Gauli, Bista, Sedain, and so on fall under Kumai Brahman. Many 
family names like Mishra, Tripathi, and a few others are common in both categories, 
however. 
fchhetry: Since marriage system is also one of the ways to acquire the Chhetry caste, 
all types of Brahman sur names are also common in Chhetry communities. However, 
there are some names in the Chhetry category, which are not found among 
Brahmans. Some common examples of such Chhetry families58 are Kunwar, Bohara, 
Raut, Basnet, or Basnyat. Racially, both Brahman and Chhetry are Indo-Aryans. 
Baisya: All other surnames (except Brahman and Chhetry), included into so-called 
touchable, are in the Baisya group. They come from Indo-Aryan stock like Bhujel, or 
Indo-Burmans like Newars, Mongolians like Gurungs, or Magars. There are also 
separate caste and family structures within Newars and many Mongolian groups, 
however59, and there are also vertically ranked caste groups in Newar communities. 
fin 
Sudra: All surnames categorized as so-called untouchable fall under Sudra. These 
Represent the most common occupational (artisan) castes in rural Nepal, such as 
pamai (tailors), Kami (blacksmiths), Sunar (goldsmiths), and Sarki (shoemakers). In 
the modem form, Damai are written as Darjii, Kami as Bishokarma or B. K., Sunar as 
Swornakar or Subarnakar (or Bishokarma or B. K.), and Sarki as Nepali in official 
: Although Thakuri (traditional and present royal families) perceive themselves as having higher 
social ranks than any other Chhetry families; in the broad four caste categories, they also fall in 
the Chhetry category. Shah, Malla, Singh, Shahi, etc., are some of the examples of such 
families. Kunwar families also prefer to be referred to as the traditional royal families. This is 
because all Rana families who ruled Nepal for about 104 years before 1950 were the 
descendants of Kunwar families. The first Prime Minister of this family, Mr. Jung Bahadur 
Kunwar, changed his title from Kunwar to Rana. After that the ruler families of Kunwar were 
called Rana. Many of them also write "JBR" (after the name of their first PM) instead of 
writing simply Rana. 
f See also Gellner et al. 1997. 
f° See also Pradhan et al. 2000; Gellner et al. 1997; Gray 1995. 
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language. These are the scheduled castes in Nepal. 
Land Management Systems in Nepal: Historical and Contemporary 
Practices 
The available historical information and contemporary sources on land management 
systems in Nepal suggest that the Nepalese system of land ownership and tenancy 
rights arrangements are unique. Many types of land ownership have existed in Nepal. 
These are known as jagera, kipat, birta, rajya, jagir, raiker, guthi, samudaik, and 
parti (see also Regmi 1988). 
Types of Land Ownership 
Jagera land: During the early history of Nepal, all private and taxable land were 
called jagera land. Jagera land was one of the major land categories during the rule 
of the early small principalities as well as during the Rana dynasty. With some 
exceptions, the state (or the rulers) never re-confiscated this land from the individual 
landowners, while birta, jagir and guthi lands were always liable to be converted to 
jagera land whenever the state or rulers wished to do so. But jagera lands were not 
necessarily always private lands. During the first quarter of the 19th century, a 
significant portion of birta land was confiscated by the state and used as state-owned 
jagera land. Later, such land was distributed to the army under the jagir system. Rana 
Prime Ministers used the state jagera land to compensate the dispossessed birta 
owners through the allotment of taxable jagera lands. This was how a small section 
of jagera land reverted back to birta land in a contraction of the state's fiscal 
jurisdiction. All land that was previously jagera land is now known as raiker land. 
Kipat land: Most of the ethnic communities in Nepal emigrated from India to escape 
violent Hindu-Muslim riots, which were mainly directed against Hindu citizens. 
Therefore, most of the emigrants to Nepal were Hindus with Kirat communities 
(Limbu, Rai, etc.) among them. Although the Limbus are known as strong warriors in 
modern Nepal, they originally immigrated to Nepal as religious refugees. The state of 
Nepal welcomed the Kirat communities and settled them in the eastern Hills. The 
land, which was given to Kirat was called kipat land. None of the owners of natural 
resources under the kipat system (including land) had to pay tribute or land tax to the 
state for their natural resources. All resources belonged to the community under 
customary law (Regmi 1988). The fiscal jurisdiction over kipat areas was limited to 
the sovereign power of taxation over individual households by the chieftain or 
headman. Later, this zone in the Eastern Hills was known as the Kirat zone (or 
Limbuwan region) where Kirat communities developed their own systems of 
jurisdiction. Even after the unification of Nepal in 1768, King Prithvi Narayan Shah 
authorized the continuation of the kipat system (Acharya 1989). The rulers at that 
time did not want to discontinue the kipat system and change kipat lands to raiker 
lands because the government had not the sufficient personnel, local knowledge, or 
administrative capabilities to deal with the diverse languages, religions, and local 
socio-economic organizations in the Kirat zone. Later, the Nepalese rulers were 
interested in keeping the Kirat people content by continuing their kipat system in 
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qrder to discourage them from taking sides with China during the 1791-1793 Nepal-
(jlhina war. However, government intervention in the kipat system was influenced by 
periodic land reform acts, especially after the promulgation of Muluki Ain (the 
national legal code) in 1853. By 1961, all kipat lands were converted to raiker land 
(private land). 
Birta land: Birta lands were tax-free lands granted to members of the royal family 
and civil servants as a favor in appreciation of their service (Regmi 1988). Such land 
could be agricultural land, a forest, or a village (mauja61). In earlier time, it was also 
fine of the common practices for establishing new settlements in the Terai belt of 
Nepal. The holders of birta did not have to pay land tax to the state. In rare cases, 
some of them paid taxes at about half the rate of raiker land. The rights to birta also 
sometimes included the rights to use free labor62 as well as rights to tax-free use of 
specified public lands. Birta owners usually had full rights to administer their land, 
but such land could also be taken back by the state (FNF 1988a). Birta is one of the 
oldest land management systems in Nepal, dating back as far as the time of small 
principalities. During the Rana regime (1846 to 1950), however, the Rana rulers 
exploited this system to allocate a larger portion of land resources to themselves, their 
family members and their supporters and civil servants (bhai-bhardars63). This was 
done in exchange for their support and services that kept the Rana regime in power. 
Although there were no economic incentives for the state to maintain this system, the 
Holders of birta lands were expected to support the rulers in their actions. However, 
there is evidence that, as early as 1805, both registered and unregistered birta lands 
were confiscated and converted into jagera lands (Regmi 1988). Included in the 
confiscated land were parcels with defective titles originally allotted by previous 
principalities and annexed into the Kingdom of Gorkha in different wars between 
Gorkha and other principalities. Between 1805-1806 alone, about 10,000 hectares 
(800,000 matomuriM) of rice land were confiscated in the hill region and assigned to 
the army as taxable jagir land. Rather than converting birta lands into the national 
treasury, the Rana rulers accelerated the distribution of birta land and doubled its area 
by the end of the 19th century. Currently, all birta lands have been registered as 
private lands (raiker lands). 
Rajya land: The Nepali translation of rajya is "state", but it mainly means 
''principality" (Regmi 1988). Even after Nepal was unified, some descendants of the 
previous king (Raja) in the western regions were granted authority to continue as 
king in their principalities (rajya65). Such "kings" were entitled to collect and 
A mauja is a collectivity of more than one village. Mauja is almost similar to later Village 
Panchayat or Village Development Committee. 
6 2 Such labor exploitation of the holders of birta land was also known as jhara. Under the jhara 
system at that time, people had to work for Birta-holder or for the government or its agencies or 
the relatives of the Rana rulers without compensation. A birta-holder was commonly known as 
birtawal. . However, it does not match the present meaning of jhara as the annual cleaning of 
canals in the case of FMIS. See also Regmi 1988. 
I3 Bhai-Bhardars: bhardars is a Nepali term used to denote civil servants while bhai means 
"brothers". However, in this case, bhai was applicable mostly for the relatives of the Rana 
rulers). 
f During that period, the system of land measurement by hectare had not yet been introduced to 
Nepal.The dominant system of land measurement was mato muri, representing the estimated 
amount of soil from the surface. The depth of surface included for measurement was a plow-
layer. Approximately, 80 mato muri are equivalent to one hectare. 1 matomuri = 1/80 hectare. 
6 5 The land under the jurisdiction of one Raja (autonomous principalities). See also Regmi 1988. 
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appropriate revenues from almost all sources in the territories under their jurisdiction. 
One of the major sources of their revenues was the land tax. The rulers of Nepal also 
wanted to maintain the institution of rajya so that the people under their jurisdiction 
would not stand against them and they would continue getting economic benefits 
from such rajya. The government of Nepal in Kathmandu also received an annual 
monetary tribute from each of the principalities. 
The institution of rajya no longer exists in modern Nepal. Some of the states 
(present districts) in the north Western Hills (Mustang) and in the far Western Hills 
(Bajura, Bajhang and Jajarkot) were ruled by relatives of Rana rulers during the Rana 
regime. However, such states were not independent like the previous principalities 
(Regmi 1988). Similarly, Jung Bahadur, the first Rana Prime Minister of Nepal 
(1846-1856 and 1857-1877), was Maharaja66 in the areas now known as Lamjung 
and Kaski (present administrative districts in the Western Hills of Nepal) from 1856 
until his death in early 1877. His domain stretched from the Chepe River in the east 
to the Kaligandaki River in the west. The institution of Maharaja was included in a 
Royal Charter granted to Jung Bahadur by Surendra Bikram Shah, king of Nepal at 
that time. Under the Royal Charter of Mahajara, Jung Bahadur was empowered to 
appropriate revenues from all available resources within his jurisdiction, including the 
lands. 
Jagir land: In the 19* century, the state paid emoluments to its employees and 
functionaries either partly or wholly through assignments of taxable lands and 
villages rather than through payments in cash (Regmi 1988). Jagir was a type of land 
assigned to civil servants and military persons usually in lieu of a salary rather than to 
the elite members of the ruling class. In exchange for jagir, the jagirdar (who was 
assigned to jagir lands) was asked to collect land taxes from its cultivators. In this 
case, it was not the land as such that was assigned to the subjects, but it was the rights 
to collect the land taxes from the general public on the specified area of land. This 
could be a small area or a whole village (or mauja). 
Unlike birta lands, the jagirdar could not occupy the jagir lands permanently. 
Moreover, jagir rights lapsed at the will of the government or when the jagirdar's 
employment ceased. The birta system was an older economic institution than the 
kipat system (popular before the unification of Nepal and during pre-Rana period). 
However, rajya, birta, and jagir systems were also overwhelmingly exploited by the 
Rana rulers (Regmi 1988). The total land area under tax-free systems was about 
double at the end of the 19th century of what it had been at the beginning of the Rana 
regime (1846). These days, however, all types of such tax-free lands have already 
been converted to raiker lands. 
Raiker land: In contemporay Nepal, raiker is the most common type of land 
ownership, it's use spanning the period from traditional times to contemporary Nepal 
(FNF 1988a). Although the ultimate ownership of raiker land is also vested in the 
kingdom of Nepal (because land is a natural resource), in most respects it is defined 
and treated as private land ownership. The owners of such lands have the rights to 
Meaning greater and more powerful than Raja, who is the head of only one principality. 
Beginning in this period, the kings of Nepal (united Nepal at Kathmandu) were called 
Maharajadhiraja (meaning greater than Maharaja, who were the kings of only a few 
principalities but not all of Nepal). 
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use, control, and alienate the land. Landowners have to secure their ownership rights, 
however, by paying a land tax to the local government each year. Irregularities in 
payment result in penalties that are paid as fees. If the penalties remain unpaid, the 
government may confiscate the land and auction it. The land taxes levied against the 
farmers in Nepal are very small, however. As a result, cases of the government 
auctioning off land because of the farmers' inability to pay the land tax are virtually 
unheard of. Because of the status of raiker land in Nepal, raiker landholders are 
tenants of the state. 
Raiker land was also one of the dominant land ownership patterns in ancient Nepal 
| when it was administered under small principalities. Raiker land owners were mostly 
farmers or majority people of the principalities. Some of the military officers, civil 
servants, politicians, and relatives of the palace and Prime Ministers also had access 
to other types of land ownership patterns such as rajya, kipat, birta, or jagir lands. 
; Currently, all lands which were granted under the title of rajya, kipat, birta or jagir 
i lands have been converted into raiker lands and registered under private tides. There 
I are no longer any provisions for granting land from the state or its rulers to any 
i citizen under those titles. Now the state may distribute land under its jurisdiction to 
the settlers who could be landless or victims of natural calamities under the state's 
resettlement programs. Such lands are registered as raiker land for individuals, 
mostly household heads. 
Guthi land: Guthi are government land grants to religious, charitable, or 
philanthropic institutions (Regmi 1988). These include temples, schools, pilgrimage 
rest houses (pati-pauwa) or monasteries. Income generated from guthi lands is used 
ito maintain the institutions or their properties. There are still many functioning guthi 
lands in Nepal, which are cared for by religious trusts or the guthi corporation (a 
semi-governmental public organization known as Guthi Sansthari). Some parts of 
previous guthi lands have been converted into the private property of the tenants 
(mohis) or their descendants. These are people who have earned their livelihood on 
the land for several years. Their access to the land as the tenants is protected by 
different tenants' rights protection acts and strengthened by different land reform acts 
of the Kingdom of Nepal during the second half of the twentieth century, such as the 
|Land Reform Act of 1964 and the Land Act of 1957 (FNF 1988b). However, there 
jremains a significant amount of land still administered by religious agencies and the 
guthi corporation. Lands once assigned to a guthi were never subject to confiscation 
!by the state. Therefore, unlike the government's land grants, some individual large 
landowners also granted part of their land to religious trusts. In such cases, the 
individual grantees could also use part of the income generated by the land if there 
|was any money left over after maintenance costs were paid. 
Samudaik land: These lands are under the jurisdiction of local governments (like 
;VDC) or some defined institution or jurisdiction. In practice, these are also 
government lands used and controlled by a community or a public organization (i.e. 
:Communal lands like communal pastures, community forests, etc.). Such lands are 
subject to restricted access rules. In many cases, this restricted access includes 
defined use rights for a group of defined people. These lands are still occupied by 
rural people in different parts of the country. Depending upon the local laws, some 
groups might permit individual farmers to plant fodder trees on the land. The 
iownership of the planted tree in these cases belongs to a family or clan, but the land 
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the tree is planted on is samuhik land. 
Parti land: All land within the state jurisdiction not claimed by any private 
individual or public organization is categorized as parti land. In principle, these are 
all government lands that no one may use. However, in many cases such lands are 
open to public access, but under clearly defined use rights. For example, a number of 
specifically defined villages may have the rights to graze cattle on parti land 
throughout the year. In cases, everybody may have the rights to collect grass and/or 
dry wood during a specified period that has been approved by government agencies. 
Likewise, cattle trails and land used or covered by brooks and rivers fall exclusively 
under state domain. If given access, individual farmers can use such marginal lands to 
plant trees for fodder, wood, or for esthetic purposes. 
Access to Land Ownership 
Nepal is rich in ethnic diversity and a diversity of cultures, heritage, and norms. This 
diversity carries over into property rights and land rights as well. Each ethnic group 
has its own set of customary laws. The state legal instruments also recognize some of 
the customary laws related to property rights arrangements. The traditional norms that 
are usually biased in favor of a certain sector of society, however, changed at a faster 
rate during the second half of the twentieth century than in the previous era. I discuss 
this general phenomenon among the majority of traditional societies in relation to 
Nepalese society in the following paragraphs. These societies mainly represent the 
traditional rural societies that are still dominant in the Hills of Nepal. 
Although there are a number of arrangements through which a farmer may gain land 
in Nepal, the chances for women to become landowners are rare. Since land 
ownership guarantees rights to membership in an irrigation system, a review of how 
male and female farmers' access to land are defined and practiced in Nepal is in 
order. As the most common type of land ownership and private land in Nepal is 
raiker land, I am going to focus on how people gain access to raiker land. Inheritance 
of parental land and self-acquisition are the two main ways by which farmers in 
Nepal come to own land. 
Access to Land Ownership Through Inheritance of Parental Land 
Aside from certain Tibeto-Burman ethnic communities, Nepal society is 
predominantly patriarchal, governed by Hinduism as a strong ideological force 
(UNICEF and NPCS 1996). In general, men are preferred over women; even some of 
the state laws are biased against women. We can take the position of women rights 
over the parental properties or land as an example. All land owned by the parents 
passes to the male children after the death of the parents. In cases where there is more 
than one male child, the general law states that the land should be equally divided. The 
male children may also ask for separation even before the death of their parents. They 
are authorized in such cases to claim part of the parental land only if they are 35 years 
of age or older. 
According to current provisions, the total land owned by the parents is divided equally 
among all male children and each parent separately. Thus, the parent spouse gets 
double what the children (or their spouse or family) receive. The parents, however, are 
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not necessarily obliged to partition the land they have purchased themselves. 
Officially, the children can claim rights only on those parts of the land that their 
parents inherited from their grandparents. 
Women's access to inherited land: Just as Nepalese state property rights laws are 
biased against women, so are the local laws. Women in most cases have less access to 
and control over resources than men. However, there are some alternative ways 
through which different categories of women can gain partial access to inherited land. 
To keep the discussion simple and clear, I will talk about how a daughter (either 
unmarried or married), or a wife (either living with the husband, separated, widowed, 
or divorced) gets or does not get access to the inherited land. 
Access of daughter to inherited land: All land owned by the parents is normally 
inherited only by their male offspring. However, if a daughter is not married at the 
age of 35 or later, she has as equal rights as her brothers. But she loses such rights if 
she marries later (see UNICEF and NPCS 1996). The reasons behind this rule are the 
i state laws, which are formulated in accordance with traditional rules dating back to 
ancient times, traditional lifestyles, and the strong influence of Hindu ideology in 
giving preference to sons over daughters. Traditionally, parents live with their son, 
while a daughter lives with her husband's family. Parents rely upon their sons as 
sources of social and economic security in their old age. Sons also traditionally 
perform the death rites for their parents, reflecting the strong belief that by doing so, 
they virtually open the gateway to heaven for the deceased parents. 
In cases when a couple has no male children, their female children inherit all of 
their property. Daughters may also receive67 some land as various forms of gifts 
(pewa, bakas, etc.), permitting them to enjoy the full ownership of such lands even 
after marriage68. However, gifts are not necessarily only given to daughters, and also 
not only through the parents. Bakas is a formal statutory institution for the voluntary 
transfer of ownership rights from an owner to another person. The recipient is not 
under obligation to give anything to the owner in exchange for the property. 
However, it is used only for the transfer of land ownership in Nepal and is mostly 
practiced between parents and their daughters. In this way, women benefit more from 
this practice than men69. Although female children are not legally entitled to claim the 
property of their parents like their brothers, a brother or parent may officially pass 
part of their land to their sister or daughter if she is perceived to be in need of it. The 
land granted from this practice is known as pewa. The owner of pewa land has every 
rights to use or alienate her land whenever she wants. Her husband or male relatives 
cannot challenge the decisions she makes regarding such lands. 
The provisions described above are found in the statutory laws and in local laws 
in those societies where Brahman and Chhetry castes dominate. There are, however, 
notable exceptions in some ethnic communities. Very complex normative legal 
arrangements are practiced in the communities of the Newar, Gurung, Sherpa, Rai, 
and Limbu. These communities are more egalitarian than other communities in terms 
of female children's access to parental land and other parental property. (UNICEF 
and NPCS 1996). 
See also Van der Schaaf 2000,1999. 
See also UNICEF and NPCS 1996. 
See also Van der Schaaf 2000, 1999. 
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Wife's access to inherited land: Although the husband has the ownership rights to 
inherited land, the wife also enjoys usufruct rights70. All products that result from the 
use of such lands is the property of the household and not of the husband personally. 
If such land has to be shared with their children, the wife will also has rights to secure 
a share equal to her husband's and her male children's. 
The same arrangement also applies for a separated wife. If the wife wants to 
separate from her family and wants to stay alone, she gets a share of the land equal to 
that of her husband and male children. In such case, she still holds the position of 
legal wife. If a wife who wants to separate from her husband is younger than 35 years 
old, her husband or parents-in-law are not obliged to register land in her name until 
she is 35 years old. However, she always has the rights to use her share of land. If 
she is a widow, she becomes the owner of all land that belonged to her late husband. 
However, she can only dispose of 50 percent of the inherited land. For the other 50 
percent, she should first get the consent of her nearest male relatives such as father or 
her adult sons (FNF 1988b). However, the age limitation for separated wives also 
applies to widows. A divorced woman's access to her share of her former husband's 
land is not necessarily protected because she forfeits all claims to her share of her 
husband's property when she divorces him (FNS 1988b). She is, however, granted 
the right to claim maintenance from her former husband for up to five years after the 
divorce or until she remarries. On the other hand, the former husband may claim the 
rights over all immovable properties (like land) owned by his former wife (separated 
or divorced) in case she remarries. 
Water rights and women's access in Nepal: Irrigation water rights are mostly 
connected to the rights over the irrigated land71. Irrigation water access and rights is 
usually either bequeathed to the offspring by their parents (as the land is also 
inherited) or transferred to new members along with the ownership or use rights of the 
irrigated lands. One noticeable characteristic of almost every irrigation system in 
Nepal is that the majority of the formal members are male. This is not surprising 
because statutory rules protect the rights of male children to inherit all property. 
Almost all property belonging to a household is either registered in the name of 
household head or administered and managed by the household head. The household 
head, which is traditionally the role of the most senior male member of the household 
(in normal circumstances), is one of the strongest social institutions in the rural 
societies of Nepal. Any land that a household owns is, for the most part, officially 
owned and administered by the most senior male member. Any new land bought, 
mortgaged, or rented by the household is also owned or administered by the 
household head. Thus, as the owner or the users of irrigated land are the members of 
the irrigation systems, it is the man who is favored to be the formal member of the 
system. The members do not necessarily own the land, but they cultivate at least a 
parcel of land within the service area of the concerned irrigation system for at least 
one year (or at least one rice season). Once a member discontinues using such land, 
he also discontinues his membership in the irrigation system. 
All members of a household have equal usufruct rights over the land owned by the household 
head. See also Ostrom 1992, 1990. 
See also Hoogendam 1995; Prins 1995, in Mollinga and Prins 1997. 
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Since there are legally pluralistic situations even within and between different 
villages, the rules described in the preceding paragraphs are the dominant attributes of 
most irrigation systems. However, any attempt to represent the complexities of 
Nepalese property rights and water rights in the literature is always insufficient, as 
property rights are defined and changed according to the contextual situations. 
Access to Land Ownership by Buying Raiker Lands 
Any citizen of Nepal can buy land and register it under his or her own name72. 
However, as long as he or she is living in another household (either a nuclear or 
extended family), the land will be used as the property of his or her household73. 
However, any land or property earned through a person's own efforts is not 
necessarily shared with brothers or sisters. Likewise, children, male or female, living 
in their family household or separate from it, are permitted to keep any land (and 
property) they have earned themselves throughout their lives. 
Partial Access to Land through Tenancy Rights 
As discussed earlier, there are different types of land ownership patterns in Nepal. 
The type of land tenancy described in the following paragraphs mostly refers to 
tenancy rights over raiker lands. 
Sharecropping: Sharecropping is popularly known as adhiya, meaning "by half in 
Nepalese. Normally, tenants get a 50 percent share of the total produce (main product 
and the by-products) of the crops they plant on farms provided by the landowners. 
For example, when a tenant grows rice, both the rice grain and rice straw are split 
between him and the landowner. Not all products are necessarily always shared by 
half, however. This arrangement depends on the agreement between the landlord and 
tenant, based on the type and quality of land, the cropping season, and the types of 
cropping systems the tenant is going to follow. Tenant rights in such sharing 
arrangements are protected by the Land Act of 1957. This states that a tenant's 
maximum share will be either 50 percent of the total produce (in cash or kind) or any 
amount reached through mutual agreement or custom, whichever is lowest. The Land 
Reform Act of 1964 left the provisions of the Land Act of 1957 intact, but the 
stipulation that 50 percent of total produce be shared was subsequently lowered to 50 
percent of the main crop only. In general, these sharing arrangements are only for one 
or two crops if adhiya is practiced on pakho land (unirrigated land). This also 
depends on the quality of land. 
The tenant may not cultivate the land or not be obliged to share the produce of 
minor crops for the other seasons within the contracted period. For example, if the 
tenant follows a cropping pattern of maize-millet-mustard, he or she may not be 
obliged to share the products of the mustard. Sometimes, if the land has very poor 
fertility, a tenant may grow only maize and keep the land fallow for the rest of the 
year. Sharecropping arrangements in khet (irrigated rice lands) are generally set 
before or during the nursery-raising period of rice, which starts each year in Jestha 
According to Part-m, Article 17.1, of The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990): 
"All citizens shall, subject to the existing laws, have the rights to acquire, own, sell and 
otherwise dispose of property" (LMC 1992a). 
See also Gray 1995. 
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(May-June). Once the tenant is given land for planting rice, he has use rights to 
control the land for another year. 
Pledge or Bandhaki: In bandhaki arrangements, which are more common in khet 
than pakho, tenants secure the use of land for a year or more. The tenant pays a 
specified amount of money to the landowner in order to acquire the rights to use a 
certain parcel of land. There is no standard rate for these arrangements and the 
amount of money depends on the understanding reached between landowner and 
tenant. The tenants give money in advance, before the planting season. Thus, the 
duration of use is not decided. If the landowner decides he wants rights to the land 
back, he must return the amount he received from the tenant. The landowner, 
however, does not have to pay interest. 
Poor farmers offer their land for bandhaki to raise money to cope with 
unexpected social events or natural disasters. They may also use it to raise money for 
the education or marriage of their children. In these cases, land is used as a means of 
social security. Relatively richer farmers give out land in bandhaki because they do 
not have sufficient labor to cultivate the land. The money from the bandhaki is 
usually reinvested in profit-making activities. Since the landowners keep the 
ownership rights, they may return the money and end the arrangement whenever they 
want. 
Mujuri: Mujuri is a special type of land tenancy arrangement practiced between two 
farmers who are involved in patron-client relationships. In most cases, mujuri 
represents a land tenancy arrangement between a hali, (plowman) and his balighar, 
the household where the hali is contracted to plow for at least a year. The hali 
receives a parcel of land from the balighar to cultivate in exchange for his plowing 
labor for a specified period. In some cases, the landowner may also grant his 
plowman a small parcel of land to cultivate as a reward for a good relationship. In 
such cases, the tenant mostly is one of the poor farmers of the village or 
neighborhood. The landowner may also benefit socially from such practices, such as 
that he or she might then be regarded as one of the rich and kind farmers of the 
locality and this may help raise his social status. 
Lease: Nepalese farmers rarely rent land under lease. In Nepal, there is no major 
difference between lease and pledge, but the money used for leasing a piece of land is 
not returned to the tenant. A lease is granted for a specified period of time. It is not a 
common practice among ordinary farmers, but some trained farmers (especially 
agriculture technicians) take land on lease for commercial farming. Generally, lease 
tenancy contracts are set for a long duration. Land used under lease arrangements is 
mostly used for growing cash crops like vegetables and fruits. 
Contract farming: Under this arrangement, the tenant pays a certain amount of cash 
or a specified amount of farm products to the landowner based on a mutual 
agreement between the two parties. Generally, such contracts are only set for one 
year. Although it is not a very common type of land tenure in Nepal, large farmers 
sometimes prefer to offer their land under this type of arrangement rather than share 
cropping because the amount of cash or produce the landowner can expect is 
guaranteed, regardless of the risk posed by the weather or natural calamities leading 
to crop failure. Tenants, however, are rarely prepared to accept this type of tenancy. 
54 
IA Historical Overview of Irrigation Development and Management 
in Nepal 
Little is known about the evolution of irrigated agriculture in Nepal. Irrigation 
development probably started as early as the first agricultural settlements. Many 
authors agree that the history of irrigation development in the hill valleys of Nepal 
dates back centuries. Some of them represent the world's oldest irrigation systems 
built and operated by farmers74 (JJMI 1991). Historically, irrigation development in 
; Nepal has fallen under the domain of religious trusts, individual initiatives, or com-
munity efforts. Some ancient irrigation systems and their institutions are still working 
in the Hills. 
Farmers' customary practices and religious laws for water use were first 
recognized during the Lichhabi dynasty (464-782). Since then, the legal tradition and 
local administrative structures have permitted FMIS to operate without interference 
from an irrigation agency or other administrative unit. The Malla kings (782-1768), 
however, made repair and maintenance of the irrigation canals by their respective 
users mandatory once every year. Non-compliance with this rule was punishable by 
the state agencies. Water use into the service area was regulated turn by turn. 
The Shah dynasty rulers also emphasized the importance of irrigation water. In 
the 16th century, Ram Shah, the King of Gorkha from 1549 to 160675, ordered the 
construction of irrigation canals and wells in his kingdom (Adhikary 1982). The need 
for rural institutions to maintain and oversee the distribution of irrigation water seems 
to have been felt even during that era when local panchayat16 were empowered to 
oversee these matters. Today, those irrigation systems are commonly known as raj 
kulo11 in the Kathmandu Valley and the Western Hills of Nepal. Except for those raj 
kulo, public sector irrigation development in Nepal does not have a long history 
(Poudel 1996). 
Access to water for irrigation and drinking purposes was more systematically 
defined with the beginning of the Shah dynasty (from 1559). Prior rights were 
granted to the first users, and trees were recognized as the protectors of water springs. 
Anyone who destroyed trees near spring sources was liable to be punished by the 
See K. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1997; Poudel 1996; Poudel et al. 1994; Pradhan 1989; 
Martin and Yoder 1987. 
At that time, Gorkha was one of several small kingdoms of Nepal. His majesty the Great King 
Prithvi Narayan Shah (1723-1775) united Nepal into a single Kingdom in 1768 (1825 B. S.). 
He was also the king of Gorkha before unification. See also Gellner et al. 1997. 
"Village Panchayat" was the lowest level administrative unit of His Majesty's Government of 
Nepal during the "panchayati system" in Nepal before 1990. A Village Panchayat was made 
up of several wards (small hamlets). Panchayati system was a single-party political 
institution where the sovereignty of the state was bestowed on the king, who was the absolute 
ruler. Although the panchayat system was officially adopted by the state in only 1960, the 
notion of panchyat for local development and administration was one of the pre-historic 
institutions in Nepal. 
Kulo means irrigation canal in Nepali language. 
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state . Although not stated in the legal code dating back as early as the 17 century, 
an edict issued by King Ram Shah of Gorkha stated that irrigation and its 
management were the responsibility of the community (Adhikary 1982). 
The first national legal code in the unified Nepal was the Muluki Ain of 1853 
(Pradhan 1994). Some customary or traditional laws relating to water rights were 
incorporated into the Muluki Ain19. According to the provisions of Muluki Ain, 
irrigators constructing canals were granted rights-of-way. The measures to 
compensate for rights-of-ways were also outlined. New canals could be constructed 
upstream of existing ones only if the water supply to the latter would not be reduced; 
water rights were secured to the prior investor and prior rights were granted to the 
upcanals. Irrigation water could not be withheld from those lands that were irrigated 
first. The Muluki Ain also incorporated some of the resource mobilization obligations 
and property rights into its legal framework that were followed at the local level. It 
also recognized the traditional customary laws and water rights provisions developed 
and practiced by farmers in their irrigation systems. It incorporated stipulations for 
water allocation and use with the intention of curtailing potential disputes over water 
priorities. It also described the conditions under which government agencies might 
assist in the repair and maintenance of farmer managed irrigation systems, as well as 
the rights and obligations that the farmer-landowners within the government-assisted 
irrigation systems had to follow. 
The Chandra Nahar,i0 constructed in Saptari district in 1923, was the first irrigation 
scheme built by government of Nepal. As a result of growing government interest in 
irrigation development, an Agriculture Council was established in 1926 to administer 
Nepal's irrigation activities. Next, the Juddha Nahar of Sarlahi district began its 
operation in 1945 as the second government-built irrigation system in Nepal. The 
rulers at that time were, however, interested in constructing the canals as a way of 
collecting state revenues by applying a water tax to the irrigator farmers. The state 
had developed rules to collect irrigation fee from each farmer who owned land within 
the irrigated area of government constructed and managed irrigation systems. The 
amount of irrigation fee collected was fixed on the basis of land size within the 
service area. 
Immediately after democracy began in 195081 (2007 B. S.), the Irrigation Department 
Religious customary laws do not allow to cut trees near the drinking water springs these days as 
well. 
"Muluki Ain" is the Nepali name of the national legal code in Nepal. 
Nahar means canal in the Nepali language. Nahar are larger than kulo in size and the volume of 
water. Generally, all small and farmers' constructed canals are known as kulo, while agency 
constructed canals are Nahar. 
Although the Kingdom of Nepal was never colonized by external powers, the dictatorial Rana 
prime ministers ruled for about 104 years, starting in 1846. While Rana did not overthrow the 
kingship, the office of king was treated as a powerless institution. Rana prime ministers used to 
hold supreme power, for the most part, ruling the country on the tip of their tongue. The prime 
ministership was rotated among the brothers and sons of the Rana family, one after another. 
The Rana regime was overthrown by the popular political revolution of 1950. Many transitional 
democratic governments ruled the country for another ten years. The "panchayati system" was 
started by King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev in 1960. The king became the absolute 
monarchy. Again, the panchayati system was overthrown and replaced by the multi-party 
democratic system in yet another popular revolution in 1990. Then, the kingship is now a 
functioning constitutional monarchy. 
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replaced the Agriculture Council in 1952 (Shukla and Sharma 1994). The Irrigation 
Department was also re-organized into the Department of Irrigation, Hydrology, and 
[Meteorology (DIHM). At that time, the Ministry of Panchayat and Local Develop-
ment, Farm Irrigation and Water Utilization Division (FIWUD) of the Department of 
Agriculture (DOA), the Water and Energy Commission Secretariat (WECS) and the 
[Agriculture Development Bank of Nepal (ADB/N) were also involved in irrigation 
development. 
The Irrigation, Electricity, and Related Water Resource Act of 1967 was the 
first attempt by the state to introduce specific legislation on water resources for 
multiple use (Pradhan 1994). This act presented a new role for the state in creating 
infrastructure development for surplus generation, compatible with the planned mode 
of development exclusively undertaken by the state apparatus. The rights of 
individuals and groups to construct irrigation systems were recognized under this act 
as well. The Act also stipulated the paramount power of the state over existing 
irrigation systems if they hindered government actions. The concept of licensing and 
the payment of irrigation service fees was also incorporated into the act. This was the 
first legislation that stipulated government agencies had the authority to control 
irrigation facilities that received state investment. 
The National Park and Wildlife Conservation Act was promulgated in 1972 
¡(2029 BS). It restricts the activities on rivers, streams, ponds, or other water resources 
within the National Parks (WECS 1987). Similarly, according to the Soil and 
Watershed Conservation Act of 1982 (2039 BS), the rights of the people are 
subjected to the rights of the conservation officer if engaging in activities related to 
the use of water resources in the specified conservation areas. 
It is estimated that the public sector now supports the irrigation needs of only 11 
percent of the total cultivated land in Nepal (see Shukla et al. 1993; Shukla and 
jSharma 1994). It accounts for only about 30 percent of the total irrigated land. DOI 
manages nearly 100 irrigation systems covering approximately 267,500 hectares of 
irrigated land (IMC 1989). The state also started the rehabilitation, extension, and 
improvement of FMISs in 1981 (Pradhan and Pradhan 1996). Many governmental 
jand non-governmental agencies have become involved in assisting the management 
land improvement of traditionally farmer managed irrigation systems in Nepal. The 
common objective of all of these agencies is to help farmers preserve their 
organizational and managerial strengths. Assistance to some of the FMISs have 
decreased the maintenance cost to users and increased the overall efficiency of their 
irrigation systems. But, in some cases, the local organizational effectiveness has 
declined due to external intervention (Shivakoti 1992). 
Despite the high priority and enormous investment in public sector irrigation 
jdevelopment, many large-scale irrigation projects in developing countries have not 
jbeen sustainable. The same problem can also be seen in many agency-managed 
irrigation systems (AMIS) in Nepal (Poudel et al. 1994; Gill 1994; Shukla et al. 
1993). FMISs have generally proven to be more effective in terms of their 
imanagement and performance than AMIS's (Acharya et al. 1993; IMC 1989). 
[Because of this, the government of Nepal (HMG/Nepal) has now developed the 
Ipolicy of turning AMIS over to FMIS, or to joint-management between the agency 
and WUA, depending upon the size and nature of the systems. 
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Consequently, state management responsibilities or AMIS are being turned over 
to the water users associations in many small to large AMISs. The process of turning 
over the responsibilities of agency-built and agency-managed irrigation systems to 
organized groups of water users has been gaining momentum through the Irrigation 
Management Transfer Project (IMTP) under the Department of Irrigation (DOI) 
(Shukla et al. 1994). The World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) sponsor 
the IMTP. In some cases, the state or agency and WUA are jointly managing 
previous AMISs. Such systems are commonly known as Jointly Managed Irrigation 
Systems (JMIS). 
Governmental approaches and policies for irrigation development introduced 
major changes beginning with the Seventh Five Year Development Plan (1985-
1990), which emphasized people's participation in irrigation development and 
management. In 1988, the government introduced the Working Policy on Irrigation 
Development for the Fulfillment of Basic Needs. This document encouraged farmers' 
participation at all levels of irrigation development from project identification, 
design, and construction, to operation and maintenance of the irrigation systems. The 
Eighth Five Year Development Plan (1992-1996) also further emphasized users' 
participation from inception to operation and management of the irrigation schemes, 
use of local technology and materials, and private sector involvement in irrigation 
development. The government's policy on people's participation in irrigation 
development has also continued in the ongoing Ninth Five Year Development Plan 
(1997-2002). The Department of Irrigation (DOI) in the Ministry of Water Resources 
(MOWR) is currently the major agency involved in the planning, design, 
construction, and management of public sector irrigation systems through its District 
Irrigation Offices (DIO). The Department of Irrigation was established in 1988. 
Since then, the state's view on the importance of irrigation management has received 
new momentum. With the objective of improving the management of all types of 
irrigation systems in Nepal, HMG/Nepal (through its line department, the Department 
of Irrigation) formulated a national irrigation policy in 1992, amended in 1996. 
Contemporary Irrigation Policy: Irrigation Policy 1996 
The latest irrigation policy was formulated by the Ministry of Water Resources 
(MOWR/N) in 1992 (MOWR 1992) and amended in 199682. It was formulated and is 
enforced by HMG/Nepal as a requirement of the national policy to implement and 
operate irrigation development programs in Nepal. 
Major Objectives of Irrigation Policy in 1996 
• to develop quick, cost effective, viable, sustainable and environmentally efficient 
irrigation systems; 
• to bring uniformity to the irrigation development process and projects of all 
concerned governmental, non-governmental, and donor agencies: 
The irrigation policies of the Kingdom of Nepal have the provision that it be amended every five 
years. 
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• to decrease government involvement and encourage people's participation in 
irrigation development and management; 
• to increase the capabilities of governmental and non-governmental irrigation 
institutions for the research and training related to technical and social aspects of 
irrigation management; 
^to develop laws giving WUA rights to collect water tax and use it for further 
development of the system; 
• to increase the farmers' capabilities in resource mobilization for rehabilitation and 
construction works in traditional FMIS. 
To fulfill these objectives, the Irrigation Policy of 1996 has defined the following 
policies expected to help in the better management and improvement of the existing 
irrigation systems within the Kingdom of Nepal. 
Provisions for WUA and Farmer Participation: 
i Every irrigation system shall have a WUA. The structure of the WUA shall 
depend on the type and extension of the irrigation system. The WUA shall be 
given legal status. They shall be developed as a multi-functional and volunteer 
institution with at least 20 percent female participation in each WUA. The WUA 
shall be legally registered before any projects are granted to such WUA. 
« All policy and policy implementation processes shall have the provisions of the 
responsible participation of WUA for inspiring them to organize into a national 
association of WUA. 
• Water-user farmers shall participate in all stages of the construction and 
rehabilitation projects of irrigation systems, including needs assessment, project 
identification, construction, repair and maintenance, and monitoring and 
evaluation of the irrigation projects. 
Policies for Resource Mobilization: 
• The WUA shall bear a specified share of the cost for all irrigation rehabilitation 
projects (see Annex XV). It shall be part of the total cost estimation for the 
proposed projects. 
• The WUA shall deposit a cash amount of 0.5 percent of the total cost in a joint 
account of the concerned irrigation agency and WUA before the beginning of the 
project activities. However, such funds shall be transferred to the concerned WUA 
after the project is completed and handed over to the WUA. Such funds shall be 
used for the repair, maintenance, and improvement of the concerned irrigation 
systems. 
4 In case any changes are made in the proposed projects and/or the proposed costs, 
the concerned agency and the WUA shall add or cut the amounts in their shares. 
*In case of discontinuity in such projects due to any unexpected reasons, the 
HMG/NEPAL shall not invest any more in the same project. In such cases, the 
remaining amount of the cash deposited by the WUA shall not be returned to the 
WUA. 
• The government resources for the proposed project shall be mobilized only after 
15 percent of the total resources shared by the WUA are used. 
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Provisions for the Irrigation Service Fee: 
• All WUA are legally allowed to collect an irrigation service fee (ISF) within the 
provisions of the 1996 Irrigation Policy. 
• Farmers shall be levied an ISF for all seasons on the basis of the size of the 
irrigated field. 
• In case a WUA is not able to collect more than 80 percent of the ISF, the WUA 
shall be allowed to get only half of the amount (see Annex XV). 
• The WUA shall also be allowed to collect the necessary resources for the repair, 
maintenance, and improvement of the irrigation systems from the water users in 
cash, kind, or labor, or a combination of these resources. But such provisions must 
be stated in the WUA constitution, and the amounts of the resources to be 
contributed from each member shall be decided upon by the WUA or the farmers' 
General Assembly according to the existing norms. However, this provision shall 
be applicable only to those irrigation systems managed by farmers. 
• Landowners shall be responsible to pay the stated resources for their lands under 
tenancy if land tenancy rights are not officially secured by the tenants. The official 
tenants shall contribute themselves. 
Beginning in November 1998, the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR) 
organized a National Irrigation Development Committee (NIDC) consisting of 21 
members (MOWR 1998). The Minister of MOWR chairs the NJDC. The Director of 
the Department of Irrigation (DOI) works as the Member-Secretary83. 
Other major agencies presently involved in irrigation development in Nepal are 
the Ministry of Local Development (MOLD, through DDC84) and the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (see Poudel et al. 1994; Shukla et al. 
1993). NGOs, INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) and some 
semi-governmental organizations are mainly involved in irrigation management 
studies and irrigation research in all types of irrigation systems. The International 
Irrigation Management Institute (EMI) is one of the leading institutions in this field. 
The Irrigation Management System Study Group (IMSSG), Mountain Resources 
Other members of NTDC, and the number of their representatives (in parentheses) include: a 
National Planning Commission (NPC) member for water resources (1); Secretaries of the 
Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) 
(3); a Special Secretary for water resources (1); an Executive Secretary of Water and Energy 
Commission Secretariat (WECS, 1); a Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Water Resources for 
policy and planning (1); a Joint Secretary of Ministry of Water Resources for program 
monitoring and evaluation (1); a General Manager (GM) of Agriculture Development Bank of 
Nepal (ADB/N, 1); a representative or President of Nepal Engineers Association (1); a Chairman 
or representative of any two Water Users Association (WUA) in Nepal as nominated by the 
government (2); a representative from the professionals among irrigation specialists as 
nominated by the government (1); a representative from among the specialists of the 
governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGO) related to irrigated 
agriculture/irrigation as nominated by the government (1); Deputy Director Generals (DDG) 
from all five divisions of the Department of Irrigation (i.e., planning, design, monitoring and 
evaluation, surface irrigation, river training, ground water irrigation, and irrigation management 
divisions, (5). 
DDC is the district-level government's political/administrative body for development and political 
activities. The committee is made up of democratically elected people's representatives from all 
nine development sub-regions of the district. The development sector of DDC consists of a local 
development officer and some technical staff. Before 1990, it was known as the District 
Panchayat. 
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Management Group (MRMG), Water Nepal, Consolidated Management Systems 
(CMS), and Legal Research and Development Forum (FREEDEAL) are some 
examples among such other organizations. 
Unlike in the past, HMG/Nepal is now trying to regulate all natural resource 
management within its national legal jurisdiction. Thus, more detailed water acts and 
regulations are currently being developed. Now, all plans and programs concerning 
water resource development activities are supposed to be discussed and approved by 
the District Water Resources Committee (DWRC) in all 75 districts of Nepal. The 
DWRC is chaired by the Chief District Officer (CDO) in each district. The Local 
pevelopment Officer (LDO) works as the Member Secretary of the committee. All 
water and agriculturally related government office heads are members of DWRC (see 
MOWR 1992). Directly or indirectly, the District Development Committee (DDC) 
and the district level office of Nepal Drinking Water Corporation (NDWC) are also 
involved in caring for water use within each district of Nepal. As supported by the 
national irrigation policies and water regulations, HMG/NEPAL has recently inspired 
[farmers' Water Users Associations to organize into a National Irrigation Water Users 
Association (NIWUA) (NIWUA 1999). The constitution of the NIWUA has already 
been developed. The primary objective of the NIWUA is to make a national 
federation of district-level Water Users Associations from all 75 districts. 
Contemporary Water Laws and Regulations in Nepal 
Water Resources Act 1992 
¡The latest Water Resource Act (WRA) of Nepal is WRA 1992. WRA 1992 addresses 
the issues of prioritization, .privatization, incentives, and licensing in the use and 
management of water resources within the Kingdom of Nepal. A fundamental 
characteristic of this Act is that the ownership of all water resources within Nepal is 
vested in the Kingdom of Nepal. Corporations, communities, groups, or individuals 
can use water resources only after completing all legal arrangements through the 
government of Nepal (HMG/Nepal) or its authorized agencies (MOWR 1994; 
Pradhan 1994; LMC 1992). The WRA 1992 definition of water resources includes all 
j surface water and sub-surface water or, in other words, any form of water85 The 
[following gives the most relevant provisions of the act: 
¡•The ownership of all water resources within the Kingdom of Nepal is vested in the 
Kingdom of Nepal. 
|» Nobody can use water resources without having a license. However, water 
resources used for or to be used for the following purposes do not need licenses: 
• Personal or communal use for drinking or other domestic uses 
• Personal or communal irrigation 
• Water for water mills 
• Water use for personal transportation with manual boats 
HMG/Nepal has also enacted a separate Electricity Act 1992 (EA 1992) (LMC 1992). 
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• The use of water sources from personally owned lands for specified purposes. But 
while using water resources, no water user (person or group) should negatively 
affect the rights of others to use water. 
• For the collective use of water resources, users should form a WUA and register it 
according to the prescribed rules and regulations. Such WUAs will be the 
authorized autonomous organized institution of the water users. 
• Normally, the priority of using water resources will be allotted in the following 
order: 
• drinking and other domestic uses 
• irrigation 
• water for livestock, fisheries and other agricultural uses 
• hydro-electricity 
• cottage industries, other industry-related business, and mining 
• water transportation 
• water use related to import-export activities, and other uses. 
• Every individual or organization having a license to use a water resource should be 
charged according to the prescribed rules. 
• HMG/Nepal reserves the rights to transfer the ownership of any water resource 
and related structure from any individual or organization to HMG/Nepal as and 
when necessary. However, this is applicable only in cases where the resources can 
be widely used by the people for public purposes. However, the previous users' 
rights to use them should not be abolished. Similarly, the resources and structures 
developed by the government can also be transferred to the authorized 
organizations. 
• Any user's rights to use water resources can be discontinued at any time if the 
users do not comply with the provisions of the contract of use. 
• Every water user may get governmental permission to use or buy others' land or 
buildings if it seems necessary for the construction of dams, diversions, dikes, 
canals, field channels, underground canals, lining pipes, the construction of tanks 
above and under the ground, construction of reservoirs or water distribution 
structures, and any other construction works related to the development of water 
resources. If necessary, HMG/Nepal will also provide security to protect the 
related structures. 
• No users are allowed to use water resources beyond the prescribed limits of the 
environmental degradation of water; no negative impacts should be incurred due to 
soil erosion, floods, and similar environmental problems. 
• Any users found to be in violation of this Act can be fined up to NR. 5000.0086. 
They should also be responsible for any losses due to related activities. 
• HMG/Nepal has every right under the provision of WRA 1992 to formulate rules 
and regulations on the development, use, protection, services, environmental 
protection, multiple uses, users organization, etc., related to water resources within 
the Kingdom of Nepal. 
Water Resource Regulation 1993 
The Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR) formulated Water Resource Regulation 
NR = Nepalese Rupees, NRs. US $ 1 = NRs. 67 
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1993 (WRR 1993) (MOWR 1993) based on the WRA 1992. The major features of 
the WRR 1993 that relate to this study are the following: 
^ Every water user or WUA should apply to the District Water Resources 
Committee (DWRC) for the registration of the WUA and to obtain a license to use 
water resources. The Chief District Officer chairs the DWRC. The DWRC ' 
includes one representative from each of the following district offices: the 
Agriculture Development Office (ADO); the Forest Office; the Drinking Water 
Office; the Electricity Project run by FfMGYNepal within the district (if any); any 
other institution within the district utilizing water resources (if any), and; the 
District Development Committee (DDC). The Local Development Officer (LDO) 
is the member secretary of DWRC. 
• The licensee shall have the rights to use water resources as specified in the license. 
• Any person or corporate body that has been utilizing water resources prior to the 
commencement of the act (i.e., WRA 1992), shall be required to make an 
application stating the particulars as prescribed by the law to DWRC for obtaining 
the license, within one year from the date of commencement of the act. 
j» There is a provision of Water Resources Utilization Inquiry Committee (WRUIC) 
relating to the settlement of water disputes. The representative from the Ministry 
of Water Resources chairs the WRUIC. The representatives from the concerned 
District Development Board (DDB) and the Regional Office of National Planning 
Commission (NPC) are members of WRUIC. While settling disputes over water 
utilization, the WRUIC gives its decisions based on the possible impacts the 
project may have on the people, the number of consumers who will benefit, the 
effects on the environment, the requirements of local people, the opinion of the 
project beneficiaries, and other necessary information. 
!The authority to apply the sanctions against the violators of WRA 1993 is vested in 
the secretariat of the Ministry of Water Resources87. 
Farmers' Laws in Irrigation Management in Nepal 
Throughout the history of Nepal, the public's awareness of water use issues, 
especially for irrigation water, has been far ahead of the state. Some irrigation canals, 
which were developed and managed by farmers date back thousands of years, and are 
still functioning in the Hills. Although informal in most of the cases, certain 
institutions and organizational structures have been developed for the operation and 
maintenance of such canals. Today, the same rules or modified versions are working 
[in many FMISs. Where a canal is also used to deliver water for purposes other than 
! irrigation, certain normative rules are in place to protect the water sanitation and to 
[permit water to be used for multiple purposes, including economic uses. The beliefs 
and value systems surrounding water and its uses influence many of these norms. 
[Now, such norms have become the common rales for irrigation management in 
Nepal. In the literature, such practices are often referred to as 'customary practices". 
Such rules describe water use rights or access for a defined community. These rules 
are found in cases where water from the same source is being shared, where water 
For details, see Section 22 of WRA 1992 & Section 36 of WRR 1993. 
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from the same canal has multiple users, and for water distribution, rotation or sharing 
for multiple uses and among users. Some rules also define the responsibilities 
involved in being a regular consumer of such water source. Some rules also define 
the need to invest in the FMIS or to share in it on the basis of investments. In the 
following section, I shall describe these rules in more detail: 
Farmers' Rules for Water Distribution 
This section reviews the practices, rules, and regulations relating to the acquisition of 
water from the source, its delivery up to the intakes of the fields, and allocation to 
different sectors or individual plots. 
Rules for Water Distribution within an Irrigation System 
The basis for water allocation within the system is varied, depending upon the 
availability of water, type of soil, the location of the lands within the service area, 
assessment of need, or genuine demands by the farmers, etc. Rules are applied more 
strictly during water deficit periods or in systems with a water deficit. 
The water allocation criteria for the individual plots in some irrigation systems 
are based on the season, the priority of demand, and the security of the standing crops 
(Poudel 1996)88. Some FMISs permit nearly twice the amount of land to be under 
irrigation during the winter and summer seasons than in the monsoon season (Martin 
1986). In such cases, more valuable but less water-demanding crops can be grown in 
larger areas than during the monsoon season. However, special attention is given in 
such cases to water needs. Unlike the continuous flooding method practiced during 
the monsoon, the winter and summer crops are irrigated in turns, with access 
depending on the following two major principles: 
i. First come, first served: Since the flow of water in the main canal during the 
winter and summer seasons is small, even a small amount of water is very 
important89. Therefore, farmers have developed a sub-rule for these seasons 
requiring that at least one farmer should work as an attendant90 in the main canal 
every day, but which farmers will be attendants are not pre-determined. The 
attendant checks for possible leakage of water from the main canal and augments 
the flow of water. Farmers who feel their crops may need water priority may 
register on the list of attendants before the other farmers. The first attendant on the 
main canal gets the first turn for irrigation. Once a farmer has registered his name as 
an attendant at the WUA office, the WUA asks him to start working on the day the 
previous attendant irrigates his land. Then the latter should regularly attend to the 
canal clearing and canal water augmentation until it is his turn to irrigate. 
ii. Security of the crop: If there is a problem of crop damage while the attendant 
is waiting for his turn, the concerned farmer should report his problem to the WUA 
in time. WUA officers should examine the problem in the field themselves and may 
allow water to be used even before it is the farmer's turn. All farmers usually 
See also Martin and Yoder 1987. 
The marginal utility of each additional amount of water is very high. 
In such situation, an attendant works as what is commonly called as water guard, panipale, 
chaukidar or dhalpa in some irrigation systems. 
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respect this special right of the WUA to award early irrigation to those farmers who 
rpally need it. If no allowance to irrigate fields were made, the concerned farmers 
v^ould lose a significant amount of their expected crop harvest due to drought. 
During the monsoon (roughly June to October), water is divided proportionately 
according to the size of the parcel. Weirs (sancho)91 are left alone to allow a 
continuous flow of water throughout the season. 
The criteria for water allocation and distribution in most Nepalese FMISs are pre-
scribed by the irrigator's organizations (see Pradhan 1989). Non-compliance with 
sjich criteria is subject to punishment. An individual's view of how irrigation water 
should be utilized is influenced by his or her sense of water ownership. The irrigator 
organizations describe the rights to use water based on their own criteria. Such 
WUAs are also responsible for water distribution in proportion to water share. Some 
systems allocate water to individual farmers based on the proportion of their 
investment made during construction of the system. In some cases, the members of 
^^TJAs also guard the system intake at the source on a rotational basis to protect their 
v^ater rights at the source. 
In both water-abundant and water-stressed systems, only the defined service area 
is entitled to the use of irrigation water even though, in some systems, the command 
area has the potential to be expanded. Farmers outside the defined service area are not 
allowed to use water. Attempts to do so are subject to penalties imposed by the irriga-
tion committees. In some cases, water allocation is also based on the type of land. 
Fields on slightly elevated lands (tandi) that have no source of water within the fields 
are entitled to get water while lowlands (ghol) are not given irrigation water, because 
they generally have their own source of nearly perennial water (Shukla et al. 1993). 
NJVhen the amount of water is a major constraint, water is allocated according to the 
Order of demands registered by WUA. There are some examples where a contractor 
performs the job of water distribution. The contractor is provided with certain rules to 
follow; he will be fined if he fails to do his job in accordance with the given rules. In 
some cases, the water distribution schedule is determined by a lottery system. 
Besides such well-developed norms relating to water distribution, there are many 
farm terraces in most of the old FMISs which do not have intakes directly connected 
to the canals. Such terraces are far from the main canal. In most of these systems, no 
secondary and tertiary canals have been constructed. Thus, only those terraces that 
are along the main canal have the opportunity to get direct intakes from the canal. 
Farm terraces that previously had direct intakes might have become divided into 
many parts due to land sharing among brothers or from sales. A single intake then has 
to be shared by more than one farmer. In such situations, the farmers from the lower 
terraces should allow other farmers' fields higher than their own to be irrigated before 
water enters their own fields. 
Rules for Inter-System Water Distribution 
Many irrigation systems in the Western Hills of Nepal practice customary rules and 
regulations for inter-system water allocation (Poudel et al. 1994). The pattern of 
water sharing between systems may vary from 10 to 50 percent to one of the two 
^ Sancho is the local name of a wooden proportional weir made by farmers to allocate water in 
proportion to their rules. 
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competing systems. The basis for such inter-system water allocation is that farmers 
usually honor whatever decisions were made by their forefathers in consideration of 
the feasibility of tapping water resources, corresponding paddy areas, and the number 
of households in the village. However, most of the rules for inter-system water 
allocation are based on the length and slope of the tributary or river (source), 
adequacy of water flow at the source during the irrigation seasons, and the abrupt 
scarcity of water soon after monsoon floods. 
An irrigation system may sometimes also becomes the source of water for 
another irrigation system (Shukla et al. 1993). Cash and labor contribution in 
operation and management are the basis for water acquisition from other systems. In 
some cases, cash is contributed to initial construction while the new systems, seeking 
access to water use, pay a sum of money to the older systems. Such arrangements are 
possible only when there is sufficient water in the upcanal to allow the lower canals 
to receive water. Additionally, arrangements do not succeed if farmers from one of 
the two concerned systems cannot agree upon the amount of water to be shared or the 
amount of money involved in the deal. In such cases, the General Assemblies of the 
concerned irrigation systems decide on these matters rather than the Executive 
Committee of the WUA. These arrangements are possible only when there is a 
mutual consensus reached between two or more systems. Many systems also enjoy 
the benefits of drainage water from upstream systems. Some FMISs, which share a 
common headwork, provide cemented or wooden proportional weirs for water 
allocation. The outlet size of these weirs is usually proportionate to the size of the 
irrigated field served by each outlet. In most cases, inter-system water allocation at 
the water source depends on mutual consensus between the upstream and 
downstream systems. It is particularly practiced during the water deficit periods of the 
year. 
Water is also allocated to different systems along the water source in turns. This 
practice is commonly known as "mole palo", or the practice of inter-system rotation 
along a river (Shukla et al. 1993). Formal rules protecting irrigation access rights to 
the water source are also found in several systems sharing water from the same river. 
In cases where two or more irrigation systems share the same headwork, the share of 
water that different systems receive is proportional to the amount of labor mobilized 
for the operation and management of the headwork. Some systems have a written 
agreement to alternating day and night water use. 
Farmers' Rules for Resource Mobilization 
This section gives a general overview of the rules for cash, labor, or material 
mobilization for the maintenance and repair of the irrigation structures during regular 
and emergency activities. More precisely, it deals with how farmers share the 
necessary resources for irrigation system maintenance. 
The majority of irrigation systems in the Western Hills of Nepal mobilize labor 
resources for regular repair and maintenance based on the size of the landholding 
under the service area of the system (Poudel et al. 1994). In case of emergency 
repairs and maintenance, each household should participate in most of the systems. 
The rest of the systems work on a household basis. Cash fees are mostly based on the 
66 
size of the landholding, but the collection of cash for regular maintenance is not a 
common practice in this part of Nepal. 
In most of the FMISs in the Southern Plains, cash resources for initial 
construction are mobilized on the basis of the size of landholding while labor is based 
oil household size (Shukla et al. 1993). The majority of irrigation systems also base 
tip mobilization of resources for repair and maintenance on the size of the parcel. 
There is a provision for sanctions on the violation of such rules. Those who do not 
participate in maintenance activities are fined (locally known as kadarai, or cash 
sanctions). The amount of kadarai is generally equivalent to a day's worth of labor 
v|ages, or may be more if labor is scarce during the repair and maintenance season. If 
the payment of a fine is ignored, the defaulters may face further graduated sanctions. 
Ihe majority of irrigation systems have provisions for graduated sanctions. However, 
the rules governing resource mobilization in the FMISs of Nepal vary by ecological 
zone. Pradhan (1989) has summarized different rules for labor contribution in 21 
FMISs that he studied in the different ecological zones of Nepal: 
Rules for labor contribution 
Proportional to land size within the service area: Some systems have adopted the 
rule requiring one labor day for each predefined parcel size (i.e. Charsaya Phant and 
Bhanu Baraha Kulo of Tanahun, Raj Kulo of Argali). Some systems have adopted the 
size of the landholding category as a basis for deciding the amount of labor farmers 
inust provide for maintenance (Rani, Gorkhe, and Kwadi Kulo irrigation systems of 
Pyuthan). In the Charhajar system of Tanahun in the Western Hills, farmers having 
up to 30 mato muri of land have the choice to either contribute labor or cash. Small 
farmers are exempt from involvement in the cleaning of the headend site of the main 
canal. The owners of more than 15 mato muri of land work from the tailend up to the 
headend of the main canal. However, all farmers must provide additional 
contributions when diversion structures are constructed at the headwork. 
Proportional investment by farmers: In some of the systems of the Western Hills 
(Thulo Kulo and Tallo Kulo of Chherlung-Palpa), a farmer owning one water share 
contributes one labor day for the duration of the maintenance work. In the Western 
Mountain regions (Phalebas, Parbat), anyone holding a water share worth one rupee 
or more is required to contribute one labor day for maintenance work. They are also 
required to pay cash in proportion to their crop yields from the command area. 
On the basis of outlet size: This rule is applied in the Western Hills as well as in the 
southern plains (Baraha, Badkapath and Pithuwa systems) of Nepal. The size is 
measured by the diameter of the hume-pipe or a wooden hume-pipe to the secondary 
canals from the main canal. The branch committee of WUA fixes the amount of labor 
contribution required from individual farmers within the service area of a branch 
canal. 
According to the area cultivated in the village: In one system in the Southern Plains 
(Chattis Mauja system of Rupandehi), the amount of labor contributed from one 
village92 is proportional to the size of irrigated land within that village. Within the 
9 2 Initially, the command area of Chhattis Mauja irrigation system served land covering 36 
villages. Now it serves 54 villages. Here, the term "village" is used to replace "mauja". In 
Nepali, "chattis mauja" means "thirty-six villages". 
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village, labor mobilization is based on the size of landholding, one person per 1.25 
hectare. 
On the basis of household: One of the systems in the Southern Plains (Lothar 
irrigation system of Chitwan district) requires one laborer from each irrigator 
farmer's household to be mobilized for maintenance and repair. In winter, farmers 
with large landholdings allow small or landless farmers to cultivate spring rice on 
their land. Such a rule helps to ensure that the labor supply is large enough to perform 
the required repair and maintenance in the summer season. Each tenant's household 
sends one laborer each. Cash payment is not acceptable. 
Rules for cash contribution 
Farmers have also developed certain rules for cash contribution (Pradhan 1989): 
On the basis of land size: In many irrigation systems in the Western Hills (Upallo 
Kulo of Gulmi, and Satrasaya and Sange Patiani of Tanahun), maintenance 
responsibilities are contracted out to a third party. Differing amounts of money are 
collected as needed, based on the number of hectares under irrigation. 
On the basis of yield: In some systems in the Western Hills (Sota Kulo of Gulmi), the 
cash collection rate for maintenance activities is fixed on a per murf3 basis of rice 
production, while some (Phalebas) have fixed the amount according to the categories 
of rice production. The categories are one to ten muri, more than 10 to 20 muri, and 
more than 20 muri. Farmers with higher production pay higher amounts. 
On the basis of estimated work to be done: In one system of the Southern Plains 
(Pithuwa), the total amount of work needed to de-silt the branch canals is calculated. 
The required amount proportionate to the area irrigated within the branch is then 
collected. 
Collection of cash for penalties: Strict labor contribution rules are enforced in many 
FMISs. If any person fails to provide the labor required for repair and maintenance, 
they are fined the equivalent of a day's wage or more, depending upon the scarcity of 
labor. Higher rates are used in cases of emergency repair and maintenance. There are 
many ways to use such funds. Mostly, they are used to strengthen the vulnerable 
physical structures of the systems. They are also invested in interest-earning 
activities, contributed to local schools or other social service activities. They may also 
be used to buy equipment and materials for the maintenance of the system, as well as 
to pay for services rendered to the system by the farmers or hired labors. 
Rules for resource mobilization in emergency situations 
Most rules for resource mobilization in case of emergency differ from those in 
regular situations. Irrigation systems with temporary headwork from the large rivers 
generally face emergencies when the intakes or parts of the main canal are damaged 
during the peak seasons. Depending upon the intensity of the emergency, the WUA 
calls upon the water users to assist in canal cleaning both in simple (locally known as 
jhara) or difficult situations (locally known as mahajhara). In simple cases, every 
member's household sends one working person. In case of difficult or urgent 
One muri husked rice = approximately 60 Kg. 
68 
situations, almost all male members of the irrigators' community are involved in 
repair activities. In one irrigation system (Badkapath), there is also the tradition of 
requesting help from the neighboring system during emergencies. If trans-system 
cooperation is needed, the head of the WUA asks the head of another WUA, who 
then asks his members to help the neighboring system. There are also provisions for 
tfie hiring of a contractor for the repair and maintenance of the irrigation structures in 
Some Western Hills systems (Satrasaya Phant, Upallo Kulo, and Sota Kulo of Gulmi). 
If the type of work to be done by the contractor is very difficult, and if the contractor 
qannot complete all necessary work within three days, each member of the concerned 
irrigation system becomes involved in emergency cases. 
Hill irrigation systems require intensive maintenance during the monsoon season, 
lylany systems levy cash fines against members who are absent from work, with 
larger fines being applied in emergency cases. If the fines are not paid, the WUA can 
\jvithhold the offender's access to irrigation water. The community of members may 
also exert social and physical pressure on such members so that he/she fulfill his/her 
obligations (Martin and Yoder 1987). The cash collected from fines is invested in 
maintenance of the systems94. 
Partners' Rules for Irrigation Dispute Management 
Farmers in Nepal are known for having developed effective measures to prevent and 
resolve water disputes. 
Prevention of Irrigation Disputes 
Ffarmers in the Western Hills have adopted many water rights practices to prevent 
irrigation disputes (Poudel et al. 1994). Some of them are as follows: 
i; Many irrigation canal diversion structures may be arrayed along the same 
stream arranged in the same way as done in the past by the ancestors. The 
distance between two diversions should be at least 100 meters. This 
minimizes the probability of the water users' involvement in the inter-system 
water disputes. 
ii. Currently, all diversions are temporary in nature (brushwood or gabon 
boxes). The users of the upstream system are not allowed to make the 
diversions permanent, nor may they shift the diversion to the downstream 
side, because this might adversely affect the volume of water the nearest 
downstream system receives, especially during periods of water deficit. The 
shifting of diversion to the upstream side is allowed up to the point where it 
still lies behind the nearest upstream diversion. The last diversion situated at 
the dead end of the stream can be shifted to either side, however. 
iii. Any system can utilize as much water as it can divert into the system if 
using brushwood diversions. 
In one of the systems in Kathmandu Valley (Khodku irrigation system), members of a religious 
organization (Guthi) with no land in the system should also obey orders issued by the Guthi 
management to de-silt the canals. The absentees are fined cash. They have a Guthi committee to 
take care of every activity. See also Shrestha 1982. 
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iv. Under conditions where two or more canals need to cross, the water from 
the canals is not amalgamated. Instead, wooden aqueducts are used to 
transport water across. By doing so, the users have protected their water 
rights. 
v. The downstream system is entitled to utilize all the drainage water of the 
upstream system. For this reason, the irrigators of the upstream system 
cannot divert drainage water directly to the stream or river. 
vi. The policy of providing irrigation water on a "first come, first serve" basis of 
demands is one of the keys to preventing irrigation disputes. The provisions of 
proportional weirs, fixing rotation, turns and time for water distribution, and 
provision of guards or dhalpa also serve to prevent irrigation disputes between 
different sectors or field channels (Poudel 1996; Shukla et al. 1993). 
Resolution of Irrigation Disputes 
Different approaches and institutions are involved in the management of different 
types of disputes. Such cases are managed on the local level through fanners' groups, 
local leaders, or local political or government units. Generally, most irrigation 
disputes between two or more farmers are mediated and settled by the people who are 
related to one of the disputing parties through social relationships of patrilineal 
kinship or marriage. The common dispute resolution practices observed in the 
Western Hills of Nepal are as follows (Poudel et al. 1994): 
i. In most cases, irrigation water dispute resolution processes initiated by the 
disputing parties themselves or by their immediate community are more 
efficiently and effectively resolved than when outside institutions become 
involved in the process. 
ii. Most disputes over water allocation and distribution in the Kathmandu Valley 
irrigation systems were discussed and settled in public meetings (Shrestha 
1982). In the most irrigation disputes in the central Inner Terai of Nepal were, 
however, resolved through mutual consensus and informal agreements 
between the disputing parties (Shukla et al. 1993). 
iii. Use of sanctions: In many systems, transparent rules are developed for 
water use and resource mobilization. Most disputes arise due to violations of 
the current norms. The Executive Committee of the WUA has every right to 
apply rales (developed by the General Assembly of all members) to punish 
the defaulters. Such sanctions can be monetary fines, cessation of water 
turns, temporary withdrawal of access to water right, or even suspension 
from WUA membership, depending upon the severity of the cases. 
iv. Motivation and attitude change: In most cases, disputes are reported to the 
WUA. The WUA itself, or the General Assembly (Mohi Sabha), will try to 
convince both disputing parties that they should avoid future disputes. Each 
member is taught about the importance of equitable water use and the need 
to conform to the rules. Such methods of dispute resolution are generally 
70 
used if the dispute affects the disputing parties more than the system as a 
whole. 
vi Educating disputants and accepting confessions: Some dispute cases arise 
because of some water users' unfamiliarity with the current norms developed 
and practiced in the irrigation systems. In such cases, the WUA familiarizes 
the disputing parties with the WUA rules. If the defaulters realize and regret 
their mistakes, they will not be punished. 
vi. Formulating new rules: Sometimes, the executives or other members of the 
WUA are also not aware of some factors that easily cause disputes in water 
use management activities because circumstances have arisen. In such cases, 
new rules are created and the disputing parties are treated according to those 
rules. Such rules may work to prevent disputes in the future as well. 
Farmers and Public Institutions for Dispute Management in Nepal 
In rural Nepal, there were traditionally several officials and institutions available 
whose task was to work towards the settlement of disputes. Among these were 
panchayats, pancha-bhaladmi, tax collectors for the irrigated lands (jimmuwal or 
talukaar) and those for uplands (mukhiya) in the Hills and Terai (praganna 
choudhary); the landlord (Jamindar); the traditional herbal doctor (baidhyd); the 
village elders (budha-paka); and sabha or kachahari (the mass meetings of the local 
people called for special purposes). Although jimmuwal, talukaar, mukhiya, 
óhoudhary, dittha, bichan were and still are among the public officials working for 
cjifferent government institutions, they continue to be popular means for the handling 
of common people's social problems, both during their official tenure as well as after 
retirement. 
Traditional Rural Institutions and Pancha-Bhaladmi 
Pancha-bhaladmi is the most dominant and probably the oldest rural social institution 
that manages village disputes in Nepal. Literally, it is a group of five persons. In 
practice, it is a voluntary collective group of village leaders, but the number of 
rnembers in this group is not important. The concept and practice of pancha-
hhaladmi in irrigation management has historical importance dating back to the era of 
Ram Shah, the King of Gorkha. As early as the 16th century95, he established 
"panchayaf as a voluntary rural institution for irrigation canal management. In 
addition to dealing with water disputes in irrigation systems, the panchayats were 
also active in the resolution of other rural social problems. The concept of pancha-
bhaladmi was very popular not only in Gorkha, but in other principalities throughout 
rural Nepal. Leadership of the pancha-bhaladmi is determined by either being the 
eldest member of the society (long experience and more respected among the 
Kiembers of the society), having education or being literate, being a priest {pandit), or aving built up confidence of the farmers by having effectively handled previous 
See also Gellner et al. 1997; Adhikari 1982. 
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disputes. Working or retired government officials like dithiha, bichari, baidar, subba, 
mukhiya, writers, soldiers or policemen, and teachers are also regarded as potential 
members of the pancha-bhaladmi. For them, age may not be the important factor. In 
general caste and high socio-economic status of the person's and their ancestors' are 
equally important for becoming a member of the pancha-bhaladmi. 
Relative to men, women had less chance to become a member of a pancha-
bhaladmi. However, this does not mean that women were not able to become 
members of the pancha-bhaladmi. Rather, their access was minimized since they 
generally had less access to public rural social institutions than the men. Strong 
factors influenced women's lack of access to those institutions. First, although the 
rate of social change is very fast today, even in the rural areas, traditional culture in 
Hindu society recognized women mainly as actors for household chores and domestic 
family activities. Any public social activities in the village or neighborhood were 
viewed as "the burden" of men. Secondly, rural women had always a very low 
literacy rate in comparison to men96. 
The role of pancha-bhaladmi in irrigation management in the Hills of Nepal 
has remained unnoticed in the literature. However, I have observed cases elsewhere 
in Nepal where the farmers of downstream farms dismantled newly built irrigation 
canals and the new farmer presented his grievances to the pancha-bhaladmi. Both 
parties in such cases had to conform to whatever decision the pancha-bhaladmi 
reached. In the cases I am familiar with, the pancha-bhaladmi respected the prior 
rights of the downstream farmers and the new system never materialized. In another 
case, a farmer had dug a small field channel (ahad) along the cropped fields of 
another headend farmer. The tailend farmer, even though he had been using the same 
space to irrigate his winter crops for the decades, had to pay an amount of grain 
determined by the pancha-bhaladmi in compensation for the crop damages caused by 
the field channel. The access rights to use the waterway was not challenged by the 
headend farmer, however. In another case, a new branch of an existing irrigation 
system, intended to convert an upland plot (pakho) into rice land (khet), was 
dismantled by a nearby downstream farmer. The pancha-bhaladmi, called upon by 
the new farmer, rejected the claim to convert the pakho land to khet. In a similar case, 
a farmer called upon the pancha-bhaladmi to discuss how a tree along the border of 
his field belonging to another farmer was blocking the sunlight from his vegetable 
patch. His claim was that the tree near the vegetable plot should be taken down. The 
pancha-bhaladmi, however, only granted him the permission to cut small branches 
(brushwood) every year, but not the tree itself nor any of its large branches. The 
owner of the tree also agreed to this solution. 
Dispute Management through Farmer Leaders 
In addition to calling upon the pancha-bhaladmi to settle difficult disputes, FMISs 
have, for several centuries, been managed by many informal farmers' institutions 
each with its own style and organization (Poudel et al. 1994). Such informal 
institutions are made up of and recognized by the farmers themselves. However, they 
Even in these days, the literacy rate of women in Nepal is far behind (23 percent) than that of 
men (57 percent). See UNICEF and NPCS 1996. 
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are not necessarily registered with or recognized by any of the governmental or quasi-
governmental agencies. Sometimes even some he farmers themselves are not aware 
tjiat such informal institutions exist. There is, however, an informal system of control 
On irrigation water and irrigation system management. Some farmer leaders are more 
active in these institutions than other villagers because of several socio-economic 
factors. Such factors include the political, educational, economic, and social status of 
the farmers and their organizational affiliations97. A farmer who has been encouraged 
by the leaders of the ruling political parties is generally interested in playing a leading 
role in the village. Such farmers may also be relatively more knowledgeable about the 
contemporary legal and judicial rules and practices than other farmers in the village. 
They may also be more economically secure than other farmers and can gain access 
to many formal and informal institutions and agencies that deal with village 
problems. In addition to these characteristics, a village leader should also have a 
relatively high social status. Caste, religion, age, gender, and occupation are major 
factors that affect the social status of a farmer in rural Nepal. Thus, influential 
individual farmers dominated many FMISs before Water Users Associations (Kulo 
Samiti) were institutionalized. 
After democracy was established in 1950, many traditional leaders who 
functioned as irrigation system managers were replaced by other farmer leaders who 
had old or new relevant status attributes. Village level officials or members of the 
WUA liked to personally handle disputes in villages. But they also include a variety 
c?f other village leaders and organizations, such as the village elite; workers of 
community-level non-governmental organizations; gender groups like the Mothers 
Group (Aatna Samuha) or the Women's Society (Chelibeti Samaj); youth 
organizations; professional organizations (like farmers' associations, ex-civil servant 
associations, ex-military associations, ex-police associations - as a group or indi-
vidual); village-level human rights or development organizations; leaders of political 
parties; mukhiya; jimmuwal; relatively well off villagers (sahu-mahajan); landlords 
(jamindar); village elders (budha-paka); or priests (pandits). 
Dispute Management by Water Users Associations 
Farmers started to organize themselves in the 1950s, when the dictatorial Rana 
rpgime was replaced by the new democratic institutions of the Kingdom of Nepal. 
Many FMISs in the hills and the plains formed associations to manage their activities. 
Whatever the kind of irrigation institution developed as most of them were involved 
in water acquisition, allocation, and distribution, resource mobilization, rule making, 
and dispute management. Currently, irrigation systems traditionally managed by 
choudhary, jimmuwal, or talukdar are undergoing transformation toward a more 
Strongly community-managed irrigation system. This change is driven by several 
factors, including the entry of new farmers using the same irrigation systems, an 
increase in the number of households headed by the children and grandchildren of 
traditional leaders, increased access to education, or the proliferation of new leaders 
among water users. Therefore, the choudhary of the Terai and jimmuwal or talukdar 
Of the Hills are also gradually replaced by Water User Associations. In most disputes 
arising between water users of the same irrigation system, executive members of the 
I See Poudel et al. 1994 for detailed information. 
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WUA now mediate the disputes between the disputing parties. Sometimes the 
problem is also publicly discussed in the WUA or its General Assembly so that have 
opportunity to present his or her interpretation and solution to the problems of the 
dispute at hand. Such an arena may help the disputing parties in their negotiations. A 
WUA also develops many rules on irrigation water management that may prevent 
possible water disputes among the farmers. They develop and implement such rules 
and principles for dispute resolution98. 
Public Institutions for Dispute Management 
Farmers in Nepal could report disputes that failed to be settled by the local 
institutions to the government agencies. They also had a choice of which government 
agency to turn to for dispute resolution. Since ancient times of Nepal, there were 
government judicial institutions for dispute management based on religious and 
cultural norms and ethics (Pradhan 2000; Bhattarai 1997; Khadka 1997). Judicial 
decisions during the Kirat dynasty (the first known rulers of Nepal, before 464) were 
based on a religious book of Kirats, known as Mundhum (Bhattarai 1997). The 
Lichchhabi kings (464-782) introduced a judicial system based on the Hindu religion 
and customs. The successors of the Lichchhabi kings, the Malta kings (782-1768), 
established a central court (Kotilinga), which was a principal judicial institution based 
on the contemporary customs and practices (riti-thiti). Shortly thereafter, Ram Shah, 
the king of Gorkha, developed a law known as Thiti™ with the help of religious 
leaders (pandits). The state was then supposed to follow the Thiti for its judicial 
cases. After the unification of Nepal in 1768, King Prithvi Narayan Shah introduced 
legal and judicial reforms based on the prior judicial systems of the principalities. 
During the Rana regime (1846 to 1950) police, badahakim, and courts were the 
government agencies that commonly handled dispute cases. Badahakim were 
regional administrators within the Kingdom of Nepal. They were authorized to make 
all administrative and judicial decisions concerning problems they encountered 
within their jurisdiction. It was, however, rare for common people to be able to 
access justice from badahakim because of the economic, social, and geographic 
constraints. However, a special group of government officials from Kathmandu or 
from the regional administrative centers was delegated to study local problems. They 
would either settle cases in the field or present a brief report to the government. Such 
delegations were commonly known as "Daudaha". Daudaha was an ad hoc group of 
civil servants formed by government agencies to perform a specified task. The justice 
given by such groups, however, was rarely fair, especially for those who had no way 
of pleasing the visitors because of their poor social or economic status. 
The police usually did not take a water dispute into their hands that involved 
problems associated with access to water rights, water turns, or watering procedures. 
Police offices were scattered around the district for the purpose of maintaining law 
and order in society according to the contemporary laws. People reported to the 
police only when an unusual case arose. There were times when water disputes 
threatened to lead to violence. Such disputes could threaten the law and order or 
A brief presentation of such rules is included under "farmers' rules for irrigation dispute 
management" presented earlier in this chapter. 
Literally, "law according to the then rule of society" or, the norms, customs. 
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could lead to or have been caused by, a crime. In such cases, the police and district 
administration would work together to solve the problem and maintain the social 
order, as authorized by the statutory laws. Without further investigation, police 
authorities would report the cases to the district administration. The district 
administration then would authorize the police to take the offender into temporary 
qustody unless the case was settled through the proper channels such as badahakim 
and daudaha. 
In the Southern Plains of Nepal (Terai), farmer leaders, government 
representatives, and land tax collectors (praganna choudhary) were traditionally the 
main persons who built and managed irrigation systems (Shukla et al. 1993). In the 
Hills, farmer leaders and government representatives and tax collectors for irrigated 
land (jimmuwal or talukdars) in the Hills led the management of many community-
managed irrigation systems. Praganna choudhary in the Terai and jimmuwal or 
talukdar in the Hills worked as village-level representatives of the Rana rulers until 
1950 and usually were among the large farmers in both areas. The functions of both 
revenue collection and civil administration in the Western Hills 1 0 0 were fulfilled by 
the land owning elite (Regmi 1988). However, some of the influential members of the 
irnmediate families of the Rana Prime Ministers were also given the title of 
Maharaja, which meant they had full financial, administrative, and judicial authority 
in their jurisdiction (rajya). The Rana rulers also made changes to the existing 
judicial system and rules. Some state legal codes were promulgated based on the 
previous religious principles (Bhattarai 1997). The national legal code, known as 
Muluki Ain of 1853, was one. Especially during the last decade of their rule, the 
people's dissatisfaction with the Rana rulers was widespread. To show the people 
that there was an independent judiciary system in the Kingdom, a Supreme Court was 
established in 1940, known as Pradhan Nyayalaya. A three-tier court system was 
developed between 1940 and 1945, including a district court (Amini and Adalat), a 
court of appeal (Appeal Adalat and Bhardari Adalat), and a supreme court (Pradhan 
Nyayalaya). 
During the Rana rule, only few irrigation disputes in the Katmandu Valley were 
reported to the Army Brigade for resolution (Shrestha 1982). At that time, it was the 
responsibility of the Army Brigade in Lalitpur to maintain law and order in the area. 
Most of the cases referred to the army concerned water theft. There was also a 
provision for guards to prevent water theft or of farm product theft. 
After the Rana regime was overthrown in 1950, the Interim Government Act 
kept the three-tier court system intact (Bhattarai 1997). The Judicial Administration 
Act of 1959 changed the names of the courts and established a four-tier system: a 
lbcal court (Ilaka Adalat) was the first instance trial court; the district court (Jilla 
Adalat) worked as the first appellate court; the higher court (Uchcha Adalat) as the 
second appellate court, and the Supreme Court (Pradhan Nyayalaya) as the highest 
judicial institution. After the introduction of the panchayat system in 1960, a judicial 
administration act passed in 1961 recognized only a three-tier court system: The 
District Court, as the court of first instance; the Zonal Court (Anchal Adalat) as the 
court of appeal; and the Supreme Court (Bhattarai 1997). hi 1974, however, the 
Regional Court (Chhetriya Adalat) was added as the second tier of the Appellate 
m Known as West No. 3 administrative zone of Nepal from the last quarter of the 19* century 
until Nepal was classified into 14 administrative zones and 75 districts during panchayat era. 
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Court. Currently, since the reintroduction of the multi-party system in 1990, there is 
again a three-tier system of courts: the District Court (75); Appellate Court (11); and 
Supreme Court (1). 
During the Panchyat period (1960 to 1990), prospective members of the pancha-
bhaladmi also played the role of pancha-bhaladmi when they were involved in other 
organizations such as the panchayat at the same time. Like pancha-bhaladmi, 
panchayat is also a group of five people. From 1960 to 1990, however, panchayat 
was the governance system. The traditional concept of panchayat as a rural voluntary 
institution was replaced by the local government body under the panchayat system 
known as the village panchayat. A village panchayat was made up of nine wards, a 
ward representing a hamlet or a group of neighboring hamlets. The executive body of 
a village panchayat consisted of a chairman, a vice-chairman, and nine ward 
members, while a civil servant served as secretary to the village panchayat. Later, 
these ward members were replaced by ward chairmen. The ward chairmen had to 
chair their ward committees consisting of four members and the chairman. The 
people directly elected all of the village panchayat officials and members from their 
respective political districts. However, the chairman, vice-chairman, and ward 
chairman of the village panchayat were still recognized as members of pancha-
bhaladmi. 
After democracy was reintroduced in 1990, Village Development Committees 
(VDC), District Development Committees PDC), Chief District Officers (CDO), the 
police and the courts became the dominant public agencies that handled dispute 
cases. The VDC as a local government body replaced the old village panchayat the 
local level. The Local Self-Governance Bill of 1998 strengthened the local role 
played by VDCs (Nepal News, 1999). The mandate of the VDCs includes the 
supervision of agriculture, irrigation, drinking water, river control, forests, and the 
environment. VDCs can make their own decisions regarding the use of local 
resources within their political boundary which is usually done in close coordination 
either with users committees or other concerned governmental and non-governmental 
agencies. VDCs can also form a mediator's committee to settle disputes within their 
jurisdiction. The committee consists of three people: the vice-chairman of the VDC 
as Chair; the local ward chairman from where the dispute originated; and the 
chairman or a representative from the other ward(s) involved in the dispute. If no 
outside ward is involved in the dispute, the third person is nominated by the chairman 
of the committee from among the ward chairs of the VDC. This committee does not 
have the right to impose a decision, however. Its role is to make an attempt to 
negotiate or mediate the dispute and settle it in the most appropriate manner. If the 
disputing parties do not agree to settle the dispute in the VDC, the VDC writes a 
report to the District Administration Office describing the details of the case and the 
reason why the case was not resolved by the VDC. It is the decision of the disputing 
parties whether to accept the agreement as stated by the VDC or report the case to the 
District Administration Office. If the disputing parties report to the District 
Administration Office, the administrative officer for the Conflict Section (Mudda 
Phant) handles the dispute. He may also try to settle the case through a mutual 
agreement (Milapatra). If one or all of the disputing parties do not agree with the 
comprise proposed by the officer he may sanction the disputing parties according to 
the statutory rules. If the disputing parties also do not agree with the statement given 
by the District Administrative Office, one of the parties can report the case to the 
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District Court. Similarly, the case may go to the Appellate Court and also to the 
(Supreme Court. Thus, courts continues to be the major state institution that deals with 
all types of dispute in Nepal. However, there is always the risk that the courts may 
transform the content of the disputes. The substantive norm the courts apply differs 
from rules of custom or ordinary morality, and their unique procedural norms may 
narrow down the issues and limit evidence (Malla and Khadka 1997). In many cases, 
disputes originating from water-related problems are not registered as irrigation 
disputes in the courts. A more important issue is that very few water disputes in 
Nepal are filed in the courts (Khanal and Khatri-Chhetri 1997; Malla and Khadka 
1997). The majority of claimants and defendants in such cases are traditional upper 
caste farmers (Brahman and Chhetri). Many underprivileged individuals may not be 
^ble to claim their rights because of the many socio-economic problems they have 
Recessing the legal systems. 
The role of the police, the district administration, and the courts has not significantly 
Changed since 1950. However, the ways in which the cases and the parties are 
handled may have changed because of an increasing democratic mentality in every 
sector of governance throughout the Kingdom. Although most writings on judicial 
processes of dispute management in Nepal describe court cases, there are also many 
other government organizations involved in irrigation dispute management activities. 
Most of them are quasi-judicial government institutions like irrigation offices, the 
police, the Agriculture Development Office, the Land Tax and Revenue Office, the 
Drinking Water Office, the Forestry and Resource Conservation Office, the Agri-
culture Development Bank, and so on. At the national level, the Department of Irriga-
tion, the cabinet of the ministries, the Members of Parliament (MPs) may also be 
Involved in the negotiation or adjudication of irrigation disputes, but it is not their 
t-ole to deliver a judicial statement to the disputing parties. Rather, they may use their 
influence to settle the dispute through an appropriate negotiating statement. The 
Cabinet of Ministers can be used as a last resort to resolve major disputes that have 
national importance. The Supreme Court, however, can also challenge a decision 
given by the cabinet. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THULOTAR KULO AND ITS FARMERS 
the purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the readers about the historical evolution 
of Thulotar Kulo and the present day socio-economic organization of Thulotar 
farmers. It describes the socio-physical characteristics of Thulotar Kulo in its 
historical and present situations, as well as the socio-economic characteristics of 
Thulotar farmers during my 1997-98 research period. I begin with a description of 
the origin of Thulotar Kulo and how it developed up to the present. Next, I will 
present a description of the socio-economic organization of Thulotar farmers and 
Thulotar itself. 
Establishment and Development of Thulotar Kulo 
Position ofTandhun District and Thulotar Kulo in Nepal 
thulotar Kulo is one of the oldest farmers built and farmer managed irrigation 
systems (FMIS) in Tanahun district in the Western Hills of Nepal. Tanahun is a hilly 
district of Gandaki zone in the Western Development Region of Nepal between 
longitudes 83° 57' to 84° 34' East and latitude 27° 36' to 28° 05' North, covering a 
geographical area of 1568.4 square kilometers (Poudel et al. 1994). It is connected to 
Lamjung and Kaski districts to the north, Kaski and Syanja districts to the west, Palpa 
tad Nawalparasi districts to the south, and Chitwan and Gorkha districts to the east. 
Byas Nagar101, the district headquarters, is situated along the Kathmandu-Pokhara 
Highway (Prithvi Rajmarg), near the middle of the district (Fig. 1). Byas Nagar is a 
municipality named after Maharshi Byas (also known as Bed Byas), an ancient 
kuthor who wrote Beda, one of the most important pieces of religious and social 
literature in Hindu civilization. It is said that Maharshi Byas once lived in a cave 
within the jurisdiction of present-day Byas municipality. The cave can be found along 
the Madi River in Byas Nagar. Previously, Byas Nagar was a Damauli Village 
Development Committee. 
There are hundreds of FMISs in Tanahun. A few of them have also received 
government rehabilitation assistance, including Thulotar Kulo. It is one of many 
small FMISs of the Rupakot Village Development Committee (VDC) on the north-
eastern border of Tanahun. Rupakot VDC contains nine wards. All nine wards consist 
of small hamlets on the northern slope of a spur of the Mahabharat Range within 
tanahun. It is one of the more remote VDCs in the Hills of Nepal. It is comprised of 
all categories of traditional caste structures. Nearly all the inhabitants of this VDC 
are poor- to middle-class farmers, the majority of whom are Hindu, but a few of the 
hill tribes are Buddhist. The population of this VDC is moderately literate. 
The Byas Nagar municipal center is known as Damauli. 
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Thulotar Kulo is situated in Rupakot Phedi in Ward No. 4 of Rupakot VDC. This 
place is known as Rupakot village. Rupakot village lies within less than one hour's 
walking distance (about three kilometers) south-west of Sundarbazar, Lamjung. It is 
situated within about two hours' walking distance to the west of Paundi Bazaar along 
Dumre-Besishahar road (Fig. 1). The general socio-economic status of the Rupakot 
villagers is relatively better than other villages under Rupakot VDC. Like most of the 
Rupakot VDC, Rupakot village also consists of all caste categories. All of its people 
are Hindus by religion, while most of them are Brahman. 
Thulotar Kulo is the modified name of the originally farmer-developed and 
farmer-managed Eghrasayatar Kulo (Fig. 2). Later, Eghrasayatar Kulo became 
popularly known as Thuloswara Kulo. What had once been known as Thuloswara 
Kulo was later named Thulotar Kulo after it underwent the very first intervention 
done by the Department of Irrigation through the Tanahun Nahar Subdivision. This 
was a project to renovate Thulotar Kulo in 1981-82102. The water in Thulotar Kulo is 
tapped from a perennial stream, locally known as Sabadi Khola103. Sabadi Khola is a 
tributary of the Naudi Khola. It lies at the boundary of Ward Three and Ward Four of 
Rupakot VDC (Fig. 3). Marshyandi River is the ultimate drainage system of the 
iNaudi Khola. Marshyandi is one of the nine major tributaries of Narayani (Gandaki) 
[River104. 
Thulotar Kulo's irrigation system consists of a permanent intake and a 740-meter 
lined/ 690-meter earth-worked main canal. Ten small branch canals with a combined 
length of 1255 meters serve about 20 hectares of land belonging to 67 farmers. In 
addition to the 67 official beneficiaries from Thulotar Kulo, nine farmers of the 
[neighboring rice fields may also use water drained from Thulotar Kulo to irrigate 
about 11 ha of land (Table 6 in Annex-I). They are not considered to be general 
members of Thulotar Kulo and do not have any defined duties or responsibilities 
related to irrigation management in Thulotar Kulo. The eleven hectares of land 
cultivated by these farmers are not included in the twenty hectares of the official 
Thulotar Kulo service area. For the most part, there is not enough water even within 
the defined area so there is no question of extending the service area. The farmers, 
[who use the drained water from Thulotar, do not claim access rights to the Thulotar 
[irrigation water. Instead, they use other sources of irrigation water. They do not play 
[any role in the construction, renovation, or maintenance of Thulotar Kulo, but they 
may get water from Thulotar Kulo according to the customary and statutory laws that 
protect access to water from gravity flow. 
The average discharge rate of the Thulotar main canal is about 200 liters per 
second (DIO Tanahun 1996). Wet land rice is the main crop grown in the irrigated 
area during the rainy season. A very small area is allotted to wheat, potato, and 
mustard in winter; the rest of the land is fallow during the winter season. Maize is the 
main crop during the summer. 
All 67 farmers of Thulotar Kulo are Hindus. Although they represent all castes, 
Brahman and Chhetry are the dominant groups. The majority of Thulotar farmers are 
Even today, Thulotar Kulo is referred to officially in government literature as Thulotar 
Irrigation Project. Normally, it is known as Thulotar Kulo in Rupakot. 
Small rivers and creeks in Nepal are popularly known as khola. 
Also known as Gandak River in India. 
81 
related to one another through various types of strong social networks based on 
brotherhood (patrilineal kinship), marriage, politics and other social ties. These 
factors have helped keep their society intact and unified. A detailed description of the 
characteristics of Thulotar farmers is presented in the forthcoming sections of this 
chapter. The next section covers a brief history of Thulotar Kulo, from the time when 
Egharhasayatar Kulo was constructed to the present status of Thulotar Kulo, in 
regards to its physical and institutional development. Then, I will conclude this 
chapter after a thorough description of the socio-economic organization of Thulotar 
farmers. 
Construction of Egharhasayatar Kulo 
Thulotar Kulo is one of the thousands of small-scale FMIS in Nepal. Egharhasayatar 
was the previous name of what is presently known as Thulotar. Similarly, 
Egharhasayatar Kulo is the original name of present day Thulotar Kulo. It is not 
known how the operation and management of contemporary Thulotar Kulo began 
as there is no written information on when the original irrigation channel for 
Egharhasayatar was dug. However, some of the elderly farmers of Rupakot know a 
version of how it began. They believe that Egharhasayatar began as a settlement 
hundreds of years ago. Later, all the settlers of Egharhasayatar moved to higher 
ground (gaun) in present day Rupakotgaun (Fig. 3) due to the fear that the lowlands 
(best) encouraged malaria. The low-lying land that is now known as Thulotar 
remained fallow for several years after the emigration of its settlers to what was 
then known as Rupakot village. Now, what was Rupakot village also has a 
settlement known as Rupakotgaun, where some of the members of present day 
Thulotar Kulo still live. 
When the villagers of Rupakotgaun felt that a wide piece of land at 
Egharhasayatar had not been properly used for several decades, they started to think 
about putting it to better use. Rice was the main staple food crop in Nepal during that 
period, just as it is today, so rice farming was of paramount importance to the 
farmers in this region. Farmers at that time produced only one irrigated rice crop per 
year. The farmers of the previous Rupakot village also thought that irrigated farming 
was more beneficial than the former upland farming in Egharhasayatar. The 
landscape of Eghrhasayatar was also not difficult to convert into rice terraces. 
Therefore, farmers proposed to construct an irrigation canal for Egharhasayatar from 
Sabadi Khola, although it is not clear who initiated the plan. This was the beginning 
of present day Thulotar Kulo. The total area of Egharhasayatar at that time was only 
about 13 ha (1100 mato muri, Fig. 2). Several decades after Thulotar Kulo began, the 
presently irrigated areas of Chalise, Dhulpure, Kole, Tilahar, Gagante, Purtari and 
Kanle were converted to irrigated rice land (khet) (Fig. 3). Previously, this was a 
forest area (Fig. 2). Purtari was the last piece of land converted into rice fields. 
Indigenous Management Systems ofTalukdar 
Most of the farmer-built irrigation systems in north-east Tanahun, for several 
centuries, have had institutions, although not necessarily formal, and the organization 
to manage irrigation water and irrigation structures for several centuries (Poudel et al. 
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1994). Thulotar Kulo probably also had some form of organization from its 
beginning. Present day farmers are able to trace the management history of Thulotar 
Kulo back to approximately 150 years ago. During this period, the village leader, who 
served as local tax collector known as mukhiya or thari was responsible to collect the 
:land taxes for upland plots (pakho'05). Similarly, a talukdar or jimmuwal was 
responsible for the collection of land taxes from the irrigated rice lands (met). The 
land tax collectors were nominated by the Rana rulers from among the village 
leaders. For several decades in many parts of Nepal, the tax collectors for irrigated 
lands managed the farmer built irrigation systems. One of the water users of Thulotar 
in the 1870s was also a popular priest (pandit) of the Rupakot area. He was also a tax 
collector (talukdar) for the north-eastern part of Tanahun, including Thulotar, and 
was popularly known by the name "Pandit" in the Rupakot area, where he collected 
khet land taxes for the Rana government. In exchange for collecting land taxes from 
the farmers, he received a certain percentage of the taxes in cash as his remuneration. 
His father was also one of the influential farmers of Rupakot. Now, one of the sons of 
Mr. Pandit is a member of Thulotar Water Users Association (WUA), and is 
recognized as a farmer leader by other farmers of Rupakot. Mr. Pandit was fully 
concious of his leading position among the farmers of Rupakot. 
According to the local history traced by some of the village elders of Rupakot, 
the first Mr. Pandit managed Thulotar Kulo (when it was still Eghrhasayatar Kulo), 
beginning in approximately 1870. It was understood that Mr. Pandit probably took 
this responsibility over from bis father. Whatever the case may have been during the 
tenure of Mr. Pandit, every farmer of Thulotar had to pay land tax during Chaitra, or 
before the end of every year. Chaitra106 (March-April) is the last month of the year 
according to the Nepalese calendar (Bikram era). If farmers could not pay their land 
taxes before the beginning of the next year, it was possible that they would lose the 
land they were using. Farmers did not want to miss this crucial date to pay land tax. 
Mr. Pandit also used this opportunity to clean the canal. There was also a system of 
recruiting labor via a village-messenger in Rupakot at that time, just as there is today. 
jThe messenger, who was known locally as kattuwal, was and still is a kind of rural 
institution in many villages in the Hills of Nepal for communicating public messages 
to the villagers. Generally, a man from a Pariyar"" family is appointed as kattuwal. 
The kattuwal is paid either in cash or in kind by each household in the village. In 
addition to cash, he also receives the benefit of getting shares of food during the 
major festivals like Dashain. Now, a Village Development Committee (VDC) 
appoints and pays for the kattuwal. However, some villages (or wards) continue the 
tradition of being responsible for the payment to the kattuwal. Ward No. 4 (Rupakot 
village) of Rupakot VDC still has such a messenger. Mr. Pandit would ask the 
[kattuwal to deliver a message to all farmers informing them of the dates for paying 
land taxes and participating in canal cleaning. 
To this day, a kattuwal broadcasts the message to the villagers during the 
Pakho land is the upland used for unirrigated agriculture. 
The Nepali new year starts around April 15th. Baisak (Baisakh), Jeth (Jestha), Asar (Aashadh), 
Sam (Shrawan), Bhadau (Bhadra), Asoj (Aswin), Kartik, Mugsir (Marga), Pus (Poush), Magh, 
Phagun (Phalgun) and Chait(Chaitra), respectively, are the names of 12 months. The words 
inside the parenthesis are supposed correct terms for them in the written language. Most of 
them are Sanskritic in origin. 
A title under the occopational caste. 
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evening of the day before the proposed day to meet and clean the part of his or her 
canal. Mr. Pandit never accepted land tax before this day so that every farmer should 
attend this event. Those absent at this event were fined in cash. Cash was very rare in 
the past, and barter and labor exchange were the dominant rural economic 
institutions. Therefore, farmers rarely missed the fixed date to pay cash or clean the 
canal. There was no water deficiency problem during the rainy season in the past, and 
winter and summer farming was not practiced in Thulotar. 
After the overthrow of the autocratic Rana regime and the beginning of 
democracy in 1950, at least a few leaders, even in the rural villages, were aware of 
people's democratic rights to participate in development works. As a result, other 
farmer leaders also showed interest in helping Mr. Pandit manage the Thulotar 
Irrigation System. They were mostly senior and respected citizens of Rupakot, 
including Mukhiya and a young village leader. They demanded government 
assistance to renovate Thulotar Kulo through one of their most popular and 
democratically elected leaders during his visit to Rupakot in 1951. Although he had 
not yet taken any position in the cabinet of ministers at this time, he was known as the 
most popular leader in 1950 revolution. Regardless of having interest in working with 
Mr. Pandit in the management of Thulotar Kulo, no new leaders showed interest in 
replacing the leadership of Mr. Pandit to 1960, and there were no village level 
government units in Nepal before 1958. The first multi-party parliamentary system, 
adopted in 1958, tried to institutionalize villages and municipalities. The panchayat 
system became the national political ruling institution in 1960 and replaced the 
parliamentary system. Then, the village panchayat and ward systems started to 
develop and act as the local government political units. It was 1960 when the 
panchayat system started and the Land Revenue Office {Malpot Adda)108 replaced 
the old talukdar system. The talukdar at that time, Mr. Pandit, continued working as 
the official representative of the Land Revenue Office as a jimmuwal. It was at this 
time that the concept of talukdar was replaced by the concept of jimmuwal, but there 
were no differences in the work responsibilities of the two. Thus, from 1950 to 1960, 
Mr. Pandit continued his leadership in the management of the Thulotar irrigation 
system as the jimmuwal of the locality. 
Formation of Water Users Association and Rehabilitation ofThuloswara Kulo 
The Thulotar irrigation system has an official Thulotar Water Users Association 
(WUA)109. The first ever WUA in Thulotar Kulo was formed in 1960 under the 
chairmanship of a young village leader, popularly known as "Writer" in Rupakot. 
Other popular leaders also joined Mr. Writer to make a WUA of Thulotar. Among the 
leaders, there was an elderly farmer of Thulotar Kulo, the Mukhiya, a vice chief 
executive officer of the village (Upa-Pradhan Pancha[[0), and a son of the previous 
leader Mr. Pandit. During his first tenure as chairman in Thulotar Kulo, Mr. Writer 
was 36 years old. He was literate in Nepali and Sanskrit. He was also one of the civil 
servants in a district level Land Revenue Office about five kilometers away from his 
home. He had some idea of the water and land rights laws of HMG/Nepal at that 
Malpot Adda is the common Nepali version of the Revenue Collection Office of HMG/Nepal. 
Known as "Thulotar Jala Upabhokta SamitV or "Thulotar Kulo SamitC. 
During the Panchayat era, Pradhan Pancha was the chief executive officer of the village 
panchayat (Gaun Panchayat). 
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time. He also was a Brahman, just as the previous leader had been who was now 
seeking someone appropriate to replace him. In the meantime, Mr. Pandit was telling 
the Thulotar farmers that due to his old age he was no longer able to lead Thulotar 
Kulo management. Mr. Writer was also somewhat richer than the other Thulotar 
farmers, as well as one of the active leaders of the ruling political party during that 
period. Mr. Writer was a member of the Adhikari family that comprises 
approximately 65 percent of the water users in Thulotar (Table 7 and Annex XH). 
This was also at the time when the people of Nepal had started to exercise their rights 
to participate in and organize development institutions. Mr. Writer led Thulotar WUA 
Until 1994, at which time he retired because he was unable to work due to his old age. 
Mr. Writer faced two major challenges during his tenure. One was a dispute against 
one of its upcanals, which will be described in Chapter 6. Another challenge was the 
improvement of the irrigation structures of Thulotar Kulo through a rehabilitation 
project, described below. 
Rehabilitation ofThuloswara Kulo 
Thulotar farmers had been interested in the rehabilitation of their irrigation system 
since 1960, when they had made their demands known to one of the popular national 
political leaders. The WUA submitted their request for renovation to the Tanahun 
Nahar Sub-Division in 1981 through a written note signed by more than fifty farmers 
of Thuloswara Kulo (DIO 1996). For any FMIS to be rehabilitated as a government 
project, a formal request had to be tendered to the irrigation authorities by an 
authorized WUA. Thus in 1980, the Thulotar WUA was registered in the office of 
tanahun Chief District Officer at Damauli. They were able to get substantial 
financial support from HMGTNepal through Tanahun Nahar Sub-Division, but only 
for the years 1982-1985. 
At the beginning of the rehabilitation project, Thulotar Kulo or Thuloswara Kulo 
as it was then called, was also called the Thulotar Irrigation Project in government 
documents. The Tanahun Nahar Sub-Division initially invested NRs 976,315.00 in 
the project (DIO Tanahun 1996). Once the project was completed, a permanent 
concrete-gated headwork and a permanent spillway replaced the initial temporary 
brushwood headwork of Thuloswara Kulo. They also lined a 740-meter section of the 
main canal, stretching from the headwork to Rupakot Phedi (see Fig. 3). According to 
the rules of HMG/Nepal at that time, farmers had to bear a 15 percent part of the total 
rehabilitation cost. Two-thirds of it, however, were substituted with labor or kind and 
only one-third by cash collection. To this end, Thulotar farmers mobilized equal 
shares of labor from each member household to collect sand and stones from the local 
fivers. They also provided timber from the local community forest to replace part of 
their labor contribution requirements. The amount of cash collected was based on the 
size of the irrigated land within the service area of Thuloswara Kulo. At that time, the 
DIO had not started in Tanahun. Farmers had no authority in deciding the quality of 
work and its supervision so the engineers from Tanahun Nahar Subdivision worked 
as the government agents. 
Election of New Water Users Association and Renovation of Thulotar Kulo 
According to provisions of the Thulotar WUA constitution, the Executive Committee 
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of Thulotar WUA consists of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, a Secretary, a Treasurer, 
and four to seven members. They are to be elected by the general members of 
Thulotar Kulo from among the members of the General Assembly. But by 1994, 
Thulotar Kulo have a general understanding that the chairman of Thulotar Kulo 
would be the ward chairman of Ward No. 4 of Rupakot VDC, where the Thulotar 
Kulo lies. The General Assembly of Thulotar Kulo consists of all general members of 
Thulotar Kulo. In practice, all of them are unanimously nominated by the General 
Assembly. There have been no elections where the executive positions in the WUA 
were contested. Generally, the Ward Chairman of Ward No. 4, Rupakot VDC, is 
nominated as the Chairman of Thulotar WUA, but the Ward Chairman is not 
necessarily the ex-officio Chairman of WUA. When I tried to find out why the 
farmers of Thulotar were so interested in nominating the Ward Chairman for the 
Chairman of WUA, the farmers responded by giving a number of reasons for 
theirchoice. According to the present VDC Act of HMG/Nepal, it is the responsibility 
of the Ward Chairman to lead and co-ordinate all types of local level development 
activities within the Ward (Nepal News 1990). Since management or repair and 
maintenance of the irrigation system are some of the important development activities 
in the farmers' community, the Ward Chairman should also chair the WUA. As Ward 
Chairman, he should visit the district headquarters in Byas Nagar several times for 
different purposes. For example, he should visit Byas Nagar at least one time each 
year to attend the Tanahun District Development Committee's (DDC) General 
Assembly (Jilla Sabhd), of which he is an ex-officio member. He may also visit there 
at least one times during his tenure to participate in the election of the DDC 
Executive Committee. The DDC Executive Committee is directly elected by the 
Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen and all Ward Chairmen of all VDCs within the district. 
Besides such visits, a Ward Chairman may also be asked by the VDC to visit district 
headquarters for the various activities the VDC is concerned with. Since many 
government line-agencies related to development and maintenance of irrigation 
systems are at the headquarters, the Ward Chairman may be able to work more 
efficiently. Moreover, the Chairman of a WUA should have leadership abilities. 
Under the present political system, the Ward Chairman is directly elected by the 
voters within his or her electorate (a ward). If a candidate for Ward Chairman wants 
to represent a political party, he or she must first be able to get the party nomination 
as a candidate to win the election on the behalf of the political party. Secondly, to be 
elected as the Ward Chairman, he or she needs to win the votes of the majority of 
villagers. Thus, the Ward Chairman will have proven his or her ability to lead. 
Because of the inability of Mr. Writer to lead Thulotar WUA due to his old age, 
he suggested Thulotar farmers change the leadership and to form a new and more 
active Executive Committee composed of younger members. Following his advice, 
the Thulotar members nominated a new Thulotar WUA in 1994 under the 
Chairmanship of the Ward Chairman of Ward No. 4 of Rupakot VDC, who was not 
the member of Thulotar Kulo. The present WUA of Thulotar consists of an eight 
member Executive Committee, including the Chairman, ViceChairman, Secretary, 
Treasurer and four Executive-Members. The President is also the elected Ward 
Chairman of Ward No. 4 of Rupakot VDC (proper Rupakot village). He comes from 
one of the relatively high status Adhikari-Chhetry families and has many relatives 
among Thulotar Kulo members through blood relation111 and marriage (Table 11 and 
In this book, the term "blood relation" or "brotherhood" is used to replace "patrilineal kinship". 
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|Annex-XI). He is the only rice-mill owner in this village and owns relatively large 
size of land in the tailend of the Thulotar Kulo service area. Generally, he gives out 
part of his land in Thulotar to share tenants. He is an ex-military officer of the Indian 
Army and an active political leader of the locality. He is literate in Nepali, but he has 
no any formal education degree. The Vice Chairman is an Adhikari-Brahman. He 
also has many relatives among the Thulotar Kulo members through blood relations 
and marriage. He holds a significant portion of khet land in the middle section of the 
Thulotar Kulo service area. Similar to the Chairman, he also gives out khet land to 
share tenants, and his non-agricultural income is considerably higher than that of the 
average farmers. He is a government employee and a high school graduate. The 
Secretary also comes from an Adhikari-Brahman family. Although he has a small 
parcel of land in the middle section of the Thulotar Kulo service area, he is regarded 
as one of the popular young leaders of the village. He is a high school graduate and 
¡the elementary school teacher in another village within the Rupakot VDC. The 
[Treasurer comes from the Poudel family. He owns a medium sized parcel of land in 
the middle and tail sections of the service area. He is also a High School graduate and 
retired VDC secretary. Now, he is a medical practitioner in a local government 
dispensary. Among the four members, one is a woman. She is one of the daughters-
in-law of the Treasurer. She is High School graduate and teacher in the local 
lelementary school. The three other members, men, are Adhikari-Brahmans. All of 
them have a high socio-economic status in Rupakot village. They are a mukhiya, an 
ex-police officer, and a son of the popular Mr. Pandit. 
Renovation of Thulotar Kulo 
Although the last rehabilitation of Thulotar Kulo was little more than a decade ago, 
there was a serious seepage problem along the main canal when I and other 
colleagues from the Irrigation Management System Study Group (IMSSG112) of the 
institute of Agriculture and Animal Science (IAAS), Rampur, Nepal visited the 
[system in 1993. We were preparing the inventory and need assessment of irrigation 
[systems in north-east Tanahun at that time. The problem was identified as a serious 
[problem and as being beyond the capacity of the Thulotar farmers to deal with, so we 
recommended external assistance. This system was listed in the 12th position among 
the 33 irrigation systems identified and listed in order of priority for external 
assistance (Poudel et al. 1994). When the Thulotar WUA heard about the status of 
their irrigation system in our report, their confidence was sufficiently high to request 
another renovation project from the Tanahun DIO in April 1995. The Tanahun DIO 
[had been established in 1986 and began assisting the FMIS in Tanahun at that time. 
The project was approved in January 1996 through the Tanahun DIO within the 
framework of the Irrigation Line of Credit (ILC) implemented by the World Bank. 
The loan was channeled through HMGVNepal (DIO Tanahun 1996; Shivakoti 1992; 
[Shukla and Sharma 1994). Below I present a brief summary of the bureaucratic 
process the Thulotar WUA followed to get the fund from HMG/Nepal through the 
LLC framework. 
April 1995: 
• The WUA applied to the Irrigation Line of Credit Turnover Rehabilitation Program 
to fund their project in the Tanahun DIO. In their application, the Thulotar farmers 
mentioned their commitment to sharing the necessary investments in cash, kind, or 
1 1 2 Now, IMSSG is renamed as WMSP (Water Management Study Program) at IAAS, Rampur, 
Nepal. 
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labor, according the ILC/DIO rules. Their commitment was also extended to their 
understanding of taking over the responsibilities of management of the renovated 
irrigation system after its completion. 
• In the meantime, the farmers also made advance contact with the Minister for 
Agriculture, and Local Development113 to gain his personal recommendation to the 
Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR). This minister was one of three Members of 
Parliament (MP) from Tanahun and the adjacent electorate region of Rupakot. He 
was also one of the very influential central members of the ruling party. 
• The Minister of Agriculture, and Local Development told the Water Resource 
Minister that the Thulotar Kulo had an urgent need for renovation. The 
Agriculture, and Local Development Minister was also familiar with this system. 
June 1995: 
• The MOWR, referring to the verbal information from the Minister of Agriculture, 
and Local Development, wrote to the Director of the Department of Irrigation (DOI) 
to start working based on the ELC rules. 
July 1995: 
• The DOI wrote to the Western Regional Directorate of Irrigation, referencing 
details communicated in the letter from MOWR. 
• The Regional Director wrote to the Tanahun DIO and instructed that a survey be 
done of Thulotar Kulo and that the survey findings be written up in a report. In a 
letter to the Tanahun DIO, the Directorate attached all the paper work details from 
the MOWR. 
January 1996: 
• After the all requirements were met, the project was approved by the Tanahun DIO 
on January 18, 1996, and by the Regional Directorate on January 19, 1996. The 
project proposal was signed by the Mobile Irrigation Team's (an authorized 
government body from DOI) team leader before it was approved by the Regional 
Director. The total amount of the approved project funding was NRs 840,000.00, 
15 percent of which the farmers had to share. Of this 15 percent share, five percent 
was cash (NRs 42,000.00) and 10 percent was kind and labor (NRs 84,000.00). 
• AH these documents were recorded and compiled by the Tanahun DIO. 
• The implementation of the renovation activities started immediately after the 
approval of the project. 
• The Tanahun DIO accepted the designation of the WUA of Thulotar Kulo as the 
Construction Committee for this project. 
• The Construction Committee appointed a contractor according to the prescribed 
rules set for the ILC program. The works covered the renovation of the 740 meter 
lined main canal. It was completed before the second half of 1997. 
Similar to the rehabilitation of Thuloswara Kulo in 1982-1985, the farmers of 
Thulotar Kulo also paid cash for the 1996 renovation project on the basis of the size 
of their irrigated land in the service area of Thulotar. They also contributed lumber 
from their community forest as a substitute for their required labor contribution. 
During this period, the contacted minister was working as the Cabinet Minister of two 
ministries, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), and Ministry of Local Development (MOLD). 
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However, they had to collect extra money to pay for local loggers and carpenters to 
prepare the wood, and also for hired laborers to collect gravel and sand. 
Institutionalization ofPanipale and Water Rotation Practices 
Before 1980, it was not possible to irrigate the fields within Thulotar without a 
significant contribution of time, labor, and patience. There were no provisions of 
water rotation practices and water guards. Harder-working male farmers went to the 
rice fields (khet) to irrigate their field during the night as well. They also worked 
through rainy nights in order to ensure their rice fields were irrigated. Farmers 
diverted water to their fields and guarded their intakes for hours during the night, 
peeping close to the intakes with the help of a locally made shyakhuxu during rainy 
nights. Sometimes, other farmers could cheat the sleeping farmers. As a result, some 
farmers worked in pairs: one to guard the intakes and another to augment the water 
flow in the canal by closing upstream intakes during the night hours. 
There were no clear rules for water distribution within the system. "Might is right" 
was the principle in practice. Those farmers who could not work and guard their 
intakes during nights, and those who did not have working male members in the 
household were deprived of their rights to irrigate their rice fields. The deprived 
farmers started to put their grievances to the WUA and leader farmers. The majority 
of farmers in Thulotar Kulo are socially undivided and have many social networks 
due to their homogeneity in lineage, marriage, religion, caste, and political affiliation. 
As a result, the majority of members in the WUA and other leader farmers outside the 
WUA could not neglect the voices of the deprived from among themselves. They 
Started to think about solutions to the inequity in irrigation water distribution. As a 
result, the practice of irrigation water rotation started in 1980. Similarly, a panipale 
(water guard) was appointed to take care of the water rotation within the Thulotar 
Irrigation System. The appointment of a panipale was done by consensus among all 
water users of Thulotar Kulo in the General Assembly (Mohi Sabha). The panipale 
was appointed for four months, starting from Shrawan (July-August) to Kartik (Oct-
Nov). The water rotation was followed only if water was insufficient for regular 
impoundment in the rice field as perceived by the panipale. He rotated irrigation 
water by dhadepalo (literally, a head and tail system of watering rotations) once 
every 24 hours. Under the dhadepalo system, the total service area is divided into 
approximately two halves as head and tail 1 1 5. 
Roles and Duties of Water Users Association and General Assembly in Thulotar 
Ijjke other social organizations, the main job of the WUA is to co-ordinate and 
execute the decisions and activities amended by the General Assembly (Mohi Sabha). 
However, as the secretariat of the assembly, the WUA also develops and presents 
proposals for activities, rales, and regulations in the assembly. The WUA also works 
as the leader or representative of the Thulotar Kulo farmers in several activities, 
A shyakhu is a common instrument used to replace umbrella during rain. Locally, it is made up 
of bamboo shoots and leaves. 
1 1 5 A detail description of water rotation practices and renumeration for panipale in Thulotar Kulo 
is presented under "Water Distribution Rules" in Chapter 5. 
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including contacts with many development agencies and personnel. Normally, the 
General Assembly in an irrigation system includes all farmers of that irrigation 
system, and there should be at least 50 percent in attendance to sanction the rules 
decided on in the General Assembly. Farmers may not be able to manage time to 
attend the General Assembly often. In such situations, the WUA has to work as the 
ultimate authority in some of the activities connected to irrigation management. Some 
of the WUA also exercise the power and authority of General Assembly. Dispute 
management is one of the major activities among many of such activities. However, it 
is the General Assembly that delegates power to the WUA in case decisions are not 
made on some important issues in one or two General Assemblies. The General 
Assembly that is made up of all farmers is the ultimate authority to develop the rules 
and regulations for water management in the FMIS. Where the WUA is strong, the 
General Assembly may also authorize the WUA to exercise the authority of the 
General Assembly. 
The Socio-Economic Organization of Thulotar Farmers 
There are more than 100 farm households in Rupakot village. From them, only 66 
households, plus one farmer in another village, benefit from Thulotar Kulo. Thus, 
Thulotar Kulo has 67 official members. The following section of this chapter 
describes and discusses the socio-economic characteristics of 67 members of 
Thulotar Kulo, individually as well as their households. The data presented in this 
section are based on the primary information available during my 1997/98 research 
year. Variations in such data may still be possible if they are compared to similar data 
recorded during other years. Data variation may also be due to how the researchers 
define the "household" or "family". In this case, all members of an extended or 
nuclear family are recorded as members of a household unless they are formally 
separated from other members of their family. In this case, not necessarily all 
members of a Thulotar Kulo member's household resided in Thulotar during the 
study year. The socio-economic characteristics presented herein, however, may not 
necessarily represent the whole> Rupakot village. All socio-economic characteristics 
discussed here are important to consider because they determine one's social status in 
the rural areas, and one's socio-economic status is the most dominant factor in 
determining the behavior of the individuals. Studying household characteristics 
therefore is necessary because it may affect the behaviors of the individual members 
of Thulotar Kulo. 
Thulotar Members: Households and their Composition 
The Family and Its Types 
The national average family size in Nepal is large (5.61 1 6). This large family size is 
due to a high population growth rate of 2.5 percent per annum (Table 13 in Annex 
XITl), and the tradition of living, for the most part, in extended family arrangements. 
The ratio of extended type to nuclear type of family among Thulotar Kulo households 
is about 1.5. A nuclear family consists of two spouses and their children, while an 
See CBS 1998. 
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extended family is made up of the nuclear family plus other relatives in residence. 
Mostly, the other relatives in Rupakot are the paternal parents. In many cases, the 
married children also live together with other family members in the parental home. 
.'.n some cases, married women without children may also live in their parental home 
for their entire life. 
A high number of extended families have raised the average family size among 
the Thulotar Kulo members in Rupakot to 6.2 persons, but this is not less than those 
of the national average (see Tables 1 and 2). This is the normal size in most of the 
rural villages in the remote Hills and Terai of Nepal. Among the 6.2 members in 
pch households, more than 50 percent (3.8) are members of working age. The 
average age of Thulotar Kulo members is around 50; this is almost the same in all 
three farm locations within the Thulotar service area. According to the number of 
heads in nuclear family households, the average number of the children per family is 
jnuch lower (2.7) than that the national average (4.87, UNDP 1999). The ability of 
Rupakot farmers in maintaining the low fertility rates may be attributed to their 
jiwareness of family planning and to their educational status, which is relatively better 
than that of the average Nepalese citizen. 
Although the total fertility rate 1 1 7 in Nepal is 4.87, the family size in this book 
refers to the household size. This means that "the family" includes all members in a 
household who share a common kitchen. Thus, it does not necessarily mean a nuclear 
family. In this book, however, the number of children per household was computed 
only for the nuclear family, not for extended families. "Children" are not necessarily 
defined by their membership in a particular age group as well. Instead, they are the 
Children in a nuclear family, in which one of the spouses is a member of Thulotar 
Kulo. In such a case, a member's household is shared only by a nuclear family. 
Table 1. Number of Thulotar members' households by caste and family types 
Caste" 8 Family Types Total 
Nuclear Extended 
Be 20 31 51 
oc 8 7 15 
Bhujcl 0 1 1 
•Total 28 39 67 
41.79 58.21 100 
Among the 67 households of Thulotar members, only six of them are headed by 
women (Annex U). Three of the female household heads are Brahman. Among them, 
two are elderly widowed women, both of whom head an extended family. The third 
one is a married woman living virtually alone, without children. Her husband works 
in a city and is living with another wife and their children. Although he comes home 
once a year, almost all decisions on running home are left to his wife. The other three 
Children born per woman. 
BC and OC stand for Brahman-Chhetry and occupational caste respectively. 
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female household heads are of the Sarki and Kami caste (occupational caste). One of 
them is a elderly widow, who heads an extended family. The husband of another 
Sarki woman has been working in India for several years and he has no control over 
household matters in Nepal. The third woman is Kami by caste. Her husband works 
in a city in Nepal. Most decisions about household matters and the neighborhood are 
made by the wife. 
Most of the large farmer households in Thulotar Kulo have extended families 
(Table 3), while medium- and small-sized farmers have no significant difference in 
the types of family structure. The number of small and medium class nuclear and 
extended farmer families are almost equally distributed. 
Table 2. Family size, number of children, and number of working-age members in Thulotar 
members' households by caste category 
Caste 
Category 
B C 
oc 
Bhnjel 
Tota l 
Family 
Size 
6.3 
5.1 
14.0 
6.2 
No. of 
Children 
2.8 
2.6 
NAlj 
2.7 
Number of 
Working-
Age Members 
(15-65 Years) 
4.0 
3.0 
8.0 
3.8 
Table 3. Number of Thulotar members by family types and farmers' class 
Farmers' Class Nuclear Kxtended 
Large 5 16 
Medium 8 10 
Small 15 13 
Farmers with larger farms have large families in Thulotar Kulo, relative to the other 
categories of farmers in the area, as well as in comparison with the Nepalese 
national average (Table 4). The major reason for this is the type of family these 
farmers have in this area. The family size of both the medium- and small-sized 
farmers, however, is less than the national average. 
If the family size and the number of children is compared, the fertility rate of small 
farmers in Thulotar Kulo looks very high (Tables 4 and 5). However, there are more 
family members of working age in large farmers' households. This may be the reason 
why the family size of the small farmers is larger than the medium-sized class of 
farmers. 
Not applicable. 
See "Land Distribution among the Households of Thulotar Members" for detailed information 
on how farmers' class is classified in Thulotar. 
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[Table 4. Family size of Thulotar members by farmers' class 
farmers' Class Family Size 
Large 8.48 
Medium 4.78 
JSmall 5.28 
ÍTotal 5.60 
Table 5. Number of children and working-age members of Thulotar households by farmers' 
class 
Farmers' Class No. of Children No. of Working-Age Members 
Large 3.40 5.24 
jVIedium 1.30 3.00 
Small 4.67 3.32 
The Caste Composition 
The farmer members of Thulotar Kulo come from all four caste categories (see 
Tables 6 and 7, and Annex U). Since all five Chhetry members are descendants of 
Adhikari-Brahmans due to marriage systems, there is no significant socio-cultural 
variations among Brahman and Chhetry members in Thulotar. Therefore, all forty-six 
Brahmans and five Chhetry are classified into the single category of BC, or 
Brahman-Chhetry. All Brahmans in Thulotar are Upadhyaya. There is only one 
fnember from Baisya, i.e. Bhujel (or Gharti). Eight Nepali (Sarki) and seven 
JBiswokarma (Kami) are also categorized into a single category, OC (Occupational 
Caste) that represent Sudra in Thulotar Kulo. In order to systematize the description 
pf the nature, characteristics, and behaviors of Thulotar Kulo members, they are 
presented as BC, OC and Bhujel in this book. In Thulotar, BC represent Adhikari, 
Poudel, and Pandit. Sarki (Nepali) and Kami (BK) form the OC group. The general 
features of these caste categories have been described earlier. The following 
paragraphs concern some of the selected socio-economic characteristics of Thulotar 
Kulo members. 
Table 6. Number of Thulotar members by caste and farm location 
Caste Farm Location 
Head Middle 
!BC 6 23 
OC 0 0 
Bhujel 0 0 
Total 6 23 
%age 8.95 34.33 
Total %age 
Tail 
22 51 76.12 
15 15 22.39 
1 1 1.49 
38 67 100.00 
56.72 100 100.00 
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Of the 67 members of Thulotar Kulo, at least 75 percent are Brahman-Chhetry 
(Tables 6 and 7). About two-thirds of the total membership comes from a single 
Adhikari family. There are only 15 households of occupational castes, and only one 
Bhujel. The six farmers of the head section are Adhikari. All 23 members of the 
middle section also are BC. All OC and Bhujel have their lands in the tail of the 
management area. Economically and socially weak farmers of the occupational castes 
and Bhujel families thus have no access to the more fertile, more productive, and 
more expensive lands towards the middle and head sections of Thulotar area. BC is 
dominant in all three sections. Not surprisingly, most of the occupational castes of 
Thulotar Kulo are small farmers (Table 8). Historically, OC have been behind in 
many aspects of their social lives (see also Bista 1972). The social disparity in South-
Asia can at least partially be attributed to the caste system itself. Therefore, as in 
other parts of Nepal, most of the occupational caste socio-economic parameters 
among Thulotar members have been very poor throughout history. 
Table 7. Number of Thulotar members by caste, family name and farm location 
Caste Family Farm Total %age 
Location 
Names Head Middle Tail 
BC Adhikari 6 19 19 44 65.67 
Poudel 0 4 1 5 7.6 
Pandit 0 0 2 2 2.98 
OC Nepali 0 0 8 8 11.94 
BK 0 0 7 7 10.45 
Bhujel Bhujel 0 0 1 1 1.48 
Total Total 6 23 38 67 100.00 
Table 8. Number of Thulotar members by the caste groups and farmers' class 
Farmers'Class BC OC Bhujel 
Large 20 0 1 
Medium 7 11 0 
Small 8 20 0 
Educational Status of Thulotar Members 
As in other parts of Nepal, there is a great disparity in schooling between Brahman-
Chhetry (BC) and occupational castes (OC) and Bhujel among Thulotar members. 
The average schooling years of BC show that they reached the highest class (grade 
eight) of lower secondary school (Table 8 in Annex I), whereas the others have only 
finished elementary school. Out of 67 members of Thulotar Kulo, nine are 
completely illiterate, and most of these are from occupational castes (Annex H). Ten 
farmers have 12 years of schooling or more, and all of them are from the Brahman-
Chhetry group. However, none of them had the chance to study agricultural or allied 
sciences. Since the occupational castes have been dominated throughout the history 
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of caste and class systems in the Hindu societies, I do not see the need for a further 
explanation of why the OC are so poorly educated in comparison to the BC even 
within the same village. The same factor has worked in Rupakot village. However, 
the average school years of 8.06 among BC and 3.33 for OC two or three decades ago 
(considering that the average age of Thulotar members is 50 years) is not so 
discouraging in a remote, rural, hilly village of Nepal. Although, there were no 
schools in Tanahun, the people of Rupakot were literate in at least Nepali and/or 
Sanskrit through Gurupithi2i. Many of the Brahmans of Rupakot have worked as 
priests (pandit) or teachers (guru) for many years. Since Brahmans were also more 
socially aware and better-off socio-economically, they somehow managed to go to 
Kathmandu, and Banarus in India to study religious and cultural literature. Similarly, 
the children of the relatively richer and better educated society had more educational 
opportunities than other citizens. Other castes might have also been influenced by the 
environment in Rupakot and sent their children to schools after they were established 
in the Hills of Nepal after 1950. In general, the literacy rate in Tanahun district is 
about 10 percent higher than the national average (Table 4 in Annex XIIL). 
The children of all Thulotar members are now only 15 minutes away on foot from an 
elementary school. A higher secondary school (HSS) is no farther than about 30 
minutes walking distance. The students at the local HSS are taught health 
education122. Students studying for their Bachelor Degrees and for higher degrees go 
either to Byas Nagar (the district headquarter), Pokhara, Chitwan, Kathmandu, or 
elsewhere. Now, many students from Rupakot study on campuses in each of these 
centers. 
As with other socio-economic characteristics, small farmers are also relatively poor 
in schooling (Table 9). However, the small farmers' average years of schooling is 
not so bad when compared to other classes of farmers. But it is below the average 
for Thulotar Kulo. None of the small farmers hold Bachelor Degrees and only about 
one-third of the small farmers are high school graduates (see Table 10). On the 
other hand, there are three Bachelor level graduates among large farmers. But the 
number of High School graduates in the large farmer class is also only one-third. 
The distribution of educational opportunity is relatively equal among the medium 
class farmers. Although they are very low in number, at least some of the Thulotar 
members have graduated high school and gone on to the Bachelor's level (Table 
10). 
Table 9. School years of Thulotar members by the farmers' class 
Farmers' Class School Years 
Large 8.19 
Medium 7.00 
Small 5.93 
Non-formal religious and educational institutions in Hindu societies. 
Although it is an education course (formal training for lower secondary school teachers), 
students who want to study at this school have only health education as an option for their 
major field of study. 
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Table 10. Number of farmers' class according to educational status 
Farmers' Below High Intermediate Bachelor Total 
Class High School School Level Level 
Level Graduate Graduate Graduate 
Large 14 3 1 3 21 
Medium 13 3 1 1 18 
Small 20 5 3 0 28 
Social Relationships among Thulotar Members 
Brotherhood (or patrilineal kinship), relation through marriage, landowner-tenant, 
teacher-student affiliation, fictive kinship (mitra saino), and plowman (hali)m are the 
dominant institutions in Rupakot which tie many members of Thulotar Kulo to each 
other. Social relationships as discussed in this section do not include the relationships 
between household members. Many of the 67 Thulotar members are related to each 
other through more than one relationship. Thus, I have presented the collective 
frequency of the same member/s when describing the social relationships in this book 
instead of counting their simple frequencies. 
Table 11. The collective frequency of Thulotar members tied with different types of 
social relationships 
Type of Relationship Number Percentage 
Patrilineal Kinship 36 53.73 
Marriage 27 40.30 
Landowner/Tenant 13 19.40 
Teacher/Student 9 13.43 
Mit 7 10.45 
Hali/Balighar 5 07.46 
More than 50 percent Thulotar members are related through patrilineal kinship 
between one another (Table 11 and Annex XI). The brotherhood relationships as 
described here include the patrilineal kinship relations among the members of 
Thulotar Kulo. The majority of Thulotar members are descendents of the Adhikari 
family. A significant number of members also come from the Poudel family. Both 
the Adhikari and Poudel families are the descendants of Upadhyaya Brahmans. 
Previously, marriage between the Adhikari and Poudel families in Rupakot was very 
common because of they were from the same caste. Normally, as a pre-requisite of 
marriage between two young people, both of them should come from the same caste 
category but not the same title (or family name). Marriage should not take place 
within a certain generational proximity. In other words, the marriage partners must 
be removed a minimum number of related generations. The number of required 
See later parts of this section for mitra saino and nali. 
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generations removed for the new marriage tie is prescribed differently in different 
normative suborders. In most Brahman communities, the proposed bride and groom 
Should not normally fall within nine generations of close relationships. The definition 
6f "close relationship" is also complex and varies in different situational contexts. To 
put it shortly and simply, marriage between the children of two close relatives is 
usually not accepted. If they are Brahman, both of them should also come from the 
Same ancestor of Poorbia or Kumai. In other words, the children of Kumai Brahman 
are not allowed to marry the children of Poorbia Brahman, and the same applies for 
children of Upadhyaya Brahmans and Jaisi Brahmans. Both the Adhikari and Poudel 
families at Rupakot are Poorbia and Upadhyaya Brahmans. Thus, many of their 
children are married to each other. It is not surprising that many youngsters married 
their peers within their own village when villages in the Hills of Nepal were isolated 
from the outside world. There were no transport or communication facilities at that 
time, and people were not educated about, or if educated, not exposed to the outside 
World. Therefore it was normal for different types of social relationships to develop 
Wong the villagers themselves rather than with geographically distant communities. 
Although there are still a few cases of such marriages between the Adhikari and 
Poudel Brahman families in Rupakot, the number is diminishing mainly due to the 
close relationships which have developed between these families because of the 
earlier marriages. 
One out of ten Thulotar members is also related to other members by mitra 
saino. In common language, mitra saino is a fictive kin relationship between two 
people who refer to each other by "mif. The children of the mit are also called mit-
children, i.e., son as "mit son" and daughter as "mit daughter". This tradition is 
commonly applied to all types of social relationships associated with the mit. One mit 
may treat the children of his/her mit as if they were his/her own children, both 
personally and socially. Similarly, the parents of mit are "mit parents" (see also 
Gurung 1997). Mostly, mitra saino is a very strong social relationship. In practice, 
the relationship between two mit and/or between the close relatives of mit can be 
pven stronger than blood relationships in some cases. The sentiment or affection 
fjetween two mits is very strong. The ties can be so strong that marriage is not 
tolerated within a certain generation of two households with members in it who are 
tied by mitra saino. 
Mitra saino is established between two individuals of the same sex when they 
develop very good personal understanding and cooperative feelings between 
themselves. In general, the mit come from the same age group and, in many cases, the 
physical appearance of two mit may also be similar. Mitra saino is practiced across 
family names and between any ethnic or caste group. In general, the proposed mit 
come from those households that are not related through any previous social 
relationships. What is most interesting about mitra saino in Rupakot, where the caste 
system is very strong and Brahmans are dominant, is that five out of the six cases of 
mitra saino reported are between Adhikari (Brahman and Chhetry) and Sarki (the 
occupational caste). Only one case occurs between two Brahman men (Adhikari and 
Poudel). In all cases, people with mitra saino ties are men, while no such 
relationships occur between women. Although there are only six cases of mitra saino 
among the Thulotar members, in practice as many as 37 people out of the total 416 
people affiliated with Thulotar members' households benefit from this type of 
relationship. 
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Many members of Thulotar Kulo are also tied to each other through landlord-
tenant relationships (Table 11 and Annex XI). Before I discuss the types of people 
associated in this kind of relationship, I need to clarify on how the number on 
landlord-tenant relationship is computed. To begin with, it is a collective frequency of 
Thulotar members who cultivate other member's land within or outside of Thulotar 
under one or more of any type of tenurial arrangement. A tenant in this case might be 
a sharecropper, contractor, pledge-tenant, or a combination of these. Tenurial 
practices that are arranged between Thulotar members and outside farmers (not 
members of Thulotar Kulo), however, are not accounted for under landlord-tenant 
relationships between Thulotar members (Tables 22 to 24). The types of land tenure 
arrangements do not necessarily continue for longer periods. A different type and 
duration of land tenure arrangement may occur in a different year. Therefore, the 
types of landlord-tenant relationship presented in this section are strictly based on my 
research in 1997/98. 
Most landlord-tenant relationships in Thulotar are between the BC and 
occupational castes. In fact, most of the tenants are members of occupational castes. 
Since a landlord-tenant relationship is between the household heads of two Thulotar 
member households, the relationship is not confined only to the members. In the 
Nepalese context, where the household concept is stronger than individual or private 
interests, virtually all persons in the households that are involved in landlord-tenant 
relationships have a relationship with each other. In other words, an individual 
Thulotar member does not act as the sole authority or operator of such tenurial 
arrangements. Here, one may also question how a landlord-tenant relationship 
becomes one of the important social relationships among Thulotar members. The 
economists may describe it as merely a rural economic institution. However, 
landlord-tenant relationships in rural areas has a great significance beyond its 
function as an economic institution. There should be strong trust and other informal 
social relationships in place before such a relationship can develop. It is necessary 
that mutual trust exists to apply the contractual understanding between the landlord 
and tenants. Once two members are joined in a landlord-tenant relationship, they may 
also cooperate with each other in many other social activities, including financial and 
manpower supports in normal life and ceremonial occasions. 
There are also nine cases where any one of the current Thulotar members is 
either the teacher or student of at least one other member. I have presented it as a 
teacher-student relationship among Thulotar Kulo members. The notion of a teacher-
student (guru-chela) relationship has been developed as a strong social institution in 
throughout the history of Nepal. Not more than 50 years ago, there were no schools 
outside of Kathmandu. Few people were able to get to Kathmandu or India for 
schooling. However, there were informal education systems operated by some of the 
religious leaders of that time (pandits, local elite), where religious and cultural 
literature was taught to small groups of students at their own home. Such types of 
home-schools were popularly known as gurupith. Although it was not like a modern 
student dormitory, most students lived at their teacher's home as well. Thus the 
relationship between the students and their teacher was as an informal group 
members. Because of this tradition, the teacher (guru) of today is expected to deliver 
similar affection to all of his or her students (chela) just as they do for their own 
children. Students are also expected to respect their teacher in the same way as they 
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do their own parents. Thus, the relationship between the teacher and student goes 
beyond a formal relationship. They may cooperate in other socio-economic activities 
in addition to the teaching and learning activities in the schools. 
One in twenty members work as a hali (plowman) for other members (Table 11 
and Annex XI). Generally, people from the two lower castes {Baisya and Sudra) plow 
the lands of Brahman and Chhetry under an annual contract or on a daily wage basis. 
In most cases, the hali is a poor farmer who may need social and economic support to 
maintain himself and his family. If he is affiliated with one of the relatively better-off 
households, his problems might be better understood by the persons in his balighar 
(the household for which the hali plows) than other persons. Although the primary 
objective of a hali is to get a certain wage in terms of cash or kind for his plowing 
labor, being a hali for a better-off household makes him feel like he is more secure 
Socially. In addition to the mutually arranged contracts, he also enjoys eating meals at 
the balighar every morning when he comes to plow. He also gets about half a 
(dlogram (one mana) of rice following each plowing day. Rice is considered a rich 
man's meal in the villages. Many poor households replace rice with corn or millet. A 
hali thus has the chance to share at least a small quantity of rice with his family 
members. He is also called in to share the rich food in almost all ritual and cultural 
ceremonies that the balighar organizes within the contractual period. Therefore the 
social relationships between the persons in a balighar and their hali are somewhat 
like being members of the same household. They are also bound by a strong patron-
client relationship. In many cases, hali may enjoy the benefit of receiving a cash or 
grain advance whenever he needs it. Hali may also get some extra money and goods 
'to help him celebrate the regular cultural ceremonies. Some of the occupational caste 
members of Thulotar Kulo work as hali for some Brahman members. 
Membership in Social and Political Organizations 
The members of Thulotar Kulo as well as their household members are affiliated 
with many local and other social organizations in Nepal in different ways. In this 
book, all types of such affiliations are broadly presented in two major categories: 
political groups and social groups. The functionaries or members of all political 
parties are categorized as being in the "political group". While all other organizations, 
such as the Teachers' Association, the Women's Group (Aama Samuha), and the 
lYouth Club are placed in the "social group" category. During my research year in 
1997/98, about half of the Thulotar members were affiliated with some type of social 
and/or political organization (Tables 12 to 14, Table 9 and 10 in Annex t and Annex 
;LX). Although more affiliations have been observed among the tailenders, four out of 
[the five affiliated members are from the BC castes ( Tables 9 and 10 in Annex I). 
Thulotar members are almost equally active in both social and political organizations. 
More than half of the large and small farmer class members are affiliated with some 
type of organization. Large class members are almost equally interested in both social 
and political organizations. Interestingly, small class members seem more active in 
politics than other social activities. Medium class members are least interested in 
either type of organization. Other family members of Thulotar members' households 
are almost five times more active in social organizations than those in political arena 
(Table 14). The children and families of BC members have more organizational 
affiliation than the other groups. 
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Table 12. Number of Thulotar members' organizational affiliation by the type of organization 
and caste category 
Caste Social Political Both Total 
BC 8 4 13 25 
OC 1 6 0 7 
Bhujel 0 0 0 0 
Total 9 10 13 32 
%age 28.12 31.25 40.62 100 
Table 13. Number of Thulotar members' organizational affiliation by the types of 
organizations and the classes of Thulotar members 
Farmers'Class Social Political Both Total 
Large 6 1 5 12 
Medium 1 0 4 5 
Small 2 9 4 15 
Total 9 10 13 32 
Table 14. Number of Thulotar members' households according to their members' 
organizational affiliation by types of organization and caste category 
Caste Social Political Both Total 
BC 10 3 10 23 
OC 6 0 0 6 
Bhujel 0 0 0 0 
Land Distribution among the Households of Thulotar Members 
Almost all the factors mentioned so far, such as the socio-economic characteristics of 
Thulotar Kulo members, affect their social status in the Thulotar Kulo area. The size 
of the farm holding of the individual members, however, is the most dominant 
deciding factor of social status in rural Nepali society (Seddon 1987). The principal 
criterion for being a member of Thulotar Kulo is ownership of irrigated land within 
the service area of Thulotar Kulo. All 67 members of Thulotar Kulo own land in the 
service area. I have classified Thulotar Kulo members (farmers) as Large, Medium 
and Small farmers based on their total land size (Table 18 and Annex VTT). The total 
land size includes all irrigated as well as unirrigated lands within and outside Thulotar 
owned by the member. To classify the farmers' landholding, I have taken the national 
average land size as the standard, which is about 0.95 ha per household (Table 2 in 
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Annex XIJJ). Using this as a reference, Thulotar Kulo farmers with an average land 
size of 0.95 or greater are classified as Large Farmers; farmers having an average 
land size of at least 0.50 ha but less than 0.95 ha are defined as Medium Farmers, and 
farmers with an average land size of below 0.5 ha are classified as Small Farmers. 
These classes of farmers are used to describe and analyze other socio-economic 
characteristics and behaviors of Thulotar Kulo members in irrigation management 
particularly for explaining water rights and dispute management activities in Thulotar 
Kulo. 
Most of the small farmers are from the tail part of the Thulotar Kulo service area. 
The majority of the medium class farmers is distributed in the middle and tail sections 
(Table 15). There are no small farmers in the head part. Similarly small farmers are 
dominantly present towards the tail parts. Therefore, the trend of the farm location 
yvithin Thulotar service area is that the larger farmers are the nearer they are to the 
Source of irrigation water. This trend further supports that land size is one of the most 
important factors determining the socio-economic status of a farmer. Mostly, large 
farmers have better access to all socio-economic opportunities including education 
and non-farm activities. These factors may help these farmers to choose better lands 
within the service area of an irrigation system. In the case of Thulotar, most of the 
farmers who occupy lands towards the head section are Brahman and Chhetry. This 
group of farmers is also dominant and more concious than other groups of farmers. 
Table 15. Number of Thulotar members by farm location and farmers' class 
Farmers' Class Farm Locations Total Percent 
Head Middle Tail 
Large 3 8 10 21 31 .34 
Medium 3 7 8 18 26.87 
Small 0 8 20 28 41.79 
Total 6 23 38 67 100.00 
total Land Holdings 
Landholdings in Rupakot are very small and fragmented. The average total 
landholding size of Thulotar farmers is 0.87 ha 1 2 4 (Table 16). The Thulotar members' 
ownership of met (lowland) and pakho (upland) is almost equal. Each Thulotar 
rnember household holds less than a hectare of land within the Thulotar service area. 
The farmers from the middle sector of the Thulotar area are relatively better-off in 
comparison to others in terms of landholdings. Aside from the OC Thulotar members, 
the rest of the farmers own more than a hectare of land each. In Nepal, such farmers 
are known as "rich" farmers. But, in the same village, the OC own only a third of a 
hectare on average. 
It is slightly smaller than the national average, but bigger than the average in Tanahun district 
(see Annex XIII). 
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Table 16. Land size of Thulotar members by farm location (ha) 
Farm Khetw/i Khet Total Cultivated Kharbari Total Total 
out- + 
Location T-tar* side T- Khet Pakho Jungle Pakho Land 
Area tar 
Head 0.032 0.421 0.743 0.168 0.074 0.249 0.973 
Middle 0.401 0.237 0.651 0.346 0.108 0.588 1.107 
Tail 0.248 0.191 0.412 0.239 0.072 0.324 0.708 
All 0.307 0.227 0.524 0.271 0.093 0.408 0.869 
Table 17. Land size of Thulotar members by caste category (ha) 
Caste Khetw/i 
T-tar" 5 
Area 
Khet 
out-
side T-
tar 
Total Cultivated 
Khet Pakho 
Kharbari 
+ 
Jungle 
Total 
Pakho 
Total 
Land 
BC 
OC 
Bhujel 
0.349 
0.156 
0.450 
0.281 
0.020 
0.622 
0.635 
0.176 
1.072 
0.291 
0.179 
0.600 
0.119 
0.000 
0.150 
0.469 
0.179 
0.750 
1.001 
0.356 
1.822 
Land Distribution within Thulotar Service Area 
The location of the farms within the service area in all gravity-fed surface irrigated 
systems is very important due to many geo-physical factors. Because of this, the 
whole service area of Thulotar has also been classified as Head, Middle and Tail in 
this book. The same categories also serve to classify the Thulotar members according 
to their farm locations in Thulotar area. All farms irrigated through Thulotar Kulo 
from Chalise to Gangate (from outlet Rl & LI to Rll from the main canal) are 
classified as "head" (see Fig. 3,4 and 5). Similarly, all farms from Purtari to Atharha 
(from outlet R12 & L2 to R17 & LI 1 from the main canal) are classified as "middle", 
and all areas below Atharha to Kanle (outlet R18 & L12 and below) are classified as 
"tail". Kanle is the last plot of the Thulotar service area at its tail end (Fig. 3). 
The division of the Thulotar service area into thre parts is based on the frequency and 
amount of irrigation water available to the service area of Thulotar Kulo. The WUA 
classifies all land from Chalise to Atharha as "head" and all area below Atharha as 
"tail". But in practice, the panipale was never found visiting the intakes in the head 
part above Purtari (Intake No. 12, see Fig. 3 and 5) to break water in many head 
intakes when it was the tail part's turn to be irrigated. Actually, water rotation was 
practiced in Purtari and below Purtari. All fields above Purtari enjoyed irrigating their 
rice fields regularly for twenty-four hours everyday. Therefore, I thought three 
classifications as "head", "middle", and "tail" were more appropriate than just 
"head" and "tail". According to this system of classification, there are six farmers in 
T-tar = Thulotar. 
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the "head", twenty-three in the "middle" section, and thirty-eight in the "tail" (Table 
15). 
The average landholding of medium class Thulotar farmers is less than half of the 
large class members (Table 18). We also see the similar difference between the 
medium class and small class farmers. 
Table 18. Land size of Thulotar members by the farmers' class (ha) 
p a n n e 
r s ' 
C l a s s 
F a r 
m e r 
No. 
Khet 
w/i T -
t a r 
Khet 
Outside T -
t a r 
Total 
Khet 
Cultivated 
Pakho 
K h a r b a r i Jungle Total 
Pakho 
Total 
land 
t a r g e 21 0.4731 0.5485 1.0400 0.4591 0.1176 0.1120 0.8283 1.7246 
^lediu 
m 
Small 
18 0.2310 0.1541 0.4100 0.2402 0.0574 0.1220 0.3131 0.7137 
28 0.1713 0.0340 0.2117 0.1496 0.0004 0.0001 0.1546 0.3271 
If we relate land size to caste membership, we see that the average farm size of BC 
farmers within the Thulotar service area is more than double than that of the OC 
farmers (Table 17). Although the farm size of the Bhujel member-household is larger 
tnan other caste categories, it is a household that consists of a large extended family 
of 14 persons. This family was living together at the time of this research. The size of 
his land can be reduced any time his sons want to separate from the extended family 
household. 
The Livelihood of the Thulotar Farmers 
Out of a total population of 416 persons of the Thulotar households, only 118 
people are full time farmers (Tables 19 & 20; Annex II & Annex ÏÏT). In contrast to 
other rural villages in Nepal, each Thulotar household has at least one member 
working in income generating activities outside agriculture. All non-agricultural 
income-generating jobs are categorized as "services" in this section. The services 
are also divided into two categories: services inside Nepal and services outside 
Nepal. Teaching is the most dominant non-agricultural activity in Thulotar. Few 
persons work in government sectors, some work as private industrial laborers and 
shopkeepers. Most of the people working outside Nepal work in the Indian Army. 
Some people also work as shopkeepers and security guards for private enterprises. 
Also twelve household heads were found to be working in other countries, mainly 
in India. The numbers in parenthesis in Table 19 and Table 20 are the total numbers 
involved in those professions. The numbers outside the parenthesis are the average 
figures for each category. 
There are at least two students in each household. The people categorized under 
"student" are not necessarily children by age; rather, they are full-time students, 
predominantly at the school but also at colleges and universities. The day-study 
Students of the local high school may assist the farmers during off-school hours. 
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The working age students live in distant places, however, and cannot contribute to 
the agriculture labor force. 
Table 19. Number of Thulotar household members by main professions and caste category 
Caste Students Farmers Service Service out- Total Sei 
in Nepal side Nepal Holders 
B C 2.1 (105) 1.7 (087) 1.2(60) 0.1 (07) 1.3(67) 
oc 2.2 (033) 1.7 (025) 0.1 (02) 0.3 (04) 0.4 (06) 
Bhujcl 4.0 (004) 6.0 (006) 1.0 (01) 1.0(01) 2.0 (02) 
T o t a l 2.1 (142) 1.8 (118) 0.9 (63) 0.2 (12) 1.1 (75) 
Pensioner 
+ 
Farmers 
0.05 (3) 
0.00 (0) 
0.00 (0) 
0.04 (3) 
Table 20. Number of Thulotar household members by main professions and farm location 
Farm 
Location 
H e a d 
Middle 
Tall 
Students Farmers Service 
in 
Nepal 
2.00 (12) 
2.00 (46) 
2.21 (84) 
2.16(13) 
1.61 (37) 
1.79 (68) 
0.05 (03) 
1.26(29) 
0.82 (31) 
Service out-
side Nepal 
0.33 (2) 
0.22 (5) 
0.13(5) 
Total Service 
Holders 
8.83 (05) 
1.48 (34) 
0.95 (36) 
Pensioner 
+ 
Farmers 
0.16(1) 
0.04 (1) 
0.03 (1) 
The people from the occupational caste households have much less incomes from 
working in government offices than Brahman-Chhetry households. Since education 
and awareness have a lot to do with access to the job market, it is not surprising that 
the less educated people from the occupational castes have fewer opportunities in the 
job markets than the Brahman-Chhetry people. The variations seen between the 
members from different locations within the Thulotar service area are mainly 
influenced by the caste groups. Some members of Thulotar households work for their 
livelihood as carpenters, masons, purohit {pandit or priest), and shopkeeper as one 
of their part-time activities. Since many of the Brahman members of Thulotar Kulo 
are Upadhyaya Brahmans, purotyain (an adjective from purohit) is their common 
profession. Some of them are working as regular attendants for defined communities 
of jajaman. Jajaman are the customers of pandits (or purohits). Purohits carry out all 
religious and cultural rituals for the jajaman every year, such as giving names, 
marriage, or after-death rituals. Some Brahman members of Thulotar Kulo are also 
professional carpenters and masons, working in Rupakot and other neighboring 
villages. 
Many occupational caste members also work as mason and carpenter. Bishwokarma 
(BK, Blacksmiths) are generally involved in iron works known as aarans. An aaran 
is a blacksmith's domestic workshop. Some members of the occupational castes 
Total population in Thulotar Kulo members' households is 416. 
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also work as hali (plowmen) for other members of Thulotar Kulo. The plowmen get 
either a daily wage in terms of grain (mainly rice) or cash in return. Where a hali 
has worked as a contract laborer regularly for at least a year, he either gets rice plot 
of certain size to cultivate from his landlord (balighar) or an amount of rice at the 
end of the contract period. The arrangement of payment for annual contracts is 
commonly known as mujuri. The contract is usually settled in January-February, 
after the monsoon rice is harvested. It may be a contract for one year or for several 
years, depending upon the contractual arrangements between the plowman and his 
landlord. 
Most of the full-time farmers in the Thulotar members' households are women. 
They are the principal work force for almost all agricultural activities in Rupakot 
except plowing127. So far only one woman has been working outside Rupakot on 
her own. This is due to a special reason. She is a married woman without children 
of her own, and virtually lives alone in the city. She is not one of the six female 
farmer-members of Thulotar Kulo, but the daughter-in-law of a member. Her 
husband is also married to another woman who has four children living in an 
extended family in Rupakot. The single woman works as a civil servant in a 
government office and seldom comes to her home in Rupakot. She is not officially 
separated from her husband and family, but she plays no role in any decision-
making at her husband's household. A handful of women are also teachers in the 
local elementary schools. They are all daughters-in-law in Brahman households. 
The only encouraging factors for the women of Thulotar is the number of female 
students going to the local elementary and high schools. There is no discrimination 
or preference for sending male or female children to school. If there are any 
differences between the students of different sexes, it is due to the differences in the 
number of children of different sex. However, only very few female High School 
graduates have the chance to go to college or university. The few lucky daughters to 
attend university are the children of either the teachers or a government officer. No 
large or better-off farmers, however, encouraged their daughters to go to study at a 
university. Another reason for there being fewer female students in the universities 
is that female children are married at an earlier age than the male children. This 
pattern is more common in Brahman communities like Rupakot than any other 
communities in the Hills of Nepal. After marriage, female students rarely get the 
chance to continue their studies. Instead, they are supposed to play the role of a 
good daughter-in-law, a good housewife, or a good mother. 
The social status of large farmers is high because of their household members' 
affiliations with academic and income generating activities (Table 21). Notably, the 
large farmers have relatively easier access to such opportunities. However, if the 
family size and the number of children are considered, the medium and small classes 
also have nearly equal access to the schools (Tables 4 and 5). However, only about 43 
percent of the children of small farmers go to school, whereas all children of the 
medium class have this opportunity (Tables 5 and 21). Large class members with the 
normal extended family pattern may have more children than nuclear families have. 
Thus, although the number of students from the small class farmers is very low, this 
observation may not be disproportionate when compared to the other class categories. 
See also Van der Schaaf 2000, 1999. 
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Table 21. Number of Thulotar household members by the professions and farmers' class of 
Thulotar members 
Farmers' 
Class 
Students Farmers Service 
Holders 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
2.62 
1.72 
2.00 
2.24 
1.44 
1.61 
1.43 
1.05 
0.78 
Land Use and Agriculture in Thulotar 
Common Crops of Thulotar 
There are three agro-climatic seasons in the Mid-Hills of Nepal. Farmers can grow 
crops during the winter, summer, and rainy season. Roughly, November to February 
is winter and March-June is as summer. The other four months are the rainy season. 
During the rainy season, also known as the monsoon season, brings heavy rains due 
to a strong southeast monsoon wind coming from the Bay of Bengal. This is the main 
source of rain south of the Himalayas. The major and minor crops for each of these 
three seasons are the following: 
Rice is the most important staple food crop in the Hills, including Rupakot. More 
than 90 percent of the food requirements in this region is supplied through rice. The 
consumption of rice for each of the two regular meals per day is also perceived as a 
symbol of higher status in the rural areas. No farmer wants to offer his guests 
anything other than rice if possible. Almost all farmers in the Hills of Nepal eat rice 
(bhat, cooked rice) at least twice a day. Rice is also used to make fried bread (celroti) 
and different types of sweets. This type of rice bread has a great importance in Hindu 
culture, as it is necessary for almost all cultural rituals. Rice grains also have a high 
religious and social value in Nepalese societies. The by-product of rice, particularly 
the straw, is also important for the farmers. Like the rice grain is for human beings, 
rice straw is the main source of silage for animal feed. The farmers also have some 
minor uses for rice straw, such as making mats. The straw is also used to preserve the 
seeds of different crops for the next season. The market value of rice is usually higher 
than that of other grains. The khet (lowland) land is designated as the irrigated land 
where paddy is cultivated every year. There are hardly any farmers who do not plant 
one crop of paddy (Oryza sativa). Farmers having no khet land tend to rent others' 
khet for paddy farming under share tenancy or other tenancy arrangements. 
Maize (Zea mays) is the second major crop in the Thulotar service area. 
Approximately one-third of the Thulotar farmers plant maize (Table 4 in Annex-I). 
Maize also has multiple uses in the farming communities. The principal use of corn is 
its consumption as a snack. Most farmers in the Hills of Nepal take their lunch at 
10:00 in the morning or earlier. After lunch, most farmers go to work outside the 
home. Children going to school have no fixed time for dinner so they may often have 
to wait until 10:00 o'clock in the evening to eat, after all members of the household 
have come home. Thus it has become common to consume snacks during the day. 
Whether they work in an office or on a farm, people take a short break for eating 
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snacks. Roasted corn is a dominant source of such snacks. Some farmers who cannot 
afford rice for each meal also use the homemade corn flakes or corn flour for lunch or 
dinner. Corn is also an important ingredient in animal feed, especially for milching 
buffaloes and milching cattle. However, it is equally important for chicken and small 
ruminants. The by-products of the corncob and its stalk are also important sources of 
animal feed. Like rice, maize also has many minor uses in the farming community, 
including religious uses. The maize stalk and the shelled cob are also used for fuel as 
a replacement for firewood. 
Thulotar farmers also grow vegetables, and grains for oil, pulse, and other uses within 
Thulotar service area. Potato (Solanun tuberosum) and radish (Raphanus sativus) 
were the only vegetable crops grown during myresearch period. However, cole crops 
like cabbage (Brassica oleracia L. var. capitata) and cauliflower (Brassica oleracia 
L. var botrytis) are also grown. Mustard (Brassica compestris) is the only seed oil 
crop in Thulotar. Legumes that are grown include lentils (Lens esculentus), 
blackgram (Phaseolus mungo), soybeans (Glycine max), cowpeas (Vigna sps.) and 
dhaincha (Sesbania aculeata). Wheat (Triticum sps.) is also grown. These crops are 
categorized as minor crops according to the importance Rupakot farmers give to 
them. 
Although it was not very common in the fields of Thulotar, potatoes are one of the 
most popular vegetables in the kitchens of each farm household. Just as rice 
dominates the food grain market, potatoes dominate the vegetable market in the 
different regions of Nepal, including the Hills, where its popularity continues to 
grow. Potatoes served during a meal are also considered a symbol of higher status in 
rural areas. If meat is not included in a meal, the guests are generally offered potato 
curry. Blackgram is also very popular and is the dominant pulse in the Nepalese 
Hills. A typical Nepalese meal consists at the very least of rice, a curry, and a pulse. 
Sesbania aculeata is one of the popular green manure crops in Nepal. 
Farming Systems in Thulotar 
Rainy season: Paddy is the only major crop grown during the rainy season. 
However, the planting of pulse crops along the bonds of paddy fields is a very 
common and popular practice in the Hills, including in Thulotar. Blackgram is a 
dominant bond crop 1 2 8 within the Thulotar Kulo service area. Soybean is also planted 
in bonds with loamy, silty, or sandy soil. Cowpea can also occasionally be seen in 
Thulotar, where it is planted on the bond to grow over the space between two paddy 
terraces where there is enough space between two terraces. Farmers in some cases 
transplant Sesbania aculeata on the bonds of rice terraces in order to produce its seed 
to be sown in the next season. 
Only about four percent (0.775 ha, Table 2 in Annex I) out of a total of 20 hectares 
of Thulotar paddy fields is planted with improved rice varieties. Only nine farmers, 
all from the middle part of the service area, cultivated improved rice varieties. The 
main reason why improved rice varieties are not adopted on large scale is that the soil 
type is not appropriate for the improved farming methods. Most of the service area 
within Thulotar Kulo consists of low fertility reddish clay soil. The terraces in the 
middle part are relatively more fertile and have more silty-loam soil. Farmers also 
A crop planted along the bonds of rice terraces. 
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plant winter crops and summer maize in the same plots. Another reason for the very 
small area planted with improved rice varieties is that the amount of irrigation water 
needed for improved varieties is not reliable. A long drought period during the paddy 
season may affect improved rice varieties more severely than the local varieties in 
Thulotar contexts. Local varieties are somewhat more resistant to the diverse local 
farming environments than the improved varieties. All the varieties of pulses are 
local as well. 
Winter season: Although wheat or lentils would be the major crops in many khet 
lands planted after the harvest of paddy in the Hills of Nepal, I did not find any major 
winter crops being grown in the Thulotar service area. However, some Thulotar 
farmers plant different winter vegetables, wheat, mustard, and lentils in the middle 
part of the service area (Table 3 in Annex I). However, winter crops are given so little 
importance that the total area covered by these crops was only about one half of a 
hectare during the year 1997-98. Of the 13 farmers growing winter crops, only two 
used improved seed potatoes. The rest planted local stock. Vegetable farming could 
be done toward the head section where more water was available. However, since no 
farmers live near this land, it is difficult to protect the crops from the intrusion of wild 
and domestic animals. Vegetable farming is also a time-consuming activity and 
requires relatively more technical knowledge than other crops. None of the farmers in 
Rupakot were interested in commercial vegetable farming. 
Summer season: Summer season farming is more popular in the Thulotar service area 
than winter farming (Table 4 in Annex I). Summer maize covers about one-fourth of 
the area planted by one-third Thulotar farmers. Another interesting fact is that about 
two-thirds of those farmers are in the tailend. All farmers plant the improved maize 
varieties. While no one was observed using the certified seeds in 1998, some of them 
had introduced the improved varieties at some point during the previous years. Since 
then, they are using their own produce as the seeding material for the next season. 
Some of the farmers in the middle section mix cowpea with maize. The purpose of this 
intercropping is to get at least some green vegetables from their own source. At the 
same time, cowpea also improves the soil quality. Only one farmer grew Sesbania 
aculeata as a green manure crop in the tailend. 
Cropping intensity: Thus, the cropping intensity in Thulotar comes around only 130 
percent. By season, it is 100 percent in monsoon, only 5 percent in winter and 25 
percent in summer. 
Patterns of crop rotation: Based on the above observations, we can conclude that 
Thulotar farmers practice different types of crop rotation in the different three sections 
(head, middle and tail) of the service area of Thulotar Kulo (see Annex XVI). Paddy-
fallow-fallow is the dominant pattern for rainy season, winter, and summer in all three 
sections. Crops are not grown in the head section, however, during the winter and 
summer seasons, while both middle and tail sections are at least partially covered with 
some type of crop. Like other parts of the Mid-Hills of Nepal, Rupakot farmers also 
grow different bond crops along the bonds of rice terraces. The middle section of the 
Thulotar service area has more diverse cropping patterns than the other sections, but 
all of the sections follow monocropping during the rainy season when rice is the only 
crop planted in the main fields. 
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Crop yields: All crops grown within the Thulotar service area have very poor yields 
(Table 7 in Annex 1). Except maize, the Thulotar service area yields are lower than 
what the national average was 15 years ago (Table 15 in Annex-Xni)129. One of the 
main reasons behind this could be the poor soil fertility, especially in the middle and 
tail areas. Another main reason for the poor yield is the common use of local seeds 
for most crops. Rice production is severely affected by the unavailability or 
insufficient supply of irrigation water during the critical periods of rice growth, 
especially immediately after transplanting (madpani) and ear-head and milking 
stages. Irrigation water is also not sufficient for winter crops and there is no water at 
all in Thulotar Kulo during the summer season. The management aspect of Thulotar 
Kulo and agricultural practices in the Thulotar area is also discouraging. Since most 
farm households have sources of non-agricultural income, which is higher in 
comparison to the farm incomes, apparently farmers are not be very worried about 
their farm production. However, our data are based on the harvests for 1997-98, 
which had relatively drier monsoon season than the normal records in other years. 
There was also an unprecedented high amount of rainfall during the rice harvest and 
winter crop season. This negatively influenced the field preparation for all winter 
crops. The exceptionally low yield of mustard was due to heavy rains during its 
flowering season. However, the winter rain did not last long, so it was not enough to 
help the other winter crops. 
Agricultural Services and Marketing Systems in Thulotar Area 
The Agriculture Development Office (ADO) of Tanahun is the agency responsible 
for agriculture development activities in the Thulotar area. Its main office is located 
in Byasnagar, which is very far away and accessible only via a fair-weather road. 
Although there are several Agriculture Service Centers (ASC) in different places in 
Tanahun, the nearest ASC for Rupakot is in Purkot-Baisjangare, about a two-hour 
walk's distance. There is at least one Junior Technician (JT) and some Junior 
Technical Assistants (JTA) in each ASC. A JT is a graduate in Intermediate 
Agricultural Science or a promoted JTA. A JTA is either High School graduate from 
a vocational agriculture school or a one-year's training course in agriculture (after 
high school) at the agriculture campus130 or a graduate of a technical school. One 
ASC should serve several VDC, so the government agencies' contributions to 
Thulotar are very insignificant. However, considerable services can be obtained from 
Sundarbazar, Lamjung. The Agriculture Service Center, Livestock-Health Service 
Center, Lamjung Campus (Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science,) and a 
farmers' co-operative are the main governmental or semi-governmental institutions in 
Sundarbazar serving farmers in Rupakot for agricultural development either directly 
or indirectly. A private agro-vet shop also provides at least some livestock medicine 
and agro-chemicals to (he farmers, and fertiliser and some certified seeds are 
distributed through the co-operative. There is also a private dealer to distribute the 
livestock feed. 
Thulotar farmers usually buy potatoe, gram, pea, and lentil from the private 
shopkeepers of Sundarbazar. Fruits and vegetables are also carried to Sundarbazar 
The data in this table is taken from a report written in Nepali. The data corresponds with the 
Nepali calendar (Bikram era, BS) that is about 57 years ahead of the English calendar. 
However, the Agriculture Campus terminated its JTA training program for last ten years. 
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from adjoining villages as well as from Terai and India. Local farmers around 
Sundarbazar can also sell their farm products in this local town. Many of the Thulotar 
Kulo farmers transport fertilizer or seed-potato from Sunderbazar themselves. 
Female farmers in Rupakot are more involved in such load carrying activities than 
their male counter-parts, while some of the better-off farmers hire wage laborers to 
carry heavy loads for them. Not all Thulotar farmers preserve all types of seeds for 
each season. To this day barter is popular in Nepalese villages, especially for 
acquiring crop seeds. However, small amounts of vegetable seeds are distributed 
among the farmers without any formal economic transaction taking place. This has 
social exchange value for the villagers. This is a common way of life of many rural 
villages including Rupakot. 
The Legal Basis for Agriculture in Thulotar Area 
There are many ways an individual or individual household can get access to 
cultivating a piece of land in the Thulotar area. The most dominant practice is as 
owner-operator. Although varied in size, all member-farmers of Thulotar have their 
own raiker land1 3 1 of varying sizes registered in the name of an individual, generally 
in the name of the household head. How an individual or a household becomes the 
owner of land in Nepal has been briefly discussed in Chapter 3. Here, I would like to 
describe the circumstances under which Thulotar members operate or rent out their 
land. 
Of the 67 Thulotar members, all but one are partial or full owner-operators. There 
are, however, many tenurial practices through which farmers also get access to 
others' land. Depending upon the type of tenure arrangement between the landowner 
and the tenant, land tenancy arrangements in Thulotar are referred to share cropping 
(adhiya), pledge (bandhaki) and contract farming (thekka)132. Of 66 owner-operators 
in Thulotar, 20 also rent out part of their land to tenants. The land rented from the 
Thulotar members in these cases, however, is not necessarily land within the Thulotar 
service area (Annex VIJJ). Below are descriptions of the types of land tenure status 
in Thulotar. 
Types of Land Tenures 
The common types of land tenancy arrangements in Rupakot are share cropping, 
pledge and contract farming. Tenants in share cropping arrangements get a 50 
percent share of the main produce and the by-products of the crops they plant on the 
farms loaned by the landowners. However, this is practiced only for monsoon rice in 
Thulotar. These share cropping practices are very interesting. Generally, 
sharecropping arrangements are made during the nursery raising period of rice in 
Jestha (May-June). Once a tenant has been given land to plant rice, he acquires use 
rights over the land for the whole year. However, unlike other rice fields in Naudi 
valley, the landowners reserve the right to plant pulse crops along the bonds of the 
rice fields used by their tenants. Blackgram (Phaseolus mungo) and soybeans 
(Glycine max) are the common pulse crops grown as bond crops in Thulotar. The 
landowners also reserve the rights to cut grass on such lands. Grass is very valuable 
in the Rupakot farmers' communities. Some of the farmers also buy grass on a 
See 'Types of Land Ownership" in Chapter 3. 
See also FNF 1988a. 
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seasonal contract basis. Under sharecropping arrangements, the tenant may ask his 
landlord to share 50 percent of the cost of chemical fertilizer applied in the rice fields. 
The landlord, however, reserves the right to decide whether the chemical fertilizers 
should be applied. Sharecropping is generally arranged for only one year. If the 
tenant or the landlord wants to continue the tenancy for the next year/s, s/he talks and 
settles the case once every year. 
In pledge arrangements (bandhaki), the tenant rents the land for one year or more. 
The tenant pays a certain amount of money to the landowner in order to acquire the 
use rights of a specified land, but there is no fixed rate. The amount of money agreed 
upon depends on the mutual understanding between the landowner and the tenant. 
However, the general understanding is that the annual interest from the amount of 
money paid by the tenant is equivalent to the value of the farm products (from the 
rented land), less the annual cost of cultivation on the rented land, but the tenants 
rarely take full labor costs into account. This is because the agricultural labor force in 
the Hills area of Nepal is underemployed. Tenants under pledge schemes utilize their 
household labor force. In such circumstances, the pledge-tenant has two benefits: 
first, they have a chance to utilize their underemployed labor force for production 
activities; second, since their money is involved, tenants also have the chance to 
multiply their resources through easily accessible rural economic institution. In such 
arrangements, the tenant has the rights to use the land he pledges unless the 
landowner returns the amount (money) he got from the tenant. The landowner, 
however, does not pay interest on that amount. 
The tenant in a contract fanning arrangement (thekka) pays a certain amount of cash 
to the landowner based on a mutual agreement between the two parties. Generally, 
such contracts are set for only one year. However, the money paid by the tenant is 
not paid back by the landowner, so the amount of money involved in a contract 
arrangement is far less than the amount in a pledge scheme. The landowners do not 
have rights to plant pulses and cut grass on the land, which is rented out for pledge 
and contract arrangements. 
Table 22. Number of Thulotar members giving out land to tenants by the type of tenancy and 
farm location 
Caste Share Pledge Share+ Contract Total %age 
Cropping Pledge 
Head 1 0 0 0 1 1 6 . 6 6 
Middle 5 1 2 0 8 3 0 . 4 3 
T a u 7 3 0 1 1 1 2 8 . 9 5 
Total 1 3 4 2 1 2 0 2 9 . 8 5 
%age 1 9 . 4 1 1 . 9 4 2 . 9 8 1 . 4 9 2 9 . 8 5 2 9 . 8 5 
About 30 percent of the farmers in Thulotar have loaned their lands out in different 
land tenancy arrangements (Tables 22 & 23, and Annex VTIl). Most of them are 
Brahman and Chhetry members who own land near the tailend of the Thulotar 
service area. The tailenders who have loaned their land out belong to the rich farmers 
who own land in both the middle and tail parts, with the land in the tail part being 
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made available to tenants. Some of these members earn more from non-agricultural 
sources than from agriculture. Many of them are also officials in government offices. 
Among the government officers, one is the member of Thulotar Kulo while others are 
family members of members' households. 
Table 23. Number of Thulotar members giving out land to tenants by the type of tenancy 
caste category and 
Caste Share Pledge Share + Contract Total %age 
Cropping Pledge (among 20) 
BC 13 2 2 0 17 85 
OC 0 2 0 0 2 10 
Bhujel 0 0 0 1 1 5 
Total 13 4 2 1 20 100 
%age 65 20 10 5 100 100 
The land given out to sharecroppers is mostly lowland (met). Such land can be 
within as well as outside the Thulotar service area. There is no uniformity in the 
characteristics of the various landowners and the sharecroppers (Annex VTIL). The 
sharecroppers can be members of Thulotar Kulo or any one else. They can belong to 
the same caste as the landowner or not. However, most tenants who are not members 
of Thulotar Kulo are citizens of Rupakot village who come from Bhujel and 
occupational castes. Sharecroppers from outside Rupakot village are mostly Kumal. 
They come from an adjoining village of Lamjung district. Kumal is a tribal caste in 
the Hills of Nepal. Traditionally, the main profession of the Kumal people was 
pottery. They made earthen pots that they sold to local customers. Now this tribe is 
changing their profession from pottery to agriculture, but they are still a socio-
economically weak segment of rural communities. Some tenants are the relatives of 
landowners. All landowners who loaned out land were male members. None of the 
six female members of Thulotar Kulo have made any of their land available for 
tenancy. It is not surprising that almost all sharecroppers were among the farmers of 
Rupakot village (Ward No. 4 of Rupakot VDC). Share cropping arrangements need 
to be harmonious and call for good communication between the landowner and 
tenant. A tenant from a distant village usually would not have better relationships 
with landlords than tenants from the landowners' own village. 
Sharecroppers and their landlords have strong and informal relationships, which have 
the character of patron-client relationships. Sharecroppers, the largest category of 
people working on others' land in Rupakot, are particularly vulnerable socio-
economically. They have developed relationships with relatively better-off 
households among their neighbors in order to secure in their food requirements and 
other social support. Sharecroppers in many cases borrow food grain from their 
landlords even before they have harvested the crops on their rented farms. For 
example, the Kumal sharecroppers of Thulotar are very poor. Thus lead them to not 
only work as sharecroppers of Thulotar farmers but also to work as wage laborers 
Sharecroppers are also known as share-tenants. 
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for better-off households. Some large farmers of Thulotar Kulo have established a 
tradition of hiring Kumal laborers for transplanting and harvesting rice every year. It 
is known informally that some rich farmers of Thulotar also lend small amounts of 
money to these Kumal people. Thus these farmers do not necessarily pay the Kumal 
laborers their due wages. Instead, they may give them a partial payment in advance 
when they need money to run their household during a time of year when the labor 
market in the neighboring villages is slow. Similar relationships are also seen 
between some better-off Brahman and Chhetry members of Thulotar and poor Bhujel 
and occupational caste people in Rupakot village, both within and outside the 
boundary of Thulotar Kulo. 
In contrast to share cropping, landowner-tenant relationships in pledge and contract 
schemes need not be only between the relatively better-off and poor farmers. The 
pledge holders and contract farmers are relatively better-off financially than 
sharecroppers because they have saved money on top of their regular household 
expenditures. To increase their money, they invest in land pledges or contracts. 
Farmers in economic crisis give part of their land out temporarily for one year or until 
they become able to overcome their crisis. Thus, land has become one of the 
guaranteed means of economic security (crisis management) for rural farmers in 
Nepal. Some Thulotar members who do not have enough labor in their own 
household, and who earn enough money from non-agricultural sources, generally 
loan their land out under pledge or contract arrangements as well. By doing so, they 
gain many social and economic benefits. They do not need to work as field laborers 
while at the same time they continue to be the landowner because their land has not 
been sold. Both these aspects allow the farmers to keep their high social status in the 
village. In the mean time, they have the chance to reinvest the money they get from 
the pledge or contract in other activities with higher returns than those found in 
agriculture. For agricultural farming with hired laborers is relatively more expensive 
in the Hills than in the Terai, mainly because of the difficult topography of the Hills 
for agriculture. Hill farmers cannot use tractors or drillers on their land. Farm 
products are also not very attractive relative to the cost of cultivation and lack of 
access to possible markets. Better-off farmers in Thulotar also use money earned 
from land pledge and contracts to pay for their childrens' education. Some of them 
have also used it to erect buildings in the local towns (Manechauka and Sundarbazar) 
which they rent out for a good price. Some of them have bought housing plots in 
other cities in Nepal. 
Tenure status and farmers' classes: The larger the farmer, the greater the tendency 
is to give out land to tenants, as has been seen among Thulotar farmers (Table 24). 
Share cropping is very common in the Thulotar area, where large farmers provide the 
land to sharecroppers. However, small farmers occasionally lend land out in pledge 
agreements as well, using their land to help them cope with living. Any class of 
farmer could practice contract farming, especially when the owner is out of the 
village for longer periods. There is only one member of Thulotar who has given out 
his land under a contract arrangement. The landowners, who have no time to take 
care of and supervise their land frequently prefer to give their land out under contract. 
The landowners in such cases are not worried about the amount of production the 
tenants get from the contracted farms. Whatever the production from the land may be, 
the tenant is only obliged to pay a specific amount of cash or kind to the landowner. 
Thulotar landowners who contract farms work in professions that provide a good 
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income. Being elite citizens, they do not want to concentrate on agriculture and they 
live in the city. 
Table 24. Number of land tenancy given out by the farmers' class 
Farmers' 
Class 
Not 
given 
Share 
Crop. 
Contract Pledge Pledge+S. 
Crop. 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
10 
12 
24 
10 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
0 
0 
2 
Annual Cash Income ofThulotar Members' Households 
To simplify the description and explanations of the status of Thulotar members' 
annual cash incomes, their income sources are here broadly grouped into two 
categories, as agricultural and non-agricultural. This includes all cash income earned 
by all members of a Thulotar members' household during the year of my during 
research period (1997/98). Agriculture is the main profession for the majority of 
working age family members of Thulotar farmers. The structure of their incomes 
from other sources directly affects the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
involvement in all agricultural activities, including irrigation water management. 
Most farmers live on the produce of their own farms. Subsistence farming in the Hills 
of Nepal is the major source of livelihood for hundreds of thousands of people. There 
are a few farmers who can sell a portion of their farm products on top of what is 
consumed in their households. Whatever cash is earned from selling farm products 
goes almost entirely toward the purchase of supplementary food items and other 
regular domestic needs. Among the members of Thulotar Kulo, hardly any farmer is 
able to save part of the money earned from the sale of what farm products they can 
spare. However, if there is additional income from other sources than agriculture, 
some farmers have the chance to save some money and use it to improve their quality 
of life. But there are not many members of Thulotar who are able to save a significant 
amount of money from whatever sources. Therefore to compute the annual income of 
Thulotar members in this particular study, I have tried to compute only the cash 
incomes from different agricultural and non-agricultural sources. 
Cash Income through Agricultural Sources 
The total annual income from the agricultural products among Thulotar households is 
about NRs 2,000.00, which is equivalent to US $ 30 1 3 4 (Tables 25 & 26, and Annex 
V). If we consider only those members who are from OC households, it comes down 
to around US $15.00 per annum. The OC and Bhujel members have not earned cash 
from the sale of grains. On the contrary, they have to invest their money from other 
income sources to buy food grains from the households of BC members. Whatever 
cash income they get from the agricultural sources is from the sale of animals and 
their products (Annex V). In general, the caste status coincides with the economic 
The present exchange rate is US $ 1.00 = NRs 67.00, approx. 
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status in decreasing order (see also Suzuki 1999). The income of a Bhujel family 
from the sale of animals/birds or their products is an exceptional case, however 
(Table 25). This was because Mr. Bhujel sold a milching buffalo during my research 
period. I have not accounted for the domestic expenditures of the farmers, but Mr. 
Bhujel later invested more than his earned-income to buy another milching buffalo 
during the same period. 
Table 25. Annual agricultural income of Thulotar members' households by source and 
caste category (NRs) 
Caste Sale of Sale of Animal/Bird and 
Lowland Rice Other Grains Their Products 
Total Agricultural 
Income 
BC 
OC 
Bhujel 
564.7 
0 
0 
539.41 
0 
0 
1111.76 
1173.11 
10500.00 
2215.88 
1173.33 
10500.00 
One of the most noteworthy observations is that as many as half of the members do 
not earn any money from any agricultural activity. The annual agricultural household 
income is highest among those farmers who own land in the middle part of the 
Thulotar service area. However, the headend fanners also sell lowland rice (dhari)135. 
There are good reasons for this. The headend farmers mostly grow only one crop per 
year on their land within the Thulotar area, and that is the monsoon rice. Although the 
headend farmers could have easy access to irrigation water in the winter, their 
residences are far from the farms, and it would be hard to protect their crops from 
wild beasts (especially monkeys) as forest surrounds the head area in two directions. 
Some headend plots are marshy. Neither of the marshy plots, however, can supply 
enough water for summer rice, nor are the soil conditions favorable for summer 
maize. There are similar problems for winter crops as well. Land sizes in the head 
and the tail are also smaller than the middle area (Table 16). 
Table 26. Annual agricultural income of Thulotar members' households by source and 
farm location (NRs) 
Farm Sale of Sale of Animal/Bird and Total Agricultural 
Location Lowland Rice Other Grains Their Products Income 
Head 833.33 150.00 466.66 1450.00 
Middle 565.22 643.91 1260.87 2470.00 
Tail 284.21 310.52 1394.73 1989.47 
In addition to the factors mentioned above that contribute to the lower agricultural 
incomes in the headend farmers' households, there are other important factors that 
Two types of rice crops are common in the Hills of Nepal. The upland or unirrigated rice 
(grown in pakho land) is known as ghaiya. While the low land rice (grown in irrigated land, 
khei) is called dhan. In English, both are rice. See also Poudel 1987. 
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contribute to lower agricultural incomes for tailend farmers. Although there is no 
great variation in land size between different locations within the Thulotar service 
area, there is high variation in crop productivity due to poor soil quality in the tailend 
(Table 7 in Annex I). Yet another, more important factor for the lesser productivity in 
the tailend area is the lower availability of irrigation water to the tailenders regardless 
of water rotation practices followed in Thulotar. Although the tail part as the head 
part receives a 24-hour watering turn, the conveyance loss to the tailend plots is not 
recognized and accounted for when determining the duration of water rotation. Thus 
an equal 24-hour water rotation practice between headend and tailend is biased 
against the tailend. Tailenders mostly transplant rice later than others do, which leads 
to a poor rice yield. The tailenders never cultivate crops in their farms during winter 
because of many such factors. Few of them, however, plant maize in the summer. 
The middle part is said to be better than the rest of the area within the service area 
because of both social and physical factors. Most of the farm owners in the middle 
part reside near the field at Rupakot Phedi (Fig. 3). Almost all households in the 
Rupakot Phedi area have rice fields in this sector. Thus, they are able to cultivate 
most of their land for all three seasons (monsoon, winter, and summer). There is no 
problem with wildlife intruders on these farms and, as there is no marshy land in the 
middle part, the soil is more fertile than in the tail and head. On top of such physical 
and social characteristics of the farm, the farm sizes of the middle farmers are also 
larger than those of other farmers within the Thulotar area (Table 16). Some of the 
farmers from this section are the large farmers of Rupakot village. In fact, the largest 
farmer among Thulotar members is also from the middle section of the Thulotar 
service area (Annex VTT). 
Cash Income through Non-Agricultural Sources 
The non-agricultural incomes of all caste and class groups of Thulotar are more than 
25 times bigger than the agricultural sources, which is more than NRs 6.000.00136 per 
household (Tables 28 and 29, and Annex-VI). The Bhujel household is an exception 
for the reason mentioned above. Similar to the agricultural incomes, the annual non-
agricultural incomes of OC household are less than half of those of BC households. 
The higher non-agricultural income of the tailenders is especially due to the presence 
of two principal entrepreneurs among the Thulotar members. One of them owns a 
rice mill in Rupakot, and the other one sells chicken (meat) in one of the major 
trading centers of Nepal (Bharatpur, Chitwan). The mill-owner also draws a large 
amount of money in the form of his pension from the Indian Army. In both cases, the 
investment cost is not accounted for in determining annual income. 
While combining both agricultural and non-agricultural sources, one household 
among Thulotar members' 67 households earns about NRs 63,500.00, which is 
equivalent to US $ 910.00 at the present exchange rate. Since the average household 
size (presented as family size in this book) of Thulotar members is 6.2, the average 
per capita cash income per Thulotar members' household is approximately NRs 
10,252.00 (US $ 146.00). The per capita income of US $ 146.00 also includes two 
About US $ 880.00 per household. But the high variation in the incomes from the agricultural 
and other sources is mainly due to the reason that the agricultural products were not included to 
compute the income through agricultural sources. The agricultural income computed in this 
book includes the cash income, which is generally received through the sale of surplus farm 
products, on top of the home consumption. 
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major sources - the chicken business, and the mill and pension. If we deduct the 
incomes of these two farmers' households, the average income of the other 65 
households is about NRs 54,000.00 (about US $ 806.00), while the per capita average 
is only around NR. 8,700.00 (about US $ 130.00). Generally, the living standard and 
the overall social status of Rupakot farmers, due to their high involvement in non-
agricultural occupations, looks better than most other villages in the Hills of Nepal. 
Since the per capita cash income of Rupakot farmers, who appear to be better-off 
because of their non-agricultural income sources, is only US $ 146.00 (or US $ 
130.00), what would the situation be for the farmers in other villages? This illustrates 
that the farmers in Nepal are subsisting in desperately low living conditions. 
Table 27. Annual non-agricultural income of Thulotar members' households by sources and 
caste categories (NRs) 
Caste Services 
in Nepal 
Service 
Outside 
Nepal 
Other 
Sources 
Total Non-Agricultural 
Income 
B C 
oc 
Bhujel 
37650.98 
3466.66 
3600.00 
7313.72 
13333.33 
6500.00 
5013.72 
14566.66 
00000.00 
69531.00 
31366.66 
10100.00 
Table 28. Total annual income 
caste category (NRs) 
of Thulotar members' households by source and 
Caste Total Non-Agricultural 
Income 
Total Agricultural 
Income 
Total Income (per 
household). 
BC 
OC 
Bhujel 
AH 
69531.00 
31366.66 
10100.00 
61456.71 
2215.88 
1173.33 
10500.00 
2106.12 
71746.88 
32539.99 
20600.00 
63562.83 
If we consider only the women-headed households among the Thulotar members, the 
annual agricultural income is only around NRs 530.00, while the annual income from 
the non-agricultural sources is NRs 31,200.00. Thus, the total annual household 
income is approximately NRs 31,730. Based on these figures, the per capita annual 
cash income is NRs 6,346, or around US $ 95.00. This shows that female-headed 
households in Rupakot suffer more than male-headed households do. Since women 
and lower caste farmers in Rupakot have been behind in the income generating 
opportunities, it is not surprising that female-headed households are poorer than 
male-headed households. 
Farmers' Classes and Annual Cash Income 
The annual cash income of large farmers is more than double that of the medium 
class farmers (Table 29). It is also significantly higher than the small farmers' 
income. The agricultural cash income of the small farmers is very low due to their 
small landholding size (Table 18). However, the agricultural income of large and 
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medium class farmers is also not very high. The poor soil fertility and very low crop 
yields in the Thulotar area are probably the major factors behind this situation. The 
major contribution to the annual cash income for all types of farmers is employment 
in the civil and other government services among Thulotar household members in 
Nepal, India, and further abroad (Annex VT). Many of Thulotar household members 
work in India. Even the low salary rates in India are high in Nepal due to the inflation 
of Nepalese rupees relative to the Indian currency. Small farmers also become 
involved in many types of wage earning activities to cope with the problem of trying 
to support a family on a very weak agricultural base. Such professions include 
carpentry, masonry, provision of building materials, agricultural labor, and so on. 
Table 29. Total annual income of Thulotar members' households by farmers' class (NRs) 
Farmer Agricultural Non-Agricultural Total Income 
Class Income Income 
As far as irrigated agriculture is concerned, rice farming is the dominant and primary 
objective of the farmers in the Hills of Nepal, just as it is in Thulotar. Although the 
seasonal crop yields of winter and summer crops within the Thulotar service area are 
very poor, the rice yield is not as disappointing in comparison to the national rice 
yield averages of Nepal (Table 7 of Annex I and Table 15 of Annex XIQ). The major 
objective in forming a Water Users Association in Thulotar was to improve the water 
management practices primarily for rice crops during the monsoon season. For this 
purpose, the Water Users Association and General Assembly of Thulotar Kulo have 
developed certain water management rules. Such rules are mainly discussed and 
sanctioned in the meetings of General Assemblies. However, the details of such rules 
and rule-making procedures are discussed in the next chapter. 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
3461.90 
2597.78 
773.21 
89219.05 
41000.00 
53785.71 
92680.95 
43597.78 
54558.92 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RULE-MAKING AND DECISION-MAKING 
ARENA IN THULOTAR 
Every social organization has certain roles and responsibilities to perform. These 
roles and responsibilities are defined according to the existing normative orders. 
Those normative orders are based on customary laws, statutory laws, and/or local 
laws. In this research, rule-making is conceptualized as a process of developing 
norms that prescribe how Thulotar members should behave in connection to irrigation 
management in Thulotar Kulo. Such rules also say how the rules are to be enforced in 
Thulotar. 
The WUA of Thulotar (Thulotar Jalaupabhokta Samiti) is the main executive body 
for implementing and enforcing rules developed in Thulotar. All rules developed in 
Thulotar are based on the mutual understandings of all members of Thulotar Kulo. In 
most cases, the General Assembly (Mohi Sabha), consisting of all members of 
Thulotar Kulo, is the supreme arena where the rules are formulated and enforced. The 
General Assembly also defines the authority, roles, and responsibilities of the WUA. 
Depending upon the situation, the WUA is at times given the supreme authority to 
develop and impliment rules and regulations based on the policies developed in the 
General Assembly. 
A detailed description of the roles and responsibilities performed by the WUA 
and General Assembly in Thulotar is presented in the following paragraphs. Since the 
WUA is the ultimate executive body for making rules and regulations according to 
the major policies developed by the General Assembly, I will begin with an 
explanation of how WUA is responsible for rule-making activities in Thulotar Kulo. 
This will be followed by a brief discussion of different types of rules developed for 
different aspects of water management in Thulotar. Next, I will present a dynamic 
account of rule-making in action in the General Assemblies of Thulotar Kulo 
organized during 1997/98. 
Water Users Association and Rule-Making Process 
Although the Thulotar Kulo General Assembly works as the supreme authority for 
almost all rules made in connection with its management, the WUA acts as the 
ultimate executive body in the rule-making process and gives the rules final form. 
The WUA initiates, runs, and co-ordinates all activities in the rule-making process. It 
invites all the members of the General Assembly to present their views on each 
agenda item discussed during the General Assembly meetings. It records the 
attendance of the participants in the General Assembly, and records all proceedings 
and decisions made in each General Assembly meeting. It is the main implementing 
authority of General Assembly decisions as authorized by the General Assembly. 
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The Thulotar WUA applies a democratic participatory approach to all of its rule-
making activities. The WUA can make rules based on the policies approved by the 
General Assembly. It can suggest that panipale start or stop water rotation practices. 
It can search for defaulters and take action against them. It can resolve minor disputes 
raised in connection with water application and its management. 
Although all major policies should be approved through the General Assembly, 
in practice it is the WUA or its members that have the influence to direct the 
discussions and decisions to reflect their own view. Thus, the WUA indirectly 
contributes to and plays a very important role in the decision-making process. It is 
also the responsibility of the WUA leaders to contact and visit outside agencies and 
make decisions concerning the activities and management of their irrigation system. 
A good example of this would be how the decision to renovate the system was made. 
First, the need for renovation was approved in a General Assembly. However, the 
type of work that needed to be done, its magnitude, and the quality of the renovation 
were decided upon outside the General Assembly with the presence of only one or a 
few leaders of the WUA 1 3 7. In many cases, WUA leaders visit agencies in the district 
headquarters or in Kathrnandu at their own expense. However, these visits are usually 
multipurpose in nature and the leaders may even conduct business outside the 
concerns of the irrigation system on the same trip.The general rules developed and 
expected to be implemented in Thulotar Kulo are discussed in the following 
section138. 
Water Distribution Rules 
In general, water distribution means the provision and methods of how the available 
volume of water is used within a specified farm. Here, the rules for water distribution 
include the general norms applied to water production or water acquisition, water 
allocation, and water application for Thulotar Kulo. In this section, I first present the 
rales of how Thulotar Kulo shares its source of irrigation water with one of its 
upcanals, including the rules governing the provision of the panipale and his 
renumeration for water rotation practices in Thulotar. The final section of this chapter 
includes the general rules of water distribution practices and how they are defined 
and applied in Thulotar Kulo for different purposes in different situations. 
Rules for the Sharing of Source 
"Prior rights" is the main principle of sharing water among many FMISs at Sabadi 
Khola (Fig. 6). The history of many of the FMISs at Sabadi Khola is not known, but 
they have been in operation for hundreds of years. In the beginning, the only 
objective of these systems was to irrigate the monsoon rice; no crops were grown the 
rest of the year. Therefore, it was a common practice in Sabadi Khola to convert 
cultivated and uncultivated uplands (pakho) into irrigated lands (khet) at the 
See "Election of New Water Users Association and Renovation of Thulotar Kulo" in Chapter 4. 
The rules discussed in this section were not necessarily developed during my research period, 
1997/98. Rather, they are the products of the practices and experiences of the Thulotar 
members. 
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beginning of irrigated agriculture. Such practices were only acceptable in the days 
when there was no competition for the water available in Sabadi Khola. According to 
the national legal code (Muluki Ain), new irrigation systems upstream of prior 
irrigation canals could not be constructed if the farmers of the prior irrigation canals 
objected to the construction of the new upstream canals. With the growth of 
population and the introduction of new technologies, farmers needed to break their 
tradition of growing only one crop in their met lands. Now, some of the irrigation 
systems are growing winter and summer crops. If some farmers intend to construct a 
separate irrigation canal upstream of an existing one, they may do it only if the 
farmers from the existing downstream canals do not oppose it 1 3 9. No new irrigation 
systems should affect the existing amount of water flow in the downstream system 
unless the existing flow is more than sufficient. The chapters "Land Reclamation" in 
Muluki Ain 1952 and "Land Cultivation" in Muluki Ain 1963 clearly mention that a 
new irrigation channel might be constructed at a point higher than the existing one 
only if the amount of water available to the field irrigated by the old channel is not 
reduced (Pradhan 200:56). These days, it is almost impossible to extend the irrigated 
land by either converting upland into irrigated lands within the command area of the 
existing irrigation canals or by constructing the new irrigation canals. Thulotar Kulo 
now prohibits virtually any new irrigation systems from being constructed upstream 
of its headwork, and no additional land is allowed to be irrigated through Thulotar 
Kulo. "Jagga jaminko no. 52a" of the "Land and Tenant and Landholder" chapter in 
Muluki Ain 1854 states that in canal disputes water should be allocated according to 
shares in those places where water was distributed according to age-old customs 
(Pradhan 2000:56). The Ghartiswara Kulo and Thulotar Kulo have equally shared the 
available water flow at the intake of Ghartiswara Kulo since 1960. Therefore, these 
rules are not only popular in the farmer's laws in Sabadi Khola, but the ancient and 
contemporary statutory laws of Nepal also respect them1 4 0. 
Rules for the Provision of Panipale for Water Rotation Prtactices in Thulotar 
Not all types of land are appropriate for irrigated farming. Yet, due to many socio-
economic factors, farmers in Rupakot prefer irrigated farming to rain-fed farming. In 
general, all intra-system institutions for water distributions within Thulotar Kulo rely 
upon panipale. The role the panipale plays in the Thulotar water distribution 
practices is unique. Before the actual water distribution rules and practices followed 
in Thulotar are discussed, the panipale''s involvement in Thulotar Kulo water rotation 
practices must be explained. The Thulotar Kulo General Assembly appoints a 
panipale to manage and oversee water allocation for about three to four crucial 
months during the monsoon season each year (mid-July to mid-October, Shrawan to 
Kartik). The tradition of appointing a panipale to oversee water rotation practices 
began in 1980. The panipale considers not only the size of a parcel of irrigated land, 
but he also argues that the soil type and soil-water environment on the farm decide 
the amount of water required by each farm. Similarly, he also believes that the 
ecological environment around the canal systems and within the service area affects 
the amount of water to be delivered to the specified canals and the specified terraces 
within the branch canals. The panipales in other Nepalese FMISs do not necessarily 
See also Pradhan 2000; Khadka 1997. 
See also Khadka 1997; Pradhan and Pradhan 1997. 
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consider such water rotation factors within the service area of an irrigation system. 
Rules for the Remuneration ofPanipale for Water Rotation Practices in Thulotar 
Initially, the General Assembly decided the panipale should be paid four mana of 
husked rice (about 1.2 kg) 1 4 1 per water-user-household of Thulotar each year. This 
system was in effect until 1985. In 1986 and 1987, the District Irrigation Office 
(DIO) of Tanahun paid a panipale NRs 700.00 per month, cash, for four working 
months (mid-July to mid-October, Shrawan to Kartik) during the first rehabilitation 
project of Thulotar Kulo. Farmers, however, started to pay him again beginning in 
1988. Unlike in previous years, they also started paying him in cash and adopted the 
same arrangement the Tanahun DIO had established. The money was contributed 
equitably based on the land size of each farmer served by Thulotar Kulo, but not as 
equally as it had been in the earlier years when four mana of rice was paid by each 
household, regardless landholding size. The cash contribution for the panipale 
continued until 1995. Again, the Tanahun DIO began paying the panipale for another 
one-year period during the second renovation project of Thulotar Kulo in 1996. 
Despite their efforts to acquire external resources to pay for the panipale, Thulotar 
farmers in 1997 had to again adopt their original practice of paying rice to the 
panipale. They started to contribute four muri of rice (about 200 kg.) equitably based 
on the size of landholding within the Thulotar service area. Since then, this system 
has become the rule in Thulotar Kulo. In 1997/98, the Thulotar General Assembly 
decided that the landowners themselves should be responsible for paying the panipale 
rather than their tenants, unlike in the 80's, when each farmer paid regardless of his or 
her tenurial rights. However, any changes in the rules surrounding the remuneration 
of the panipale is sanctioned by the General Assembly, but not by the WUA. Now, 
the allowance for working 3-4 months as the panipale in Thulotar Kulo is only equal 
to about NRs 2,000.00 worth of rice. It is very low in comparision to the minimum 
wage that ranges from NRs 50 to NRs 200 for one day's labor depending upon the 
type of the work. 
Water Allocation Rules for Monsoon Paddy 
After a dispute over the security of prior water rights at Sabadi Khola, the users of 
Thulotar Kulo were inspired to further improve water management within their own 
system142. At the same time, some of the Thulotar water-users were aware of their 
rights to appropriate water as one of the members in Thulotar Kulo. There were no 
water rotation or panipale systems previously143. 
The practice of water rotation in irrigation started in 1980. Similarly, a panipale 
was appointed to handle the water rotation within the Thulotar Kulo service area. 
However, the water rotation was followed only if water was insufficient for regular 
impoundment in the rice fields; whether water was enough for the continuous 
irrigation to all lands simultaneously was personally judged by the panipale. During 
1 mana husked rice = 0.305 Kg. 
The details of the type of dispute addressed here are presented later in Chapter 6. 
See also "Institutionalization of Panipale and Water Rotation Practices" in Chapter 4. 
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periods of water deficit, the panipale rotated irrigation water by dhadepalo over a 24-
hour time rotation. The dhadepalo divides the total service area of Thulotar Kulo into 
approximately two halves, as head and tail sectors. All of the head section and 
middle section of the service area, as shown in Fig. 4, are classified as "head" for 
water rotation purpose. This includes all khet lands from Chalise to Athahra (Rl & 
LI to R17 & LI 1, see Fig. 3 and Fig. 6). The rest of the fields fall in the "tail". The 
General Assembly has also given the panipale the authority to apply patepalo if 
necessary. Patepalo is a scheme whereby the head and tail parts under dhadepalo are 
further divided by half; land to the right of the main canal makes one division, while 
land to the left of the main canal is another division. Thus, the entire service area of 
Thulotar Kulo is divided into four different sectors under patepalo. The duration of 
water rotation is reduced to 12 hours for each sector. 
The general understanding is that if there is enough water to irrigate the whole 
area simultaneously, the panipale may not apply rotation practices. When water is 
very scarce, he may practice patepalo rather than dhadepalo. Patepalo, however, is 
rarely applied. Once the panipale is given the authority to decide, he is the one to 
decide whether it would be appropriate to follow dhadepalo, patepalo, or to not 
follow any rotation practices at all. He decides on the base of the available water flow 
in Sabadi Khola at the headwork of the main canal. The General Assembly also gives 
the panipale the authority to decide the volume of the flow to each branch and intake 
along the main and branch canals. Since the same individual has been working as the 
panipale for the last 15 years, he has tremendous knowledge about which particular 
plot needs what volume of water to irrigate all lands within the given branch or intake 
during the given time (24 or 12 hours). He determines the appropriate volume of the 
flow based on his personal knowledge gained from working with the soil types and 
soil-water characteristics of the land, the available alternative water sources within 
the service area, and the possible seepage and leakage losses along the branch canals 
and within the fields. Water rotation during dhadepalo starts at 17.00 hours each day. 
The panipale goes to the field at 17.00 hours each day to start or change the rotation. 
If the panipale is going to start water rotation from the tail sector, he must close 
all intakes into the fields within the head section starting at Chalise to Athahra (Fig. 
3). Then, he starts allocating water from the first intake (LI 2) in the tail section (Fig. 
5). He continues allocating water to the last intake of Thulotar Kulo. Finally, he 
judges whether the volume of water allocated to the last intake is appropriate. If he 
perceives that the volume is less or more at the last intake, he re-adjusts the volume to 
all other intakes. Since there are no structural facilities installed in any of the intakes 
or branches to measure the flow, there might be chances in the variation of the 
allotted water flow from the required volume. To minimize the occurrence of such 
cases, the panipale visits the field early the next morning to re-adjust the flow once 
again for the remaining 12 hours. If he observes water flowing out of the defined 
service area after irrigating the allocated plots, he stops water from entering these 
fields before the end of the 24-hour period. He also reduces the flow to fields where 
there is the possibility to drain the water after a few hours. Any individuals, either 
the concerned user of the intake or other farmers, who alter the volume of water flow 
fixed by the panipale are regarded as water thieves and are punishable by the 
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The panipale does not receive directions telling him which sector of the service 
area should get the first chance for rotation. The panipale reserves the rights to make 
the decision. Generally, he starts from the tail. During my research period, the 
panipale generally allowed water to flow into the rice field at the head intakes from 
Chalise (Rl) to Gangate (Rl l ) 1 4 5 regularly without interruption. The logic behind this 
practice was that all intakes along the right side of the main canal within the head 
section have small piped intakes. One of the main reasons for this was that, once they 
were closed, they would not be able to irrigate the connected fields for their turn for 
another 24 hours. In the meantime, there was no appropriate technology for the 
opening and closing of such piped intakes at every 24 hours. Another reason was that 
the panipale could save about an hour if he did not visit all the intakes of the head 
section. The panipale is not paid enough to contribute more time to manage the 
irrigation water better. The only remaining intake within this zone is the intake in 
Chalise (LI). It irrigates about one-forth of a hectare. The water drained from this 
khet is returned to the main canal, so it is not very important to regulate this intake. 
On the other hand, the panipale is getting his portion of rice from all the farmers of 
this sector whether he visits those intakes or not. Some of the tailend farmers have 
grievances against the panipale not visiting the headend intakes, but these grievances 
are not reported to the WUA, nor does the WUA show any interest in the issue. 
There have been are no clear norms developed during rice transplanting season. 
However, there is the understanding that farmers are normally expected to use 
irrigation water for transplanting during the day and for irrigating the newly 
transplanted rice fields during the night. The first (madpani)14 and some early 
waterings after the transplantation are so important that it may affect up to 25 percent 
of the rice crop yield depending upon frequency of watering and the duration of the 
gap between successive waterings. Farmers are traditionally aware of this problem. 
Thus, this is a period when there is the highest demand for water both for 
transplantation as well as for irrigation. 
Methods of water application: There are no sophisticated structures to apply water in 
Thulotar. Given the nature of the source and the canal system, the panipale practices 
gravity fed continuous flow to each rice plot. The chuhan khet, however, should 
allow the upstream plots to be irrigated before water enters their fields through the 
field-to-field irrigation method. Chuhan khets do not have direct intakes to their 
fields, nor do they have any field channels. However, the owners of such fields do 
have all of the other rights the other members of the concerned irrigation system 
have. Therefore chuhan khets have the same access, use, and ownership rights as the 
other fields147. The chuhan khet system has been regularly applied for several years, 
since before irrigation water was a scarce resource in Egharasayatar. The normal rice 
fields are also converted into chuhan khet when the household members of the field 
A detailed discussion of the circumstances under which the farmers of Thulotar are convicted 
as water thieves is presented under "The Rule-Making Process in Action" in the later parts of 
this chapter. 
According to the norms of dhadepalo, he has to block those intakes while watering the tail. 
Madpani is a Nepali technical word denoted for the first watering in the rice crop after 
transplantation of its seedlings. Technically, this stage of watering rice crop is very important 
for further growth and better yield of the rice crop. 
See also Schlager and Ostrom 1992. 
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owner divide the plots while sharing their parental properties at the time of their 
separation. It can also occur when the existing rice plots are sold and further 
fragmented. There are nine farmers with chuhan met in Thulotar, most of them being 
in the tail section (Table 5 in Annex I). However, these cover less than 10 percent of 
the total service area within Thulotar Kulo. Other plots with direct intakes from the 
canal commonly use continuous gravity flow or rotational gravity flow of surface 
irrigation water. Unless stipulated otherwise for specific reasons, all upstream farmers 
should allow the flow of the drain water to pass to the immediate downstream plot. 
This is a very common rule in Thulotar that is also respected by the Nepalese legal 
statutory rules1 4 8. 
Rules for Watering Winter Crops and Kitchen Gardens 
Winter crops and vegetables are traditionally planted in the middle section of the 
Thulotar service area. Thirteen farmers planted winter crops (Table 3 in Annex I ) 1 4 9 
during the year of my study period, growing irrigated wheat, potato, and mustard on 
their met lands during January and February. There are no specific formal rules for 
winter irrigation. Farmers wishing to irrigate will walk along the canal and go to the 
headwork to augment the water flow in the canal. If they are able to get water into the 
canal, they irrigate their own field. Although there are no norms developed for the use 
of irrigation water for winter crops, no one closes the intake without the consent of 
the irrigator if one farmer is irrigating his/her field. Generally, however, the irrigator 
himself blocks his intake after his field has been irrigated. There is only a small 
number of farmers planting winter crops in their met lands within Thulotar service 
area (Table 3 in Annex I), so there is no competition for water during the winter 
season. Most of the farmers are convinced that if many farmers were to grow winter 
crops, the amount of water available for winter crops would be less than the required 
amount, so it would be better to just not plant any winter crops. If the harvest is poor, 
the benefit-cost ratio may become very low. Many farmers cannot spare their 
household labor force, and hiring wage labor and renting bullocks is very expensive 
as well. Therefore, not many farmers are interested in growing winter crops. 
All farmers grow certain types of vegetable crops on a small scale in their 
kitchen gardens. Cruciferous crops such as cauliflower, radish, etc., are most 
commonly grown. Nobody irrigates kitchen gardens through gravity flow, but 
sufficient water is fetched from the irrigation canal for use in the kitchen garden. For 
the most part, women fetch the water. Regardless of the season, all farmers of 
Thulotar have an understanding that no farmer of Rupakot is denied the rights to fetch 
kitchen garden water from Thulotar Kulo. At the same time, however, no one is 
allowed to use gravity surface irrigation water from Thulotar Kulo to irrigate their 
kitchen gardens, nor is it permitted to use pipes to harvest water from Thulotar Kulo 
for kitchen gardens irrigation. 
See also Pradhan and Pradhan 1997; Khadka 1997. 
See also "Farming Systems in Thulotar" discussed earlier in Chapter 4. 
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Rules for Fallow Irrigation 
Farmers who plan to plant summer crops in the Thulotar area need to perform the 
first plowing during January-February, after the rice harvest. Almost all land in 
Thulotar is clay. Clay soil is very hard for the first plowing. Therefore, some farmers 
irrigate their fallow land to loosen the soil for plowing. All farmers of Thulotar have 
water access to water the fallow lands, but farmers wanting to do this must bring the 
water from the canal themselves. Since the water flow from Sabadi Khola is very low 
in the winter, bringing water to the field requires a significant amount of labor. Jf 
farmers are not able to find water for fallow irrigation, their lands at Thulotar may not 
be cultivated the following summer. 
Rules for the Use of Water for Non-Irrigation Activities 
The water in Thulotar canal is valuable to Rupakot for uses other than irrigation. 
Major uses of water from the main canal include fetching water for general household 
use, the washing of clothes and pots, bathing, wallowing buffaloes, and allowing 
livestock, buffalo and small ruminants to drink directly from the canal. There are no 
rules governing the access and utility of water from Thulotar Kulo for non-
agricultural uses. Any person has access to Thulotar Kulo for such purposes. In 
Rupakot, women are mostly the ones who use water for such activities. The Thulotar 
WUA has not developed any rules that protect the water from becoming polluted at 
Thulotar Kulo. 
Rules for Drainage 
The drainage system in all irrigation systems is equally important as the irrigation 
itself. Farmers in Thulotar may face drainage problems mainly during the 
transplanting and harvesting periods of rice. Not many drainage provisions have been 
developed in Thulotar, but the main gate at the head has been adjusted in such a way 
that prevents the river water from flooding the main canal beyond its capacity. During 
the periods when flooding is a problem in the main canal, any farmer can stop the 
flow from entering to the main canal by completely closing the gate. The panipale is 
also expected to follow this practice during his tenure. Spillways and flumes are also 
made to drain the floods coming through the small creeks along the main canal. 
In case of heavy floods during the rice transplanting periods, farmers may close 
their intakes for a certain period of time. There is no spillway near the tail end of the 
main canal, so the tailenders have to cope with the flood problems. All farmers close 
their intakes completely during the harvest season. There are also some informal rules 
that are traditionally applied to draining water from the marshy lands during the rice 
harvest season. Farmers with marshy lands drain water to the immediate downstream 
plots from their fields by making small temporary field channels along their rice 
fields before rice harvest. Downstream farmers also follow the same practice unless 
the flow is diverted to a nearby natural ditch. Downstream farmers cannot protest 
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against this practice of draining water to the downstream fields because the drained 
water should be allowed to flow according to the law of gravity. Every farmer is 
expected to follow this rule. 
Local norms say nothing about the role of gender in drainage activities. 
However, female farmers helped to close their intakes during heavy rains in 
November, 1997, even during the night. Many women were also involved in draining 
water in marshy lands. 
Although fallow irrigation is practiced, some farmers worry about their fallow 
lands where winter crops are to be planted being flooded by the water drained from 
the irrigated fallow lands. Wet lands are also left unplowed for at least a few days to 
up to a week because the soil may be too saturated with water. 
There are no statutory rales that may block upstream farmers from draining 
water during the harvesting period. However, a blanket statement regarding the 
recognition of customary rales in the MulukiAin of 1854 allows farmers to have the 
access of way for draining water from others' land. However, farmers are not 
expected to change water drainage routes each year. Instead, they should follow the 
same route that was traditionally in use. Thus, the farmers downstream of the marshy 
lands allow the upstream farmers to use their lands as a route for drained water during 
the rice harvesting season and after. 
Rules on Resource Mobilization for Repair and Maintenance 
Like in all other FMISs, the farmers of Thulotar Kulo also need to have resources for 
both regular and emergency irrigation management. The amount of work required 
during emergencies such as floods or landslides depends on the amount of damage 
and the crop seasons. When discussing the rales concerning resource mobilization for 
repair and maintenance, expected and normal repair and maintenance are referred to 
as regular repair and maintenance; unexpected repairs and heavy damage to the 
system are referred to as emergency repair and maintenance. 
Thulotar farmers made a rale during the 1997/98 research period stating that the 
Thulotar WUA earnings should be deposited in the bank in Sundarbazaar, Lamjung. 
According to the rule, the chairman of the WUA would jointly operate the bank 
account with the secretary. However, the WUA had not yet opened the bank account 
as of February 1999. 
Rules on Resource Management for Regular Maintenance 
Thulotar farmers clean the irrigation canals at least once each year in July after all, or 
almost all, the farmers within its service area have completed transplanting their rice. 
The WUA decides the cleaning date and calls the General Assembly called to meet 
on the same day as the date proposed for the cleaning of the canal systems. The ward 
kattuwal (messenger) delivers the notice of the General Assembly meeting to all 
members of Thulotar Kulo the evening before the proposed meeting. Each member 
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expects that the first General Assembly called in July is the same day for contributing 
labor for canal cleaning. The WUA requests that all members attend the event 
themselves or to send a working age male member if possible. The amount of land 
owned by each individual within the Thulotar service area is not the deciding factor 
for the number of participants in such activities. The general rule of Thulotar Kulo is 
that in principle the member of Thulotar Kulo should attend the cleaning of the canal. 
If the member is absent or not able to attend, another working age member from his 
or her household may represent him or her. If possible, the representative should be a 
male member. 
On this day, all participants are asked to meet at Phediko Chautaro150 under the 
shade of Ficus trees at Rupakot Phedi. After a brief orientation by the WUA 
members, all participants are requested to attend the canal-cleaning program. 
Generally, the young male participants are asked to start working at the headwork, 
other men work in the middle and the women at the tail part of the main canal. 
The branch canals and the tail end of the main canal are cleaned by the 
respective members in some other days organized by the respective members 
themselves. These farmers or their representatives meet and find a common day or 
morning for the work, depending on the expected amount of work required to clean 
the canals. Any one among them can take the initiative to coordinate a date to clean 
the canals. Any working-age member of the members' households can attend the 
activity, depending on the availability of the work force in the household. There are 
no gender-specific rules for the repair and maintenance activities on the branch 
canals. 
According to the rules developed by the Thulotar General Assembly, there are 
provisions for graduated sanctions against members who are absent from the canal 
cleaning. Generally, one-day absentees are subject to a monetary fine equivalent to 
one day's paid labor, to be paid to the WUA. The penalty is doubled if the same 
individual is absent from the succeeding General Assembly meeting. However, the 
General Assembly may also develop temporary ad hoc sanction rules. For example, a 
General Assembly in 1997/98 granted a concession to all offender-members by fixing 
a nominal sanction of only NRs 5.00 per day of absence. At the same time, it was also 
ruled that it was a one-time concession for all absentees. The offenders who repeat 
the offences would be subject to the graduated sanction of the previous rule. In 
practice, however, only a few absentee members complied with the rule change and 
paid the penalty during my stay at Rupakot. In fact, no one who committed an 
offense during my stay at Rupakot was penalized at all. 
A chautaro is, generally, a stone-worked rectangular construction usually built by an individual 
for religious or social service purposes. At least a pair of Ficus religiosa and Ficus benghalensis 
trees, one each (trees of religious importance), are planted in each chautaro. The main purpose of 
planting the trees is to offer shade for travellers. The chautaro used for a Thulotar General 
Assembly meeting is larger than other normal chautaros. Instead of normally planting a pair of 
trees, this chautaro consists of two pairs. In this book, Phediko Chautaro has been used as the 
name of a place where Thulotar farmers meet for General Assemblies. 
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Rules on Resource Management for Emergency Repairs 
Many FMISs lack permanent irrigation system structures. Floods or landslides may 
cause severe damage to the systems during the critical periods when irrigation water 
is of paramount importance. This situation may arise during the rice transplanting 
period, during the irrigation period immediately after transplanting (madpani), and 
during tillering, booting, and the ear-head development stages of rice crops. All of 
these stages are during June to September each year. 
Thulotar farmers did not have to face any emergency situations during my stay. 
In 1993, however, a 15-meter section of the main canal was completely eroded by a 
landslide during the second half of July before all of the farmers had completed 
transplanting their rice. It was critical that the newly transplanted rice fields were 
irrigated. Since there were no other alternative sources of irrigation water in the 
Thulotar service area, farmers had no choice but to repair the damage as soon as 
possible by using any means they could afford or acquire. The WUA launched an 
emergency General Assembly, which authorized the WUA to take any measures that 
would help carry the water flow as quickly as possible to their fields by any means 
that could be afforded by its members. The WUA bought some zinc plates (which are 
primarily used as roofing materials), folded them, and installed them to replace the 
section of the main canal, which had been washed out. All the water users helped the 
WUA to install the plates and, as a result, were able to temporarily receive water. 
Since it was very expensive for the farmers, the WUA, at the request of the General 
Assembly, asked the Tanahun District Irrigation Office (DIO) to make funds 
available for the necessary repairs to the damaged part of the main canal. At the same 
time, the Thulotar WUA also requested that the DIO renovate the main canal. The 
DIO provided the necessary funds to renovate the entire Thulotar Kulo in 1996. This 
shows that the supreme arena to make the rales for emergency resource mobilization 
in Thulotar is the General Assembly, and not the WUA. The General Assembly may 
authorize the WUA to carry out decisions or make regulations based on the policies 
or directives developed by the General Assembly. In such cases, the WUA may have 
the authority to contact the Tanahun District Irrigation Office directly. 
Rules on the Mobilization of Resources for Normal Rehabilitation Projects 
The normal process for the collection or acquisition of resources for normal 
rehabilitation and renovation activities is always discussed at the beginning of 
General Assembly meetings. The WUA is directed and given authority by the 
General Assembly at the meeting to collect or acquire the necessary resources 
through whatever means or processes available. However, all necessary policies are 
identified and drafted in the General Assembly. The WUA then makes a final 
accounting of the rehabilitation issues discussed during the meeting. Since the local 
Village Development Committee's primary concern is to identify and facilitate the 
local development activities within its jurisdiction, the Thulotar WUA addresses its 
request to the Rupakot VDC. 
All requests to the Rupakot VDC, from Thulotar as well as other areas, are 
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discussed in the annual Village Council meeting of the Rupakot VDC. If the Village 
Council sanctions the Thulotar Kulo request as showing a legitimate need for 
consideration as a development project, the Rupakot VDC then addresses the same 
request to the Tanahun DIO. The Tanahun DIO or one of its line agencies then decide 
whether the request forwarded by Rupakot VDC on behalf of Thulotar WUA should 
be approved. Jf the Tanahun DIO approves the rehabilitation project, the government 
of Nepal (HMG/Nepal) requires that all the members of Thulotar share in the cost of 
the rehabilitation. As per the present rules of HMG/Nepal, farmers are generally 
responsible for contributing 15 percent of the total rehabilitation cost of which one-
third is to be money. The rest can be contributed in labor. However, the amount of 
money to be shared by the farmers may differ depending upon the rules of the agency 
that sponsors a rehabilitation project. The Thulotar WUA collects the cash resources 
from each member of Thulotar Kulo in proportion to their land size within the service 
area. However, each member contributes an equal amount of labor as needed. During 
the last two rehabilitation projects, the Thulotar WUA replaced a major part of the 
labor supply requirement by providing stones and lumber from their local community 
forest area. 
The Rule-Making Process in Action 
This part includes a descriptive account of the Thulotar General Assembly meetings 
I observed. I provide observations of how the rule making process worked, what 
rules were made, what rules changed or were modified, what rules applied in action, 
what rules did not apply and why they did not apply, and other related information 
in Thulotar during my 1997/98 stay. Other information consists of the participant 
composition and the characteristics and behavior of participants in the rule-making 
arena. It also includes a brief explanation of the participants' behavior observed 
over the course of the rule-making process. The General Assembly is the main rule-
making arena in Thulotar. Either myself, my research assistants, or all of us 
observed all three General Assemblies organized by the Thulotar WUA during the 
1997/98 research period. Therefore, I am able to describe and discuss all the 
activities we observed during the assemblies, and the background of the issues. 
The General Assembly and Rule-Making Process 
The Thulotar General Assembly is composed of 67 Thulotar Kulo members. All of 
them, except for one from a neighboring VDC, are from Rupakot village (Ward No. 4 
of Rupakot VDC). There are only six female members in Thulotar Kulo (see "Sex" 
in Annex-U), two of whom have husbands that have been working in India for several 
years. The husband of one woman has a full time private enterprise in a city in Nepal. 
The other three women are widows. Thus, a woman is officially listed as a member of 
Thulotar Kulo only if her husband has been out of the country or far from home for a 
long period or if he is dead. However, many men listed as members of Thulotar Kulo 
also reside outside of Rupakot. Most of them are government employees or are 
involved in non-agricultural income generating activities. They visit Rupakot 
occasionally. In most cases, their wives are the ones mainly responsible for most farm 
activities throughout the year. Although officially there are only six women members 
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in the General Assembly, 10-15 women usually attend each General Assembly. This 
is because the wives of the male members or their working-age daughters represent 
their husband or father in the General Assemblies. 
Normally, a General Assembly meeting is called once a year in July, after nearly all 
the farmers have completed transplanting monsoon rice within the Thulotar Kulo 
service area. The main objective of this Assembly is to elect the WUA, appoint the 
panipale and to fix his remuneration. Other issues of discussion include presentation 
of the annual report and fixing water rotation dates. The Assembly also develops the 
norms for irrigation management. It also fixes the date for cleaning the irrigation 
canals and may also clean the canals the same day. More than one General Assembly 
may also be called and other issues may be added in any of those General Assembly 
meetings. During my research period, the Thulotar WUA called for three General 
Assemblies of its members. They discussed many issues and developed many norms 
related to the management of their irrigation system. In the following paragraphs, I 
present a more detailed account of these meetings. 
First General Assembly 
During the first week of our stay at Rupakot, we had the chance to study a live rule-
making process through participatory observation when Thulotar WUA called the 
first General Assembly of Thulotar Kulo on July 4, 1997. Half the Thulotar farmers 
had completed their rice transplanting. Transplanting rice was given the first priority 
for receiving irrigation water. However, it was equally important to irrigate the newly 
planted rice fields. However, there was not sufficient water to serve both of these 
objectives simultaneously. The irrigation canal had not yet been cleaned, but the 
amount of flow could be increased with cleaning and minor repairs. The WUA was 
aware of such matters. Among the executives of the Thulotar WUA, the vice-
chairman seemed to be more worried and more aware than rest of the members about 
the way irrigation was managed in this system. The location of his home was one of 
the major factors affecting why he was more concerned than rest of the members. He 
was living close to the system in Rupakot Phedi, and he did not have to expend extra 
effort or time to observe the daily activities in Thulotar Kulo. He proposed to the 
chairman and member-secretary that a General Assembly be called to clean the canal 
immediately. The chairman also realized that there was a problem relating to the 
volume of water needed for transplanting and irrigating newly transplanted rice 
fields. He asked the ward kattuwal to notify all the members of Thulotar Kulo to 
gather in a General Assembly on July 4, 1997. The kattuwal delivered the message in 
the evening of July 3, 1997. The chairman does not normally consider calling a WUA 
meeting to be necessary for deciding the date for an upcoming General Assembly 
meeting, but the chairman, vice-chairman and secretary will at least talk informally 
before asking a kattuwal to inform the general members. 
A kattuwal always notifies the villagers the evening before any meetings that all 
members of Ward No. 4 (Rupakot village) or all members of Thulotar need to attend. 
His medium of communication is shouting to the villagers from the tops of hills in 
three places in Rupakot. It is expected that at least one member of each household can 
hear the message and communicate it to his or her household members during dinner 
of the same evening. The ward kattuwal is accountable to the ward chairman (ward 
adhyakshyd) but is not on the staff of the Thulotar WUA. Instead, he is appointed by 
the ward committee of Ward No. 4, Rupakot VDC. However, since the chairman of 
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the Thulotar WUA was the ward chairman of this ward, he could ask the kattuwal to 
communicate any activities concerning the citizens of Ward No. 4. Since many 
farmers were busy transplanting rice, the WUA needed to find a time when all farmers 
could spare a few hours to participate in the General Assembly, and later in repair and 
maintenance activities. The WUA decided on July 4 for the General Assembly 
meeting, which was a day with a new moon (Aunshi). According to Hindu tradition, 
farmers do not plow on new moon and full moon (Poornima) days1 5 1. 
Generally, the time for General Assembly meetings is fixed at 11:00 AM. Most 
or, if possible, all general members are expected to attend such meetings. In most 
cases, the general members are the household heads of each Thulotar member 
household. Other members of their household attend as their representative if the 
members are unable to attend. Generally, the wife or one of the elder children 
represents the member. According to the norms of Thulotar WUA, there should be at 
least 50 percent of the general membership or their representatives in attendance, and 
also 50 percent executive members present for a legitimate quorum. Executives 
cannot be represented by one of their household members. No decisions can be 
officially sanctioned in a General Assembly that does not have the required minimum 
quorum present. Therefore, at least 34 general members (including executives) of 
Thulotar Kulo out of a total of 67 general members should be present to start any 
formal General Assembly. 
The early arrivals to the General Assembly had to wait until 12.00 noon for the 
required quorum to gather before the meeting could start. In the absence of the 
chairman, the vice-chairman initiated the discussions. One of the executive members 
of WUA had also been elected ward chairman the previous April and was nominated 
as chairman of the Thulotar WUA in the third General Assembly meeting on July 21, 
1997. He showed his concern about the low turn out of the general members in this 
Assembly. He argued that all absentees in such meetings, regardless of their clan, 
should be penalized by the WUA, and the WUA should act strongly in doing so. 
Some other participants also supported his idea. Nobody talked against this policy, 
however. Since it was the day for cleaning the main canal, the vice-chairman 
requested that all participants first proceed to the canal and come back to the same 
meeting place at a later time to continue the discussion. The vice-chairman requested 
that the participants divide into two groups to clean the main canal. One group was 
made up of 13 young men. They were asked to start cleaning the main canal 
beginning at the headwork. The rest of the members divided themselves to work on 
the middle and tail sections. Female participants, however, preferred to clean the tail 
section of the main canal. The canal cleaning involved only the part of the main canal 
from the headwork to Rupakot Phedi. 
Having accomplished the cleaning and the needed minor repair, all participants 
returned to the meeting place to continue their discussions on irrigation management 
There are also many other events during which farmers do not plow their land. Plowing is not 
practiced during the major festivals and ceremonies like Dashain (or Bijaya Dashami), 
Deepawali (or Tihar), Harisayani Ekadashi, Haribodhini Ekadashi, Shreepanchami, 
Naghpanchami, Shivaratri, Saunesanskranti, Haritalika (or Tif), Shreekrishnastami, the day of 
Bratabandha or enlightment, and marriage, and so on. Farmers also do not plow on the day of 
naming of the new-borne, all death anniversary of their family member or close relative, all 7-
13 days from the death of a family member or a closely related person depending upon the 
social distance to the deceased person and ethnic customs, and so on. 
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issues. Again, the vice-chairman and the ward chairman dominated the meetings. 
They discussed many issues that could make Thulotar WUA more efficient and 
effective. They were particularly interested in solving the problem of low attendance 
at General Assembly meetings and at the maintenance and repair activities. Finally, 
the General Assembly approved the following rules about the penalties and resource 
mobilization: 
1. The scheduling and practice of water rotation, and the appointment of a panipale 
would be decided in the forthcoming General Assembly meeting to be called at 
the next full moon day, July 21, 1997. The appointment of the panipale before 
the water rotation practices were to begin would be of no use. It would be better 
to start water rotation systems after all farmers had completed transplanting their 
rice. 
2. A graduated sanction would be enforced against the members absent from 
General Assembly meetings and the cleaning of the irrigation system. Those 
absent for the first time should pay NRs 35.00 to the WUA. If the same members 
were absent from subsequent meetings, they would be required to pay NRs 
70.00. If anybody denied being obliged to follow those rules, the WUA would 
have the authority to close the intakes of the offenders' rice fields. 
3. In principle, the members should attend the General Assembly and repair and 
maintenance activities themselves. If a member was absent or unable to attend, a 
working-age member of that household should be sent to represent the 
household. If possible, male members should be sent. 
Some participants also raised a question about the reorganization of the 
Executive Committee. This issue, however, was not discussed in this General 
Assembly because the vice-chairman suggested the issue should be discussed in the 
forthcoming meetings when a larger member participation would be expected. 
The secretary of the WUA recorded all decisions made by the General 
Assembly. He finally also registered the attendance of all participants. Forty-five 
members or their representatives participated in this General Assembly, including 11 
women participants. All literate participants signed after their names while illiterates 
were assisted in registering their names on the list of attendance by the secretary. 
Second General Assembly 
The second General Assembly was called on the next full moon day, July 21, 1997, 
as decided in the first General Assembly. The chairman, vice-chairman, and the 
member secretary arrived at the meeting place at about 12.00 noon. Since they 
represented only one-third of the nine-member WUA Executive Committee, they did 
not have the required quorum for the meeting to start. The chairman requested the 
sons of two WUA executive members to call their fathers immediately. Fortunately, 
the majority of the absent members were from Rupakot Phedi, which was close to the 
meeting place. After the arrival of two other members, the number of total attendees 
became 35 including five executive members and eight women. It was a legitimate 
quorum to start the meeting. The eight women participants were either the official 
general members of Thulotar Kulo or representative sent from members' households. 
However, there were a total of 15 women present, including a group of 7 observers. 
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The WUA had not formally invited other participants. However, my team members 
and I attended the meeting as observers. In addition to the 7 women, a group of other 
observers including young boys, livestock caretakers, and some older men had also 
come to listen. 
Although it did not seem to have been well organized, all participants 
assembled at Phediko Chautaro and started discussing some of the issues regarding 
Thulotar Kulo irrigation management. However, most of the same issues had been 
discussed in the last General Assembly. The discussion was not initiated by a single 
individual and was not organized, with many farmers talking simultaneously. The 
secretary was trying to listen the discussions carefully, but the situation was so noisy 
that the secretary had a hard time noting who was saying what. A group of women 
was seated in a corner of Phediko Chautaro at some distance from the men. Among 
the eight women-participants, two of them participated in the discussion. Both 
women were there representing their husbands in the General Assembly, and both 
were from relatively better-off Brahman households and had 7-9 years of schooling. 
It was difficult to understand what these women representatives were saying. In the 
mean time, the other participants did not seem to be interested in listening. 
The first issue to be discussed concerned the need to start water rotation, and so 
the need of appointing a panipale was brought up. Before any decision was made 
about this issue, the previous year's panipale (who was not a member of Thulotar 
Kulo and a Bhujel by caste) raised a problem he faced for the collection of his 
remuneration. He was paid four muri (approx. 200 Kg) of rice collected every year 
from each Thulotar member. This amount was based on the size of the irrigated lands 
and the number of the intakes an individual member was allowed from the canal. The 
panipale claimed that members having more intakes should pay a greater amount of 
rice in comparison to members with fewer intakes, regardless of the relative sizes of 
the irrigated land. When he mentioned an example of the two rice fields of the same 
size but having different number of intakes, the discussion diverted to a particular 
intake in the middle sector of the Thulotar service area. The majority of the 
participants in the General Assembly claimed that the intake noticed by the panipale 
was not a legitimate intake. The user of that intake defended the disputed intake by 
pointing out that it had been in operation from the time of his father. This became a 
very hot issue, especially between the vice-chairman and the concerned farmer. One 
of the sons of the disputing farmer also reacted very angrily towards the vice-
chairman. The chairman of the Thulotar WUA finally intervened in the discussion. 
He convinced the son of the disputing farmer to not intervene in that particular issue. 
The logic of his decision to not allow the farmer's son to participate was nothing new. 
It was reflective of the view that young people might not have accurate information 
that would help resolve the case, and that their participation might, according to the 
chairman, encourage social tension among the farmers. 
Since the disputing farmer was the oldest among all participants, he was given 
enough time to present the possible evidence and information in support of his claim. 
If the disputed intake was allowed to operate as a legitimate intake, many of the 
farmers having intakes below the disputed intake would suffer. Two women-
participants, both of whom were tailenders, were among the active participants who 
stood against the use of the disputed intake. The discussion became so heated that 
finally the chairman had to intervene for the second time on the same issue. He 
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suggested that the disputed intake should be allowed to use a small volume of water 
until the case could be finalized after a detailed examination of the legitimacy of the 
intake. This issue finally came to a temporary conclusion when the General 
Assembly asked the WUA to examine the authenticity of the disputed intake and 
resolve the dispute in due course152. 
Next, the General Assembly turned to other issues. Two participants, who were 
also teachers in the local schools, asked the WUA members to call another General 
Assembly and present the status of the WUAs financial reports. The WUA was asked 
to show the balance sheet of all debits and credits for the last year. The chairman 
responded to this issue and requested that the participants allow some time for the 
WUA to prepare the reports from the meetings of the WUA executives. The 
participants also asked the WUA members to become more serious and careful in the 
management and supervision of Thulotar Kulo. Some of the participating members 
also asked the other members for compulsory participation on the day when repair 
and maintenance activities were arranged. Proposals were also raised to dissolve the 
existing WUA Executive Committee, but some participants claimed that the present 
WUA could not be dissolved unless it could present the last financial report in front 
of the next General Assembly. The chairman also supported this idea and requested 
to delay the dissolution of the existing WUA by few more days. Despite such time-
consuming discussions, the General Assembly was able to make some major 
decisions by the end of the meeting. These were as follows: 
1. Yet another General Assembly would be called on the following Saturday, which 
was July 27,1997. 
2. The same panipale as in the previous year was appointed to carry out the water 
rotation practices, effective from July 24. The tenure of the panipale and the 
water rotation practice would last until October 30,1997. 
3. The WUA Executive Committee was authorized to set the amounts to be paid to 
the panipale. This would be worked out and decided upon by the forthcoming 
WUA meeting where all executive members would participate. 
4. The list of absentees would be published in the following General Assembly that 
would also decide whether to punish or excuse the absentees. It would also 
decide on the amount of cash sanctions to be levied against the absentees. 
Although not recorded as the decision of the General Assembly, the chairman 
requested that all landowners (members of Thulotar Kulo) that had rented out their 
met land within Thulotar to take care of the payment for the panipale themselves. 
According to the previous rule, the tenants (or the cultivator of land), rather than the 
landowners, were responsible for the rice payments for the land he or she used for 
rice cultivation. 
The secretary registered the name of all participants during the course of the 
meeting. He also prepared a list of the absentees. There were 55 participants in this 
General Assembly, including nine women. Finally, the secretary read the decisions of 
the General Assembly and asked all participants to attend the next General Assembly 
meeting and to communicate the date of the proposed meeting to the 12 members 
who were not in attendance. Then, with the consent of the chairman, the secretary 
The details about this dispute are discussed later in Chapter 6. 
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requested that all participants proceed towards the irrigation canal for its cleaning. 
The young male members were asked to start at the headwork, the other men to begin 
in the middle section, and the women to take the tail part of the main canal. Nobody 
was asked to clean the branch and tertiary canals. 
Third General Assembly 
As agreed upon in the previous General Assembly, the third General Assembly was 
called on July 27, 1997. It was a special General Assembly aiming to develop many 
rules and regulations that were expected to further improve management in Thulotar 
Kulo. Most members particularly considered the issue of penalizing members absent 
on the canal cleaning days to be a hot issue. In contrast to the previous General 
Assembly, more than 50 participants had arrived at Phediko Chautaro before noon. 
Only five women participated this time, however. The number of women became 
lower because the WUA had requested that the members attend themselves and to not 
send their representatives if it was possible. The meeting was called on a Saturday to 
make it easier for the men, who lived outside Rupakot to attend the meeting. 
This General Assembly was also conducted more systematically than the 
previous ones. Before starting the General Assembly, the secretary requested that all 
participants sit down in a circle at Phediko Chautaro. Unlike the last meetings, he 
registered the names of the participants before any discussion began. The discussion 
started after the chairman was asked to take his seat under one of the four trees at 
Phediko Chautaro. After a brief orientation by the chairman, the participants were 
asked to present their opinions. The chairman also asked that all interested speakers 
wait and listen to the former speaker until he or she completed his or her presentation. 
Similarly, all interested participants would be allowed to present their views. 
The first speaker claimed that a farmer upstream from him on a branch canal 
had made several intakes that created problems in supplying the amount of water 
required by the downstream farms. In reaction to this claim, the defendant said that 
several intakes were made only at the time of rice transplantation to facilitate the 
small volume of water directed into each plot. However, the new intakes were closed 
after transplanting was completed. The defendant was the eldest daughter of a general 
member who was working in a government office outside the district. She accused 
the claimant of reporting the case to the General Assembly without first checking the 
intakes after the rice transplanting had been completed. She also asked the claimant to 
observe the field carefully before making any remarks and to not make such mistakes 
again. Although she was a woman, she was a High School graduate. Her father 
seldom came home and she was living with her mother, younger sisters, and a 
younger brother. Being a relatively educated woman and the eldest child of her 
parents, she helped her mother in most of the activities at home and in the 
neighborhood. She also represented one of the high caste Adhikari Brahman and 
pandit household in Rupakot. Her father was a high-class government officer and her 
household had a relatively higher annual cash income relative to the average 
members of Thulotar Kulo. All of these factors have allowed her to present her ideas 
at the General Assembly without the fear of encountering biased gender norms that 
expect women to not be vocal about public activities. 
A second farmer claimed that the controlled size of his branch canal intake was 
small relative to the size of the land that it needed to irrigate. The vice-chairman 
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claimed in response that none of the fields had sufficient water according to the 
expectations of the farmers. He requested that all the farmers within a branch should 
cooperate for better water management practices. He said that the role of the panipale 
was only to divert the water from each legitimate intake into the fields, but it was 
each farmer's responsibility to manage the available water inside his or her field. One 
of the participants suggested that the panipale should take care to allocate water to 
the rice fields in a more equitable manner so that the water would not be misused153. 
Responding to this issue, the secretary asked all the water users to take personal 
interest in co-operating with the panipale for efficient water allocation. 
The discussion was then diverted to the major issue of the last meeting, the 
financial statement of the WUA. One of the executive members of the WUA who had 
been responsible for collecting the cash contributions to pay for the main canal's 
renovation project claimed that some of the members were not cooperating with him 
and not paying the amount of their share. When he mentioned this, a group of 
participants reacted angrily against the behavior of the offender-members. They 
asked for the names of the members right in front of the Assembly. Despite the 
chairman's request to not make the offenders' name public, some of the participants 
insisted their demand be met. Among the insisting members, two ex-WUA Executive 
Committee members were the most demanding. These were young members of 
Thulotar Kulo. One of them worked as a teacher in the local secondary school and the 
other was a relatively better-off member of the occupational caste members of 
Thulotar Kulo. It was informally observed that they were probably also interested in 
working on the forthcoming new WUA Executive Committee. The problem was 
actually between a father and his son over who was responsible to pay their share of 
the renovation cost. The fee had been levied on a parcel of land within Thulotar area 
that was being used by these two farmers, alternating tenancy every two years. The 
owner of the land had not been seen for several years. The son claimed that his father 
should be responsible for paying the share because he was cultivating the land during 
the year (1996) when the rehabilitation project was launched in Thulotar Kulo. The 
father said that both of them should share the cost equally because the land was being 
used by both of them in turn. Neither of them was official member of Thulotar Kulo, 
however. In the mean time, it was not possible to see the landowner and ask him to 
pay his share of the rehabilitation cost. 
The offenders were considered to be good neighbors by the Thulotar members 
even though they belonged to the Bhujel caste. The money collector, as well as all 
other members of the WUA Executive Committee, did not initially want to make the 
offenders' name public because it was a minor problem that was expected to be 
solved within a short period of time. They thought that it was only a matter of a small 
amount of money. It was not wise to publicize the name of their neighbor as the 
offender of Thulotar because of such a small offence. The WUA was willing to 
allow a few more days for the offenders to clear their account before the matter 
arrived in front of the General Assembly. Finally, their name was mentioned in front 
of the General Assembly. One of the members asked the WUA to collect all dues by 
the next Saturday and show the balance sheet before the Assembly. The WUA 
accepted his suggestion, and agreed to call a WUA Executive Meeting to solve this 
problem as soon as possible. 
I 5 J This case is presented as one of the major disputes among Thulotar farmers later in Chapter 6. 
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After a brief listening hour was completed, the secretary finally came up with 
an agenda to be discussed and decided upon by the General Assembly: 
1. Formation of a new WUA committee 
2. Provision of a bank account and its management 
3. Penalties for those absent at the previous meeting 
4. Remuneration for panipale 
5. Water allocation and sanctions for defaulters 
6. Miscellaneous 
Formation of a new committee: Finally, one member repeated the previous meeting's 
proposal to dissolve the existing WUA, which was still not an easy task. On the one 
hand, general members were asking for the financial statement from the existing 
WUA while, on the other hand, there were demands to dissolve the existing WUA so 
that new members would get the chance to work in a way better than the existing 
WUA. Most members were especially interested in inviting the newly-elected ward 
chairman to chair the Thulotar WUA. Many members were also not happy about the 
performance of the existing WUA chairman because of his inability to make the 
financial statement of his tenure public. However, there were no other caste, status, or 
political factors influencing the intention to dissolve the existing WUA Executive 
Committee. The annual election of a WUA executive body was also one of the 
legitimate rules and objectives of the General Assembly, but this does not mean that 
all WUA executive members should necessarily be changed each year. The General 
Assembly also had the right to elect the same committee for several years, provided it 
was sanctioned through a legitimate General Assembly once each year. However, this 
time two of the ex-WUA executive members also seemed to be ready to take the 
responsibility of the new WUA Executive Committee membership in case they were 
invited to do so. 
The standing WUA chairman was neither a ward chairman nor a user of Thulotar 
Kulo. He had been requested to chair the Thulotar WUA the previous time because of 
his position as ward chairman. Therefore, many leading farmers proposed that the 
chairman be replaced by the new ward chairman, who was also a Thulotar user and a 
member of the on going WUA Executive Committee. The General Assembly also 
promised to give the new chairman the authority to nominate the other members of 
the new Executive Committee upon his acceptance of the chairmanship. By granting 
him this authority, the Executive Committee hoped to facilitate the Assembly of the 
best team of WUA and improve the management of Thulotar Kulo. The candidate for 
new chairman at first rejected the proposal on the grounds that the existing WUA 
needed to complete its responsibilities before transferring responsibility to a new 
committee. Ultimately he agreed to assume the position of chair after being pressured 
by the leading participants. At the same time, the other members of the Executive 
Committee also asked the Assembly to accept their resignation as well, so that the 
new members would be able to serve on the WUA Executive Committee. However, 
the Assembly wanted them to remain in their post until the WUA financial reports 
could be presented. The chairman-elect also requested that all other members 
continue their tenure until the next General Assembly. Finally, it was agreed that the 
future of all other members would be decided upon in the next General Assembly. 
However, the other members never changed during my stay at Rupakot, nor was the 
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WUA able to present the financial statement to the General Assembly. 
Provision of a bank account and its management: The General Assembly thought 
that the Thulotar WUA should have its own bank account at the bank in Sundarbazar, 
Lamjung, to be overseen by the chairman and the secretary. The WUA was also 
interested in alternative methods of income generation, but they were not able to open 
a bank account during my stay at Rupakot. All money collected for the Thulotar 
WUA was held by the secretary. 
Penalties for absentees: The first General Assembly decided on NRs 35.00 and NRs 
70.00 graduated sanctions levied against members absent from General Assembly 
meetings. In extreme cases, the WUA could also close the intake of the offender. The 
WUA members at the meeting, however, pointed out that the purpose of the fine was 
not to punish the members, but to change their attitude to improve the management of 
Thulotar Kulo. The General Assembly finally decided to not enforce the previous 
rules. Instead, those absent from the last two meetings would be asked to pay only 
NRs 5.00 per meeting missed. All absentees were given three days to pay their dues. 
Non-compliance with this rule would lead to the closure of their intakes. However, 
this was just a one-time concession for the members who were absent during the last 
two meetings when the rules had been sanctioned. Anyone absent from future 
meetings would be liable for an amount equivalent to one-day's labor for each day 
absent. This was not necessarily NRs 35.00 per absent day as decided in the first 
meeting, but an amount based on the existing wage rates during the period when the 
General Assembly was called. Absentees would have to pay double if they missed a 
second time. The WUA would close the intake of a defaulter's rice field if he or she 
did not pay the fine. Based on this rule, some members who missed last two 
assemblies paid NRs 5.00 per day missed during the Assembly. Those who did not 
pay on that day never paid during my stay at Rupakot, nor did the WUA close the 
intakes of offenders who did not pay. 
Remuneration for the panipale: A panipale collects about four muri (about 200 Kg) 
of rice as his remuneration. Every land-user traditionally gave their rice payment to 
the panipale in November and December when the rice was threshed. The amount of 
rice each individual member paid was fixed by the WUA, mostly proportionately 
based on the size of the rice field within Thulotar service area. However, farmers 
having a higher number of intakes paid a higher amount of rice than those with fewer 
intakes. As requested by the panipale and decided upon by the General Assembly, 
each landowner (whether they cultivate their land themselves or rent it out to tenants) 
would from then be responsible for payments to the panipale, and the panipale would 
not ask the tenants for his remuneration. However, the rice would come from the 
tenant's share and the panipale would receive it through the landowner. 
Water allocation and sanctions for defaulters: The General Assembly authorized the 
panipale to determine on the amount of water each branch and authorized intake 
along the canals would be allocated. No fanners would be allowed to change the 
amount of water allotted to the branches and intakes without the panipale s consent. 
Anyone changing the amount of water would be regarded as a water thief. Such 
violators would pay a fine of NRs 100.00 to the WUA. If the same offender repeated 
the offense for a second time during the same rice season, he or she would be levied a 
NRs 200.00 fine; and if it were repeated a third or more times, the sanction would be 
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raised to NRs 500.00. Non-compliance with these rules would lead to the closure of 
their intake. The WUA, however, would conduct a thorough examination of the 
charges and be the final authority to pass judgment on the offender. The General 
Assembly also decided that any individual who informed the WUA of such an 
offense would receive a reward equal to the amount levied against the offender. 
However, members of the WUA Executive Committee and the panipale would not be 
eligible to receive such rewards. This was because such activities were included in 
their regular duties and responsibilities. 
Provisions for Multiple General Assemblies 
Normally, only one General Assembly is called per year. During the year of the my 
research, the WUA was interested in developing norms to further improve the 
management of Thulotar Kulo. Therefore, they called three General Assembly 
meetings that year. The main objective of those meetings was to develop policies 
that would encourage Thulotar members participate in the General Assembly 
meetings so that there would be broader and more equitable member participation. 
This would hopefully encourage a participatory approach to the management of 
Thulotar Kulo, thus making its management capabilities more effective. The 
second General Assembly of the year also helped by cleaning the silt deposited in 
the main canal by a large flood after the first General Assembly. If necessary, an 
emergency General Assembly would also be called when the WUA suddenly 
needed extra authority to cope with unforeseen events in the irrigation system. Such 
meetings were generally called when the WUA had to approve rules to mobilize 
extra resources for an immediate solution. An emergency meeting might be called 
to handle issues concerning the production or acquisition of irrigation water or to 
solve problems with the management of the irrigation system created by natural 
disasters or man-made crises. Such a meeting was called in Thulotar when a 
landslide flushed out a section of the main canal in 1993. Therefore, although there 
is the provision for one General Assembly meeting each year, farmers may call 
more than one meeting according to the needs assessed by the WUA Executive 
Committee. 
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CHAPTER 6 
WATER DISPUTES AND DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS IN THULOTAR 
Introduction 
The Thulotar irrigation system is a rural social organization supported by the water 
users organization's institutional rules. I described different types of rules and the 
rule-making process in detail in Chapter 5. Had these rules been applied to irrigation 
management in Thulotar Kulo, there would have been no problems in managing it 
effectively. However, since problems and disagreements inevitably arise in almost all 
social relationships (Bisno 1988; Roberts 1979; Gulliver 1969), and it is rare for 
irrigation systems to have no water disputes"4, it was no surprise to observe some 
water-related tensions and disputes in Thulotar Kulo. 
I shall describe in this chapter the tensions and disputes concerned with water 
management in Thulotar Kulo. In general, there were not many water disputes in 
Thulotar and only a few problems related to water management were transformed 
into disputes while many problems were not. The disputing parties also did not 
seriously perceive most of the disputes. I did observe, however, some serious disputes 
during my 1997/98 research period. Among them, there was only one major historical 
case, the resolution of which was achieved only after a long disputing process 
between Thulotar farmers'55 and one of its upcanals', Ghartiswara farmers along the 
source, the Sabadi Khola. This dispute resulted in a long-lasting structural change. 
All disputes were more or less contained in the local sphere, however. No disputes 
affected the social order or challenged the existing law and order of the society and 
many open disputes were quickly resolved for the time being. Not many disputes 
were even brought to the local official forum in Thulotar. It is interesting that none of 
the disputes in Thulotar have ever been reported to any of the semi-governmental or 
governmental dispute management agencies. Although they did not develop into an 
open dispute nor were brought to third parties, many grievances were felt by Thulotar 
farmers. 
The majority of grievances and disputes in Thulotar were due to the scarcity of 
irrigation water, especially during the high demand period of the monsoon season. 
Many grievances related to water scarcity were transformed into disputes. A few 
heated disputes over irrigation system rehabilitation project's resource mobilization 
were also observed, but not all such disputes were necessarily presented seriously. All 
disputes were either opted out of by doing nothing to settle them or they were settled 
among the disputants bilaterally or discussed, negotiated, and mediated by the 
panipale, other farmer-leaders, and the WUA executives or General Assemblies of 
See also Pradhan and Pradhan 1997, 1996; Sutawan 1997; Khanal and K. C. 1996; Khatri-
Chhetri and Pradhan 1997; Shukla et al. 1997; Poudel 1995; IMC 1990. 
When I say Thulotar farmers, it represents both the members of Thulotar Kulo as well as other 
members from Thulotar members' households. 
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Thulotar Kulo. Many grievances that did not develop into disputes, however, 
concerned irrigation water rights of way and how the WUA officials and panipale 
handled the water management problems in Thulotar. 
While most grievances between the WUA executives, the water guard {panipale), and 
the general members were heard, the parties involved in most disputes were either the 
men, women, or children from the households of Thulotar members, including the 
members themselves. At least one dispute was also observed between the WUA 
Executive Committee and general members of Thulotar Kulo. Except for a major 
inter-system dispute, most internal disputes in Thulotar involved occasional ad hoc 
problems. Such cases may not have lasting impact on irrigation management 
practices in Thulotar. Although some of the discussions surrounding water 
distribution and resource mobilization were hot issues among members, the intensity 
of most disputes was mild and temporary in nature. 
In the following section of this chapter, I first present a detailed account of a major 
inter-system dispute between Thulotar Kulo and Ghartiswara Kulo. I also include an 
analytical perspective on how this dispute was raised, managed, resolved and resulted 
into the long-lasting structural changes. Next, I present a description, explanation, 
and analysis of many internal grievances, some incidental bilateral disputes, a 
bilateral dispute between the general members and the WUA, and water disputes 
that were settled by the intervention of third parties. This also includes the post-
conflict situations of the dispute settlements based on the nature of all disputing 
events. Finally, I present an analysis of the general characteristics of water disputes 
and the disputing process in Thulotar. 
Dispute Over Water Rights at Sabadi Khola: A Full-Fledged Dispute 
Between Two Irrigation Systems 
Throughout its long history, Thulotar Kulo had only one significant inter-system 
dispute with one of its upstream systems. This was when its prior rights was 
challenged by the construction of a new irrigation canal (Ghartiswara Kulo) about 
300 meters above its headwork in 1935 (Poudel 2000). This is the only example of a 
water dispute that entered a long chain of disputing processes that resulted in a full-
fledgedd dispute escalation. The following description of this dispute process 
illustrates how disputes in rural societies are negotiated in the local setting through 
the intervention of third-party village leadership. The description below includes the 
socio-economic as well as situational contexts of this dispute and a description, 
explanation, and analysis of the dispute case during the dispute and the post-dispute 
circumstances. 
The Construction of Ghartiswara Kulo in 1935 and Grievances of Rupakot 
Farmers 
Ghartiswara Kulo is one of the systems upstream from Thulotar Kulo, located about 
300 meters above Thulotar Kulo's headwork in Ghartiswara, Ward Three, Rupakot 
VDC, Tanahun. The Ghartiswara Kulo canal system consists of a temporary 
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brushwood type of headwork and a 2500-meter long earth worked main canal with no 
branch canals"6. It irrigates about six hectares of khet land owned by 11 farm 
households consisting of nine Brahmans and two Gurungs. All farmers of 
Ghartiswara Kulo live in Khalte village, Ward Three, Rupakot VDC. Similar to 
Thulotar Kulo, rice is the main crop grown in the irrigated area during the rainy 
season. Only a small area is allotted to wheat, potato, and mustard in winter while the 
rest of the land is fallow. Maize is the main summer crop. 
Before 1935, Ghartiswara was upland (pakhom ) belonging to the farmers from 
Khalte village. There was also not much slope to the land at Ghartiswara, making it 
easy to convert into use for rice farming. Six farmers from Ghartiswara decided to 
convert part of their pakho land into rice fields'55. At first, they converted only 180 
mato muri of upland (about two hectares) into khet land in 1935. To irrigate this field, 
an irrigation canal (kulo) was constructed the same year from the right bank of Sabadi 
Khola. This was the only source for the immediate downstream Thulotar Kulo 
farmers for many centuries. The new kulo was named Ghartiswara Kulo. 
In the beginning, all water users of the newly built Ghartiswara Kulo were 
Kumai Brahmans. Although there were only six farmers using water from this canal, 
there were many of Kumai Brahman households in Khalte village. All of them 
supported the construction of Ghartiswara Kulo in 1935. During this period, one of 
the Ghartiswara farmers was also an official in the district court. He was commonly 
known in the village as Bichari. His socio-economic status was very high in 
comparison to other citizens of the locality, including Rupakot. His influence went 
beyond the district in the government institutions of that time. If any pancha-
bhaladmi were called to resolve the social problems in Khalte village and its 
neighborhood, Mr. Bichari would always lead such groups (and such activities). His 
son was also an influential leader in the village. Ghartiswara Kulo water users were 
tied with Mr. Bichari and other Kumai Brahman households through kinship, 
neighborhood, and other social relationships. At the time Ghartiswara Kulo was 
constructed, about three-fourths of the farmers in Thulotar Kulo were Upadhyaya 
Brahmans, many of whom were literate and working as local pandits. Their social 
influence outside the village or with the possible dispute managing institutions was 
less in comparison to the Khalte people, however. 
Many farmers in both villages were more or less aware of the rights (prior 
rights) to irrigation water at that time, secured by the first legal code of Nepal, the 
Muluki Ain ("National Legal Code")"'. But Rupakot farmers could not oppose the 
construction of Ghartiswara Kulo because of the social influence the water users of 
Ghartiswara Kulo and their supporters had during its construction period. Another 
reason why the conflict between Khalte and Rupakot did not bring forth as a dispute 
was that the volume of available water for Thulotar Kulo, even after the construction 
of Ghartiswara Kulo, was sufficient to irrigate the Thulotar Kulo service area in 1935. 
However, the same case has emerged as a major dispute between the same parties 25 
years after the construction of Ghartiswara Kulo. 
Its average discharge rate at the main canal is 62 liters per second (Poudel et al. 1994). 
In most cases, any names of the lands ending with "swam" are the pakho lands. 
Rice is the main stable food grain crop in Nepal. It is also more economical in comparison to 
other substituting crops in the Hills of Nepal. 
See also Pradhan 1994; WECS 1987. 
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Fig. 5 Thulotar Kalo and intakes from the main canal. 
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In the case of Rupakot, the farmers were well informed that any new irrigation 
systems to be built above Thulotar Kulo (their own) would need their prior 
permission. No new irrigation canals above Thulotar Kulo could be constructed 
without the consent of Thulotar farmers. Thus, it illustrates that the Rupakot farmers 
had grievances against the construction of Ghartiswara Kulo from the beginning 
when it was constructed in 1935. They could not claim them right away because of 
other social factors, however, such as the higher socio-economic status of Khalte 
farmers and the easier and more comfortable access to the government agencies the 
Khalte leaders had compared to those of the Rupakot farmers. Therefore, the process 
of dispute emergence, for the time being, was forced to enter a certain period of 
"incubation" before the grievances were claimed and led to an inter-system dispute in 
I960 1 6 0. In the meantime, it is also very important to note how the farmers of 
Rupakot became able to claim their rights to use Sabadi Khola water after a long 
period of patience. This was mainly due to the education, exposure and adventure of 
an young farmer of Rupakot and the development of social ties between the 
influential leaders of Rupakot and Khalte villages, which is briefly discussed in the 
following parts of this section. 
The Claiming of Grievances and Proposal for Negotiated Settlement 
Irrigation water in 1960 was not sufficient for Thulotar khet because of the 
reduction161 of water volume at the source, the Sabadi Khola and the extension of the 
irrigated area in Thulotar. The traditional leadership of Talukdar and Jimmuwal had 
already been replaced by a young, dedicated, and relatively well-educated high class 
Brahman man of age 36, known by the name of Writer. As chairman of the Thulotar 
WUA, he was usually worried about the inadequate water supply in Thulotar. One 
day Mr. Writer was leaving Rupakot and noticed water flowing in the service area of 
Ghartiswara Kulo. At the same time he recalled the lack of water in Thulotar, while 
Ghartiswara had enough to meet its needs. This led him to wonder whether the same 
water source could be diverted to Thulotar Kulo. Since both systems were sharing the 
same source and Ghartiswara Kulo was about 300 meters upstream from Thulotar 
Kulo, it was possible that more water could be diverted into the stream. He 
presented the matter to other farmer leaders when he returned to Rupakot and asked 
them to support his idea to reduce the volume of water flowing into Ghartiswara 
Kulo. The other farmer leaders supported the idea. They claimed that Egharhasayatar 
Kulo was hundreds of years older than Ghartiswara Kulo was. Thus, the construction 
of any new irrigation systems above the intake of Egharhasayatar Kulo, including 
Ghartiswara Kulo, required the permission of Egharhasayatar Kulo"0. Mr. Writer 
therefore suggested that Egharhasayatar Kulo had the rights to reduce the flow of 
water into Ghartiswara Kulo. 
After gaining support from other leader farmers in Thulotar, Mr. Writer decided 
See also Felstiner et al. 1981. In this particular case, the dispute transformation model presented 
by Festiner et al. as "naming", "blaming", and "claiming" has been blocked by the social 
factors that were stronger than the grievances perceived by the Thulotar farmers. 
An increased number of settlements and the conversion of many uncultivated forestlands into 
khet lands near the Sabadi Khola watershed over the previous 25 years (1935 to 1960) had 
resulted in the reduction of a significant amount of water flow at Sabadi Khola. 
See also LMC 1992. 
145 
to talk to some of the Ghartiswara Kulo farmer leaders about reducing the water 
volume for Ghartiswara and thus augment the volume for Thulotar. He was aware of 
Thulotar Kulo's prior rights of use over any other new systems from Sabadi Khola. 
Therefore, he visited the leaders of Ghartiswara Kulo and proposed to reduce the flow 
of water into Ghartiswara Kulo at its intake by half. He also tried to convince the 
Ghartiswara farmers that the amount of water they were getting from Sabadi Khola 
was not necessary to irrigate the land served by Ghartiswara Kulo. At the same time, 
he added that the available flow at the intake of Egharhasayatar Kulo was simply not 
enough to irrigate lands under its service area. He mentioned that the 1854 Muluki 
Ain had protected the rights of prior water users against any later users. 
The Ghartiswara farmers flatly rejected the proposal presented by Mr. Writer to 
reduce the amount of water in Ghartiswara Kulo in July, 1960. However, Mr. Writer 
did not want to withdraw his decision to protect his prior rights to use water in Sabadi 
Khola. Mr. Writer was as influential and as able as Mr. Bichari of Khalte had been in 
1935. At the same time, the people of Khalte had the problem of how they could 
save face as they wanted to continue their social dominance in this locality as usual. 
Given the expected personal esteem and the expected personal and social incentives 
of the young leader from Rupakot side, the leader of Rupakot was not prepared to 
back away from his claim of prior rights in the least (see Merry 1982; Gulliver 1979). 
Thus, the flat rejection of the Rupakot leader's claim and the almost equal leadership 
characteristics of both disputing parties were the main factors behind the initiation of 
the inter-system dispute between Rupakot and Khalte villages'". The dispute would 
not have moved ahead had one of the parties been weaker than the other party (see 
Merry 1982). In this case, the leaders from the both parties were not willing to 
withdraw their claims, not even partially. 
Second Attempt to Negotiate 
After the unsuccessful meeting with Ghartiswara farmers about sharing the source of 
irrigation water, Mr. Writer invited Ghartiswara farmers to the intake of Ghartiswara 
Kulo to try to end the dispute once more. At this time, the social relationship between 
Rupakot and Khalte had worsened to the point that neither party was ready to step 
back from their own water claims. It was thus nearly impossible to avoid a potentially 
serious dispute between the two parties. Mr. Writer had received such strong support 
from the people of Rupakot that about 70 people, at least one from each WUA 
member and non-member household, went to the intake under his leadership. All 
villagers were prepared to face any challenge which might come from Khalte. Some 
farmers from the Khalte side also came to the intake under the leadership of the son 
of a court official, Mr. Bichari. According to some of the senior citizens of Rupakot, 
the farmers from Ghartiswara Kulo had come with sticks. In addition, a crowd of 
women and children from Rupakot had also gone to the nearby forest to watch the 
event. Some observers said that some of the farmers from the Ghartiswara side 
threatened to abuse the young leader of Thulotar. On the other hand, farmers from 
Rupakot were not in a state to tolerate any harm to their leader. 
However, the main reasons for this dispute were the construction of the new irrigation canal and 
the limited amount of irrigation water. See also Pradhan and Pradhan 1997; F. and K. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1996; Poudel et al. 1994. 
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The leader from Rupakot first tried to convince the Ghartiswara farmers to 
reduce the volume of water entering their canal. He repeatedly said that the irrigated 
area in Ghartiswara had no need for such a large volume of water that could have 
very productive use for Thulotar. Once again, his request was not welcomed by 
Ghartiswara farmers. 
Confronted with this scenario, Mr. Writer permitted his followers to dismantle 
the headwork of Ghartiswara Kulo when his last attempt to negotiate failed. A group 
of young farmers dismantled the intake of Ghartiswara Kulo immediately. The job 
was completed within a few minutes. The outnumbered Ghartiswara farmers could 
not react to this action immediately. The Rupakot farmers at that moment were not in 
a state of mind that would allow any amount of water into Ghartiswara Kulo. Had 
the Khalte farmers taken any immediate reaction against them, the Rupakot farmers 
would have reacted without mercy. Fortunately, this did not happen. Both parties 
returned to their respective villages after the intake was dismantled. The most 
influential leader of Khalte village, Mr. Bichari, was absent from this event, however. 
Priority Given to the Protection of Water Rights Over the Cost of Sacrificing 
Social Relationships 
Some members of Ghartiswara Kulo were also among the kinship circle of Mr. 
Writer and other Adhikari families at Rupakot. They had land under both disputed 
systems. Being members of a close kinship group, these farmers hoped that their 
leader would agree to allow at least enough water through to their land in 
Ghartiswara. A few hours after dismantling of the Ghartiswara intake, they asked Mr. 
Writer to allow a small amount of water through that would be sufficient to irrigate 
their land in the Ghartiswara Kulo service area. The leader of Rupakot rejected such 
private privileges to his close relatives, however. He was not ready to lose Rupakot's 
prior water rights over Sabadi Khola for the price for helping a few relatives (see also 
Nader and Todd 1978). As a leader of Rupakot village, his conscience did not allow 
him to do this. 
The Third Attempt at Bilateral Negotiation: Influence of the Leaders' Social Ties 
and their Characteristics 
Mr. Bichari, the leader of Khalte, was not a farmer user of Ghartiswara, and he was 
not present at the meeting at the intake of Ghartiswara Kulo, but he was a member of 
the same kinship group as the majority of users. Being one of the court officials and 
the most influential leader during that period, he was looked up to as the pancha-
bhaladmi of Khalte village. His position as a popular leader in Khalte would be 
called into question if his relatives, villagers, and friends did not get any more water 
to plant rice after using it for the previous 25 years, nor would he be able to sleep in 
peace until the dispute case was resolved. His status in the locality did not allow him 
to be the observer of the trouble his villagers and neighbors were faced with. 
Therefore, Mr. Bichari was willing to resolve this dispute as soon as possible. The 
attempts at dispute resolution through negotiation were also made easy because of the 
strong social relationship of the leaders of Khalte and Rupakot. Mr. Bichari and Mr. 
Writer were tied through a strong fictive kinship relationship of mitra saino as mit-
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buba and mit-chkora, respectively. Mr. Writer was a cousin of the mit of Mr. Bichari's 
son. There was no misunderstanding between these two leaders on the personal level. 
Since they were also both the supreme leaders in their respective villages, each one 
understood that it was their responsibility to handle any problems in the local area 
beyond the limits of their villages as well (see also K. von Benda-Beckmann 1984). 
Therefore, Mr. Bichari was first interested in having private negotiations with his mit-
chhora before any negotiation was done between the farmers of Rupakot and Khalte 
villages. 
The day after the destruction of the Ghartiswara intake, Mr. Bichari went to the 
home of his mit chhora (Mr. Writer) early in the morning to wake him up. Since he 
was the mit-buba of Mr. Writer, Mr. Bichari was hopeful that he would be able to 
find a solution that would be agreeable to both parties. When Mr. Bichari called Mr. 
Writer from the yard outside his home, Mr. Writer at first rejected the proposal of 
having a private meeting with his mit-buba. After a few minutes, however, they 
agreed to briefly talk about the dispute case. This short meeting resulted in an 
agreement to divide the water of Sabadi Khola in half at the intake of Ghartiswara 
Kulo. Then, both agreed to inform their followers and call a meeting the same day at 
Rupakotphedi. 
That same afternoon, a mass meeting of all the members of the two systems was 
called at Rupakotphedi. After a brief presentation and discussion of the leaders' 
proposal, the meeting ratified the agreement to split water sharing and decided to 
draw up a statement of agreement. Seventeen representatives from Rupakot, 
including two tax collectors, an older farmer, and the supreme leader, plus five 
representatives from Ghartiswara and four witnesses (sakshi), including Mr. Bichari, 
signed the agreement on the thirty-first day of Shrawan in 2017 BS (July, 1960). The 
agreement is not registered with any external agencies but both parties have a copy 
(see Annex- XIV). This is how the negotiated settlement was ratified in the public 
forum right away in the village. 
The Consequences of The Dispute 
A chuhan khetgets its separate intake in a quasi-formal way 
In recognition of his bold and successful leadership during the dispute with 
Ghartiswara, Mr. Writer was rewarded with a separate field channel leading to his 
chuhan khet, the last tailend plot of the Thulotar service area. The retired land 
revenue collector (mukhiya) himself permitted a direct field channel to pass through 
his private land, giving Mr. Writer direct access to the main canal. This agreement 
was not passed in the WUA or General Assembly meetings, nor had any farmers 
directly proposed any reward. Now, farmers with chuhan khets within the Thulotar 
Kulo service area have grievances over why only one farmer was provided with a 
direct field channel to his previous chuhan khet while nine other chuhan khets still 
operate. Their grievances continue against both the provider of the field channel, Mr. 
Mukhiya, and Mr. Writer, the end user of the field channel, but have not yet 
developed into an open dispute. 
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Social acceptance of leadership 
Everyone involved in the dispute was convinced that Mr. Writer's leadership should 
be recognized. He went on to have the chance to lead the Thulotar Kulo WUA for 
another three decades, from 1960 to 1993, until he was unable to continue in his 
position due to his old age. Mr. Writer was respected as the top leader among local 
pancha-bhaladmi after the dispute and his demands or grievances started to be taken 
seriously by external agencies and personalities, even those outside Rupakot VDC. 
Negotiation and Social Justice: Looking Back at the Negotiating Process and Its 
Implications in the Disputing Communities 
The disputing process of one of the most serious and violent disputes in Thulotar 
demonstrated that disputes are not necessarily destructive to a society. After the 
negotiated settlement of this dispute, both Ghartiswa and Thulotar farmers improved 
their irrigation management through the introduction of very important institutions 
consisting of new rules governing water acquisition practices (see also Greenhalg and 
Chapman 1995; Gulliver 1979). At the same time, this case also shows that a 
negotiated dispute settlement approach is an effective and beneficial means of dispute 
settlement in rural societies. The agreement signed by the disputing parties has also 
become the means of keeping any future disputes between Ghartiswara and Thulotar 
in check. 
It has now been about four decades since the irrigation source water sharing 
agreement was signed and there have not been any violations of the agreement by 
either party since. This case supports the idea that negotiated solutions to water 
disputes are rarely violated by the disputing parties (see also Brans and Meinzen-
Dick 1997; Sutawan 1997). Since Ghartiswara Kulo has a temporary headwork, there 
are no other structures for dividing the water, nor do the farmers of Ghartiswara 
leave any space at the diversion across the stream at their headwork in order to let 
half of the flow go down. The leakage to the stream amounts to almost half the actual 
volume flowing towards the Thulotar intake. Sometimes, the farmers from each 
system meet at the intake of Ghartiswara Kulo to see whether the volume is divided 
proportionately according to their last agreements. Generally, they do it during July in 
case water is not sufficient in either of the systems. The results of such meetings are 
always productive for both parties. 
This cooperation between the two parties shows that the Rupakot farmers 
became involved in the dispute only to protect their prior user rights but not break 
social relations with their neighbor village. The disputing parties managed to 
negotiate a solution through the influence of the personal social ties of the local 
leaders164. This shows that the social network and the role of the individual actors are 
very important in the study of water rights in irrigation systems. 
As far as the Rupakot farmers' perception is concerned, the dispute with their 
neighbor was settled by the best means available for dealing with the case. The inter-
system dispute between Rupakot and Ghartiswara Kulo has been settled and there are 
See also F. von Benda-Beckmann 1985a; K. von Benda-Beckmann 1984; Merry 1982; 
Gulliver 1979. 
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no indications that it will re-emerge, at least in the present scenario. Several questions 
remain, however. If negotiation would be one of the best processes of resolving 
community disputes, what made Rupakot farmers wait 25 years to get justice? Even 
though the dispute was negotiated and signed by the leaders of both sides, is it fair to 
say that a handful of Khalte farmers were not affected by the presence of a large 
crowd from Rupakot village? Was Mr. Bichari (non-user of Ghartiswara Kulo) the 
right person to serve as a leader and mediator for Ghartiswara Kulo? Did the venue of 
negotiation (Rupakotphedi) influence the bargaining ability of Khalte farmers? 
The Rupakot farmers may also have such grievances. Although more than 50 
villagers from Rupakot were present, the ideas proposed by their leader, Mr. Writer, 
were not necessarily formulated with the full participation of other members of 
Thulotar Kulo. Farmers not only had to rely on him, but it looked like they also 
confirmed his proposals without asking any questions. This raises the question of 
whether his personal characteristics affected the social context of the entire disputing 
process. On the other hand, why did only Mr. Writer have a direct field channel to his 
chuhan khet while other farmers did not? There are still nine farmers in Thulotar with 
no waterways directly connected to their rice fields (see Annex-I, Table 5). Would all 
of these problems be resolved if the disputing parties had chosen other folk 
institutions or state institutions to resolve their grievances? These are some of the 
questions that remain unanswered. 
The Grievances of Thulotar Farmers 
"Grievance", as used in this section, refers to a perceived injurious experience faced 
by a farmer who blames someone else for his or her injury, but the fault for the injury 
is not claimed directly against any entity'65. In Rupakot, it is difficult for the observers 
to ascertain how unperceived injurious experiences are transformed into perceived 
injurious experiences because of the insufficient knowledge of the local situation. 
However, I was able to find out that many people were aware of injurious 
experiences that were blamed on someone, but it was difficult for them to claim 
against the grievances, especially against people of higher social status. Many people 
have grievances against people of high caste or high class status among the water 
users, and against the panipale and the WUA. Many of the Thulotar Kulo farmers 
have not been able to stand up against the WUA, mainly because all the WUA 
members carry relatively higher social status. This may be either because of their 
political positions, caste and economic positions, historic family position, or 
professional positions. The grievances against the larger and higher caste members 
are similar in nature to those against WUA members. Farmers' inability to claim 
grievances against the panipale is also because of the association of the panipale to 
higher caste and higher class members or WUA executives in Thulotar. 
My general impression of the experiences in Rupakot is that conflicts are not 
necessarily phenomena which are easily observed. One cannot say a society has no 
conflict simply because conflict among the members of a society was not observed. 
The same applies to the Thulotar irrigation system. Conflict between a wife and 
husband might only be discovered if the researcher is able to talk to the wife and if a 
See also Felstiner et al. 1981. 
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good rapport is established under very friendly and harmonious conditions. The same 
can be said for conflicts between a mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, between step-
wives, between a father-in-law and daughter-in-law166, or between Brahmans and 
lower caste members, between rich and poor farmers, between a landlord and a share 
tenant, and so on. Minor conflicts are mostly unobservable in societies where 
traditional attitudes towards caste, sex, and age predominate. In the following 
paragraphs, I shall examine in more detail why even perceived grievances are not 
claimed against the perceived opponents. First, I shall begin with the grievances 
between the water users. Then, I will deal with those against the panipale and, finally, 
those against WUA policies. 
Grievance for Rights to Access the Field Channel 
One of the farmers with a plot towards the last part of the Piple-Birauto branch in the 
middle section of the service area (see Fig. 4) used a field channel to irrigate his field 
throughout the history of Thulotar Kulo. About 20 years ago, two pandit'67 farmers 
from Rupakotgaun wanted to build houses close to a field channel. The pandit 
farmers had requested the use of the field channel because they were interested in 
moving their place of settlement from Rupakotgaun to Rupakotphedi (see Fig. 3), 
where most of their wet land was located. At the same time, the channel user had no 
neighbors living near him. He was interested in inviting some people, especially close 
relatives, to settle near his home. However, by sacrificing the original route of his 
field channel, the farmer had to use a public track as an irrigation canal that was also 
a little bit of a longer route for getting his water. The temptation of getting good 
neighbors inspired the farmer to agree to the pandit farmers' proposal. It was also not 
considered wise to go against the request of pandits who had higher social status than 
the farmer. Therefore, two pandit farmers asked the farmer to stop using the field 
channel to irrigate his rice field. As an alternative, they suggested the farmer use a 
gully (which was also being used as a path to Rupakot) as a canal to his field. The 
farmer accepted the alternative proposal and used the gully as the water canal to his 
rice field. The two pandit farmers erected two new buildings along the side of the 
previous field channel. They have been residing there for twenty years. 
The farmer then wanted to use his previous field channel again. He asked the 
pandit households to grant him the same field channel access that he had had 20 years 
earlier, but he did not report his request to the WUA or General Assembly because 
he wanted to settle the problem with the two pandit farmers himself. The pandit 
farmers, however, ignored his request. I did not observe any signs of the problem 
reaching an agreeable settlement during my stay at Rupakot. 
The farmer and the two pandit farmers were members of the same lineage of the 
top class Adhikari Brahman family in Rupakot, and the two pandits were father and 
son. As a popular pandit during this period, the father enjoyed high status among the 
Rupakot villagers. The son had average status while the farmer was relatively poor. 
The senior pandit farmer was a cousin of the farmer. 
See also Van der Schaaf 2000,1999. 
Here, the term "pandit" is used to denote the profession as priest, but not as the family name, 
Pandit. 
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The amount of water available to Thulotar at that time was more than is available 
now. As time passed, the influence of the village leader also eroded every year. The 
farmer also thought that if the original route had been allowed to operate again, he 
would have saved a certain amount of irrigation water as well as reduce the amount 
of time required to maintain the canal. It would have ultimately resulted in a higher 
yield of rice for him. Unlike before, he was then also aware that he had every right to 
claim the original route as a field channel as he had used it for several years 
immediately after the construction of Egharhasayatar Kulo. At the same time, he 
hesitated to violate customary rules requiring him to respect the relatively higher 
status of the pandits, and he had a hard time breaking the close ties of his kinship 
relation with them. Therefore, although he ended up having many other neighbors of 
the same Adhikari lineage, he did not want to go against his closely related opponents 
by making the problem public. 
This case suggests that in some cases, the farmers do not want to present their 
grievances to the public arena not only because they want to preserve the harmony 
and peace in their neighborhood, but also because they are bound to do so because of 
their perceived inferior social status, even with descendants of the same families 
(shared ancestors). In this case, a disputing party enjoyed social status superior to 
their opponent they were relatively better off and because of the local practice of 
pandityainm. The opponent, having a perceived inferior social status, feared possible 
negative social consequences if his case entered the public arena. Thus, his evaluation 
that he would benefit from the disclosure of grievances against his high status 
opponent was in this particular case negative. 
Grievances Against the Rights of Way 
As described in the major dispute case earlier, the leader of Thulotar, Mr. Writer, was 
granted a separate access of way (field channel) for his chuhan met at the very end of 
the Thulotar Kulo service area after he provided the effective leadership in the inter-
system dispute. Mr. Mukhiya personally granted his land as access of way to allow 
the extension of the tailend of the main canal to Mr. Writer's met land at Kanle, the 
last tailend land in the service area of Thulotar Kulo (see Fig. 3). This was done at the 
personal request of Mr. Writer to Mr. Mukhiya when Mr. Writer's leadership status 
was at its highest point after the settlement of the dispute with Ghartiswara Kulo. Mr. 
Mukhiya was also seen at this time to be the second-generation leader after Mr. 
Writer. Thus, his decision to grant his private land for the field channel was also 
informally done on behalf of the rest of the Thulotar farmers. There were nine other 
farmers who also owned a chuhan met within the Thulotar Kulo service area (see 
Table 5 in Annex-1). None of them had a direct channel to their fields. Although no 
one reported their complaint to the WUA against Mr. Mukhiya's decision to allow 
Mr. Writer to give the rights of way from his private field in the WUA, I heard the 
oppressed grievances among the owners of chuhan met during my period of field 
research. They believed that the weakness of the entire WUA Executive Committee 
allowed the continuation of the access benefit to only one farmer while nine other 
chuhan met farmers were never given consideration. 
The adjective of pandit. 
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Most chuhan met farmers were from Adhikari households. At the same time, 
they were also the younger brother, cousins and nephews of the most influential 
leader of Rupakot, Mr. Writer, and the second-generation leader, Mr. Mukhiya, as 
well. However, none of them were as rich as Mr. Writer, nor was their overall social 
status as notable. Mr. Writer also owned a relatively larger area of land than most of 
the other members of Thulotar Kulo. He also had considerable non-agricultural 
income. In general, the overall socio-economic status of Mr. Writer comes second to 
Mr. Pandit, who was the manager of Thulotar Kulo before Mr. Writer. Mr. Mukhiya 
also had higher status than the average members of Thulotar Kulo because of his role 
as second generation leader and his position of mukhiya in the village. Thus it is not 
surprising that no one directly challenged Mr. Writer for the use of the field channel 
or Mr. Mukhiya for allowing his private land to be used as a new field channel. With 
the changing overall socio-economic environment in the villages of Nepal, people 
may start to show their grievances against their former boss as well, so it is not 
surprising that at least some quiet grievances are being heard, even against Mr. 
Writer. 
A Silent Conflict: Grievances of a Lower Caste Farmer Against a Brahman Boy 
On July 10, 1997, one of the special tenants (hali, the plowman) had planned to 
transplant rice to a plot he had rented through the provision of special tenancy 
(mujurim) from one of his baligharm. The plot was the second to last field within the 
Thulotar service area. This tenant, a member of the Biswokarma (BK) caste, was 
also a member of Thulotar Kulo through land he owned in another part of the tailend 
area. Water rotation and the appointment of the panipale was to begin on July 23. 
The tenant went to the headwork to augment the flow in the main canal at 6:00 
o'clock in the morning and closed all intakes upstream of his own, diverting all 
available water into his field that was scheduled to begin rice transplanting at 10:00 
o'clock. A boy, who was the son of a Brahman member of Thulotar Kulo, arrived at 
the rice field about a half hour later and diverted all the water into his field of 
transplanted rice located near the middle of the tailend. The plowman/tenant was no 
longer at the intake of the Brahman boy, but he noticed the diversion within a few 
minutes and closed the boy's intake completely. Again, the boy went back and 
diverted water to his field after the tenant had returned to his rented land. This was 
repeated three times, but neither talked to the other. The tenant got rid of the problem 
at about 10:00 o'clock when the boy went to school. The tenant farmer, however, 
never made this problem public. 
"Water for transplantation has priority over water for rice fields" is the 
unquestioned and one of the most common informal rules of water allocation in 
Thulotar Kulo. It is hard to believe that such a common rule is not equitably exercised 
towards some of the members of Thulotar Kulo, the rules of which do not 
discriminate among members, i. e., there are no sub-group rules in Thulotar1". 
However, some of the farmers' grievances about their fields not being allowed to be 
watered even at the time of transplanting have never been claimed in any forums that 
The land given to the plower as remuneration for plowing the owner's land throughout the 
year as part of the special contract of hali. 
The household for whom the plower is working as hali. 
See also Ostrom 1992. 
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might justly resolve their complaints. The victim in this case was a farmer with low 
status according to three different standards: he was a poor low caste member 
working as hali (plowman) in a Brahman's household (low caste, poverty, and halt). 
He had to work as a hali because of his low caste tradition and poverty. He did not 
even dare to speak a single word against his opponent, a teenage boy of a Brahman 
family. The boy's family also happened to be closely related to the family he plowed 
for. 
The factors that influence status in Thulotar prevent the grievances of many 
Thulotar members' from ever reaching a public forum. Some of the farmers perceive 
that large landholders and headend farmers may be favored. Many farmers are not 
affected by the norms of Thulotar because the WUA does not want to apply the rules 
very strictly. The social interests of WUA executive members (and/or the village 
leaders of Rupakot) have impact on the management of Thulotar Kulo in a negative 
way. This may have further impact on rule violations committed by other farmers or 
by the same offending farmers who repeat offenses in the future. The Thulotar WUA 
and the Rupakot village leaders are blamed for many grievances held by average 
Thulotar farmers, but many of these cases never reach the open arena and are never 
reported; they are never claimed as disputes between either of the parties. Status 
differences among the farmers seem to be the main factor behind all such grievances. 
In Hindu culture, Brahmans are superior to other castes because of their normatively 
prescribed roles as the highest category in the caste groups. This is why Brahmans in 
Rupakot are more educated, more involved in non-agricultural income earning 
professions (like teaching and clerical jobs), include more large farmers, and have 
more access to other socio-legal institutions. As a result, they have more power in 
dispute management. This leads to grievances rarely being claimed against Brahmans 
by farmers of other caste categories. 
Grievances Against the Panipale 
The Thulotar panipale has a challenging job. He manages to do the extraordinarily 
difficult job of preventing disputes among the farmers that would probably erupt if 
there were no proper water distribution practices implemented by the panipale. In 
many cases, the panipale himself has played the role of judge-in-practice and 
managed to keep many dispute cases from becoming public. Some suppressed 
grievances are heard against the panipale among the Thulotar farmers. Although no 
cases were reported to the WUA against the panipale or any other dispute 
management arena, some farmers believe that the panipale may be biased in favor of 
the headenders, his balighar (the households he plows for), rich farmers, and those 
households with whom he has patron-client relationships, giving more attention to the 
rice fields owned by these farmers. According to some small farmers, he may also not 
report any wrongdoings committed by the large fanners. Unfortunately, all of the 
farmers in the categories allegedly favored by the panipale had relatively larger plots 
towards the upper riparian of the Thulotar Kulo service area. 
None of the farmers could claim having been cheated by the panipale (as 
perceived by them) in favor of the large farmers. Nor can the panipale do it against 
any of the large farmers. The farmers' hesitation to stand against the panipale was not 
because of the panipale's social status (which was lower than most farmers), but 
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because of the social relationship the panipale has with the high status farmers. In this 
case, the multiplex relationships the panipale had with the large farmers as a tenant 
and partner in patron-client relationship was very important for his social status and 
security in Rupakot village. 
Grievances Against the Lenient Nature of WUA 
Instead of a normal annual General Assembly meeting, three General Assemblies 
were held during my 1997/98 research period. The main reason for this was that the 
majority of the farmers were willing to improve the management of Thulotar Kulo by 
developing and applying new water management rules. Interestingly, the General 
Assemblies formulated and ratified many rules"2. Below is an example of some of 
these rules and other business conducted by the General Assembly: 
- It was proposed that those absent from the General Assembly would have to pay a 
cash penalty. A graduated sanction would be applied for those who did not comply 
with this rule. 
- The WUA was asked to find a solution to an intake dispute. 
- The WUA was also asked to present the annual accounting (debit and credit), 
especially for the costs of a rehabilitation project. 
- Full authority was granted to the WUA to apply sanctions against farmers who do 
not comply with the required cash contribution for rehabilitation projects. 
- A new WUA Executive Committee was expected to be formed. 
- It was proposed that the WUA should open a bank account for the management of 
its cash incomes. 
Many of these proposed rules were never implemented during my stay at 
Rupakot. Had they been implemented, Thulotar Kulo would be known as one of the 
most effective FMISs in Nepal, like the Chherlung, Argali, Pithuwa, and Chhattis 
Mauja systems. Unfortunately, some of them were applied and then discontinued 
within a couple of weeks. For example, some absentees paid NRs 5.00 as a nominal 
penalty for missing a day in the General Assembly and canal cleaning as decided by 
the third General Assembly. Many of the absentees, however, did not even comply 
with such a nominal rule. The WUA never tried to penalize the offenders further by 
closing their intakes, which was also a rule sanctioned by the General Assembly. 
Many farmers in Thulotar Kulo did not welcome this very lenient approach the WUA 
took against its offending members, but none of these grievances were claimed 
against the WUA, nor were they were reported in the General Assemblies. Some 
proposals were also never brought into practice. The WUA was not able to open the 
bank account. It was also not able to collect the share of rehabilitation cost that two 
farmers were quarrelling over. The WUA was also not able to present the financial 
statement to the General Assembly. Alternative sources of income to fund Thulotar 
Kulo were not sought as agreed upon by the General Assembly, nor was the change 
of the WUA Executive Committee fully done and the old committee was not re-
elected by the General Assembly. 
Most of the leading farmers among the Thulotar members are on the Executive 
For more details, see First, Second, and Third General Assemblies in Chapter 5. 
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Conirnittee of the WUA. After the WUA cornrnittee leadership was passed from Mr. 
Writer to the ward chairman in 1993, a new committee was formed which was 
comprised primarily of relatively high status Thulotar members. The committee 
consisted of the relatively more elite members of Rupakot than the average farmers. 
Although such a WUA committee may have many advantages, one disadvantage is 
clearly observed in how problems in Thulotar Kulo are dealt with. If there are any 
shortcomings from the WUA side, the rest of the members usually hesitate to go 
directly against the actions of WUA members. This makes WUA members strong in 
their status but at the same time poor in performance. The social ties and 
neighborhood, and political relationships between the influential WUA executive 
members and other members have also resulted in such problems in Thulotar. 
I never found any Thulotar Kulo farmers who objected (directly or indirectly) in 
a public arena to any improvement efforts in the Thulotar Kulo management system. 
Even so, both the General Assembly and the WUA Executive Committee have 
problems applying most rules and regulations they themselves have developed in the 
General Assemblies. This seeming lack of concern among the Thulotar farmers may 
seem strange and even disappointing to development workers or visitors and the 
Rupakot farmers, but there is reasonable logic (reasonable, at least for leader farmers 
in Rupakot) behind this attitude. Most water users in Thulotar Kulo are closely tied 
either through kinship, marriage, or other strong social ties (Annex XIII). An action 
or sanction against a farmer by the WUA means extra problems for their colleagues 
or, in many cases, their social dependents. On the other hand, all Thulotar Kulo users 
are from the same residential community, Rupakot village. Thus, any problem to any 
member of Thulotar Kulo means a problem for a neighbor (which most villagers do 
not like), and a threat to village harmony and peace. 
Politics is probably the most important factor accounting for the poor 
performance of the Thulotar WUA in the Rupakot context. The majority of the 
Thulotar Kulo farmers follows the same political ideology. Historically, even before 
Nepal was liberated from Rana rulers, Rupakot village was known for its democratic 
revolutionary inclination. Being the citizens of a remote village, they have also 
played significant roles in the democratic movement of Nepal. Today, it is well 
known that the young people of Rupakot are active in maintaining the democratic 
ideology. National political leaders have recognized the significant role Rupakot 
farmers play in local and national government elections. Thus, both local leaders and 
national leaders want to preserve the unity of the village to continue their political 
contribution. Most farmer leaders in Thulotar Kulo also want to maintain their unity 
in Rupakot at any cost, including inefficient management of Thulotar Kulo. Had 
these rules been rigidly applied, peace in Rupakot would have been lost and a further 
deterioration of the management of Thulotar Kulo might have ensued. 
After observing many farmers' grievances in Thulotar, I do not think that all 
experiences perceived to be injurious were blamed against someone and transformed 
into "grievances". However, the farmers may have perceived that they were 
discriminated against or disfavored or victimized on certain occasions. There may 
have been moments that farmers noticed less water than the expected volume that 
should have been entering their intakes. They may have had hostility toward an 
unknown entity that diverted water into their fallow land that had to be plowed the 
next day. They also kept their sadness to themselves when they observed a flood 
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flowing into their newly planted rice fields. Many such experiences, however, could 
not be blamed on any entities. 
Incidental Bilateral Disputes 
I focus in this section on some incidental disputes between different categories of 
Thulotar farmers. All four cases of such disputes that I observed during my research 
period were about water distribution issues related to water scarcity problems. Three 
of them were observed during the rice transplanting period when water was 
desperately needed both for timely transplantation of rice seedlings and the first 
irrigation (madpani) of the newly planted rice fields. People involved in such disputes 
were not necessarily members of Thulotar Kulo. Some of the disputing parties were 
members of a Thulotar member's family. These included children and women as well 
as men. In some cases, the role children played as members of a farmer's family is 
interesting, especially how the children are emotionally involved in water distribution 
on their family farms. All of these dispute cases were incidentally observed for a 
short period and settled or dismissed. The age, caste, and vertical social ties among 
the disputants were found to be of primary importance in the settlement or the 
resolution of these disputes. In this section I first present the role children play in 
water disputes and how age and gender influence the course water disputes may take. 
This is followed by an examination of the role social status plays and the importance 
of harmonious relationships among the farmers in water dispute management. 
Dispute among Lower Class Children of Different Age Groups 
During the transplanting season, transplanted fields are generally allowed to be 
irrigated after 16.00 hours, which is after most fields have been prepared for 
transplanting. On July 19, 1997, two children173 came to Thulotar and started 
irrigating their rice fields. This was after 16:00 hours and nobody was opposed to the 
boys' irrigation of the transplanted fields. Both boys shared a limited amount of water 
in the main canal to irrigate their transplanted rice fields in the tailend. 
A girl with a field below the boys eventually came and asked them to share the 
flow equally between the three of them. Both boys objected to her proposal, claiming 
that since they were the first ones in the field after 16:00 hours, the girl could get 
water only after they had finished their irrigation. The girl disagreed with them and 
removed the diversion the boys had made across the main canal. The dispute became 
serious when the boys completely blocked the flow in the main canal and diverted the 
entire flow it to their own fields. In the meantime, one of the boys scolded the girl 
with unacceptable language. The girl had developed a good friendship with my 
research assistants, who were present, so she took this as a prestige issue against her, 
especially in front of the outsiders. She could not keep herself from taking revenge, 
so she slapped the boy who had used the vulgar language. The boys could do nothing 
more. The girl then divided the water into three equal parts and none of the boys 
dared close the canal again. It just so happened that the three of them were cross-
All children discussed in this and other dispute are the children of Thulotar Kulo members. 
157 
cousins from three different lower caste households. They were related to one another 
through kinship and marriage as well, but some were more closely related than the 
others were. The girl was older than the two boys, as they were 10 to 12 years of age 
and she was about 14 years old. 
It is interesting to note that, unlike many other cases where disputants wanted to 
stop water entering into their opponents' fields completely, the senior opponent in 
this case wanted to share the available flow equally among the three of them. The 
close kinship and similar caste affiliation (especially lower caste) inspired the senior 
disputant's action. However, it can not be denied that the presence of my research 
assistants as her friends, who were from a higher caste, more educated, and older than 
all the disputing persons, had partial impact on her normal behavior. At the same 
time, although junior in age, the boys did not want to accept the proposal made by 
their senior. They instinctively reacted as males facing against a female opponent. 
However, faced with a failed compromise and needing to water her newly 
transplanted field, the girl was forced to apply her advantages of age and coercive 
ability as a last resort. 
Dispute Between a Lower Caste Farmer and Mixed-Caste Children 
On July 19, 1997, one scheduled caste farmer was transplanting rice near the tailend. 
At the same time, two boys 10 and 12 years old (one of them also from a scheduled 
caste family, and another from a Brahman family) stopped the water flowing to the 
tailend of the main canal. Both of them diverted water to their newly transplanted rice 
fields. This caused the tailend farmer to stop plowing for rice transplantation, so he 
went to find out why the water in the canal was blocked. He saw that the children 
had diverted water into the transplanted fields so he closed their intakes. He brought 
the issue up with the children and asked them to not divert the water when it was 
being used for transplanting. However, the children opened their intakes again when 
the farmer left. The farmer came again and was very angry with the children. After 
that, the children dared not open their intakes again. 
In this particular dispute case, it is important to examine why the lower caste 
farmer reacted angrily against the higher caste Brahman boy; why the children did 
not comply with the first request of the farmer; and why the children complied to the 
farmer only after he became angry. Although the disputing farmer was of a lower 
caste, he was facing a water deficit when transplanting his rice. He had no choice but 
to act against the existing normative order about the hierarchy of status based on the 
caste system. Unlike many other cases where the disputing parties chose not to 
sacrifice the social interdependence and caste-bound normative order, the farmer in 
this case did not hesitate to break the caste-bound hierarchy to gain scarce irrigation 
water. Thus, he did not care whether his opponent was Brahman or other caste; 
instead, he asked them to keep the water flowing into his field. Ingrained with the 
high caste instinct, however, the Brahman boy did not seem to take the farmer's 
request in a positive way. Feeling privileged by the company of a high caste Brahman 
boy, another boy, although he himself was from the lower caste, did not comply with 
the farmer's request either. The farmer was also aware that, as far as water allocation 
was concerned, rice transplanting always had priority over the irrigation of rice fields 
that had already been transplanted. He was also fed up with the lack of water that 
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would force him to stop his rice transplanting if he did not act boldly against his 
opponents. He made a second furious attempt to get the children to stop. Had they 
not complied with his demands that they not disrupt the flow, they would have been 
seriously penalized. Faced with such threats coming from a person much older than 
themselves, the children had no choice but to leave and avoid being penalized for 
their wrongdoings. The children were also afraid that they might face negative 
consequences from within their community for not complying with the requests of a 
man many years their senior. 
Although many factors influenced the disputing processes and settlements in the 
last two dispute cases, it was mainly the age factor that brought the event to a 
settlement. In the rural communities of Nepal, age is an influential factor that helps 
determine the relative social status of individuals. In the last two cases of dispute 
discussed, the older farmers (or their children) were able to protect their rights to use 
irrigation water as members of Thulotar. The juniors among the disputants were not 
even able claim their grievances about being manhandled by their senior opponents. 
Age as a factor of respect is stronger among members of the same family or within 
the same household than in broader society, but farmers rarely disobey senior 
members of a village or neighborhood. This is one of the main reasons why junior 
members of the rural societies were dominated by the seniors and why the juniors 
could not express their grievances against the wrongdoings of senior members. 
Rather, juniors keep their grievances within themselves. 
Water Disputes and the Influence of Vertical Social Ties 
Another dispute arose when two farmers, an uncle and nephew, were transplanting 
rice in below Tinmangale (Fig. 4) in the tailend of the Thulotar service area. The 
uncle was an elderly farmer. Before noticing that each of them was suffering from a 
water deficit, both were willing to augment the flow in their respective branches at 
Tinmangale. They thus completely closed each other's branch at least once. After a 
while, both came to the branch's intake and blamed the other for closing their intake 
when there was a serious shortage of water for both farmers. They told one another 
about the problem they faced because of the water shortage. However, later they 
understood that both of them were facing the same water deficit for transplanting 
rice. They realized that there was no solution to the problem without augmenting the 
flow in the main canal. The uncle suggested that the nephew should go farther up the 
canal towards the head and divert more water into the main canal. The nephew agreed 
to his suggestion. He went to the head part of the canal and closed all intakes that 
were used to irrigate the rice-transplanted fields of other Thulotar members with 
fields in the middle and headend parts. As a result, there was no longer a water deficit 
problem for either of the disputing parties. Both transplanted rice in their fields 
throughout the day without any water constraints. The augmented volume of water 
ended the dispute for both parties. 
In this particular case, it is interesting to note why the dispute case did not turn 
into a more serious and lengthy process. It is also significant that the nephew agreed 
to obey to his uncle's request to go to the headend of the main canal and augment the 
water flow. In principle, there are no variations or exceptions in the rules of water 
rights for the 67 farmers of Thulotar Kulo, but the role of individual farmers may 
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differ, depending on the vertical social ties of the users such as between the uncle and 
nephew in this case. If a farmer and son, who is farming a plot subdivided from his 
father's, want to transplant rice and use the same insufficient water source, it is the 
son's, or junior farmer's, job to augment the flow at the canal. The senior farmer's 
responsibility ends once he has asked the junior farmer to do the job. The Thulotar 
WUA rules never favor senior members. At the same time, they are not biased in 
favor of the junior farmers, but the juniors have to obey their seniors. Such norms 
may differ between different generations not only among village kinship relations, 
but there may also be variance within the same household"4. Had these two farmers 
not been closely related as uncle and nephew, the disputant might not have agreed to 
his opponent's proposal. The case under such circumstances would have developed 
into a more intense dispute. However, had these two farmers not had the close kinship 
relation of uncle and nephew, the factor of age within a vertical social relationship 
may have also produced the same outcome. Whatever the reasons, the way in which 
the described dispute was resolved demonstrates how vertical social ties between two 
disputing parties may favor the one who has a social status higher than his or her 
opponent. At the same time, the compliance of the junior to his senior opponent's 
proposal as set by the local normative order may have helped to abort the dispute case 
before it turned into a worse social event. Had the junior not complied with the local 
norms of status roles, the situation would have worsened. In this event, the local law 
respecting senior members would have led to negative consequences for the junior 
farmer. 
Neighborhood and Withdrawal of Social Status 
Early one morning in Thulotar, a lower class BK"5 woman was cutting grass in her 
rented rice field while my research assistants and I chatted with her. Shortly, a 
Brahman woman who owned the land below the BK woman's plot arrived and 
suddenly started scolding the lower class woman. The Brahman woman claimed that 
the BK woman augmented the flow to her field early in the morning without regard to 
the provisions stating that no farmer could touch the intake without the panipale's 
consent once water rotation had begun. Violation of this rule was subject to 
punishment. She threatened her opponent that she would report the case to the WUA. 
The BK woman reacted by saying that the Brahman woman had also violated these 
rules several times before. If the Brahman reported the case against her, she could 
also do the same against the Brahman. The Brahman woman seemed to be 
humiliated by the equal reaction from a lower caste and low class BK woman, 
especially in front of us as outsiders. However, the women came to the rice fields so 
early in the morning not just to visit their rice fields, but because they had to cut grass 
and return home before 10 AM, which is the normal lunch hour at Rupakot. After a 
while, both women stopped their claims against each other and started cutting grass 
again. The dispute was discontinued without any further resolution processes. 
Neither of the women reported the case to the panipale, the WUA, or the General 
Assembly. This case never reappeared in any arena. 
Given the strong caste-based community of Rupakot, with Brahmans at the top 
The behavioral attributes among the mother and daughter may not match with that of among 
mother and son, and so on. See also Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 1997. 
Abbreviation of Bishokarma or Kami that represents one of the lower caste title. 
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of the caste-based hierarchy, why, then, did such a privileged Brahman woman 
tolerate such a humiliating reaction against her by a lower caste and lower class 
Bishwokarma woman? Most likely it was to preserve a harmonious relationship 
within the community, as, in most cases, peasant societies prefer living together in a 
peaceful manner even at the cost of some of their grievances. To do so, they may also 
be prepared to withdraw their social status in the centuries-old tradition of caste-
based hierarchy. Regardless of the heated discussion between these two disputants, 
neither of them wanted to advance their claims on the opponent's water distribution 
rules violation to the public arena. This was because neither of them wanted to see the 
other penalized by the WUA. This dispute case suggests that a higher-class woman 
does not want to sacrifice her social interdependence even with a lower caste BK 
woman"6. The indulgence of the Thulotar WUA may also be another reason why 
these farmers did not report the case to the public forums. It is possible that they 
believed the WUA would not necessarily take the proper action even if the case was 
filed. Another reason was that many farmers in Rupakot also believe in opting out 
rather than becoming involved in a dispute against one of their neighbors. 
It looks as though the one who is lower in status always takes the first action in 
water disputes"7. The lower status in one of the cases described above was because of 
the generation or the relative age. In other cases discussed earlier, the lower status 
was because of gender, caste, or wealth. However, not all people accept their 
subordinate position silently, as becomes clear in other dispute cases. In cases where 
water scarcity is vital because it seriously threatens the crop and livelihood of the 
farmers in general, people may stand up against their opponent despite their lower 
position. The dispute case discussed in this section between children of different ages 
and gender showed that the dominant factor is more active in the situations where the 
hierarchy of status is not clear. In this case an older girl was able to use her age 
against younger children even though they were boys. In general, a combination of an 
urgent need for water such as during transplanting and first watering for rice crop, 
social norms of hierarchy, WUA rules, as well as personal character are responsible 
whether action is taken and by whom in a water dispute. 
Bilateral Disputes Between the Thulotar Farmers and the WUA 
Although not directly related to water distribution, a dispute between an irrigation 
system water management organization and its water users is an important illustration 
of how disputes are handled, even if it is not directly related to water rights. This case 
illustrates the circumstances under which the members of a strong, normatively 
articulated society are willing to sacrifice their strong social relationships and break 
the centuries-old normative laws when it is necessary. 
In nearly every General Assembly meeting I observed, the farmer participants 
asked the WUA to show the balance sheet for the costs for the last rehabilitation 
project. The WUA, however, only presented the reasons why it could not publicize it 
at the annual General Assembly meeting, which is when it should be presented. The 
This is not true in all cases when farmers are also ready to sacrifice their social relationships 
when water becomes a rare resource. 
See also Galanter 1974. 
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WUA said that some of the committee members assigned to collect the money from 
their sectors had not submitted their reports yet, while the committee members 
claimed that some of the farmers had not yet paid their share. After a brief discussion, 
the WUA agreed to present the case again in the following meetings. However, it was 
never brought up again during my stay at Rupakot. Such a failure of the Thulotar 
WUA to perform its regular task caused many general members to question the 
existing WUA committee's ability to properly manage Thulotar Kulo. 
In most cases, the executive members of the WUA are the dominant speakers in 
General Assembly meetings. The executive members of the Thulotar WUA are also 
high status members among the Thulotar members. Thus, it was not surprising that 
the WUA easily avoided the general members' demand that they make the financial 
statement public. It is interesting to note that none of the WUA executives reacted 
negatively against the general members' demand. Rather, they assured the members 
that the statement would be made public in the forthcoming General Assembly 
meeting. However, they never called another General Assembly. The only reason 
they gave in the General Assembly for why they were not able to present the financial 
statement was that two farmers had not yet deposited their share of the money for the 
rehabilitation project. It was not clear whether there were any other reasons as well. 
Whatever the reasons, the WUA avoided the escalation of a major dispute between it 
and the general members, at least momentarily. 
I also discussed about the general members' grievances against the performance 
of the WUA in an earlier section of this chapter, but Thulotar Kulo members 
generally do not speak out against the Executive Committee members. Interestingly, 
in this case they seemed to be very vocal about the financial matters. This behavior 
also supports the claim that farmers may be willing to sacrifice their social 
relationship if the dispute is about scarce resources (Poudel 1994; Shukla 1993; 
Bumalag and Bhuyan 1986). Natural resources do not necessarily have to be the 
scarce resources, however. In this case, cash resources in a remote farmers' 
community like Rupakot are probably very important resource. Therefore, it also 
suggests that the disputes in an irrigation system do not arise only because of water 
issues; indirectly, this was related to land rights, and thus water rights. The farmers 
in this case were asked to share a cash contribution to protect their water rights'7". 
Water Disputes and Intervention by Third Parties 
After a section on a dispute between two irrigation systems in the earlier parts of this 
chapter, I talked about the grievances of Thulotar farmers that were never claimed 
against their perceived opponents. Then, I also discussed some of the incidental 
disputes that were either settled bilaterally or dismissed with minimum actions by the 
disputing parties. In this section, I will describe and explain the water disputes that 
where third parties intervened to settle them or reach a resolution. Interestingly, none 
of the disputes among the farmers of Thulotar Kulo have been reported to external 
agencies or any dispute management organizations. All of them were dealt with either 
by the Thulotar WUA, the panipale, or by the village leaders individually or in an 
See also "Third General Assembly" in Chapter 5. 
162 
organized way. The role ofWUA members and the panipale in water distribution and 
the overall handling of problems and water management practices was mostly 
intended to minimize water disputes. The roles of the panipale, WUA chairman, and 
ward chairman have played an important role in preventing many disputes from 
escalating into serious events. Their role was also noticeable in preventing grievances 
of the farmers turning to disputes, at least for the time being. However, WUA 
practices that were too lenient were not welcomed by some members of Thulotar 
Kulo. 
In the following part of this section I will first discuss the disputes where the Thulotar 
WUA intervened. These include the description and explanations of the dispute cases 
and the role of the WUA in the temporary settlement or resolution of the dispute. 
Next, I will present those disputes that were either settled or prevented from 
escalating further by the panipale. Finally, I will describe a case where a village 
leader intervened. 
WUA Intervention in Water Disputes 
A Tripartite Dispute Between the Panipale, a Middle Sector Farmer, and Some 
Tail Sector Farmers Regarding the Legitimacy of an Intake 
On the day of the second General Assembly (mohi sabha), July 21, 1997, the 
panipale raised the issue that the contribution of rice for his remuneration was unjust. 
He argued that two farmers with the same size of plots but a different number of 
intakes should pay different amounts of rice, but the specific farmer that the panipale 
was talking about did not react immediately. However, when the panipale objected to 
the legitimacy of an intake used by the concerned farmer, the farmer immediately 
reacted against the panipale's claim17'. 
In this case, the panipale was referring to a disputed intake near the middle 
section of the service area which was a major issue during the second General 
Assembly of Thulotar in 1997/98. The panipale's intention was not to get more rice, 
but to perform his duty as the attendant of the system. He reported the case in the 
General Assembly because he felt that it was his duty to report any deviations in the 
water distribution general rales. He was willing to reach a decision about the 
legitimacy of the disputed intake. The vice-chairman of the WUA claimed that the 
disputed intake was not legal; rather, it was a new intake opened by the farmer 
himself without the consent of other water users. Finally, the chairman suggested that 
the disputed intake should be allowed access to a small amount of water, unless the 
WUA came to a different solution after examining the legitimacy of the disputed 
intake. The chairman, vice-chairman, member-secretary, and some executive 
members of the WUA went to look at the disputed intake the next day. They directed 
the panipale to allow water at times scheduled by the rotation schedule, but less than 
the normal volume. The WUA never resolved this dispute case, however, nor were 
they able to reach a decision about the panipale's remuneration because of the 
operation of the disputed intake. 
The user of the disputed intake in this case was the oldest participant in that 
See also "Second General Assembly" in Chapter 5. 
163 
General Assembly. He claimed that the intake was being used from the time of his 
father and that his opponents knew nothing of Thulotar when the intake began 
operation. He insisted that since the intake had been in use for several decades, its 
authenticity should not be called into question. Since the disputed intake was in the 
middle section of the Thulotar service area, all tailenders would suffer the reduction 
of a relatively small volume of water reaching their fields if the intake was deemed 
legitimate. As the discussion intensified, the collective interest of the tailenders was 
challenged, becoming a case between a single farmer from the middle sector and all 
tailenders. The vice-chairman began to look like he was acting as the leader of the 
tailenders even though he owned no tailend land. The proceedings became a hot 
discussion between the vice-chairman and the disputing farmer. The vice-chairman 
was the nephew of the farmer. It appeared as though the vice-chairman was honestly 
playing his role as the vice-chairman of the Thulotar WUA, rather than acting as the 
nephew of the farmer. He asked all the tailenders to respond to the question of the 
legitimacy of the disputed intake, but the majority of them did nothing. Two of the 
female tailenders reacted against the farmer, but with restraint, and the other farmers 
did not listen to their points. The situation started to become so bad that the chairman 
had to intervene. Ultimately, the chairman was able to keep the argument between the 
middle and tail farmers from becoming worse, but he did not reach an appropriate 
solution to the problem. Complaints against the liberal nature of the WUA were heard 
among the tailenders, but they never seriously raised the subject. 
The farmers of Thulotar are convinced that disputes within the community 
should be settled at any cost before it becomes a pathogenic case for the whole 
community. Sometimes this is so difficult for the WUA to accomplish that they have 
to find quick temporary solution for dispute settlement so that the harmony and peace 
of the community is not threatened. In such circumstances, the moderate interim 
decisions have to be carried out even if the violation is clear to most of the members 
of the irrigators' community. If the suspects are among the senior members within the 
kinship circle, the WUA would want to avoid any direct action against them. When 
the claim seems to be genuine, temporary solutions are sought to convince the 
claimants to stop their claim at least temporarily. By doing this, the WUA hopes to 
preserve community harmony by averting the dispute between close relatives. 
However, this policy of seeking temporary solution may not necessarily apply for 
distant relatives even though they belong to the same descent group. 
The chairman of the WUA was able to satisfy all the members of the General 
Assembly momentarily by providing an interim solution to the dispute. Although 
many of the farmers have grievances against such actions taken by the WUA, a 
positive aspect of this kind of action is that the WUA was able to prevent the issue 
from escalating into a serious dispute among the farmers. In a way, the WUA wanted 
to protect the farmer's customary rights to operate the intake in case it was one of the 
old intakes which had been in use throughout the history of Thulotar. On the other 
hand, most executive members of the WUA, including the chairman, were also aware 
that the user of the intake, who was a senior member of Thulotar, should not be 
humiliated by the actions of the General Assembly. He was also a senior member 
with close kinship ties to most of the Adhikari members of Thulotar including the 
vice-chairman, the secretary and an influential member who was nominated as the 
next chairman of the WUA in the third General Assembly. Any punishment enacted 
against the farmer would also be a serious violation of the age- and caste-based 
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normative orders of the village. The WUA leaders, who were also the local political 
leaders were not in the mood to disturb the nearly united political environment in 
Rupakot by humiliating one of their senior relatives. Such an outcome could have 
resulted in a serious political upheaval in Rupakot village. 
Dispute Between Farmers over the Issue of Resource Mobilization 
The farmers of Thulotar Kulo have had no information about an absentee landowner 
in Thulotar for over a decade. About 15 years before the time of my field research, he 
was a citizen of Lamjung district and a member of Thulotar Kulo with a small parcel 
of land in the tail part of Thulotar. From the beginning when he owned the land, he 
had given his land to a Bhujel family in Rupakot in share tenancy. The same family is 
still using this land and does not pay anything to their landlord. This family is now 
divided into two households of the father and a son. When one of the sons of the 
tenant household separated180 from his parents, the father and son agreed to make a 
rule for operating the land they were using for last several years. According to the 
agreement, the father and son rotate the use of the land on alternate years. 
The 1996/97 season was the father's rum to cultivate the field. Thulotar Kulo at 
that time was undergoing its second renovation project. Every water user had to 
contribute a certain amount of cash to the project through the WUA. Since the real 
owner of the land was not present, the users of the land did not pay anything because 
they were the tenants and, since the father was cultivating the land during the 1996/97 
season, the WUA registered the father's name as the usufructary-owner. The farmer 
did not protest against this because it could be very helpful to him if he decided to 
register the land in his name if the owner did not return. When WUA asked him to 
contribute his share of money for the renovation project in proportion to the land he 
was using, he did not disagree but asked his son to share half the amount. His logic in 
this may be correct because they both used the land on alternate years. However, the 
son rejected his father's proposal on the grounds that the WUA had registered the 
father's name as the owner of the land and it was the father who was using the land 
during the renovation period. 
The case was later discussed in the General Assembly. The WUA members 
advised the son to not let the case become a dispute between father and son, and to 
share the amount by half. The son disagreed with their advice. Some of the WUA 
members threatened to close the intake to their parcel, but nothing happened for the 
remainder of time I was in Rupakot for the field research. However, had the WUA 
chairman not intervened in the heated verbal exchange between the farmers, the case 
would have become more serious, and there was doubt whether this dispute could be 
settled. 
Citizen's rights in all societies are connected to obligations; the same holds true 
for water rights in an irrigation system. The duties and responsibilities of each water 
user in an irrigation system are defined by the type and extent of water rights he or she 
enjoys as a member (or non-member) of a particular irrigation system. The owner of 
an irrigation system has secured the management rights to that system. Management 
rights involve obligations as well. All members of Thulotar Kulo are together the 
Moved out from the joint family and started living only with his nuclear family. In such cases, 
the property owned by the joint family is divided. Land is one of the most important items for 
sharing (dividing). See also "Access to Land Ownership" in Chapter 3. 
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owners of this system. As such, they take charge of the equitable responsibilities or 
obligations for the management and maintenance of the irrigation systems. The 
obligations of all members in Thulotar Kulo are connected to the land rights. Every 
member is obliged to contribute their share of cash contribution for the rehabilitation 
activities proportionate to the size of their land holdings. In this case, however, the two 
farmers did not contribute their share to the WUA even after the completion of the 
project. Normally in such cases, WUA would revoke the defaulting members' rights 
of access to irrigation water. However, since both of the disputing farmers were from 
Rupakot village, the Thulotar WUA did not want to exercise this rule. At the same 
time, the WUA never withdrew its claim that the farmers should deposit the amount 
levied for the rehabilitation project. 
It is also interesting that the WUAs attempt to collect the rehabilitation money 
from the two farmers was in conflict with their own rale for cash mobilization. The 
Thulotar Kulo general rale for cash contributions is that tenant farmers will not be 
asked for resource contributions. Whether the land is cultivated by the landowner or 
rented out to the tenants, the landowners should be responsible for contributions in 
cash levied on their land. In fact, all official members of the WUA are the landowners 
of Thulotar. Thus, the WUA was not expected to ask for money from non-members. 
The practical problem in this case was that the landowner could not be reached and 
asked to pay his share of the contribution. At the same time, these two farmers did 
not own the disputed land, but they also did not pay the landowner as most tenants 
did. Given the context in which these farmers were using the land, they were acting 
as de facto landowners. Such complexities in the interpretation of the rales may have 
led the Thulotar WUA to deal liberally with the two farmers. The WUA also did not 
want to discontinue its claim against the two farmers because they then would not be 
in conformity with the WUAs general rules. If the WUA discontinued its claim 
against the father and son, it might lose its ability to claim contributions for activities 
related to water management, shared among the members with contribution based on 
the relative size of the land owned by each member. With the exception of these two 
particular fanners, this was the only rule of Thulotar that the WUA was able to 
implement. 
Dispute Between an Upper Branch Irrigators and Lower Sector Farmers 
In this case, many farmers who cultivated land with the Purtari canal branch (Fig. 4) 
faced insufficient supply of irrigation water. They determined that the problem was 
caused by the small size of the humepipe at the intake of their canal. On July 27, 
1997, the day of the third General Assembly meeting, some of the farmers who used 
the Purtari branch, claimed that the size of the humepipe fixed at their branch's intake 
along the main canal was too small to deliver the volume of water required to irrigate 
the area of their rice fields. Once one of the Purtari branch farmers raised the issue, 
all farmers under this branch supported the case and claimed it needed to be resolved 
soon. Other farmers, especially from the tailend sector of the service area, did not 
agree with the Purtari farmers' claim that their intake was smaller than what was 
required. Instead, they insisted that if the Purtari branch had a large intake, then their 
tailend part would go dry. 
This issue dominated the General Assembly discussions. The WUA was worried 
that the case would interrupt discussions of other important issues. As an immediate 
solution to the dispute, the chairman said he would visit the intake after the General 
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Assembly meeting was completed. The Purtari farmers accepted this proposal. The 
Purtari intake is near by Rupakotphedi, the venue where the General Assembly 
meetings are held. After the General Assembly was concluded, about thirty farmers 
visited Purtari intake, including all the WUA executives and about half a dozen 
women. Other farmers, especially those having land immediately below the Purtari 
branch, strongly opposed the Purtari farmers' claim that the branch-intake was too 
small. The vice-chairman, who was a downstream farmer, suggested that the Putari 
farmers' problems were due to an insufficient water volume allocation for their 
branch. He further stated that the farmers receiving water from other branches 
downstream also faced similar problems, and added that insufficient water was a 
common problem for the whole Thulotar irrigation system and not just the Putari 
branch. 
The Purtari farmers, however, did not seem to be willing to listen to any of the 
WUA members. They insisted that the volume of water into their branch should be 
increased under all circumstances. When the downstream farmers noticed that the 
Purtari farmers were not listening the WUA members, they expressed serious concern 
against the Purtari farmers's claim. It seemed as if they would not tolerate the claim 
even if the WUA allowed the flow increase into the Purtari branch. Both disputing 
parties became involved in heated exchanges about their respective claims and no 
one listened to the chairman's request to calm down. The situation became so bad 
that everyone forgot their social ties and social norms of respect. An interesting 
observation was that the more extraverted opponents on both sides were closely 
related through marriage. Excluding the WUA executives, the disagreement looked 
like it was between the Adhikari and Poudel clans. Most land in Purtari was owned 
by Poudel clan members while the disputing leaders from the tailend side were 
Adhikari. Some of the Poudel members from the tailend were also among the tenants 
at Purtari, but they were taking the Purtari side as well. It was not clear whether they 
were taking the side of their clan members or if they were really serious about the 
lack of irrigation water at their rented land in Purtari. 
My research assistants and I observed the event with great interest and curiosity. 
Rupakot village is in Ward No. 4 of Rupakot VDC. I come from Ward No. 9 of the 
same VDC. I personally knew some of the farmers of Thulotar Kulo even before I 
went to Rupakot as a researcher. Two of them had been my teachers at my 
Elementary School. This placed me in a difficult situation. According to my research 
agenda, I should only observe the case as an independent observer, but my 
conscience did not allow me to do so, especially when there was a chance that the 
case in front of me could become very serious. I found that none of the participants 
had information about the real problem in Purtari, so I presented them with what I 
had found through my observations in Purtari over the course of my regular 
observations in the Thulotar service area. 
There were reasons why water was so insufficient in Purtari. As in other parts of 
Thulotar, the amount of water allocated to the Purtari branch during this dispute 
period was not adequate for the complete irrigation of all the fields within Purtari. 
There was not a sufficient amount of irrigation water to cover all the land within a 24 
hour period without proper management, even within a sector divided for water 
rotation. On the other hand, a significant volume of water was being drained out to 
the downstream fields through the last intake of the Purtari branch. This was because 
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the elevation of the first, terrace (muhane garho), along two intakes among many 
intakes in the Purtari branch, was higher than the diversion which the panipale had 
made to divert water into the field from the Purtari branch. Another reason why the 
surface area was not covered by the water allotment was because the drainage 
structures (gamda), through which water had to pass to reach downstream terraces, 
were too high in many cases. The drainage structures were also technically defective, 
especially during the stage of the rice crop when deep standing water was not 
advisable in the rice terraces. The Purtari farmers did not know this. If the farmers 
had been able to identify the reasons behind the water deficit, the dispute would not 
have arisen among their close relatives. These farmers only perceived that the 
problem was due to the small size of the humepipe at the intake, when the root of the 
problem was either ignorance or the lack of the contextual knowledge of the Purtari 
farmers inside their fields and the panipale at the intake point. 
All the farmers recognized the real problem after I had explained it to them. It 
seemed that the farmers (landowners as well as tenants) either lacked sufficient 
knowledge about the land ecology of the fields they had been cultivating for years, or 
they were ignorant of the proper use of irrigation water in their fields. Thus, the 
farmers' lack of knowledge and an inadequate interpretation of the situation were the 
main reasons for the water dispute. However, after learning the reasons behind the 
issue, all the Purtari farmers agreed to take their claims back and the dispute came to 
an end. 
The circumstances under which this dispute arose among the farmers of Thulotar 
suggest that even the farmers' dispute management organizations such as the WUA 
may not have found out the real problem behind the dispute181. Had I not clarified the 
real problem and brought the situation under control, the two disputing parties would 
have continued arguing over the amount of water. The dispute would have become 
more intense and may have led to a worse dispute between close relatives and 
neighbors in Rupakot. 
A heated verbal exchange was observed among cross cousins (second 
generation) and members closely related through marriage and other social ties. This 
suggests that, unlike the principle of popular negotiating processes in rural societies, 
farmers may sacrifice social relationships through their efforts to protect their claims 
over scarce resources during a dispute182. The way in which this dispute was aroused 
also illustrates that a difference between reality and the interpretation of the members 
of a social entity is one of the major factors in social tensions and disputes. This 
applies to all entities, from individuals to groups and societies operating in different 
social contexts. The lack of knowledge about the reality of the situation made this 
dispute one of the most serious disputes among the farmers during my research 
period. The seriousness of the lack of knowledge of the real problem in the 
community disputes is reflected in the characteristics of this internal dispute between 
the members of Purtai and rest of the downstream farmers in Thulotar Kulo, as listed 
below: 
See also Malla and Khadka 1997. They suggest that not necessarily WUA are able to resolve 
the water dispute in all circumstances. 
See also Malla and Khadka 1997; Poudel 1994; Shukla 1993; Bumanglag 1986; Nader and 
Todd 1978; Gulliver 1969. 
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• There were no other reasons for this dispute, but the lack of knowledge between 
the farmers' perception of the cause of the dispute and the reality in the farmers' 
fields. In fact, this was the only inter-branch dispute I observed that took place 
between the farmers of one of the branches at the head of the service area and 
farmers from the lower branches (and intakes) of the same section of the fields. 
• This was the second case that a large number of members showed interest in. 
• Considering the tone and content of what was said between the disputing parties, 
this was the worst case of how social relationships could be sacrificed that I 
observed during my stay in Rupakot. 
• The dispute would have become even worse than it was if the underlying causes 
of the problem not been revealed to the disputing parties in time. 
Intervention of the Panipale to Prevent Water Disputes 
Dispute prevention through the personal judgement of the panipale 
The panipale patrols the irrigation canals and checks all intakes to make sure that 
farmers are not violating water rotation rules. While conducting one of his patrols, he 
discovered a rice field in the head area (Purtari, see Fig. 3) that was irrigating out of 
turn, when it was the tail part's turn to irrigate'85. The panipale wanted to know the 
details of the violation, but he could not easily determine who the defaulting farmer 
was because anyone could have diverted water to this field'84. The owner or cultivator 
of the field was not necessarily the only one who could have diverted water to the 
field. He asked several other farmers if they were familiar with the situation. They all 
said that they did not know who had diverted water into the concerned field. 
Frustrated because he could not gather any information about the case, he visited the 
household that owned the rice field to interview the household members. When he 
described the case to the household family members, a minor girl told him that she 
was the one who diverted the water. She was the 11-year-old daughter of the farmer 
who owned the concerned land. Mr. Panipale explained the water rotation rules to the 
girl and about possible sanctions for violating them. The girl said that she was neither 
aware of the water rotation practices nor the possible sanctions against her. She 
further reported that she diverted water into her field because she saw plenty of water 
flowing in the canal when her rice field was dry. None of the other household 
members talked about the case. Her father, the owner of the concerned land and a 
member of Thulotar Kulo, claimed ignorance about the case and asked the panipale 
to excuse his teenage daughter's violation of the rotation rule. The panipale was 
convinced that none of the household elders had asked the girl to divert the water, nor 
had. it been done by any of the older farmers. Therefore, he did not want to report the 
case to the WUA or fine the guardians of the girl the NRs 100.00 as stipulated for 
such violations in the rules developed by the General Assembly. He excused the girl 
as well as the household from being penalized. 
A couple of factors may have worked to settle this case without it going public. 
First, the panipale was not interested in examining the fine details of the case because 
it might lead to a penalty against the offender if the offense was committed 
A 24 hour water rotation between the head and tail parts was being practiced at this time. 
In one of such cases of water stealing about five years back, a drunk man from the neighboring 
village was found guilty of diverting water to a rice field that had no watering turn. 
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intentionally by one of the adult members of the concerned household. He was well 
acquainted with the lenient attitude the WUA had towards its members. He did not 
want to become subject of controversy in this case. The second factor influencing his 
decision was that the farmer involved was a Brahman who had much higher status in 
the village than the panipale had. The panipale was a low caste and low class Bhujel 
who did not want to make an enemy of the farmer by having a dispute with him. 
Dispute prevention through the personal consent of the panipale 
In a similar case, a downstream farmer in the middle section repeatedly closed a 
tenant's intake. Both the tenant farmer and the offender were of the low Bhujel caste. 
Water availability at that time was not a problem if distribution was equitably 
managed, so the panipale was not practicing water rotation. He was, however, 
responsible for the equitable allocation of water to each branch and intake. The tenant 
reported the case to the panipale, but because there was sufficient water, the panipale 
did not perceive the case as a real problem. Rather, he went to the disputed intake and 
found that it was legal, so he opened the intake himself. He then visited the 
defaulter's household and requested that none of the household members repeat the 
offense. As in the previous case, if the offender had been penalized, he would have 
had to pay NRs 100.00. This would also have been the first time that a farmer had 
been penalized for stealing water in Thulotar Kulo. In this case, water availability was 
not stressed, nor was it wise to make a poor Bhujel family the first victim of a rule 
that had never been applied against other offenders. 
Dispute Intervention by a Village Leader 
On July 3, 1997, many farmers were transplanting rice in Thulotar but water rotation 
had not yet started. Two women in the tailend became involved in a heated 
discussion. They were both daughters-in-law of Rupakot Adhikari families and each 
wanted to increase the volume of irrigation water in their branch at Tinmangale (Fig. 
4) to transplant rice. Three canal branches spread from approximately the same point 
on the main canal at Tinmangale, but there was not enough water to share between 
the three branches. These two women used land fed by two different branches, but 
neither branch was able to deliver the required amount of water to their fields during 
this period. The disputant from the upper intake had sandy soil in her field, but the 
size of her field was smaller than her opponent's field. She claimed that she needed as 
much water as her opponent needed, despite the relatively smaller size of her plot 
because of the sandy soil. At the same time, the woman from the lower intake 
claimed that she should get a larger volume of the flow because her field was larger 
than her opponent's field. Both of them were closing the flow to the other's branch, 
one after the other. One woman was asking the other to go to the head of the canal to 
augment the flow, thus increasing the amount of water available to their branches. 
In the mean time, one of the influential members of the WUA and the ward 
chairman arrived on the scene. After examining the case, he suggested that the 
woman from the lower intake goes to the headend and augments the flow at the main 
canal. The woman accepted his suggestion. She went towards the head part and 
blocked several intakes irrigating the transplanted fields in the headend section of the 
Thulotar service area. Both women then had sufficient water for transplanting rice 
throughout the day. As there is a common understanding that transplantation has 
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priority over irrigating transplanted fields, none of the farmers from the headend 
objected to the closure of his or her intakes. 
It is significant that the mediator asked the woman from the lower intake to 
augment the flow rather than the one from the upper intake because there were 
sufficient reasons to ask the woman from the lower intake to do the job. In his 
personal judgement, there was no reason to reduce the flow to the upper intake by 
less than the half when it had to divide between the two plots. At the same time, the 
land to be irrigated through the upper intake had sandy soil, thus requiring more 
water. The woman with the upper intake also had no working age male members in 
her household and she lived with her elderly widowed mother-in-law and an infant 
son. Because of these additional responsibilities, she could not spare the time to travel 
to the headend. The ward chairman took this into consideration and decided that 
there was no reason why the upper farmer should have to invest more time than the 
lower one in such a situation. 
The role people with high social status in Rupakot play in helping those in need 
does not go unnoticed. Community leaders in rural villages think that it is their duty 
to try to settle any troubles in their communities at the very first signs of the problem 
(Gulliver 1969). It is not only a one-sided egoistical perception of the leaders, but 
they are also the traditionally respected leaders and their suggestions are taken as the 
rule of village law (Merry 1982)1"5. In the dispute discussed above, neither of the two 
disputing women asked the ward chairman to intervene in the case. He, however, was 
interested in settling the case because he knew it could develop into a hostile dispute. 
Being the chairman of the ward committee and one of the members of the Thulotar 
WUA, his conscience would not allow him to neglect the case once he had noticed it. 
His status also allowed the disputing women to quickly accept his suggestion m . The 
woman from the lower intake neither challenged his suggestion nor did she consider 
not complying with it. 
This was a good example of how (and why) the village leaders also shop around 
for dispute settlement187. Normal people may perceive no reasons why an outsider 
should become involved in the dispute settlements of other villagers, especially when 
there are no any economic incentives. Neighbors, however, have an interest in 
becoming involved. While there may not be any economic interests to become 
involved, many social impact may result if such cases are intentionally ignored by 
the villagers (especially by prospective candidates for pancha-bhaladmi). No village 
leaders want to see their neighbors become entrapped in difficulties, either. They 
perceive their responsibility to be the prevention of dispute escalation among their 
neighbors. 
The ward chairman's actions as a mediator also played an important role in the 
resolution of the problem. Not only was he a ward chairman or village leader, but, in 
this context, the two middle-aged disputants viewed him as a senior member of 
Rupakot community. At the same time, he was the uncle of both women's husbands, 
placing him in a position that commanded a great deal of respect from the two 
women, who were "buhari" (or daughters-in-law) to him even though they were not 
See also Meinzen-Dick and Bruns 1997; Witty 1978. 
See also Koch 1978; Rothenberger 1978. 
See also K. von Benda-Beckmann 1984. 
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closely related. Thus, it was difficult for the women to ignore his suggestions. In this 
case, the kinship and neighborhood relationship between the mediator and disputants, 
the higher status of the mediator, and the pressing need for water during rice 
transplantation period made the settlement of the dispute successful. Thus, the way in 
which a particular dispute is settled also depends on a variety of situational 
circumstances. 
If transplanters are competing for water, each farmer normally shares the flow 
available from the main canal. A water dispute is inevitable in most competitive cases 
such as this because the volume of water available in the main canal is insufficient. 
Mediators, however, may still find some clues in the situational context of the dispute 
that could be used to effectively settle such disputes. In the above dispute between the 
two women, both women desperately wanted water for rice transplantation yet 
neither was willing to travel to the headend of the main canal to augment the flow. 
Instead, each was asking the other to do it. The sudden arrival of the mediator, an 
influential village leader, was a major factor in settling the case. 
The General Characteristics of Water Disputes and Disputing 
Processes in Thulotar Kulo: An Analysis 
Water scarcity is the major cause of irrigation disputes 
To characterize the water disputes in Thulotar Kulo, I have presented the different 
types under different headings. All disputes can be attributed either directly or 
indirectly to the single causal factor of water scarcity. With some exceptions, there 
would not have been any observable disputes among the Thulotar Kulo farmers if 
enough irrigation water had been available. Tailenders are involved in more disputes 
because they face water scarcity more frequently. Middle farmers have relatively 
fewer problems than the tailenders. The activity of the panipale has prevented 
disputes arising from water scarcity among headenders by allowing them to regularly 
irrigate their fields 24 hours a day during the rice season. 
It is not surprising to see water scarcity as the most important factor of disputes 
in Thulotar Kulo. This was where I and other colleagues of IAAS found many 
disputes arising from the lack of sufficient irrigation water (Poudel et al. 1994). 
Malla and Khadka (1997) also mentioned water scarcity as one of the major factors 
for disputes in many FMISs in the Hills of Nepal. Water scarcity was also a major 
factor for many full-fledgedd irrigation disputes in some FMISs in the southern plains 
of Nepal (Shukla et al. 1997; Shukla et al. 1993). 
Disputes tend to be concentrated towards the tailend 
Despite the provisions of equitable water distribution rules that apply to all Thulotar 
farmers, most water disputes occur in the lower sector of the Thulotar service area. 
Whether among men, women, children, and caste groups or between the farmers in 
different sectors of Thulotar, tailend farmers were involved in disputes more 
frequently than the farmers from the middle and headend sectors. This is because 
most of the tailenders are small farmers or tenants who are relatively more intensely 
involved in farming than the large and landowner farmers. Like water is a scarce 
resource, the small size of land owned by most tailenders is also a scarce resource for 
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them. They are desperately willing to get maximum output from their limited land. It 
is one of the reasons the tailenders of Thulotar Kulo were involved in irrigation 
disputes more frequently than other farmers. In a study on the performance of farmers 
in one communal irrigation system in the Philippines in 1990,1 also observed tailend 
farmers being involved in irrigation disputes more frequently than the rest of the 
farmers. This was because the tailend farmers violated the Farmer Irrigator Group's 
(FIG) rules more frequently, which led to irrigation disputes188. 
There are also some large farmers towards the tailend, however189, but they are rarely 
involved in water disputes. Most of them have let their land to share-croppers and 
plowmen. Thus, the tenants rather than the landowners that have let their land out are 
the ones who become involved in disputes during times of water deficit. It is not 
surprising that no dispute cases were observed among farmers in the head section; the 
upper riparian makes out the best in most irrigation systems190. The head section is 
less subject to water deficits than the tail section is, meaning water disputes over a 
lack of water are less frequent. Directly or indirectly, the headenders always enjoy 
better accessibility to irrigation water than the other farmers. The headenders in 
Thulotar enjoy continuous irrigation while the middle and tail farmers have to follow 
water rotation practices. Thus, they have few reasons to become involved in irrigation 
disputes. 
Many social factors prevent the unperceived injurious experiences and 
grievances to develop into claims andfull-fledgedd disputes 
The grievances and different types of disputes discussed in this chapter suggest that 
there may be many cases where Thulotar farmers may not even know they have been 
kept apart from social justice. In many cases, they may perceive their problems as the 
normal social behavior of other members of Rupakot community. Even though they 
identify the problems and are aware of the causes of their problems, they may not be 
able to claim them against their perceived opponents. Once the claims are made 
public, they may not enter into a full-fledged dispute and long-lasting solution of the 
disputes. In most cases, the children, women, low caste farmers and the tenants 
reflect such behavior in Thulotar Kulo. In the following part of this section, I first talk 
about the village laws that make people not perceive their problems. Then, I move to 
discussion on the age, gender and the factors on social relationships that prevent 
grievances to develop into claims and full-fledged disputes. These circumstances 
have positive as well as negative consequences on irrigation management depending 
upon the social and situational contexts under which such behavior is observed. 
Village laws make the injurious experiences unperceived: "I should listen to my 
seniors because I am younger than them. I should not open my mouth in front of 
him, because he is my father-in-law. I should minimize my tone in the public arena, 
because I am a woman. I should obey him, because he is one of the influential 
leaders of my village. I should not decline his suggestion, because he is my patron. I 
should follow whatever advice my son gives me, because he is my eldest son. I 
should not pass by this route, because they are holding their sacred events over 
there. I should not pass by this way, because there is the yard of a Brahman. I 
should not step on that balcony, because it belongs to a Brahman family. I should 
See also Bumaglag and Bhuyan 1986. 
See Table 1 and Table 4. 
See also Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen, 1997 (especially the case of Chhattis Mauja Kulo). 
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not touch them, because they are higher caste people. I should work harder than 
they should, because I am the daughter-in-law in this household. I dare not go 
against him, because he is the head of my household." 
These are the perceptions of some young people, women, wives, daughters-in-
law and lower class citizens who have full faith in these social norms that can be 
found in most of the rural villages in Nepal including Rupakot. They themselves want 
to follow such norms, being members of the society that expects them to follow them. 
In such cases, not necessarily all the citizens of the village are concious of their civil 
(human) rights. They do not have any idea that they, in principle, also have the same 
chance to exercise social power as other citizens whom they may perceive as having 
special authority due to their ascribed status. In such circumstances, what I like to call 
the complexity of the "rules of respect", we can never claim that each farmer in an 
irrigation system has exercised equal power and participation in irrigation 
management activities. Although they do not notice it, they may be facing some 
circumstances that may not be in their favor. This shows that dispute-free situations 
are not necessary problem-free situations. There may still be problems, but even the 
victims do not notice them. 
In such circumstances no troubles, problems, or personal or social tensions are 
transformed into disputes (Felstiner et al. 1981). However, the problems being faced 
by the farmers may still exist in the societies as "unperceived injurious experiences". 
In one way, this situation may help maintain harmony in society; on the other hand, 
such unnoticed injurious situations are hampering personal as well as social 
development. In a just society, every citizen should be informed about the situations 
they are living with. An inability to provide such an environment for each member 
leads to social injustice and underdevelopment of the society. 
The readers should also be very cautious about using these findings from 
Rupakot to make policy in other parts of Nepal. The social and situational contexts in 
the Hills and Terai areas of Nepal may not necessarily match, even amongst the 
agrarian societies. Some farmers' communities are made up of more educated, more 
experienced, and more egalitarian segments than other communities. Farmer 
communities in the newly settled regions of the Terai generally have better socio-
economic position than other regions even within the Terai belt. For example, the 
farmers of Chitwan, Jhapa, Morang and Rupandehi districts in Nepal Terai are 
relatively better-off than the rest of the districts in Nepal. To cite an example, the 
women farmers in Chhattis Mauja irrigation system in Rupandehi district have been 
very successful at negotiating their demands informally (Zwarteveen and Neupane 
1996). They are actually given priority in the rotational water delivery systems during 
times of scarcity. Women farmers in Chhattis Mauja even benefit as free-riders, who 
are not even subject of punishment against this free-riding behavior. 
The abilities of the weaker people to express their problems and grievances and 
influence people also depend on the composition of their community. In communities 
where upper class Brahmans dominate, the voices of the women, children, 
youngsters, and low caste and low class people are kept in very low profile. Contrary 
to Rupakot, where there is an overwhelming dominance of upper caste Brahmans, the 
farmers of Chhattis Mauja are divided into many regional groups that exist in small 
clusters of many migrant communities and original settlers of many castes or ethnic 
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origins. 
The normative orders are even stronger in the communities of Upadhyaya 
Brahmans than those Brahman communities where most families are Jaishi 
Brahmans. This is because most Upadhyaya Brahmans in the rural communities 
work as pandit or purohit. Therefore, whether they want it or not, they should be 
observed as strong practitioners of traditional norms that facilitate the continuation of 
their top class social status. At the same time, Brahmans who violate the caste and 
religious norms will have difficulty working as purohit because they are not 
considered to be holy, and they may not be acceptable to all of their religious clients 
(jajaman). Thus, the Upadhyaya Brahmans also have strong economic incentives to 
maintain the normative rules of their communities whether or not such rules are 
biased in favor of Upadhyaya Brahmans. 
Age is one of the major factors for social status and dispute settlement: "Aago 
tapnu mudhako, kura sunnu budhako" ("the larger the logs the better the fire, so is 
it with the talk of the elders"). This is a very popular proverb in rural Nepali 
societies. The Rupakot village farmers also have a common perception that the 
elders are better in all respects. Old people normally have relatively higher status 
than the young because of their age. In most cases, the village elders are the ones 
who settle village disputes. The disputing parties rarely oppose the resolutions 
proposed by an elder or a group of elders. Whether a farmer likes it or not, she or he 
normally has to work according to the suggestion of his or her elders. In such cases, 
the juniors are not able (or do not want) to blame and claim their injurious 
experiences and grievances on the concern parties. 
Since elders enjoy higher social status than the juniors, they are also more 
influential and powerful than the junior members because the power and influence is 
associated with the status. Age is also one of the main factors behind why the 
membership of the pancha-bhaladmi consists primarily of elderly people of the 
village. However, since most of the leading elderly farmers in Rupakot have occupied 
a position in the Thulotar WUA, the role of the pancha-bhaladmi has been replaced 
by the WUA. Therefore, although the mandate of the Thulotar WUA is to take care of 
the water management activities in Thulotar Kulo, they may also be involved in 
dealing with other village problems (mostly to settle the village disputes). 
Men are more powerful than women: Although age is one of the principal factors 
for higher status in rural societies, an old man generally has higher status among 
villagers while an old woman's higher status may only be among the women. The 
women of Rupakot listen and follow (normally do not oppose) their husbands, 
fathers-in-law, and even their sons, because they are the men. Men are culturally 
and thus socially preferred over women. Ancient practices of the gender-based 
division of labor continue to allow men to make most of the decisions within the 
household or in the village. It is the man who inherits the parental property, who is 
the household head, who has access to the better socio-economic opportunities, and 
who has access to the village meetings. Thus, it is also the men who control the 
sources of power in the village. Therefore, men are the most powerful in dispute 
management. Women are generally not landowners. As a result, they are also not 
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members of the irrigation systems and have no access to the rule-making arena . 
Thus, women have no power to manage irrigation disputes192. Therefore, the 
women in Rupakot are in the minority in reporting their grievances to- and 
participation in the decision-making (rule-making) arena. 
Social relationships may work as preventive factors in disputes: According to 
Felstiner et al (1981), the "grievances" are transformed into "disputes" only when 
the grievances are claimed against the suspected opponents and such "claims" are 
rejected either in whole or in part. In Thulotar contexts, not necessarily all farmers 
with grievances are able to claim the grievances against their opponents due to 
many normative factors of social relationships. Here, social relationships may act as 
the buffering factors in many disputes. The vertical social ties among close 
relatives, the neighborhood, political affiliation, and general social ties prevent 
farmers from claiming their grievances, and so from converting grievances into 
disputes. There are also some situations when the claims are ignored or 
disregarded. In such situations, there is no way the claims can enter into a dispute 
process. 
Thulotar Kulo is not the only case where social relationships play a role in 
disputes. Many authors believe that the social relationships between and among the 
disputing parties play a role in disputes processing and their outputs (Greenhalgh and 
Chapman 1995; Polzer et al. 1995; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1985a; Merry 1982; 
Gulliver 1979; Nader and Todd 1978; Witty 1978). Although these authors' findings 
do not necessarily state the role social relationships play in the prevention of disputes, 
they understand that many types of social relationships may prevent the disputes from 
escalating. The kinship and neighborhood relationships among many farmers in 
Thulotar Kulo have direct impact on preventing grievances from turning into 
disputes, and disputes into further escalation. In Thulotar contexts, kinship, marriage, 
neighborhood, mitra saino, hali, political affiliation, and landowner-tenant 
relationships also have impact on the social status and power relationships that shape 
the behavior of the disputing parties and, ultimately, the prevention of disputes in 
many cases. 
WUA and panipale try to prevent dispute escalation 
Like in most irrigation systems, it was not uncommon to see a few water disputes 
arise in Thulotar Kulo. A common behavior observed among the farmers of Thulotar 
is that none of the disputing parties wanted to take up issues outside their own 
community. Whatever problems arose were eventually managed by the communities 
in which the problem arose, especially by the WUAs and panipale. In fact, very few 
of the disputes were reported in the WUA. Many Thulotar farmer grievances were 
never known by the third parties because farmers did not claim their grievances. 
Many incidental disputes settled or ignored by the disputing parties themselves. The 
panipale and WUA also honored the tradition of living together. The "emphasis on 
maintaining peace" is the rule for coping with the social problems in Rupakot. 
In some cases, the WUA demonstrated its ability to persuade all the Thulotar 
Kulo farmers to avert the possible escalation of major disputes by providing 
temporary solutions to dispute management. The practice of discussing the problems 
1 9 1 Mostly, women are assigned for household chores. 
1 9 2 See also Van der Schaaf 2000,1999; Rubin and Brown 1975. 
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of the concerned disputes in front of all the members and seeking out suggestions 
from the General Assembly seemed to be a democratic and participant approach 
when dealing with the farmers' common disputing problems. At the same time, the 
panipale played a central role in minimizing the possible negative repercussions of 
water disputes among the farmers of different sectors and categories of Thulotar. Had 
the panipale not been able to do so, many disputes would have escalated into more 
destructive and expensive full-fledged disputes. 
Since a problem goes through different stages of transformation before it 
becomes a dispute (Felstiner et al. 1981), the behavior of the Thulotar WUA and 
panipale have great impact on preventing disputes from escalating. The WUA 
members of Thulotar are also the influential leaders of Rupakot village, so their role 
as members of WUA or as leaders of Rupakot had significant impact on dispute 
management. Although not graced with personal higher status, the association of the 
panipale with the WUA members also gave him an opportunity to present himself as 
one of the high status individuals of Rupakot. On the other hand, the authority of 
panipale was also very strong as far as water management was concerned. 
In some cases, the potentially disputing parties themselves may not be aware that 
they have a problem related to water management. This is because not all injurious 
situations are necessarily perceived as injurious. Although perceived as injurious with 
the injury blamed on some entity, they may not have claimed against the opponents. 
Therefore, Thulotar farmers may have many grievances which are not easily 
observed by a normal man or woman. Thus, not necessarily all outsiders or visitors in 
Thulotar Kulo are able to observe water disputes among the farmers. A casual 
observer can easily say that there are only a few problems related to water 
distribution in Thulotar, yet if a scientific observation is conducted, there are many 
problems, many grievances, and many disputes. I have tried to see the disputes 
through my own eyes which have been trained and shaped to study water rights and 
dispute problems in Thulotar during the 1997-98 research period. 
The question of why the WUA members or panipale are interested in preventing 
the water disputes from escalating may arise. Their will power inspired them to work 
hard to achieve this goal. Although they have no immediate economic interests, all of 
the WUA members perceive some positive social consequences for themselves, their 
relatives, or their neighbors (see Merry 1982; Gulliver 1979)"3. If they ignore the 
disputing problems in Thulotar, they may lose their status and political support in 
Rupakot. They might be ignored in many important social events. After all, they may 
lose their social status, and most people do not want this to happen. The panipale not 
only has social status to lose, but he may also lose the opportunity to work as 
panipale in the future if he cannot effectively prevent destructive disputes among the 
villagers in Rupakot. This would lead to the loss of his dignity as well as the loss of 
an opportunity to get rice from Thulotar members. Although his economic incentive 
for not letting water disputes to escalate is nominal, it meant a lot to him even though 
he had a low status. 
Disputants prefer local means of dispute management 
Observations of internal dispute management in Thulotar Kulo suggest that the 
See also Kramer and Messick 1995. 
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farmers do not like to invite external agencies to handle water disputes that arise. As 
in other traditional societies, there are also ranges of local level dispute management 
mechanisms in Rupakot (see also Merry 1982). WUA members and other village 
leaders are mostly involved in managing disputes among the members of their 
immediate communities either individually or in an organized way. In other words, 
whether the farmers like it or not, the farmers seem to prefer the local negotiating 
arena. This may be not only because of a lack of access to adjudicating agencies due 
to their poor socio-economic status, but also because of their need to continue living 
harmoniously with their neighbors, relatives, and clients (or patrons), as these are the 
people who are involved as the disputing parties and as well as the negotiating and 
mediating parties. It is not surprising to know that farmer prefer informal dispute 
processing mechanisms in Thulotar where most disputants live in multiplex or 
continuing permanent social relationships (see K. von Benda-Beckmann 1984). Since 
many disputes were between two or more closely related families or neighboring 
parties, they liked to settle their disputes through negotiation or mediation of the 
village leaders or the WUA (see Witty 1978). 
Social relationships are sacrificed over scarce resources 
Social relationships in rural societies are known for their characteristics to preserve 
societal unity and provide avenues for dispute negotiation. Blood or kin relations are 
some of the strongest kinds of social relationships. More than half of the Thulotar 
Kulo members are connected through patrilineal kinship (Table 11). A significant 
number of farmers are also networked through marriage and other types of social 
relationships. Even within these strong social relationships, however, I observed 
some disputes where Rupakot farmers violated their traditional norms of relationships 
and social ties. For example, earlier in this book I discussed a case where a tailend 
farmer scolded and threatened some boys who were members of his close circle of 
relatives. He did this to secure a continuous flow of water to his field for rice 
transplantation. Similarly, a teenage girl did not hesitate to bring two boys under her 
control regardless of her close kinship (cross cousins) with her opponents. In another 
case, farmers closely related by marriage were involved in a heated argument. All of 
these events were observed during times of irrigation water scarcity, which played a 
significant role in the emergence of the disputes. The farmers also violated their laws 
of respect in one of the cases during a dispute over the mobilization of cash resources 
for irrigation management. This suggests that, while many local laws of respect are 
strongly applied and followed in Thulotar, farmers do not hesitate to disregard those 
laws if they are involved in a dispute over scarce resources. 
However, although irrigation water is insufficient and becomes a scarce resource 
during the monsoon rice season, most cases of the violations of the laws of social 
relationships occurred during rice transplantation and first irrigation periods of the 
newly transplanted fields. Irrigation water in Thulotar becomes an extremely scarce 
resource during this period because the limited amount of water available in the canal 
needs to be divided for transplanting as well as irrigation. Most farmers are aware of 
the impact of timely transplanting and the first irrigation on rice yields. It is not 
unusual in such situations to observe social relationships between two or more 
competitive parties being sacrificed to acquire the highly competitive water resource. 
It is not uncommon to see bloodshed or even homicide when irrigation disputes 
become very intense, although it never happened in Thulotar (IMC 1990; Maas and 
Anderson 1986 in Tang 1992; Merry 1982). 
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The weaker is the loser 
Considering the national statistics on average land size and earnings, the farmers of 
Rupakot are not very poor. But the farmers themselves are poorer than other 
categories of professional groups of people. Then there are the poorest among the 
poor in Rupakot. Most of the water-related problems, grievances and water disputes 
in Thulotar involve the poor, children, women, or lower caste farmers. These groups 
are also more deprived than other groups. The most of their problems may go 
unnoticed. Similarly, the majority of their grievances go unclaimed and are not 
listened to even when claimed. Most grievances and disputes are recorded in the tail 
section where most of the farmers are either small or poor farmers, tenant or 
plowman-tenants, or members of lower castes. These people are rarely involved (with 
some exceptions) in other non-agricultural money-making activities. If they are, they 
only earn a very small amount. Irrigation disputes do not only mean they have 
problems watering their fields. It also means they lose (partially) harmony among 
their neighbors and, as a result, possibly the neighbors' helping hands when in need. 
Thus, disputes have various effects throughout the society. 
Land is the main source for small farmers' and tenants' economic security. 
Because of this, they will always try to intensify the utility of their land resources to 
maximize farm yields and they must pay more attention to their farming business 
(including irrigation management) than other farmers. This leads to a higher 
frequency of water disputes among the weaker farmer sectors. While large farmers 
can bear risks more safely than small and poor farmers, they are hardly bothered by 
occasional variations in crop yields. 
The large Thulotar farmers not only have more land, but their land is usually 
better in quality and better situated in the service area of the irrigation system, so that 
they have easier and more access to water. The members of their households are also 
involved in income earning activities other than the farming. This means they have 
fewer and fewer pressing disputes over land and water. As a consequence, they do 
not have to jeopardize their social relationships as oftenhy fighting for their rights. In 
addition, once a conflict develops into a dispute, they have better chances to be heard 
and win. I do not think that the weaker are in jeopardy only in Thulotar, however, in 
many cases "haves" come out ahead (see Galanter 1974). 
As in other farming communities with complex and multiplex relationships, Thulotar 
farmers also have several problems related to water management. Many problems, 
however, are not perceived as injurious experiences, especially by the weaker sectors 
of the community like poor, low caste, and tenant farmers, and children and women. 
Once a problem is perceived and develops into a grievance, it is not necessarily 
claimed against the suspected opponent and thus transformed into a dispute. Once a 
grievance is claimed, it is not necessarily heard by the dispute management forums, 
but not necessarily all problems and grievances follow the same route of dispute 
transformation process. Members of the weaker sector also open their lips when the 
dispute concerns a desperately scarce resource, especially irrigation water for rice 
transplantation and for the first irrigation of the newly transplanted rice farms. 
A number of disputes have been observed due to the conflicts between the 
customary laws perceived by the disputants and laid out by the customary norms. For 
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example, many disputants perceived that transplanting must have irrigation access 
priority over irrigating the transplanted fields while others perceived otherwise. At 
the same time, if transplanting is given priority, different farmers may understand 
differently which field should get priority over which in case more than one field has 
to compete for the limited amount of water. Similar problems also prevail when 
irrigating newly transplanted fields. There is also conflict in understanding some 
statutory laws that recognize customary laws stipulating that the resources should be 
shared among the beneficiaries according to the traditional practices. Such confusion 
among Thulotar farmers has mainly been due to the lack of local laws that should 
have been especially developed for the most water scarce period, the rice 
transplanting and first irrigation period. On the other hand, either the violation of laws 
or the leniency in their execution has resulted in many grievances and the emergence 
of many disputes among the farmers of Thulotar Kulo. 
None of the disputes have been reported to the outside dispute management 
agencies thus far. Most disputes are either settled temporarily or resolved by the 
WUA, other village leaders, or the panipale of Thulotar Kulo. By doing so, they have 
not necessarily followed the formal irrigation laws. Rather, they have developed their 
own norms to settle disputes at least temporarily, and prevent them from escalating 
into destructive and full-fledged disputes. But although many disputes did not re-
emerge once they were managed through the local means, a number of suppressed 
grievances were heard against the behavior of WUA members and the panipale. 
Many small farmers in particular did not like the WUAs lenient application of rules, 
and the panipale was seen as siding with large and influential farmers at the cost of 
small farmers. 
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Muralidhand Kulo 
Ghartiswara Kulo 
Bhalurumtako Kulo 
Bhalurumtako Upallo Kulo 
Bhalurumtako Bichko Kuló ^ 
Bhalurumtako Tallo Kulo 
Banayatar Kulo 
Lamakhet Tallo Kulo. 
Serabagar Kulo 
Sotako Kulo 
Chhahare Kulo 
Rumtakhet Kulo 
Keureniko Kulo 
.Chalise Kulo 
halisebagar Kulo 
ThulotarKulo 
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Khagarbagar Upallo Kulo 
Khagarbagar Tallo Kulo 
Aahalebagarko Tallo Kulo 
Gidarbote Kulo 
•Jorteko Kulo 
Fig. 6 Irrigation canals at Sabadi Khola. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The central theme of my research has been water rights and dispute management in a 
farmer-managed irrigation system. The research was conducted in Thulotar Kulo, 
Ward No. 4 of Rupakot Village Development Committee (VDC) of the northeastern 
part of Tanahun district in the Western Hills of Nepal. Since wetland rice is the 
staple grain crop of the Thulotar area, irrigation is crucial for food production. The 
available amount of irrigation water in Thulotar is scarce, however, and access to it is 
likely to be contested by many farmers. Thus, who gets access rights to water and its 
management and who does not are very important issues. State laws developed by 
various administrative bodies during different periods of Nepal's history up to the 
present have influenced how water rights are defined. 
Since water rights are the result of customary and state laws as well as the local laws 
of the concerned societies, the definitions of water rights in Thulotar have also been 
affected by a situation of legal pluralism created by the traditional and local laws. The 
main objective of my research was to find out whether there were water-related 
tensions, grievances and disputes among the farmers of Thulotar Kulo, and between 
Thulotar farmers and outsiders. I was especially interested in finding out whether 
such grievances and disputes in Thulotar were related to water rights. My major 
questions were: How was Thulotar Kulo developed and managed? What rules were 
applied to govern water distribution, resource mobilization, and dispute management? 
How and under what circumstances were such rules developed and executed? I was 
also particularly interested in questions surrounding water disputes, such as the types 
of grievances and disputes the Thulotar farmers were faced with; who the disputing 
parties were and what the causes of disputes were; the methods and circumstances of 
dispute management; and the results and consequences of dispute management. 
This book places the study of Thulotar Kulo in the context of the general 
development of hill irrigation systems and water management in Nepal, which is 
described and analyzed through a history of the making and changing of rules 
governing resource mobilization, water distribution, and dispute management in 
Nepal, as well as the influence of the changing political, economic, and legal social-
systems from ancient times to the present day. 
Political changes and impacts on irrigation management 
Thulotar Kulo is one of many small irrigation systems in Nepal. It is fed by Sabadi 
Khola, a small rivulet that supports dozens of similar irrigation systems. The history 
of when and how Thulotar Kulo was constructed is not known. However, I was at 
least able to sketch out its history for about the last 150 years. The historical 
evolution of the management of the Thulotar irrigation system shows that the changes 
in the socio-political environment in Nepal had significant impacts on how the system 
was managed until 1950. Nepal was ruled by the Rana clan for 104 years beginning 
from 1846. Their governance of the country was based on dictatorship rather than 
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democracy, and people had little chance to participate in development and 
administrative activities. Local elites were favored and trusted to work for the 
government at the village level. In the Hills of Nepal, irrigation system management 
was mainly under the jurisdiction of tax collectors {talukdar) of irrigated land (khet). 
A land tax collector in Thulotar popularly known as "Pandit" in Rupakot coordinated 
the responsibilities of the annual repair and maintenance of Thulotar Kulo through the 
mobilization of the farmers' labor and resources. After the overthrow of the Rana 
regime by a popular people's revolution in 1950, the responsibility of land tax 
collection was transferred to the jurisdiction of land revenue offices established in the 
district headquarters. Before the land revenue offices were fully able to work for land 
tax collection, village-level land tax collectors continued functioning in their job. The 
title of talukdar was replaced by jimmuwal, so Mr. Pandit continued working as the 
jimmuwal in the area and managed Thulotar Kulo until 1960. Mr. Pandit acted not 
only as a representative for the Rana rulers before 1950 and democratic governments 
thereafter, but he was also the most important leader of Rupakot farmers. 
The impacts of the democratic changes in the national political system had been 
felt in the village by 1960 and an increasing number of villagers had access to social, 
political, and administrative institutions and organizations. This led to change in the 
local leadership as young leaders became interested in managing the Thulotar 
irrigation system. In 1960, the tax collector voluntarily handed his responsibilities of 
managing Thulotar Kulo over to an organized farmers' group, the Water Users 
Association (WUA), which at that time was led by a 36 year old farmer leader in 
Rupakot popularly known as "Writer". He was supported by other farmer leaders like 
the land tax collector (mukhiya) of the uplands (pakho), a village-level political 
leader, an elderly farmer, and one of the sons of Mr. Pandit. Thus, along with the 
emergence of democracy and changes at the national socio-political level, democratic 
institutions also started to emerge and become stronger in the villages. However, the 
continued acceptance of Mr. Pandit as village leader up to 1960, as well as the 
inclusion of one of his sons and the mukhiya in the democratically elected/selected 
WUA in 1960, shows that the influence of the former feudal institutions in the 
management of natural resources like land and water in Nepal continued for several 
years. The inclusion of an elderly farmer also shows that age was still considered to 
be an important factor of selection. The membership of an influential village-level 
politician in the WUA shows that the village organizations were also influenced by 
village politics. 
Further change came to the Thulotar WUA in 1980 when a water guard, locally 
known as a "panipale", was appointed and instituted the rule of water rotation during 
water deficit periods, especially during the peak season of water requirements. Mr. 
Writer was also able to acquire government funds for the renovation of Thulotar Kulo 
in 1982, which itself is a good example of the influence the democratic changes had 
on the behavior of villagers and the rural development activities in the countryside. 
In a process of continuing efforts to improve the management of natural 
resources, the government of Nepal encouraged users' groups to participate more in 
the management of the resources they benefit from (MOWR/N 1996, 1994, 1993, 
1992). The Thulotar farmers capitalized on this opportunity to select a more capable 
WUA Executive Committee in 1994, led by the ward chairman of Ward No. 4 of 
Rupakot VDC. Some of the elderly leaders like Mr. Writer himself voluntarily 
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vacated their positions in the WUA to give the more active leaders the opportunity to 
improve the management of Thulotar Kulo. However, the appointment of the ward 
chairman as the ex-officio chairman of Thulotar Kulo was a turning point, and 
village-level politics began exerting a strong influence on irrigation system 
management. The mukhiya and Mr. Pandit's son continued working on the new 
executive committee as members of the WUA. Thulotar Kulo received a second 
renovation project from the Tanahun District Irrigation Office (DIO) in 1996. 
Thulotar Kulo has been managed by an organized Water Users Association since 
1998, which is led by the ward chairman, who is also a member of Thulotar Kulo. 
The Thulotar Kulo General Assembly is made up of 67 farmers, all of whom own 
irrigated land within the Thulotar Kulo service area. The traditional domination of the 
WUA by Brahman and Chhetry castes has not changed, however. Despite the 
constitutional provisions of the Thulotar WUA requiring annual elections, the 
General Assembly formally extends the tenure of its existing WUA officials every 
year until a new ward chairman has not been elected in the village ward for five 
years. The Thulotar WUA constitution is based on the statutory laws of HMG/Nepal. 
But the ways how the WUA executives are selected in Thulotar shows that if 
Thulotar Kulo farmers want, they are able to apply the statutory laws in a way that 
neither the statutory rules are violated nor the interests of the farmers jeopardized. In 
this particular example, the Thulotar General Assembly was able to replace the 
provision of a WUA "election" with a "selection", or with the approval from the 
legitimized General Assembly each year, so they could nominate the types of people 
they wished to have work for the WUA. This was how they respected and applied the 
existing "statutory laws", and the village-based "customary laws" through a moderate 
practice that could be called "local law". 
Rule-making and pluralism of rules 
The Thulotar Kulo General Assembly has, in principle, the ultimate decision-making 
authority. Therefore, the General Assembly consisting of all Thulotar members is the 
main arena for the development of rules for the operation and maintenance of 
Thulotar Kulo. Major policies and rules in Thulotar Kulo are discussed and 
sanctioned by the General Assembly. The officers of the WUA Executive Committee 
call at least one meeting of the General Assembly each year in July and additional 
meetings may also be called if necessary. While the WUA is the executive body 
elected/selected by the members of the General Assembly from among themselves19 , 
the WUA has leadership responsibilities in all activities that lead to the formulation of 
rules for Thulotar Kulo. The WUA cannot make rules independently without the 
consent or approval of the General Assembly, but it may make some specific rules 
based on the general rules sanctioned by the General Assembly. In Thulotar, 
however, the personal influence of WUA executive members has affected the 
formulation and execution of the water management rules. This shows that, like in 
many other farmer-managed irrigation systems (FMISs) in Nepal, the influence of the 
traditional caste-, age-, religion- and gender-based customary rules strongly influence 
the management of Thulotar Kulo (Pradhan et al. 2000; 1997; K. von Benda-
Beckmann etal. 1997)195. 
The two main areas where the Thulotar WUA has developed rules are water 
1 9 4 The chairman is not necessarily chosen from among the Thulotar members, however. 
1 9 5 See also F. von Benda-Beckmann 1996; Sowerwine et al. 1994; Pradhan 1987. 
1 8 5 
distribution and resource mobilization. In general, water distribution rules mainly 
cover norms for the irrigation of monsoon rice grown during the rainy season. A rule 
giving priority to water for rice transplantation over irrigation has been found to be in 
place informally among the farmers. Even though it is informal, this rule is seen as 
the most important rule by the majority of Thulotar farmers. Surprisingly, no General 
Assembly WUA meetings have recorded this norm as a rule of Thulotar Kulo in their 
minute-books or constitution. The rules pertaining to the first watering after rice 
transplantation [madpani) are of special importance as well. Farmers are normally 
expected to use irrigation water for transplanting during the day and to irrigate the 
newly transplanted rice fields during the night. There are no formal rules surrounding 
this issue for Thulotar, however. There are few informal rules covering irrigation and 
related issues during the winter season as well. For the summer, there were no rules 
as well, as no water is available during that season. The Thulotar Kulo General 
Assembly appoints a panipale during the monsoon season, starting in July and lasting 
until October every year during the rice season. Each Thulotar member pays the 
panipale in kind with rice, based on the size of irrigated land and the number of 
intakes from the canal to each farm plot within the service area. The panipale 
determines whether a continuous flow is allowed or if a watering rotation scheme 
should be adopted. Any intervention in the volume of water fixed by the panipale is 
subject to punishment. Although there are no officially documented rules governing 
water distribution for winter crops in Thulotar, interested farmers may receive water 
at the main canal and divert it to their fields without any objection from other 
farmers. It is also the same for fallow irrigation and for a farmer who wants to irrigate 
his fallow field to loosen the soil for plowing after the rice harvest. Any farmer may 
also fetch or use water from the Thulotar canal for use in the kitchen garden or other 
household activities. Although there are also no formal rules concerning the draining 
of excess water from the Thulotar service area, each farmer may divert water from 
his/her land to the subsequent downstream terrace to drain water from marshy lands 
during rice harvest periods. Water sharing among the FMISs in Sabadi Khola is based 
on "prior rights". 
Each member of Thulotar should attend or send a working age household 
member as a representative to one or more General Assembly meeting and canal 
cleaning day each year. In principle, those absent from such events are subject to a 
fine, but sanctions are very lenient in Thulotar. In case of emergency repairs, the 
WUA is normally authorized to make ad hoc rules to mobilize labor or cash 
resources. Cash contributions from each member are proportional to his or her land 
area held within the Thulotar Kulo service area. The WUA may also ask its members 
to contribute money for normal irrigation structure rehabilitation projects. However, 
the hours of labor contribution do not differ according to the differences in the land 
size. In conclusion, we can say that there are also a number of water management 
rules in Thulotar that are not necessarily stated in the statutory rules (see Pradhan 
2000; MOWR/N 1994, 1993; LMC 1992). 
Water-related grievances and dispute management 
There are many cases of water dispute that have turned into very serious social 
problems in Nepal, ranging from social tension and social strife to homicide (Khadka 
1997; Pradhan et al. 1997). Such cases may occur among farmers of the same 
systems or across systems. Many cases were reported to governmental and semi-
governmental organizations for their resolution, ranging from the VDC, district 
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administration, and district court to the Supreme Court (Khanal and K. C. 1997; K. C. 
and Pradhan 1997; Shukla et al. 1997). There were several grievances, bilateral 
disputes and a few major disputes in Thulotar. Unlike in other parts of Nepal, no such 
disputes were ever reported to outside agencies, however. All disputes were either 
settled in a very informal way or were negotiated by the water users associations. 
There were several grievances associated with watering during transplantation 
and first irrigation after transplantation. Some grievances were also heard against 
what was seen as WUAs leniency towards the enforcement of water management 
rules developed by the Thulotar General Assemblies. Such grievances were also 
heard against the panipale. Several disputes between the farmers of upper and lower 
riparian areas, and middle part and tail part inside the Thulotar service area were 
observed as well. These disputes were between farmers of different ages, sex, and 
castes. Some of the disputes were between the WUA and other farmers and some 
were between the farmers and the panipale. 
Thulotar Kulo has been involved in only one inter-system dispute. This was 
between Thulotar and Ghartiswara Kulo. Except for this major inter-system dispute, 
most internal disputes centered around occasional ad hoc problems. These cases will 
most likely not have lasting impacts on the irrigation management of Thulotar Kulo. 
Although some of the discussions surrounding water distribution and resource 
mobilization were hot issues among the members, the intensity of most disputes was 
mild and temporary in nature. Similar to other parts of Nepal and Tanahun, water 
scarcity or water rights were the major factors in most disputes among Thulotar 
farmers and in the dispute between Thulotar and one of its upcanal-neighbors196. The 
inter-system dispute erupted only when Thulotar farmers wanted to protect their prior 
water rights over Sabadi Khola. However, had there not been any water scarcity 
problems in Thulotar, the dispute with the neighboring village would not have 
escalated. 
The timing of most of the internal disputes in Thulotar also proves that water 
scarcity is the main factor in disputes between irrigator farmers as most of these 
disputes were observed during periods of water scarcity when most of the farmers 
had to transplant rice. At the same time, the farmers also had to apply water for their 
newly transplanted rice fields. Thus, the main reasons for the high frequency of 
disputes during transplantation periods are the non-appointment of a panipale while 
transplanting, the absence of formally sanctioned rules governing the priority of 
transplantation water over irrigation water, and a lack of strong rules designed to 
prioritize the first watering of the newly transplanted fields within a specified period 
of transplantation. While most grievances that were transformed into hostile disputes 
were due to water scarcity problems, a few heated disputes over irrigation system 
rehabilitation project resource mobilization were also observed. 
Locational differences, caste, relative social status, and farmers' innocence and 
inadequate technical knowledge, as well as other social factors, had direct or indirect 
impacts on how disputes erupted in Thulotar. Most of them had both positive and 
negative impacts, however. For example, kinship and marriage relations and the 
See Pradhan et al. 2000, 1997; K. von Benda-Beckmann 1997; Meinzen-Dick and Bruns 1997; 
Pradhan and Pradhan 1997; Poudel 1995; Poudel et al. 1994. 
See also K. von Benda-Beckmann 1997; Meinzen-Dick and Bruns 1997; Poudel 1995. 
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political interests of WUA members and other Rupakot village leaders had been the 
major factors keeping the village harmony intact. At the same time, there were 
several issues where the influence of the village leadership, which is mainly based on 
politics and caste, age, gender, and religious normative orders, kept the Thulotar 
farmers in check to report their grievances against the suspected opponents. The 
panipale's role has been influenced by the status of the leaders he is affiliated with 
through his roles and duties and patron-client relationships. As a result, the panipale's 
powerful position and his reputation for honesty has been threatened to some extent. 
Village leaders' status was also influential in settling the disputes in the village. In 
this sense, the normative orders of the village have helped to keep the social 
environment of Thulotar intact, while the socio-economic status of the Thulotar 
farmer-leaders remained unthreatened. On the other hand, the number of internal 
disputes could have been smaller if the farmers had enforced their understanding that 
transplantation should have priority over transplanted rice field irrigation. Disputes 
could have also been minimized if rules governing first irrigation in the newly 
transplanted fields had been developed, and if all the rules developed and sanctioned 
by the General Assemblies through 1997 and 1998 had been followed. 
In many irrigation systems in Nepal, external agency intervention has been 
regarded as one of the major factors contributing to water disputes in the concerned 
FMISs1 9 8. The major reason why water disputes are caused by external intervention is 
because of the impacts on existing physical structures and institutional 
arrangements199. Major disputes between upstream canals and downstream canals in 
the eastern Chitwan of Nepal, Tanahun, and Dang, for example, were started after the 
headwork of the upstream canals was improved by government-funded irrigation 
rehabilitation projects200. Some of these projects also led to changes in the size of the 
irrigated areas and the organizational structures of irrigation management institutions. 
The rehabilitation of Thulotar Kulo, however, neither expanded nor reduced the 
existing service area, and the institutional structure was not noticeably impacted. 
Only one internal dispute occurred as a result of the rehabilitation project. This 
concerned the cash contribution (resource mobilization) required for the rehabilitation 
of the main canal in 1996. Two farmers claimed against each other as to who the 
party was that was responsible for the payment of the rehabilitation cost. The cost 
was levied for a parcel of irrigated land in the Thulotar service area that was used by 
the two of them in turn. Thus, although government intervention in FMISs mostly 
results in irrigation disputes among the farmers of the concerned systems, the 
frequency and intensity of the expected disputes may also depend on the extent to 
which the intervention projects affect the existing physical and social/institutional 
structures of the concerned irrigation systems201. One reason why disputes were kept 
to a minimum during the Thulotar Kulo rehabilitation projects could be because of 
the minimal impact the projects had on the existing Thulotar system. It seems as 
though the conversion of the temporary brushwood intake to the concrete-gated 
intake would have been opposed by the downstream systems of Sabadi Khola, but in 
fact, none of the downstream systems opposed the Thulotar rehabilitation projects. 
The reasons why the construction of the permanent intake for Thulotar Kulo was not 
See Shukla 1997; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1996; Pradhan and Pradhan 1996; Poudel 
1995. 
See F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1996; Poudel 1995. 
Khatri-Chhetry and Pradhan 1997; Shukla et al. 1997; Pradhan and Pradhan 1996; Poudel 1995. 
See also F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1996. 
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opposed have not been studied, however, and represent issues for further study in the 
future. 
Open disputes and invisible grievances 
Most irrigation scientists who study water disputes regard disputes among farmers or 
between farmers and agencies as easily observable social phenomena (Pradhan et al. 
1997). After studying water disputes and their management practices in Thulotar, I 
have found that only a few water-related problems and grievances had the 
opportunity to become open disputes and be at least temporarily resolved, reducing 
tension between farmers for at least the time being. Many grievances concerned 
scarce resources such as irrigation water during the most critical period of the rice 
season and the collection of cash to be used for the rehabilitation of irrigation 
structures. Some farmers with such grievances were able to overcome the normally 
expected behavior between the villagers and the village leaders, and their seniors and 
close relatives. This happened during the rice transplanting period when irrigation 
water was in equal demand for transplantation and the first irrigation of the newly 
transplanted rice fields. Similarly, farmers seemed to be very concerned about the 
WUA's failure to present the previous year's financial statement, which was expected 
to be done at the end of each year. In such situations, whatever the long-term impact 
of challenging the status of their seniors and respectful members of the village may 
be, farmers who were faced with water-related problems and grievances were able to 
find a resolution and settle their tensions at least momentarily. 
I found that in most situations, farmers' water-related tensions were not 
transformed into easily observable disputes. Thus, there were many grievances that 
could be observed only through the careful eyes of social scientists who were able to 
develop a good rapport between them and irrigator farmers' communities. Many 
serious cases did not become disputes, but they remained as major grievances. This 
was not surprising in Thulotar Kulo, where there were strong normative orders based 
upon caste, age, gender, religion, or cultural dominance. Many grievances that did not 
develop to disputes concerned rights of way for irrigation water and the way in which 
WUA officials and the panipale handled the water management problems. Despite a 
majority of farmers being in disagreement, no-one made public the grievance they 
were dissatisfied with the way that Mr. Writer got a separate field channel for his 
previous chuhan met while many other farmers having chuhan met did not. 
Similarly, the majority of the tailend farmers were also not satisfied with the 
panipale, particularly with his action of not closing the intakes of the majority of 
headend-section when it was the tailend section's turn to irrigate. Similar grievances 
were also observed against the lenient nature of WUA officials in taking action 
against the defaulters in Thulotar Kulo. The principal reason why none of the farmers 
brought the grievances to the public arena was the dominant social status of Mr. 
Writer, the donor of the field channel (the mukhiyd), WUA officials, as well as the 
panipale by virtue of his affiliation with other prominent farmers. Other reasons were 
the strong social ties among the majority of Thulotar farmers through a mesh of 
kinship, marriage, Active kin, and political relationships. 
See also Felstiner et al. 1981. 
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Water disputes and performance of Thulotar Rulo 
Thulotar Kulo could thus generally be said to be an effectively managed irrigation 
system because there were not many open water disputes. The effective role of the 
panipale, prompt decision making, or at least the temporary resolution of disputes, 
and the avoidance of possible escalation into major disputes were the common 
characteristics of Thulotar Kulo. These were also some of the major properties found 
in other irrigation systems in Nepal, which were categorized as effectively managed 
irrigation systems . 
Many other water-related problems and grievances may have prevented farmers 
from participating in the development activities of Thulotar Kulo, especially in the 
decision-making in the General Assembly and WUA. At the level of the individual 
farmer, such grievances may be even more problematic than open disputes. Farmers 
who are involved in a dispute and have reported the case publicly at least have the 
chance to achieve a temporary or long-lasting resolution that rids them of the 
problem. Whereas grievances always take place in the minds of farmers facing 
problems, they have always been a burden to those farmers who participate in 
development activities independently. Unless there is a social environment that 
allows all farmers' grievances to transform into open disputes or, in other words, 
unless all farmers facing problems are able to present their grievances publicly to the 
litigating organizations or individuals, it cannot be said that there is equity or social 
justice. Thus, the ability to express grievances is similar to the ability to participate in 
decision-making. Unless all farmers in an irrigation system, of which they are the 
beneficiaries, are able to decide their own fate in irrigation management, the system 
cannot be said to be effectively managed or to have good performance. 
Although many authors in the fields of social science and legal anthropology 
believe that a common property resource such as a communal irrigation system or an 
FMIS managed by a group of farmers should be run in a no-dispute or minimum 
dispute situation, the "definition" of dispute most authors envision is an "open 
dispute", which is only part of a whole concept of dispute management, as indicated 
by this research204. Based on this assumption, many FMISs in Nepal are categorized 
as "effective, efficient, and well-performed" irrigation systems. This is one of the 
most important reasons why most FMISs are popularly known as irrigation systems 
which are better managed than most agency-managed irrigation systems (AMISs, 
Shukla and Sharma 1994; Shukla et al. 1994; IMC 1989). 
The findings of this research raise doubts about this assessment, especially in 
those irrigation systems which are managed by such farmers' groups which are 
dominated by caste-, age-, gender- and religion-based normative orders. There may 
not have been many open disputes, but are we certain that there were no other 
tensions and grievances? Or should we classify all irrigation systems where there 
were no easily observable water-disputes as "effective systems"? Should we not 
consider other water-related tensions or disputes under the broader framework of 
"water dispute management"? 
See also Meinzen-Dick and Bruns 1997; Shivakoti et al. 1997; Zwarteveen and Neupane 1996; 
Poudel et al. 1994; Shukla et al. 1993; Martin and Yoder 1987. 
See also Pradhan et al 1997; Pradhan and Pradhan 1996; Wiber 1992; IMC 1990; Gibbs and 
Bromely 1989; Bisno 1988; Crutz et al. 1987; Merry 1982. 
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The assumption of classifying "an irrigation system with open disputes" under 
the category of "non-effective systems" may be questionable as well, as not all water 
disputes in irrigation systems are necessarily detrimental and threatening to the 
management of those systems. Some of the disputes also have a positive impact on 
the societies (Barker et al. 1991; Coser 1982, 1964; Foster 1973). In some cases, 
water disputes lead to the "solution of the problem" but do not necessarily "create the 
problem". Although mostly temporary in the context of Thulotar, many disputes 
among the farmers of different categories ended with some solutions. In order to 
resolve disputes, the Thulotar General Assemblies were also able to develop new 
rules to prevent an aftermath of many possibly detrimental disputes in the future. At 
the same time, the temporary resolution of some disputes could ease the tensions 
among the disputing parties and help to keep village harmony intact. Whether water 
disputes have positive impact in the farmers' communities or not, however, depends 
on how, when, and where the disputes were managed.205 The low frequency of water 
disputes in Thulotar Kulo and their low intensity may have been due to the timely 
action the local institutions and farmer leaders took against the reported water-related 
problems, right at the time that the disputes occurred. Due to such actions, none of the 
disputes in Thulotar seriously threatened the social order in Thulotar. Whereas at the 
same time, the inter-system dispute, which erupted 25 years after the construction of 
Ghartiswara Kulo, developed as a fully-fledged long-lasting dispute, and created 
hostility between Thulotar and Ghartiswara farmers. 
Unfortunately, most research done so far in the name of "irrigation disputes" has 
been confined to the easily observable "open disputes" but not other water-related 
problems and grievances (K. C. and Pradhan 1997; Malla and Khadka 1997; Pradhan 
and Pradhan 1997; Shukla et al. 1997). Just few years ago, farmers' water-related 
grievances were not normally included within the framework of irrigation dispute 
studies conducted by myself and others (Poudel et al. 1994). To cite an example, I 
and other colleagues from the Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science (IAAS) 
worked on the inventory preparation and external need assessment of some of the 
FMISs that included Thulotar and Ghartiswara Kulo in the northeastern parts of 
Tanahun district. In the course of the study, we identified only a few water disputes 
among the farmers of an irrigation system and between two or more systems. In 
Thulotar, we had included only the inter-system dispute described in detail in this 
book. None of other types of disputes identified by my present research were 
identified by that study, however. We thus may need to rethink our conception of 
dispute management and the notion of effective systems or better performance. 
Implications and suggestions 
The findings of this research may thus also have implications for the present 
government irrigation development and management policies in Nepal. One such 
aspect is the present policy of turning agency-managed irrigation systems over to 
formally organized WUAs. Although the findings of this research may not have 
direct implications for the Irrigation Management Transfer Project (JMTP) currently 
being implemented in Nepal, there may be lessons to be learned and included with 
the respect to the dispute management aspect of its current procedures. The IMTP 
currently launches three major activities before handing any government managed 
irrigation systems over to the farmers (MOWR/N 1992). First, they train the farmers 
See also K. von Benda-Beckamnn 1985; Gulliver 1979; Rubin and Brown 1975. 
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to form a management organization (e.g. WUA) and ask them register it with the 
District Water Resources Committee. The second step is the rehabilitation or 
renovation of the concerned irrigation system through a participatory approach. The 
final part is the handing over of the partial or full management responsibility of the 
irrigation system to the formally organized farmers' associations. However, the 
farmers' abilities to manage disputes, which may also include grievances and other 
water-related tensions, and pertinent training is not included in the farmers' training 
package. The whole IMTP policy is based on the common assumption that, as far as 
irrigation management is concerned, farmers are better managers than the external 
agencies. Thus, by transferring the management responsibilities of many previously 
agency-managed irrigation systems to farmers' organizations, HMG/Nepal expects to 
further improve the management of many AMIS's. But the persons involved in the 
IMTP are not necessarily aware that the socio-economic circumstances of the 
farmers' communities differ according to context and the socio-normative 
environments, and that there may be inevitable conflicts between different normative 
orders. Similarly, not all WUAs are necessarily more effective than all AMISs in 
terms of dispute management. 
The dispute management abilities of existing FMISs may, therefore, also need a 
thorough study, and farmers may likewise need the necessary training so that all 
FMISs may function in non-dispute or minimum-dispute situations. Although there 
are almost no irrigation systems without dispute problems, it depends on the 
awareness, interest, and ability of the managers of those systems whether or not such 
disputes are managed in a proper way and in the proper time. The farmers' histories 
and the contemporary water dispute management situation may need a detailed study. 
Every WUA may have its strengths and weaknesses and, based on research results, 
existing WUAs may need further training for these responsibilities as well. Thus, the 
weaknesses would be corrected and the strengths multiplied. 
The present agenda for the study of dispute management in Nepal is, however, 
likely to move in a new direction because of the interests of some international 
organizations (Ford Foundation, International Water Management Institute, 
Wageningen University, Erasmus University, etc) in studying water disputes as an 
important social phenomena in the development and management of irrigation 
systems (Pradhan et al. 2000,1997). Unlike a blind dependence on farmer institutions 
as one of the best institutions for dispute management (and so for natural resource 
management), they have tried to make the concerned policy-makers or agencies 
realize the existence of the legally (or normatively) differentiated farmers institutions 
even among the farmers of a single irrigation system (or a single village). 
Other semi-governmental and non-governmental organizations within and 
outside Nepal have also recently become involved either directly or indirectly in the 
research and study of water rights and dispute management in both farmer-managed 
and agency-managed irrigation systems in Nepal206. These organizations include the 
Water Management Study Program (WMSP) at IAAS Rampur, the Legal Research 
and Development Forum (FREEDEAL), Mountain Resources Management Group 
(MRMG), and some of the Faculties of Law at Tribhuvan University. I hope the 
These organizations are directly or indirectly supported by the Ford Foundation, International 
Water Management Institute, Department of Irrigation Nepal, Wageningen University Research 
Center, Erasmus University, Indiana University, and so on. 
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cooperation between all of these and other similar national and international 
organizations will continue for further study and research into the problem areas 
identified by this research. 
Finally, I would like to point out that while the findings of this research may provide 
some lessons for evaluating the present assumptions on the performance of FMISs 
and irrigation management policies in the Hills of Nepal, such a study conducted on a 
very small irrigation system may not be sufficient to suggest that its findings be 
directly implemented in other large scale FMISs and AMISs, whether it may be in the 
case of management transfer or in the existing WUAs. However, I am hopeful that it 
may provide food for thought that may lead to further research and studies on the 
issues identified by this research. 
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Samenvatting 
Dutch Summary 
Dit boek is het resultaat van een onderzoek naar waterrechten en geschillen behandeling in 
het irrigatiesysteem Thulotar Kulo van het Ontwikkelingscomité van het dorp Rupakot in de 
bergen van West Nepal in 1997 en 1998. Het geeft een gedetailleerde beschrijving en analyse 
van de wijze waarop waterrechten het belangrijkste geschilpunt worden in een door boeren 
beheerd irrigatiesysteem (farmer managed irrigation system FMIS). De studie omvat het hele 
scala van onderhuidse problemen tot openlijke geschillen over water binnen en tussen 
irrigatiesystemen. Deze worden bestudeerd in hun samenhang met de factoren, situaties of 
omstandigheden die verantwoordelijk zijn voor deze geschillen. 
Vanwege de aard van zijn beheersstrukturen is een FMIS een gemeenschapsgoed. Een goed 
functionerend regime voor gemeenschapsgoederen zou vrij moeten zijn van geschillen. 
Irrigatiesystemen zonder geschillen over water zijn echter zeldzaam. Maar of een 
watergeschil in een irrigatiesysteem een probleem is hangt ervan af hoe zulke geschillen 
worden behandeld en opgelost. Daarom is het belangrijk om te bestuderen hoe zulke 
geschillen worden behandeld in verschillende sociale en situationele verbanden. Over het 
algemeen zijn geschillen over water verbonden aan waterrechten. In Nepal hangen 
waterrechten meestal ook af van rechten op land. Dit onderzoek is in de eerste plaats gericht 
op geschillen en op de vraag hoe het gewoonterecht en regels van statelijk recht die van 
belang zijn voor waterbeheer daarop van invloed zijn. Daarbij ligt de nadruk op waterrechten 
in hun samenhang met landrechten. De aandacht gaat ook uit naar rechtspluralisme en naar 
de vraag hoe de toegang tot waterrechten en processen van geschillen behandeling 
functioneren in een context van plurale rechtsstelsels. Het belangrijkste doel van deze studie 
was om de kenmerken van organisaties belast met het beheer van water, de praktijk van deze 
organisaties, en de gemeenschappelijke normen met betrekking tot waterverdeling, 
mobilisatie van hulpbronnen en de praktijken van geschillenbeslechting in het 
onderzoeksgebied in kaart te brengen. Van centraal belang in het onderzoek waren de 
oorzaken, soorten en onderwerpen van geschillen, en de scenario's tijdens en na de 
behandeling van geschillen. 
Het boek begint met een overzicht van het analytisch perspectief op waterrechten en 
geschillen behandeling met betrekking tot irrigatiebeheer dat in deze studie wordt gehanteerd. 
Irrigatiebeheer wordt opgevat als het proces waarin boeren een irrigatiesysteem beheerden, 
besturen en onderhouden. Waterrechten zijn echter een produkt van zowel gewoonterecht als 
statelijk recht. Deze verschillende normatieve kaders bestaan naast elkaar en worden 
afwisselend geraadpleegd wanneer mensen hun aanspraak op het gebruik van water 
verdedigen. Na het analytisch kader volgt een korte beschrijving van de sociaal-juridische 
dimensies van het landbeheer en een gedetailleerde beschrijving van deze dimensies van het 
waterbeheer in Nepal. Vervolgens wordt een beschrijving gegeven van de sociaal-
economische kenmerken van leden van Thulotar Kulo en de andere leden van hun 
huishoudens, van de regels van Thulotar Kulo, en van de arena waar deze regels worden 
gemaakt. Daarna volgt een beschrijving van geschillen over water en van systemen van 
geschillen behandeling in Thulotar. Het laatste gedeelte van het boek geeft enige conclusies 
met betrekking tot waterrechten en geschillen behandeling in Thulotar Kulo. 
De huidige complexiteit van rechten op land en water is beïnvloed door verschillende 
historische en hedendaagse beheersinstituties. Nepal is een klein Hindoe koninkrijk in de 
Himalaya, dat in het verleden werd geregeerd door een opeenvolging van vele kleine vorsten, 
Shah koningen, alleenheersende Rana eerste ministers, en absolute en constitutionele 
monarchen. Het eerste nationale Nepalese wetboek werd uitgevaardigd in 1853. Dat erkende 
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enkele gewoonterechtelijke praktijken met betrekking tot land- en waterbeheer, maar pas in 
de jaren tachtig van de twintigste eeuw ging de Nepalese overheid over op een beleid om 
boeren zelf te laten deelnemen in de ontwikkeling en het beheer van irrigatiesystemen. 
Andere wetten en regelingen met betrekking tot water werden in de jaren negentig van de 
twintigste eeuw afgekondigd. Een andere factor die bijdraagt tot de complexiteit van rechten 
op land en water is de op het kastesysteem en het Hindoeïsme gebaseerde culturele erfenis 
van Nepal. De meerderheid van de huidige overheids- en lokale wetten die 
irrigatiewaterrechten raken, zijn verbonden met landrechten, terwijl zowel het gewoonterecht 
als ook het statelijk recht traditioneel de mannelijke hoofden van huishoudens als de enige 
eigenaren van het land van hun huishouden hebben erkend. Tot op heden wordt het land van 
de ouders vrijwel alleen door zonen geërfd en niet door dochters. Daarom hebben vrouwen in 
Nepal, uitzonderingen daargelaten, zelden toegang tot waterrechten in irrigatiesystemen. 
Bovengenoemde omstandigheden lokken vele geschillen uit tussen verschillende groepen en 
individuele burgers in de rurale gebieden van Nepal. De meeste geschillen betreffen de 
toegang tot en het gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen, met name land en water, en andere 
vermogensbestanddelen van huishoudens, vooral het ouderlijk vermogen. Verschillende 
soorten van juridische, para-juridische en lokale instituties zoals pancha-bhaladmi, daudaka, 
rechtbanken en andere overheidsinstanties, groepen watergebruikers en lokale 
bestuursorganen zijn vanouds bij geschillenbeslechting betrokken geweest. Daarnaast waren 
ook boerenleiders zoals jimmuwal, talukdar, mukhiya, jimidar, chaudhary, gepensioneerde 
ambtenaren en anderen bij geschillen betrokken. 
Thulotar Kulo is een van de tientallen kleine FMIS van de rivier de Sabadi Khola. Wanneer 
en hoe Thulotar Kulo gebouwd werd is onbekend. In het verleden werd Thulotar 
Egharasayatar genoemd. Later werd het bekend als Thulotar Kulo. Het beheer van Thulotar 
Kulo werd voor 1960 vrijwillig verzorgd door de belastinginner (talukdar) van geïrrigeerd 
land (khet). In 1960 droeg de belastinginner zijn verantwoordelijkheden vrijwillig over aan 
een georganiseerde boerengroep, de Vereniging van Watergebruikers (Water Users 
Association WUA). Tegen 1980 had Thulotar WUA een Waterwacht (lokaal bekend als 
panipale) aangesteld en een roulatiesysteem voor de toedeling van water in tijden van 
watertekorten ingesteld. Dit gold met name tijdens het hoogseizoen, dat in Thulotar Kulo 
over het algemeen van juli tot oktober valt, wanneer het watertekort het meest nijpend is. 
Thuloswara Kulo werd officieel Thulotar Kulo genoemd toen Egharasayatar Kulo voor het 
eerst overheidssteun ontving voor restauratie in 1982. Thulotar Kulo ontving ook een tweede 
restauratieproject van het Tanahun District Irrigatiekantoor in 1995/96. Thulotar Kulo wordt 
momenteel beheerd door een Water Users Association die 67 boeren vertegenwoordigt, 
waarvan de meerderheid tot de hoogste kasten behoort (Brahmanen en Chhetry). Slechts 15 
boeren vertegenwoordigen de beroepskasten (Sudra), de laagste kasten in de hiërarchie. Eén 
boer komt van de derde kastencategorie (Baisya). Thulotar boeren hebben tal van onderlinge 
sociale relaties door verwantschap en huwelijk. Zij hebben een zeer lage sociaal-economische 
status: De gemiddelde grootte van een boerderij is slechts 0,8 hectare. Thulotar boeren 
hebben gemiddeld slechts 6,9 jaar scholing gehad. Vele boeren van Rupakot zijn in 
overheids- en militaire dienst in Nepal en India geweest. 
In principe heeft de Algemene Vergadering van Thulotar Kulo, bestaande uit alle leden van 
Thulotar Kulo, de uiteindelijke beslissingsbevoegdheid over bestuur en onderhoud van het 
systeem. Daarom is de Algemene Vergadering de belangrijkste arena om regels voor het 
bestuur en onderhoud van Thulotar Kulo te ontwikkelen. De WUA, het uitvoerend orgaan dat 
wordt verkozen door de Algemene Ledenvergadering, kan zelf geen regels geven zonder 
toestemming of goedkeuring van de Algemene Vergadering. De WUA kan wel nadere regels 
formuleren op basis van de algemene regels die door de Algemene Vergadering zijn 
uitgevaardigd. In Thulotar had echter de persoonlijkheid van uitvoerende leden van de WUA 
veel invloed op de formulering en uitvoering van de regels van waterbeheer. 
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De twee belangrijkste terreinen waarvoor Thulotar WUA regels heeft ontwikkeld zijn 
waterverdeling en mobilisatie van hulpbronnen. Over het algemeen gaan 
waterverdelingsregels alleen over de bevloeiing van de moessonrijst die in de regentijd wordt 
verbouwd. Er bleek echter een zeer informele regel met betrekking tot voorrang van water 
voor het overplanten van rijst boven bevloeiing te functioneren onder de boeren. Gezien het 
grote belang van water op het moment van overplanting is het merkwaardig dat deze regel 
nooit door de Algemene Vergadering of de WUA is opgetekend. Ook de regels met 
betrekking tot de eerste watergift na het overplanten van rijst blijken van bijzonder belang te 
zijn, maar de algemene regels van Thulotar Kulo zwijgen hier eveneens over. Met betrekking 
tot bevloeiing en verwante zaken tijdens het winterseizoen bestaan er alleen enkele informele 
regels. Er zijn in het geheel geen regels waargenomen tijdens de zomer, omdat er geen water 
beschikbaar is in dat seizoen. De Algemene Vergadering van Thulotar Kulo stelt elk jaar een 
Waterwacht {panipale) aan voor de moessontijd van juli tot oktober. Ieder Thulotar lid 
betaalt de Waterwacht in rijst op grond van de hoeveelheid bevloeid land en het aantal inlaten 
van het kanaal naar elk veld binnen het door Thulotar bediende gebied. De Waterwacht 
bepaalt of een doorgaande stroom is toegestaan of dat er een schema van waterroulering 
moet worden gevolgd. Elke inbreuk op het door de Waterwacht vastgestelde watervolume 
wordt bestraft. 
Hoewel er geen officieel opgetekende regels met betrekking tot waterverdeling voor 
wintergewassen zijn in Thulotar, kunnen geïnteresseerde boeren in dat seizoen water 
ontvangen uit het hoofdkanaal en dat naar hun velden leiden zonder enig bezwaar van andere 
boeren. Hetzelfde geldt als een boer zijn braakland wil bevloeien na de rijstoogst om de 
grond losser te maken voor het ploegen. Elke boer mag ook water uit het Thulotar kanaal 
putten of gebruiken voor een groentetuin of andere huishoudelijke activiteiten. Hoewel er 
geen formele regels zijn met betrekking tot drainage van overtollig water uit het door 
Thulotar bediende gebied, mag elke boer water van het eigen land afvoeren naar het volgende 
terras stroomafwaarts om moerassig land te ontwateren tijdens de rijstoogst. Waterverdeling 
tussen de FMIS's in de Sabadi Khola onderling is gebaseerd op voorrang voor de eerste 
leden. 
Ieder lid van Thulotar moet elk jaar deelnemen aan een of meerdere algemene vergaderingen 
en kanaal-schoonmaakdagen, of zich laten vertegenwoordigen door een lid van zijn 
huishouden. In principe worden de afwezigen beboet, maar de straffen zijn zeer mild in 
Thulotar. In geval van onvoorziene reparaties heeft de WUA gewoonlijk de bevoegdheid om 
ad hoe regels te maken om arbeid of geld te mobiliseren. De WUA kan zijn leden ook vragen 
om geld bij te dragen voor gewone herstelprojecten aan de irrigatiestructuren. Geldelijke 
bijdragen van de leden zijn evenredig aan de omvang van hun landbezit binnen het door 
Thulotar bediende gebied. Er is echter geen verschil in hoogte van de arbeidsbijdrage op 
basis van landoppervlak: Ieder huishouden draagt evenveel mankracht bij. De belangrijkste 
gedragslijnen en regels in Thulotar Kulo worden besproken en vastgesteld door de Algemene 
Vergadering. De ambtsdragers van het uitvoerende orgaan WUA beleggen op zijn minst één 
bijeenkomst van de Algemene Vergadering per jaar in juli. Bijkomende vergaderingen 
kunnen naar behoeve worden belegd. 
Een doelstelling van dit onderzoek was om alle geschillen met betrekking tot waterbeheer in 
Thulotar Kulo te bestuderen en beschrijven. Het overgrote deel van de aan waterbeheer 
gerelateerde grieven liep nooit uit op openlijke geschillen. Tijdens mijn onderzoek in 
1997/98 nam ik slechts een aantal geschillen waar die hoog opliepen. Er was slechts één 
historisch geval tussen Thulotar boeren en een van de bovenkanaalse irrigatiesystemen dat 
pas na een langdurig proces kon worden opgelost. De meerderheid van de grieven en 
geschillen in Thulotar hadden te maken met waterschaarste, vooral tijdens de moessontijd. 
De belangrijkste oorzaken waren de afwezigheid van een taak voor de Waterwacht tijdens het 
overplanten van rijst, en van formeel vastgestelde regels over de voorrang van water voor 
overplanten boven bevloeiing, en van de cruciale eerste watergift na overplanten. De meeste 
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grieven over waterschaarste ontwikkelden zich tot geschillen. Er waren echter ook enkele 
verhitte geschillen over de mobilisatie van hulpbronnen voor restauratieprojecten van het 
irrigatiesysteem. Voorts waren er veel grieven over rechten om een weg te banen voor 
irrigatiewater en de manier waarop de WUA ambtsdragers en de Waterwacht de problemen 
van waterbeheer in Thulotar hanteerden. Deze mondden echter over het algemeen niet uit in 
openlijke geschillen. 
De partijen in de geschillen waren meestal Thulotar leden en leden van hun gezinnen. Er 
werd ook op zijn minst een geschil tussen de WUA bestuurders, de Waterwacht en een lid 
van de Algemene Vergadering waargenomen. Hoewel sommige discussies over 
wateraandelen en de mobilisatie van hulpbronnen hete hangijzers waren onder de leden, 
waren de meeste geschillen mild en kortstondig van aard. Een belangrijk geschil tussen 
Thulotar Kulo en een van de bovenkanaalse systemen aan de Sabadi Khola, resulteerde in 
een duurzame structurele oplossing. Maar de meeste interne geschillen betroffen nu en dan 
voorkomende ad hoe problemen en hadden waarschijnlijk geen blijvende en structurele 
uitwerking hebben op Thulotar's irrigatiebeheer. 
Over het algemeen kan worden gezegd dat het Thulotar irrigatiesysteem geschillen 
doeltreffend behandelde, omdat er niet veel geschillen over water werden waargenomen. De 
doeltreffende rol van de WUA en de Waterwacht in Thulotar Kulo, de duidelijke beslissingen 
die werden genomen bij geschillen, en het vermijden van mogelijke escalatie van belangrijke 
geschillen, waren daarvoor belangrijke factoren. Maar de lakse houding jegens overtreders 
bij het afdwingen van regels door de Thulotar WUA waren ook de oorzaak van een 
gebrekkig beheer van het Thulotar irrigatiesysteem. Vele boeren van Thulotar Kulo waren 
dan ook niet tevreden over deze toegeeflijke houding van de WUA. Nauwkeurige en 
intensieve waarneming toonde aan dat er in Thulotar Kulo veel onderhuidse onvrede over 
water was. Er waren veel onopgeloste, aan water gerelateerde grieven. Zolang boeren met 
problemen niet in staat zijn om hun grieven openlijk te presenteren aan de instanties of 
individuen die geschillen behoren te behandelen, kan er niet worden gezegd dat er 
rechtvaardigheid of sociale gerechtigheid is. De mogelijkheid om grieven te uiten hangt nauw 
samen met de mogelijkheid om aan besluitvorming in deze organisaties deel te nemen. 
Zolang niet alle begunstigde boeren in een irrigatiesysteem in staat zijn om over hun eigen 
lot in het irrigatiebeheer te beslissen, kan er niet worden gezegd dat het systeem doeltreffend 
wordt beheerd of goed wordt uitgevoerd. 
In de discussies over het beheer van gemeenschapsgoederen (common property) wordt de 
doeltreffendheid van het systeem meestal gemeten naar het aantal openlijke geschillen dat in 
deze systemen plaatsvindt. Op basis daarvan worden vele door FMIS's in Nepal aangeduid 
als "doeltreffende, efficiënte, goed uitgevoerde" irrigatiesystemen. Dit is een van de 
belangrijkste redenen waarom wordt aangenomen dat FMIS's door de bank genomen beter 
worden beheerd dan AMIS's (door instanties beheerde irrigatiesystemen). De bevindingen 
van dit onderzoek doen twijfels opkomen aan deze bewering, vooral in die irrigatiesystemen 
die worden beheerd door boeren gemeenschapppen waar normatieve ordes gebaseerd op 
kaste, leeftijd, geslacht en godsdienst overheersen. Omgekeerd kan ook de veronderstelling 
dat een "irrigatiesysteem met openlijke geschillen" moet worden ingedeeld in de categorie 
"niet doeltreffende systemen" worden aangevochten, omdat niet alle geschillen over water in 
irrigatiesystemen noodzakelijkerwijs nadelig en bedreigend zijn voor het beheer van deze 
systemen. De meeste geschillen tussen boeren in Thulotar leidden tot bepaalde, zij het vaak 
tijdelijke, oplossingen. De Thulotar Algemene Vergadering ontwikkelde naar aanleiding van 
een bepaald conflict ook wel nieuwe regels waarmee een nasleep van vele verwante, 
mogelijk schadelijke geschillen kon worden voorkomen. Tegelijkertijd kon een tijdelijke 
oplossing in sommige geschillen de spanningen tussen de twistende partijen verminderen en 
zo helpen de dorpsharmonie in stand te houden. Of geschillen over water positieve 
uitwerkingen hebben in boerensamenlevingen of niet hangt echter af van de vraag hoe, 
wanneer en waar de geschillen behandeld worden. De lage frequentie van geschillen over 
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water in Thulotar Kulo en hun geringe hevigheid kunnen het gevolg zijn geweest van een 
tijdig optreden door de lokale instellingen en boerenleiders zodra de geschillen ontstonden. 
Dankzij zulk optreden bracht geen van de geschillen in Thulotar de sociale orde in Thulotar 
ernstig in gevaar. Tegelijkertijd groeide het geschil tussen systemen, dat 25 jaar na de bouw 
van het nieuwe systeem uitbrak, uit tot een volledig uitgegroeid en langdurig geschil. 
Helaas is het merendeel van het onderzoek dat tot dusverre onder de noemer 
"irrigatiegeschillen" is uitgevoerd beperkt tot gemakkelijk waarneembare "openlijke 
geschillen", en zijn andere problemen en grieven met betrekking tot water daar niet in 
betrokken. Nog enkele jaren geleden besteedde ik daar zelf ook geen aandacht aan in mijn 
onderzoek naar irrigatiegeschillen. Er zal meer onderzoek en discussie nodig zijn en de 
begrippen "geschil" en "effectief beheer" zullen opnieuw moeten worden doordacht. 
Hoewel dit onderzoek geen betrekking had op het Irrigatiebeheer Overdracht Project (TMTP) 
dat thans in Nepal wordt uitgevoerd, en de resultaten daar dus niet direct op van toepassing 
zijn, kunnen er toch lessen uit worden getrokken die voor het huidige irrigatie ontwikkelings-
en beheersbeleid van de Nepalese overheid van belang zijn. Dat geldt met name voor het 
huidige beleid om AMIS's over te dragen aan organisaties van irrigerende boeren, waarvoor 
een trainingsprogramma is ontwikkeld. Trainingen voor boeren om geschillen te behandelen 
maken daarbij helaas geen deel uit van het opleidingspakket. Het hele IMTP beleid is 
gebaseerd op de stelling dat boeren beter in staat zijn geschillen te behandelen en dus ook 
betere beheerders van irrigatiesytemen zijn dan externe instanties. Door de 
beheersverantwoordelijkheid van vele voordien door instanties beheerde irrigatiesystemen 
aan de WUA's over te dragen, verwacht de overheid van Nepal het beheer van die systemen 
verder te verbeteren. Men ziet niet voldoende in dat er grote sociaal-economische verschillen 
tussen de deelnemers aan een irrigatiesysteem bestaan, en dat er onvermijdelijk conflicten 
optreden ten gevolge van de naast elkaar bestaande en vaak conflicterende normatieve 
stelsels. Men beseft voorts onvoldoende dat er grote verschillen bestaan tussen WAU's wat 
betreft hun capaciteiten om geschillen te behandelen. Door boeren beheerde systemen 
functioneren dan ook niet per definitie beter dan door de overheid beheerde systemen. 
Hoewel er vrijwel geen irrigatiesystemen zijn zonder problemen, hangt het af van het inzicht, 
de belangstelling en de bekwaamheid van de beheerders van deze systemen of zij geschillen 
op de juiste wijze en op het juiste moment weten te behandelen. Op basis van onderzoek zou 
telkens kunnen worden bepaald of een WUA verdere training nodig heeft en hoe de zwaktes 
daardoor verbeterd zouden kunnen worden en de sterke kanten versterkt. 
Het huidige scenario voor de studie van geschillen behandeling in Nepal zal naar 
verwachting een nieuwe richting inslaan en geschillen over water zullen in toenemende mate 
als een belangrijk sociaal fenomeen bij de ontwikkeling en het beheer van irrigatiesystemen 
worden bestudeerd. Er dient niet blind op te worden vertrouwd dat boerenorganisaties de 
beste instellingen zijn voor de behandeling van geschillen en daarmee voor het beheer van 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen in het algemeen. De betrokken beleidsmakers en instanties dienen de 
normatief bepaalde differentiaties binnen boereninstituties serieus nemen. Ik hoop dat dit 
gedetailleerde onderzoek naar een klein door boeren beheerd irrigatiesysteem zal dienen als 
een aanzet tot reflectie en tot verder onderzoek zal leiden naar de kwesties die dit onderzoek 
heeft geïdentificeerd. 
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ANNEX -1 Land Use and Other Socio-economic Characteristics of Thulotar Kulo. 
Tablel NomberoflatulowneraiidtsnaittfoniMnbytliet^wdlfKatlimorlandghfen^ 
membership and caste of land owner ^ tenants, and land owner-tenant social tie*. 
Typeof Location of Land 
Land W/l Thulotar Outside 
Thulotar 
Khet 6 0 
0 1 
Pakbo NA 1 
Khet+Pak. 0 1 
Membership of tenant Caste of 
Thulotar Nou- Land 
Member Member Owner 
5 0 BC-5 
Bhujel-1 
0 1 BC-I 
1 3 BC-3 
OCI 
0 1 BC-1 
Caste of Landowner-Tenant 
Tenant Social Ties 
Relative Non-ReL 
OC-i 2 4 
BC-2 
BC-I 0 1 
BC-I 0 4 
OC-2 
Other-1 
OC-1 0 1 
Table2 Location and area of inproved rice Tariettesin Thulotar during rainy season, 1997. 
Farmer's No. NameofFlel Location of Field Areathal Variety 
8 Purtari Middle 0,05 Mansuii 
13 Banse Middle 0,1 Himoli 
14 Chholbidj Middle 0.1 Morauli 
15 Athariia Middle 0.025 Radha-7 
17 Atharha Middle 0.15 Radha-7 
20 Atharha Middle 0,1 Marauii 
41 Athailia Middle 0.05 Radha-7 
64 Barlernani Middle 0,15 Radha-7 
63 Birauto Middle 0,05 Radha-7 
9 Middle 0,775 
Tabte i Location, area and types of winter crops in Tbulotar. 
Farmer's No Field Name Location Areafha. 
12 Kole Middle 0.025 
14 Atharha Middle 0.025 
17 Atharha Middle 0.025 
17 Atharha Middle 0.05 
17 Atharha Middle 0,05 
20 Atharha Middle 0.025 
20 Atharha Middle 0,075 
20 AthaTha Middle 0.075 
21 Atharha Middle 0.05 
21 Atharha Middle 0.025 
64 Barlemani Middle 0.05 
65 Birauto Middle 0,025 
66 Birauto Middle 0.025 
Total 0,525 
CronTme Itnovd/Local Name 
of Crop 
Location 
Vegetable Local Potato+R Middle 
Vegetable Local Potato Middle 
Vegetable Improved Potato Middle 
Grain Local Wheat Middle 
Oil crop Local Mustard Middle 
Vegetable improved Potato Middle 
Grain Local Wheat Middle 
Oil crop Local Musrard Middle 
Grain Local Wheel Middle 
Pulse Local Lenti] Middle 
Vegetable Local Potato Middle 
Vegetable Local Potato Middle 
Vegetable Local Potato Middle 
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Location, area and types of summer crops In Thulotar. 
Farmer Area Name of tmpvdV 
8. No. Bo, Location thai Variety Crop Local Inferences 
1 17 Middle 03 Anm Maize Improved Although improved. 
2 18 Middle 0.1 Anm Maize Improved farmers use the seeds 
3 29 Tail 03 Arun Maize Improved from the last year's 
4 55 Tail 0.1 Anm Maize Improved harvest 
5 47 Tail 0.1 Arun Maize improved Cultivation in 
6 13 Middle 0.2 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved the head area 
7 14 Middle 03 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved is not practiced 
8 69 Middle 0.2 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved due to security 
9 64 Tail 03 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved problem. 
10 65 Tail 0.45 Khumal Yellow Maize improved 
1! 20 Tail 0,45 Khumal Yellow Maize improved 
12 21 Toil 0J5 Khumal Yellow Maize improved 
13 19 Tail 0.2 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved 
14 33 Tail 0.1 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved 
15 34 Tail 0.1 Khumal Yellow Maize improved 
1$ 24 Tail 0.2 Khumal Yellow Maize improved 
17 15 Middle 0O5 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved 
18 16 Middle 0,25 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved 
19 28 Tail 0.2 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved 
20 38 Tail 0,1 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved 
21 43 Tail 0.2 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved 
22 26 Tail 0.2 Khumal Yellow Maize Improved 
23 39 Tail 0.2 (not known) Sesbailia Improved 
Total 5,05 
Location and area of Chulian Kbet within Thulotar service area-
Field 
Farmer No. Name 
54 54 Kole Tail 0.257 
55 55 Kole Tail 0.15 
75 75 Tardash Tail 0,190 
57 57 Kole Tail 0.4 
60 60 Tar Tail 0.15 
61 61 Tar Tail 0342 
56 56 Purtari Middle 0.058 
76 76 Tar Tail 0.16 
62 62 Birauto Middle 0.15 
Name, location and area of rice fields using drained water from Thulotar Kulo. 
Nearest 
TIP Field 
Name of Kbet 
Using Drained 
Water 
Tar 
Panchniure 
Birauto 
Atharha 
Tor 
Kanle 
rhirtari 
Birauto 
Birauto 
Tail 
Middle 
Middle 
Middle 
Tail 
Tail 
Middle 
Middle 
Middle 
Tar 
Panchmure 
Birauto 
Aahale 
Kanle 
Thutokhet 
Lamakhet 
Aahale 
Aahale 
2 
0,5 
0.5 
11.2 
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Tab!« 7 Seasonal crap yields In Thulotar. 
Seasonal Crops Yields 
fntt/hal 
Monsoon Rice 
Head 2,07 
Middle 1,76 
Tail 1,5 
Average 1,78 
Winter Crops 
Wheat 1,16 
Potato 2,8 
Mustard 0,08 
Slimmer crop 
Maize 1.55 
Tables' Socto-ecoconuc chararterlsttcs of Thulotar members by caste and farm location. 
BC Members 
Farm Locatl Age school yrs. 
Head 50,16 8,83 
Middle 51,85 8.08 
Tall 51,05 7.81 
Total 51.35 8.06 
OC Members 
Age School yrs. Age 
NA NA NA 
NA NA NA 
42,86 333 66 
42.86 333 66 
Total 
School yrs. Age School yrs. 
NA 50.16 8,83 
NA 51,95 8,08 
3 4831 5,92 
3 49,67 6.82 
Number of Thulotar members' households according to their members' 
orgnnlrattnnal atllliation by types M^ardzation and farm location. 
%age 
Head 3 0 0 3 4,48 
Middle A S 3 10 14.92 
Tall 0 0 7 16 23.88 
Total 16 3 10 29 43.28 
%a(je 23,88 4,48 1 4,92 43.28 4338 
Table 10 Number of Thulotar members' organizational affiliation 
according to their farm location and types of organization. 
Farm Locatl Social Political Both Total %age 
Head 2 1 0 3 4,48 
Middle 4 0 6 10 14,92 
Tall 3 9 7 19 28,36 
Total 9 10 13 32 47,76 
%age 13,43 14,92 19.4 47.76 47,76 
Tabletl Annual non-agricultural cash Income of Thulotar members' liouucboids by 
sources and farm locations (Rs). 
Farm 
Location 
Services 
In 
Nepal 
Service 
Outside 
Nepal 
Other 
Sources 
Total Non-agricultural 
Income 
Head 
Middle 
Tall 
24000 
40000 
24847.37 
20000 
10260,87 
7421,05 
5000 
5182.61 
8544.73 
48000 
51139,13 
69826.31 
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ANNEX-II Socio-Economie Characteristics of Thulotar Members. 
rlerab. Farm Farnlrf Age School Main Farmers 
K& Carte ÇÇ Ls& Name VQs Ses ÏTJ , Degree Profession Inferences Class 
1 Chhetri BC Head Adhikari 63 M 4 Literate Fanner Ex-Poh'ceO) Medium 
3 Brabman BC Head Adhikari 67 M 7 Literate (Elderly) Ex-tarmer Medium 
4 Brahman BC Head Adhikari 39 M 10 Test pass Army(N) Medhrro 
5 Brahman BC Head Adhikari 40 M 10 S.L.C. Farmer Ex-Service Large 
6 Brabroan BC Head Aahikari 49 M 12 LA Teacher Primary School Large 
7 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 60 M 14 B.E. Service Engineer Large 
8 Brahman BC Middle PoudeJ 44 M 10 Test Pass Service Medical Medium 
9 Brahman BC Middle Poudel 48 M 10 Test Pass Farmer Arnii+Ex-service Medium 
10 Brahman BC Middle Poudel 60 M 14 B.E4 Teacher Large 
11 Brahman BC Middle Poudel 29 M 10 S.L.C. Army(N) SmaD 
12 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 73 M 7 Literate (Elderly) Ex-Police Small 
13 Brahman BC Middle Adhikan 74 M 7 Literate (Elderly) Ex-serviceman Large 
14 Chherry BC Middle Adhikari 48 M 14 B.Com. ServicefN) Bank Manager Large 
15 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 68 M 0 Illiterate Farmer Medium 
16 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 34 M 6 Literate Farmer Karmi Small 
17 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 36 M 10 S.L.C. Teacher Primary School SmaD 
18 Brahrnan BC Middle Adhikari 41 F 0 Dherate Farmer (Husband Small 
19 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 45 M 10 Tesrpass Fanner Ex-Teacher Small 
20 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 61 M 7 Literate Fanner Large 
21 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 26 M 12 Madhyama Teacher L.S. School Medium 
22 Brahman BC Tail Poudel 54 M 10 Tesrpass Serviceman Large 
23 Brahman BC Tail Adhikari 53 M 3 Literate Fanner Ex-Police(N) Large 
24 Kami OC Tail Biswokarma 40 M 0 fieterate Farmer Karrrti+Aaran Small 
25 Brahman BC Tail Adhikari 38 M 8 Literate Serviceman Medium 
26 Kami OC Tail Biswokarma 40 M 0 Illiterate Farmer ironwork Medium 
27 Kami OC Tail Biswokarma 32 M 5 Literate Farmer Karmi Small 
28 Brahrnan BC Tail Adhikari 41 M 9 Literate Service Unrversity(N) Medium 
29 Brahman BC Tail Pandit 56 F 3 Literate Fanner Widow Medium 
30 Chhetri BC Tail Adhikari 49 M 7 Literate Farmer Ex-PolicetT) Large 
31 Kami OC Tail Biswokarma 42 F 3 Literate Farmer Small 
32 Kami OC Tail Biswokarma 45 M 8 Literate Serviceman Small 
33 Brahman BC Tail Adlukari 48 M 12 CEd Teaching Primary School Small 
34 Brahman BC Tail Adhikari 39 M 12 I A Teaching Primary School Medium 
38 Gharti Bhujel Tail Bhujel 66 M 3 Literate Farmer Large 
39 Brahman BC Tail Adhikari 44 M 10 S.L.C Fanner Large 
41 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 57 F 0 nitrate Fanner (Widow) Medium 
42 Brahrnan BC Tail Adhikari 74 M 3 Literate Elderly Poltician Large 
43 Brahrnan BC Tail Adhikari 37 M 10 S.L.C. Service Farmer Small 
44 Brahrnan BC Tail Adhikari 58 M 5 Literate Serviceman Fanner Medium 
45 Brahman BC Middle Adhikan 54 M 10 S.L.C Famiei Ex-service Large 
46 Sarki OC Tail Nepali 40 M 2 Literate Fanner Small 
47 Sarki OC Tail Nepali 38 M 0 Illiterate Farmer Kamu Small 
48 Sarki OC Tail Nepali 60 M 0 Illiterate Farmer Dakarmi Small 
49 Sarki OC Tail Nepali 50 F 0 Illiterate Fanner Widow Small 
51 Sarki OC Tail Nepali 33 M 10 S.L.C Former Small 
52 Sarki OC Tail Nepali 43 M 0 Literate Service India Small 
53 Sarki OC Tail Nepali 40 M 2 Literate Farmer Small 
54 Brahrnan BC Tail Adhikari 58 M 7 Literate Sopkeeper Farming Tools SmaD 
55 Brahman BC Tail Adlukari 30 M 12 I.A. PVT. Service Poltician SmaD 
56 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 44 M 12 I.A. Teacher Lower S. School SmaD 
57 Chhetri BC Tail Adhikari 50 M 3 Literate Farmer Ex-ArmyOO Large 
58 Brahman BC Tail Adhikari 43 M 10 S.L.C. Teacher Primary School Medium 
59 Brahman BC Tail Adhikari 59 M 10 S.L.C. Farmer Poltician Medium 
60 Sarki OC Tail Nepali 60 F 0 miterale Farmer Husbandwork SmaD 
61 Chhetri BC Middle Adhikari 63 M 2 Literate Farmer Medium 
62 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 73 M 7 Literate Elderly Large 
63 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 54 M 3 Literate Service Peon SmaD 
64 Brahman BC Tail Adhikari 54 M 10 S.L.C. Teacher Primary School Large 
65 Brahman BC Tail Adhikari 77 M 8 Literate Elderly Large 
66 Brahman BC Middle Adhikari 40 M 14 B.A. Serviceman Co-operative Medium 
67 rrratunan BC Middle Adhikari 63 M 7 Literate Fanner Purohil Large 
68 Kami OC Tail B.K. 40 M 7 Literate Serviced) Small 
69 Brahman BC Tail Adhikari 52 M 7 Literate Servrce SmaD 
71 BC BC Head Adhikari 43 M 10 Test Pass Farmer Large 
74 Brahman BC Tail Adhikari 73 M 3 Literate Elderly Ex-tarmer Large 
75 Brahman BC Tail Pandit 36 M 10 S.L.C. ServioeOI) SmaU 
76 Kami OC Tail B.K. 40 M 7 Literate Semce(I) SmaD 
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ANNEX-TH Socio-Economk Characteristics of Thulotar Members' Households. 
Memo Type of Farm Family No. of No. of HH Member! by Age Farmers 
He, Family cc L2& She Children S o r « S 6 toH X 8 Inferences Class 
l Nuclear EC Head 0 2 0 0 4 0 Medium 
3 Joint Be Head 6 NA 2 0 3 I Medium 
4 Joint Be Head 7 4 0 4 3 0 W/Thuli Aetna Medium 
5 Nucleat Be Head 5 3 1 2 2 Large 
6 Joint Bo Head 6 3 0 1 5 0 W/Kdi Large 
7 Joint Be Middle 10 NA 1 2 7 0 Large 
8 Joint Be Middle 7 4 0 2 4 I W/Mother Medium 
9 Nuclear Be Middle 4 2 I 3 0 Medium 
10 Nuclear Be Middle 6 4 0 1 5 Large 
11 Joint Be Middle 5 2 1 I 2 1 wVAama Small 
12 Nuclear Be Middle 2 NA 0 0 1 1 Small 
13 Joint Be Middle 9 NA 0 1 6 2 Large 
14 Joint Be Middle 10 NA 2 1 6 1 Large 
15 Joint Be Middle 6 NA I 0 4 1 Medium 
16 Nuclear Be Middle 4 2 I 1 2 0 Small 
17 Joint Be Middle 6 3 I 2 2 1 W/Mother Small 
18 Nuclear Be Middle 5 2 0 1 4 0 W/two Wives Small 
19 Nuclear Be Middle 5 3 0 I 4 0 Small 
20 Joint Be Middle 8 NA 1 0 6 1 Large 
21 Joint Be Middle 7 2 2 0 5 0 Medium 
22 Joint Be Tail 10 NA 4 0 6 0 Large 
23 Joint Be Tad 8 NA 2 1 5 0 Large 
24 Nuclear OC Tail 6 4 I 1 4 0 Small 
25 Nuclear BC Tail 4 2 0 2 2 0 Medium 
26 Nuclear OC Tail 3 I 0 I 2 0 Medium 
27 loint OC Tail 5 2 0 2 3 0 W/Mother Small 
28 Nuclear BC Tail 4 2 0 2 2 0 Medium 
29 Joint BC Tail 5 2 0 2 3 0 W/mother Medium 
30 Nuclear BC Tail 7 5 I 3 3 0 Urge 
31 Joint OC Tail 3 0 0 0 3 0 W/Bhanjee Small 
32 Nuclear OC Tail 2 0 0 0 2 0 NochildTen Small 
33 Joint Be Tail 7 NA 2 0 5 0 Small 
34 Nuclear Be Tail 4 2 0 2 2 0 Medium 
38 Joint Brunei Tail 14 NA 3 2 8 I Large 
39 Nuclear Be Tail 7 5 2 3 2 0 Large 
41 Joint Be Middle 4 NA 1 0 3 0 Medium 
42 Joint Be Tail 17 NA 3 1 13 0 Urge 
43 Nuclear Be Toil 5 3 0 3 2 0 Small 
44 Nuclear Be Tail 2 0 0 0 2 0 Medium 
45 Joint Be Middle 7 NA 2 0 S 0 Large 
46 Joint OC Tail 7 4 0 3 3 1 W/Father Small 
47 Nuclear OC Tail 7 5 0 4 3 0 Small 
48 Nuclear OC Tail 2 I 0 0 2 0 Death of wife Small 
49 Joint OC Tail 6 NA 2 0 4 0 Small 
51 Nuclear OC Tad 4 2 0 2 2 0 Small 
52 Joint OC Tail 8 NA I 1 6 0 Small 
53 Joint OC Tail 7 4 0 3 3 I W/Father Smafl 
54 Joint BC Tail 4 NA 0 0 4 0 W/Buhari Small 
55 Nuclear BC Tail 5 2 2 0 3 0 Two Wives Small 
56 Nuclear BC Middle 0 4 1 1 4 0 Small 
57 Joint BC Tail 8 NA 0 1 6 1 Large 
58 Joint BC Tad 6 NA 0 2 4 0 Medium 
59 Joint BC Tail 7 4 1 3 2 1 W/Mother Medium 
60 Joint OC Tail 5 NA 0 1 4 0 Small 
61 Joint BC Middle 0 NA 0 0 0 0 Medium 
62 Joint BC Middle 13 NA 1 5 6 1 Large 
63 Joint BC Middle 8 NA 0 0 8 0 Small 
64 Joint BC Tall 7 NA 0 0 0 1 Large 
65 Joint BC Toil 8 NA 2 2 2 2 Large 
66 Nuclear BC Middle 4 NA 0 1 3 0 Medium 
67 Nuclear BC Middle 2 NA 0 0 2 0 Large 
68 Nuclear OC Tail 0 4 I 3 2 0 Small 
69 Joint BC Tail 7 NA 0 0 7 0 Small 
71 Joint BC Head 11 NA 3 1 7 0 Large 
74 Joint BC Tail 5 NA 1 0 2 2 Large 
75 Nuclear BC Tail 5 3 0 3 2 0 Small 
76 Nuclear Oc Tad 0 4 1 3 2 0 Small 
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ANNEX- IV Number of Thulotar Household Members According to Their Professions. 
Employed 
Farm Menu). Employed Otrrstde Pensioner Farmers 
ÇÇ Loc, Mdenta Farmers to Nepal Nepal & Farmer Inferences Class 
BC Head 1 1 1 0 1 1 Indian Arniy Medium 
BC Head 3 1 2 1 0 0 Medium 
BC Head 4 4 2 0 1 0 Indian Army Medium 
BC Head 5 2 2 0 0 0 Large 
BC Head 6 3 2 1 0 0 Teacher Large 
BC Middle 7 3 0 3 0 0 Multiple Large 
BC Middle 8 4 1 I 0 0 Health Medium 
BC Middle 9 2 2 0 0 0 EX'Teacher Medium 
BC Middle 10 3 1 2 0 0 Multiple Large 
BC Middle 11 2 0 1 0 0 Small 
BC Middle 12 0 1 0 0 0 Ex-Police Small 
BC Middle 13 4 2 2 0 0 Ex-service Large 
BC Middle 14 2 3 2 0 1 Large 
BC Middle 15 0 2 0 2 0 bid. service Medium 
BC Middle Id 1 2 0 0 0 Kami-1 Small 
BC Middle 17 2 1 I 0 0 Small 
BC Middle 18 2 I 2 0 0 (HMOPvt) Small 
BC Middle 19 3 2 1 0 0 Pvtservice Small 
BC Middle 20 1 3 1 0 0 Private Large 
BC Middle 21 1 2 2 0 0 Teacher Medium 
BC Tail 22 0 2 A 0 0 Multiple Large 
BC Tail 23 4 2 0 0 I Wx-PoBce Large 
OC Tad 24 1 4 0 0 0 Disabled Small 
BC TaQ 25 2 I 1 0 0 Court Medium 
OC Tail 2d 1 2 0 0 0 Medium 
OC Tad 27 2 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tad 28 2 1 1 0 0 TU Medium 
BC Tail 29 2 1 0 0 0 Medium 
BC Tatt 30 4 0 0 0 Large 
OC Tail 31 1 1 0 0 0 lCTrade) Smalt 
OC Tail 32 0 1 1 0 0 Put Small 
BC Tail 33 0 2 0 0 Multiple Small 
BC Tail 34 2 1 1 0 0 Teacher Medium 
Bbujel Tad 38 4 I 1 0 Indian Army Urge 
BC Tail 39 4 1 I 0 0 Health Large 
BC Middle 41 0 1 0 1 0 Ind-Pvt. Medium 
BC Tail 42 3 0 0 0 Multiple Large 
BC Tail 43 3 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tad 44 0 1 1 0 0 School staff Medium 
BC Middle 45 1 1 4 0 0 Multiple Large 
OC Tail 46 4 1 0 0 0 Small 
OC Tail 47 4 0 0 0 Small 
OC Tail 48 1 1 0 0 0 Small 
OC Tail 49 1 1 I 0 0 Teacher Small 
OC Tail 51 2 0 0 0 1 Ex-teacher Small 
OC Tad 52 3 1 0 1 0 Pvt India Small 
OC Tail 53 4 1 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tail 54 0 1 0 0 ! (Trade! Small 
BC Tad 55 0 I 1 0 0 Pvt. Small 
BC Middle 56 4 1 1 0 0 Lower Small 
BC Tail 57 3 0 0 0 I Ex- Large 
BC Tail 58 3 I 2 0 0 Multiple Medium 
BC Tad 59 3 I 1 0 0 Teacher Medium 
OC Tail 60 I 3 0 1 0 Pvt India Small 
BC Middle 61 1 3 1 1 0 NPLdhdArmy Medium 
BC Middle 62 6 3 2 0 0 1 (Ex- Large 
BC Middle 63 2 2 2 1 0 India PVt+ Small 
BC Tail 64 3 2 2 0 0 Multiple Large 
BC Tad 65 3 2 I 0 0 Tourism Large 
BC Middle 66 2 1 1 0 0 Food Medium 
BC Middle 67 0 2 0 0 0 Large 
OC Tail 68 4 1 0 1 0 Pvt Small 
BC Taj 69 2 3 2 0 0 Small 
BC Head 71 I 4 1 0 0 Army Large 
BC Tail 74 1 0 2 0 0 2 Teacher Large 
BC Tad 75 3 1 1 0 0 Tourism Small 
OC Tad 76 4 1 0 1 0 Pvt Small 
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ANNEX-V Annual Cash Income of Thulotar Members' Households from Agricultural Sources (Rs). 
Animal/Bird 
Farm Memo. Lowland Other irheh- Total Agri. Farmers 
ÇÇ Let No, Rice Grains Prodact* Income Inferences Classes 
BC Head 1 0 0 2500 1500 Goat Medium 
BC Head 3 0 0 0 0 0 Medium 
BC Head 4 2500 0 300 1800 Medium 
BC Head 5 2500 600 0 3.100 Large 
BC Head 6 0 300 0 300 Large 
BC Middle 7 8000 2400 0 10.400 Large 
BC Middle 11 0 500 7000 7.500 Goat Medium 
BC Middle 9 0 0 0 0 Medium 
BC Middle 10 0 1200 0 1200 Potato Large 
BC Middle 11 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Middle 12 0 300 0 300 Small 
BC Middle 13 2500 0 0 2500 Large 
BC Middle 14 0 250 0 250 Large 
BC Middle 15 0 0 10000 10.000 Buffalo Medium 
BC Middle 16 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Middle 17 0 750 0 750 Small 
BC Middle 18 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Middle 19 0 1500 2000 3500 [W/ Pulse. Banana & Buflalo Small 
BC Middle 20 0 0 0 0 0 Large 
BC Middle 21 0 1650 2400 4050 Goat Medium 
BC Tail 22 0 1800 9000 10.800 Buffalo Large 
BC Tail 23 0 0 0 0 Large 
OC Tail 24 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tail 25 0 0 0 0 Medium 
OC Tad 26 0 0 1600 1600 Pig Medium 
OC Tail 27 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tail 28 0 2400 10.600 13000 (ghee+milk) Medium 
BC Tail 29 0 1600 0 1600 W/Orange700 Medium 
BC Tail 30 4000 0 2000 6000 (ghee,chicken) Large 
OC Tail 31 0 0 16000 16000 Buftalo Small 
OC Tail 32 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tail 33 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tail 34 0 1200 1100 2300 Buflalo Medium 
Btmjel Tad 38 0 0 10500 10500 Buffalo Large 
BC Tail 39 3500 1200 2200 6900 Oxen Large 
BC Middle 41 0 1050 0 1050 w7Putse300 Medium 
BC Tail 42 0 0 0 0 Large 
BC Tad 43 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tail 44 0 0 0 0 Medium 
BC Middle 45 0 750 7000 7750 Buffalo Large 
OC Tail 46 0 0 0 0 Small 
OC Tail 47 0 0 0 0 Small 
OC Tail 48 0 0 0 0 Small 
OC Tail 49 0 0 0 0 Small 
OC Tail 51 0 0 0 0 Small 
OC Tail 52 0 0 0 0 Small 
OC Tail 53 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tad 54 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tail 55 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Middle 56 0 500 600 1100 Ghee W/Vegetables 200 Small 
BC Tail 57 0 900 0 0 Large 
BC Tad 58 0 0 0 0 Medium 
BC Tail 59 0 0 0 0 Medium 
OC Tad 60 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Middle 61 0 0 0 0 Medium 
BC Middle 62 0 1800 0 1800 Large 
BC Middle 63 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tail 64 3200 1200 0 4400 large 
BC Tail 65 0 1200 0 1200 Large 
BC Middle 66 0 360 0 360 Medium 
BC Middle 67 2500 1800 0 4300 Large 
OC Tail 68 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Tail 69 0 0 0 0 Small 
BC Head 71 0 0 0 0 Large 
BC Tail 74 100 300 0 1300 Large 
BC Tail 75 0 0 0 0 Small 
OC Tad 76 0 0 0 0 Small 
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A n n e x - V I A n n u a l C a s h I n c o m e o f T h u l o t a r M e m b e r s ' Households f r o m A g r i c u l t u r a l S o u r c e s ( R s . ) 
Etnpyt Kmpyt Other Annual Incomes 
Farm Mem lustde Outside Farmers 
cc L o c e& Nenal Nepal Amount; Sources Total Inferences Class, 
B C Head i 36000 0 24000 Pension 60000 (Indian Army) Medhtrn 
BC Head 3 30000 0 0 Purohit 30000 Multiple Medium 
BC Head 4 0 120000 0 120000 Multiple Medium 
BC Head 5 0 0 0 0 Large 
BC Head 6 30000 0 0 30000 Teaching Large 
BC Middle 7 166000 0 0 166000 (multiple) Large 
B C Middle 8 29000 0 0 29000 Medium 
BC Middle 9 0 0 5000 KarmRPurohit 5000 Medium 
B C Middle 10 84000 0 0 84000 Large 
B C Middle 11 38000 0 0 38000 Small 
B C Middle 12 0 21000 Pension 21000 Small 
B C Middts 13 57000 0 0 57000 Large 
B C Middle 14 90000 0 16000 (Pension-lnd) 106000 Large 
B C Middle 15 0 0 60000 Pension-bid 60000 Medium 
B C Middle 16 0 0 10000 Katmi 10000 Small 
BC Middle 17 28000 0 0 28000 Teaching Small 
B C Middle IS 57000 0 0 57000 HMOServ. Small 
BC Middle 19 24000 0 7000 Purohil 31000 Pvt. Serv. Small 
BC Middle 20 36000 0 100 Purohit 36100 Large 
B C Middle 21 40000 0 0 40000 Teaching & Medium 
B C Tail 22 100000 0 0 lOOOOO Large 
B C Tan 23 0 0 25000 Pension 25000 Ex-police Large 
OC Tall 24 0 0 2000 Aaran 2000 Small 
BC Tail 25 26000 0 0 26000 Medium 
OC Tafl 26 0 0 500 Aaran 500 Medium 
OC Tail 27 0 0 2000 Wage Labor 2000 Small 
B C Tafl 28 24000 0 0 24000 Medium 
B C Tail 29 28000 0 0 28000 Medium 
B C Tail 30 0 170000 400000 Penaton+MUl 570000 Ex-police Large 
OC Tail 31 0 0 180000 Business 180000 Selling chieken Small 
OC Tail 32 24000 0 0 24000 Private job Small 
B C Tail 33 610000 0 5000 Purohit 615000 Small 
BC Tail 34 28000 0 0 28000 Medium 
Bbtrjet Tail 36 36000 65000 0 101000 Large 
BC Tail 39 33000 0 0 33000 Large 
BC Middle 41 0 36000 0 36000 Corporate service Medium 
BC Tail 42 186000 0 u 186000 U r g e 
BC Tail 43 2500 0 0 2500 Small 
BC Tafl 44 4000 0 500 Purohit 4500 Medium 
BC Middle 45 64000 0 0 64000 Large 
OC Tafl 46 0 0 10000 Karnri 10000 Small 
OC Tafl 47 0 0 4000 Kanrn 4000 Small 
OC Tail 48 0 0 500C Karrru 5000 Small 
OC Tafl 49 28000 0 0 28.000 Small 
OC Tail 51 0 0 500C Kama* 5000 Small 
OC Tail 52 0 50000 0 50000 Small 
O C Tail S3 0 0 10000 Karnri 10000 Small 
BC Tafl 54 2500 0 14000 Trade+Medical 16500 Health worker Small 
BC Tail 55 28000 0 24000 Private Service 52000 Small 
BC Middle 56 36000 0 0 36000 Teaching Small 
BC Tail 57 22000 0 600 Elderly allowance 22600 Large 
BC Tail 58 64000 0 0 64000 Medium 
BC Tail 59 28000 0 36000 64000 Medium 
OC Tail 60 0 30000 0 JOOOO Pvt Serv. hid. SmaLt 
B C Middle 61 9000 50000 0 59000 Medium 
B C Middle 62 96000 0 0 96000 Large 
BC Middle 63 42000 15000 0 57000 Small 
B C Tail 64 64000 0 0 64000 Large 
BC Tafl 65 27200 0 1600 Purohit+Jyotish 28800 Large 
BC Middle 66 60000 0 0 60000 Medium 
BC Middle 67 0 0 100 Purohit 100 Large 
O C Tail 68 0 60000 0 60000 Private job in Ind. Small 
BC Tafl 69 44000 0 0 44000 Small 
BC Head 71 48000 0 0 48000 Large 
BC Tail 74 56000 0 0 56UO0 Large 
BC Tafl 75 28000 0 0 28000 Small 
OC Tail 76 0 60000 0 6ÛU00 Private job in Ind. Small 
2 2 0 
A N N E X - V H T h e T y p e a n d Size o f T h u l o t a r M e m b e r s ' L a n d . 
Farm Memo. KhetW/I Khet Out- Total Cultivated Kharbarl Jungle Total Pakbo Total Farmers 
££ Lgc. T I P ma* side dial K a r t Pakno fba. (ha. (na. fUDtand. bal Land (aal Class 
BC Head 1 0^628 0,1564 0.5192 0,0564 0.0064 0 0.0628 0,562 Medium 
BC Head 3 0,0918 0.3868 0,4786 0.2856 0,065 0 0.3506 0.7374 Medium 
BC Head 4 0.2628 0.5596 0,8224 0.0064 0.0128 0 0.0192 0.84)6 Medium 
BC Head 5 0,2628 0,6628 0,9256 0.15 0.08128 0 0.1628 1.0884 Large 
BC Head 6 0,3522 0,2096 0,8114 0.3666 0.0826 0 0.4492 1.261 Large 
BC Middle 7 1.0256 0.25 1.2756 0.75 0.1 0.9 1.75 3.0256 Large 
BC Middle 8 1.532 0 0.1532 0.25 0.1 0 0.35 0.5032 Medium 
BC Middle 9 0.25 0,25 0.5 0,25 0.1 0,05 0.4 0.9 Medium 
BC Middle 10 0.3756 0.75 1,1256 0.25 0 0 0.25 1.3756 Large 
BC Middle 11 0,177 0.0546 0.2316 0.1962 0 0 0.1962 0.4278 Small 
BC Middle 12 0,2628 0 0.2628 0,1064 0 0 0.1064 0.3692 Small 
BC Middle 13 0,982 u 2,382 0,3 0 0 3,3 2.682 targe 
BC Middle 14 0,6858 0,7724 1,5582 0,5998 0.1678 0 0.7676 23258 Large 
BC Middle IS 0.25 0.2 0,45 0,1 0.05 0 0.15 0.6 Medhmt 
BC Middle 16 0.2528 0 0,2528 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.3528 Small 
BC Middle 17 0,3192 0 0,3192 0.1262 0.0064 0.003 0.1358 0.455 Small 
BC Middle 18 0,1596 0 0,1569 0.1262 0,0064 0.0032 0,1358 0,2954 Small 
BC Middle 19 0.2134 0 0.2134 0.1262 0.0064 0.0032 0.1358 0.3492 Small 
BC Middle 20 0.6OO2 0.35 0,9502 0.8502 0.1662 0 1.0164 1.9666 Large 
BC Middle 21 0.403 0 0,403 0.4094 0.0628 0.0128 0.484 0.887 Medium 
BC Tsfl 22 0.25 0,1756 0.4256 0.65 0 0 0.65 1.0756 Large 
BC Tail 23 0.3364 0.4324 0,7688 0.9444 0.0038 0 0.9482 1.717 Large 
OC Tail 24 0,1618 0 0.1618 0.12 0 0 0.12 0.2818 Small 
BC Tea 25 0,432 0,032 0,464 0.132 0 0 0.132 0.596 Medium 
OC Tail 26 0,2965 0.0836 0.3801 0.28 0 0 0,28 0.6601 Medium 
OC Tan 27 0,15 0 0.15 0.15 0 0 0.15 0.3 Small 
BC Toa 28 0,2108 0 0,2108 0,408 '0 0 0.408 0.6188 Medium 
BC Tafl 29 0,4442 0 0,4442 0.286 0 0 0,286 0.7302 Medium 
BC Taa 30 0.2542 1,1712 1,4254 0.2538 0.2298 0 0.4836 1.909 Large 
OC Tail 31 0,1608 0 0.1608 0.078 0 0 0.078 0.2388 Small 
OC Tea 32 0,1608 0 0.1608 0,078 0 0 0.078 0.2388 Small 
BC Tail 33 0,222 0.6226 0,8446 03364 0.01 0 0.3464 0.191 Small 
BC Tafl 34 0,1476 0,083 0,2306 0.557 0 0 0.557 0.7876 Medium 
Bhojel Tafl 38 0,45 0.6224 0,0724 0.6 0.15 0 0.75 1.8224 Large 
BC Tai l , 39 0.6 0,35 0.95 0.15 0.05 0.1 0.3 1.25 Large 
BC Middle 41 0. 1500 0 0.15 0.5 0 0.007 0.567 0.6564 Medium 
BC Tail 42 0.3256 0.45 0.7756 0.25 0.25 1.25 1.75 1.5356 Large 
BC Tafl 43 0,1256 0.032 U.1576 0.1 0 I) 0.1 0.2576 Small 
BC Tafl 44 0.3256 0 0.3256 0.15 0.1 0 0.25 0.5756 Medium 
BC Middle 45 0.5042 0.2202 0.7244 0.4736 0.3396 0 0.8132 1.5376 Large 
OC Tafl 4 « 0,1216 0 0.1216 0.2506 0 0 0.2506 0.3722 Small 
OC Tail 47 0,2 0 0,2 0.1342 0 0 0.1342 0.3342 Small 
OC Tafl 48 0.1256 0 0.1256 0.2762 0 0 0.2762 0.4018 Small 
OC Tsfl 49 0.1256 0 0.1256 0,1102 0 0 0,1102 0.2358 Small 
OC Tafl 51 0.1216 0 0,1216 0.2506 0 0 0.2506 0,3722 Small 
OC Tail 52 0.1216 0 0,12)6 0.25O6 0 0 0.2506 03722 Small 
OC Tail 53 0,1216 0 0,1216 0.2506 0 0 0.2506 0.3722 Small 
BC Tail 54 0,2564 0 0,2564 0.0756 0 0 0.0756 0.332 Small 
BC Tafl 55 0,15 0 0.15 0.0408 0 0 0.0408 0.1908 Small 
BC Middle 56 0,0578 0,02 0.2578 0,1 0.1 0 0.2 0.4578 Small 
BC Tail 57 0.4 0,3 0,7 0.3 0 0 0.3 1 Large 
BC Tafl 58 0.0884 0.65 0.7384 0.1 0.05 0 0.15 0.8884 Medium 
BC Tail 59 0.1 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.2 0.1 0.55 0.8 Medium 
OC Tafl 60 0,15 0 0.15 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.4 Small 
BC Middle 61 0,3412 0.222 0.5626 0.2528 0.087 0 0.34 0.9026 Medium 
BC Middle 62 0,15 0.15 1.65 1.279 0 0 1.279 2.929 Large 
BC Middle 63 0,2164 0 0,2164 0.15 0 0 0.15 0.3664 Small 
BC Tail 64 0,75 0,25 1 0.25 0,25 0 0.5 1.5 Large 
BC Tail 65 0,6 0 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.2 Large 
BC Middle 66 0.3 0 0.3 0.05 0,2 0.05 0.3 0.6 Medium 
BC Middle 67 0.1682 0.726 0.8936 0.609 0 0 0.609 1.5026 Large 
OC Tail 68 0.1596 0.112 0.271 0.1072 0 0 0.1072 0.3782 Small 
BC Tafl 69 0.15 0 0.15 0.05 0 0 0.05 0.2 Small 
BC Head 71 0.35 0.55 0.9 0.25 0.2 0 0.45 1.35 Large 
BC Ttril 74 0.2718 1,626 1.8974 0.2656 0 0 0.2656 2.163 Large 
BC Tafl 75 0.1956 0 0.1956 0.1436 0 0 0.1436 0.2392 Small 
OC Tafl 76 0.1596 0.112 0.271 0.1072 0 0 0.1072 0.3782 Small 
Total 19,8547 14,1424 3 3 J 0 3 17,8082 3.55008 2,5792 26,9284 36,0833 
Large farmers^ Land size 0.95 or larger. 
Middle rarmers=aLand size between 0.5 to 0.95 
Small farmers^ Land size below 0.5 
221 
ANNEX-VUI The Type and Size of Land Tenancy Given Out by Thulotar Members. 
Typo of Location Membership Landlord-
Farm Mem Typeof Land of Land of Tenant Caste of Tenant Farmers 
c c Loc 5!& Tenancy Given Ont Given In TIP Tenant Social Ties Class 
BC Head l Not given out None None None None None Medium 
BC Head 3 Adhiya Khet W/.TIP TIP Member OC Non-relative Medium 
BC Head 4 Not given out None None None None None Medium 
BC Head 5 Not given out None None None None None Large 
BC Head 6 Not given out None None None None None Large 
BC Middle 7 Adhiya Khet&Pakho Both Non-Member BC+OCs Non-relative Large 
BC Middle 8 Not given out None None None None None Medium 
BC Middle 9 Pledge Khet Outside TIP Non-Member BC Non-relative Medium 
BC Middle 10 Adhiya Khet Both Non-Member BC+aH castes Non-relative Large 
BC Middle 11 Adhrya+Pledge Khet&Pakho Both TIP Member BC Relative Small 
BC Middle 12 Adhiya+ Pledge Khet&Pakho Both Non-Member BC+aD castes Non-relative Small 
BC Middle 13 Adhiya Khet Both Non-Member BC+au castes Non-relative Large 
BC Middle 14 Adhiya Khet W/iTlP TIP Member OC Non-relative Large 
BC Middle 15 Not given out None None None None None Medium 
BC Middle 16 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Middle 17 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Middle 18 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Middle 19 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Middle 20 Adhiya Pakho Outside TIP TIP Member OC Non-relative Large 
BC Middle 21 Not given out None None None None None Medium 
BC Tafl 22 Not given out None None None None None Large 
BC Tail 23 Adhiya Khet&Pakho Both Non-Member BC+OC+all cas tes Non-relative Large 
OC Tafl 24 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Tail 25 Not given out None None None None None Medium 
OC Tail 26 Not given out None None None None None Medium 
OC Tail 27 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Tail 28 Adhiya Pakho Outside TIP Non-Member BC Non-relative Medium 
BC Tail 29 Not given out None None None None None Medium 
BC Tafl 30 Adhiya Khet WflTIP TIP Member OC Non-relative Large 
OC Tail 31 Pledge Pakho Outside TIP Non-Member OC Non-relative Small 
OC Tail 32 Pledge Khet&Pakho Both Both types BC+OCs Non-relative SmaQ 
BC Tail 33 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Tail 34 Pledge Khet&Pakho Outside TIP Non-Member OC Non-relative Medium 
Bhujel Tail 38 Contract Khet W/iTIP Non-Member OC Non-relative Large 
BC Tafl 39 Adhiya Khet W/iTIP TIP Member BC Relative Large 
BC Middle 41 Not given out None None None None None Medium 
BC Tail 42 Adhiya Khet Both Both types OC Non-relative Large 
BC Tail 43 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Tail 44 Adhiya Pakho Outside TIP Non-Member Other castes Non-relative Medium 
BC Middle 45 Not given out None None None None None Large 
OC Tail 46 Not given out None None None None Small 
OC Tail 47 Not given out None None None None None Small 
OC Tail 48 Not given out None None None None None Small 
OC Tail 49 Not given out None None None None None Small 
OC Tail 51 Not given out None None None None None Small 
OC Tail 52 Not given out None None None None None Small 
OC Tail 53 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Tail 54 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Tail 55 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Middle 56 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Tail 57 Not given out None None None None None Large 
BC Tail 58 Not given out None None None None None Medium 
BC Tail 59 Adhiya Khet & Pakho W/iTIP/Outside TIP Member BC+aD castes Non-relative Medium 
OC Tafl 60 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Middle 61 Not given out None None None None None Medium 
BC Middle 62 Not given out None None None None None Large 
BC Middle 63 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Tail 64 Not given out None None None None None Large 
BC Tail 65 Not given out None None None None None Large 
BC Middle 66 Not given out None None None None None Medium 
BC Middle 67 Not given out None None None None None Large 
OC Tail 6S Not given out None None None None Small 
BC Tail 69 Not given out None None None None None Small 
BC Head 71 Not given out None None None None None Large 
BC Tail 74 Adhiya Khet W/iTIP TIP Member BC Relative Large 
BC Tail 75 Not given out None None None None None Small 
OC Tail 76 Not given out None None None None None Small 
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ANNEX-IX Type and Frequency of Thulotar Members' Organizational Affiliation. 
Type of No, of Status Max. Perd Cottectfve 
Fatm Mam AfRd. Affid. Functional of of Cont Tenure of Farmers 
cc Lac m± Oram. Qrazpj TvBeofAfa Afro, AfttfYrsl AfnfYrs. Class 
BC Head i None None None 0 0 Medium 
BC Head 3 None None None 0 0 Medium 
BC Head 4 None None None 0 0 Medium 
BC Head 5 Social 2 Executive] Ex-Member 5 10 Large 
BC Head 6 Social 2 Membed Working 15 20 Large 
BC Middle 7 None 0 None None 0 0 Large 
BC Middle 8 None None None 0 0 Medium 
BC Middle 9 None None None 0 0 Medium 
BC Middle to Social 1 Membed Working 7 0 Large 
BC Middle 11 None None None 0 0 Small 
BC Middle 12 None None None 0 0 Small 
BC Middle 13 Both 2 Member] Both 7 9 Large 
BC Middle 14 Social Member! Wwking 2 0 Large 
BC Middle 15 None None None 0 0 Medium 
BC Middle 16 None None None 0 0 Small 
BC Middle 17 Both 3 Membed Working 7 19 Small 
BC Middle 18 Both 2 Member! Wwking 7 14 Small 
BC Middle 19 Both 2 Member) Wwking 7 10 Small 
BC Middle 20 Both 2 Member! Working 5 10 Large 
BC Middle 21 Both 6 Executivel+Memberl Both 5 17 Medium 
BC Tail 22 Social 3 Membed Both 32 38 Large 
BC Tail 23 None None None 0 0 Large 
CC Tad 24 None None None 0 0 Small 
BC Tad 25 None None None 0 0 Medium 
OC Tad 26 None None None 0 0 Medium 
CC Tail 27 Political 1 Member! Working 2 0 Small 
BC Tail 28 Both 2 Member) Both 27 29 Medium 
BC Tall 29 None None None 0 0 Medium 
BC Tad 30 Both 7 Member! Both 15 25 Large 
CC Tad 31 Political 1 Member! Woiking 7 0 Small 
OC Tad 32 None None None 0 0 Small 
BC Tad 33 Both 2 Member! Both 34 42 Small 
BC Tail 34 Both 4 Member] Both 16 30 Medium 
Bhuje] Tad 38 None None None 0 0 Large 
BC Tad 39 Both 5 Memberl Both 19 4o Large 
BC Middle 41 None None None 0 0 Medium 
BC Tad 42 Both 6 Memberl Both 35 100 Large 
BC Tad 43 Political 1 Memberl Working 7 0 SmaU 
BC Tad 44 None None None 0 0 Medium 
BC Middle 45 None None None 0 0 Large 
OC Tad 46 None None None 0 0 Small 
OC Tad 47 Political 1 Memberl Working 18 0 SmaU 
OC Tad 48 None None None 0 0 Small 
OC Tad 49 Social 2 Memberl Working 7 8 Small 
OC Tad 51 Political 1 Memberl Working 10 0 Small 
OC Tad 52 Political 1 Memberl Working 2 3 Small 
OC Tad 53 None None None 0 0 Small 
BC Tad 54 None None None 0 0 Small 
BC Tad 55 Political 1 Membed Working 7 0 Small 
BC Middle 56 Social 1 Memberl Working 15 0 Small 
BC Tad 57 None None None 0 0 Large 
BC Tad 58 None None None 0 0 Medium 
BC Tad 59 Both 7 Membed Both 19 46 Medium 
OC Tad 60 Political 2 Memberl Working 5 6 Small 
BC Middle 61 None None None 0 0 Medium 
BC Middle 62 None None None 0 0 Large 
BC Middle 63 None None None 0 0 Small 
BC Tad 64 Social 1 Member. Working 20 0 Large 
BC Tad 65 None None None 0 0 Large 
BC Middle 66 Social I Memberl Working 7 0 Medium 
BC Middle 67 None None None 0 0 Large 
OC Tad 68 None None None 0 Small 
BC Tad 69 None None None a a Small 
BC Head 71 Political 1 Member] Working 7 Û Large 
BC Tad 74 None None 0 None 0 0 Large 
BC Tad 75 Political 1 Memberl Working 7 0 Small 
OC Tail 76 None None None 0 0 Small 
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ANNEX - X Type and Frequency of Organizational Affiliation of Other Members in 
Thulotar Members' Households. 
No. of Funtui Current Max. Tenure Couecuve 
Farm Memo. Type of Alttd. Type of Status of Continuons Tenure of Farmers 
ÇÇ U& Ko. AfTtn. Onto. Affln. of Ann. Affiliation Affiliation Class 
BC Head 1 Social 1 Membet Current 1 Medium 
BC Head 3 None None None 0 Medium 
BC Head 4 None None None 0 Medium 
BC Head 5 None None Norte 0 Large 
BC Head 6 Social 3 Both Both 7 7 Large 
BC Middle 7 Political 1 Member Current 7 Large 
BC Middle 8 None None None 0 Medium 
BC Middle 9 None None None 0 Medium 
BC Middle ID Social 1 Member EX-Member 10 Large 
BC Middle 11 None None None 0 Smad 
BC Middle 12 None None None 0 Small 
BC Middle 13 Social 1 Member EX-Member 8 Large 
BC Middle 14 None Norte None 0 Large 
BC Middle 15 None None None 0 Medium 
BC Middle Id None None None 0 Small 
BC Middle 17 None None None 0 Small 
BC Middle 18 Both 2 Member Current 7 14 Small 
BC Middle 19 Social 1 Member Current 4 Small 
BC Middle 20 Both 2 Both Both 13 20 Large 
BC Middle 21 Both 2 Both Current 13 15 Medium 
BC Tad 22 Both 2 Both Both 13 20 Large 
BC Tad 23 Social 1 Member Current 13 Large 
OC Tad 24 None None None 0 Smell 
BC Tail 25 None None None 0 Medium 
OC Tail 26 Social 1 Member Current 6 Medium 
OC Tail 27 None None None 0 Smad 
BC Tad 28 None None None 0 Medium 
BC Tad 29 Both 2 Both Current 13 25 Medium 
BC Tad 30 None None None 0 Large 
OC Tad 31 Social 1 Member Current 1 Smad 
OC Tad 32 None None None 0 Small 
BC Tail 33 None None None 0 Small 
BC Tad 34 Both 2 Both Current 13 20 Medium 
Bhujel Tail 38 None None None 0 l-arge 
BC Tad 39 None None None 0 Large 
BC Middle 41 Political 1 Member Current 7 Medium 
BC Tad 42 None None None 0 Large 
BC Tad 43 None None None 0 Small 
BC Tad 44 None None None 0 Medium 
BC Middle 45 None None None 0 Large 
OC Tad 4« None None None 0 Small 
OC Tad 47 None None None 0 Small 
OC Tad 48 Social 1 Member Current 2 Smad 
OC Tad 49 Social 1 Member Current 18 SmaU 
OC Tad 51 None None None 0 SmaU 
OC Tad 52 Social 1 Member Current 2 Small 
OC Tail 53 None None None 0 SmaU 
BC Tad 54 Both 2 Both Both ' 13 Small BC Tad 55 None None None 0 Small 
BC Middle S6 None None None 0 Small 
BC Tad 57 None None None 0 Large 
BC Tad 58 Both 2 Member Current 7 12 Medium 
BC Tad 59 Social I Member Current I Medium 
OC Tad 60 Social 1 Member EX-Member 5 SmaU 
BC Middle 61 None None None 0 Medium 
BC Middle 62 Political 1 Member Current 15 Large 
BC Middle 63 None None None Q SmaU 
BC Tad 64 Both 2 Member Both 13 17 Large 
BC Tad 65 Social 2 Member Both 7 10 Large 
BC Middle 66 Social I Member Current 3 Medium 
BC Middle 67 None Norte None 0 Large 
OC Tad 68 None None None (J SmaU 
BC Tad 69 None None None • 0 Snndl BC Head 71 Social 1 Member Current 13 Large 
BC Tad 74 Both 2 Member Both 3 Large 
BC Tad 75 None None None 0 SmaU 
OC Tad 76 None None None 0 SmaU 
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ANNEX - XI The Type and Frequency of Thulotar Members' Social Networks. 
Memb. 
No. Type of Network 
1 Blood+Marriage 
3 Blood+Marriage 
4 Blood or Brotherhood 
5 Blood or Brotherhood 
6 Bfood+SbriOTt+H&li 
7 Blood+Tenant 
8 Blood+Marriage+ Student 
9 Blood+Marriage 
10 Student+Tenant 
11 Blood+Marriage 
12 Blood or Brotherhood 
13 Blood+ Marriage+Tenaru 
14 Kood+Marriage+Tenant+Mit 
15 Blood+Tenant 
16 Blood or Brotherhood 
17 Blood+Marriage+Teacher 
18 Blood+Marriage 
19 Kood+Marriage 
20 Blood+ Marriage+Tenarrl+ Mit 
21 Blood+ Mairiage+Teacher+Landlord 
22 Blood or Brotherhood 
23 Blood or Brotherhood 
24 Blood or Brotherhood 
25 Blood or Brotherhood 
26 Blood or Brotherhood 
27 Blood or Brotherhood 
28 Blood+Marrioge+ Student+Teriant 
29 BIcod+Marriage 
30 Blood+Hali 
31 Blood+Marriage 
32 Blood or Brotherhood 
33 Blood or Brotherhood 
34 Blood+Teruml+Studem+Hali 
38 Mood+Marriage+Tenant 
39 BlCrOd+Marriage+Tenant 
41 Blood+Marriage+Mit 
42 Blood+Tenant+Hali 
43 Blood or Brotherhood 
44 Blood or Brotherhood 
45 BIood+ Marrmge+Stud^+Tenant+Hali 
46 Blood or Brotherhood 
47 Blood+Mit 
48 Blood+Mit 
49 Blood+Mit 
51 Blood or Brotherhood 
52 Blood or Brotherhood 
53 Blood or Brotherhood 
54 Blood+Marriage 
55 Blood+Mamage 
56 Blood or Brotherhood 
57 Blood or Brotherhood 
58 None 
59 Blood+Student 
60 None 
61 Blood or Brotherhood 
62 Blood or Brotherhood 
63 Blood or Brotherhood 
64 Blood+Mamage+Student 
65 Blood or Brotherhood 
66 Blood or Brotherhood 
67 Blood or Brotherhood 
68 Marriage 
69 Blood+ Mamage+Tenant 
71 Blood+Mamage* Student 
74 Biood+Marrmge+Mit 
75 Blood+Marriage 
76 Marriage 
No. of Related 
Hh» Related FamPyNaroee 
3 Brahman 
9 Brahman 
20 Brahman 
20 Brahman 
9 Brahmarr^Occupational Caste+Other 
9 Bnuinuin+C^upabcmal Caste+Other 
33 Brahman 
25 Btahman 
18 Bnuunan+Occupatiorial Caste+Other 
7 Brahman 
5 Brahman 
1) Brahman 
10 Brarunan+OccupatMMial Caste+Other 
2 Brahman 
1 Brahman 
15 Brahman 
13 Brahman 
13 Brahman 
10 Brarmwi+Occupational Caste+Other 
20 Brahman 
1 Brahman 
2 Brahman 
3 Occupational Castes Only 
3 Brahman 
4 Occupational Castes Only 
4 Occupational Castes Only 
15 Brahman+ Occupational Caste+Other 
22 Brahman 
6 Brahman+Occupational Caste+Other 
2 Occupational Castes Only 
4 Occupational Castes Only 
1 Brahman 
6 Brahman+Occupational Caste+Other 
b Brahman 
6 Brahman 
15 Bralinian+Occupational Caste+Other 
o Brahman+Occupational Caste+Other 
3 Brahman 
4 Brahman 
15 Brahmon+Occupational Caste+Other 
3 Occupational Castes Only 
5 Brahman+Occupational Caste+Other 
5 Brahman+Occupational Caste+Other 
5 Brahman+Occupationa Caste+Other 
3 Occupational Castes Only 
3 Occupational Castes Only 
3 Occupational Castes Only 
8 Brahman 
9 Brahman 
3 Brahman 
7 Brahman 
0 None 
3 Brahman 
0 None 
2 Brahman 
6 Brahman 
6 Brahman 
15 Brahman 
6 Brahman 
13 Brahman 
6 Brahman 
4 Occupational Castes Only 
11 Brahman 
7 Brahman 
7 Brahman 
22 Brahman 
4 Occupational Castes Only 
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ANNEX - XII Farmers* Names, Their Field Names and Location within Thulotar. 
Memb.No. Farmer Name Field Name Location 
1 Agan Bar. Adhikari Chahse Head 
3 Narayan Drdta AdlukaaXSano) Tuahar Head 
4 Shreekarrt Adtukari Gangate Head 
5 Slrreelcdshna Adhdrari Gangate Head 
6 Klisirna Datra Adrnkori Gangate Head 
7 Jiva Nam Adlukari Puttari Middle 
8 Ram Krishna Poudal Purtari Middle 
9 Laxmi Pd. Poudel Purtari Middle 
10 Ram Chnadra Poudel Purtari Middle 
11 Parashuram Poudel Purtari Middle 
12 Laxmi Nam Adhikari Kole Middle 
13 Dandabari Adhikari Banse and Tarsal Middle 
14 Riddhi Bdr. Adhikari Clihotbiti&Tarsat Middle 
15 Devi PA Adhikari Athahra Middle 
16 Shree Pd. Adhikari Cbhotbidi Middle 
17 Ram Hari Adhikari Athahra Middle 
18 Ram Krishna Adhikari Athahra Middle 
19 Ram Chandra Adhikari Athahra Middle 
20 Raghu Nath Adhikari Athahra Middle 
21 Tulasi Bikes Adhikari Athahra Middle 
22 Bishnu Prasad Poudel Barlemani Tad 
23 Krishna Pd. Adhikari TarPandhra Tad 
24 Bal Knstaa B.K. ChepteTar Tad 
25 Shreebhadra Adhikari ChepteTat Tad 
26 BirBdr.B.K. Jundyahatar Tad 
27 Bhim Bdr. B X Tor Dash Tad 
28 Keshav Adhikari Tar Dash Tad 
29 Sirs Pandit TarPandhra Tad 
30 Ram Bdr. Adhikari Tar Sat Tad 
31 ArtaB.K. Tar Tod 
32 LakhuteB.K. Tar Tad 
33 Rem Nath Adlukari Tar Dash Tad 
34 Purrta Pd Adhikari Tar Dash Tad 
38 Lalit Bdr. Bhujel Tar Dash Tad 
39 Qjvmda Adlukari TarPandhra Tad 
41 Coma Adhikari Athahra Middle 
42 Restrain Raj Adlukari Tar Tad 
43 Indra Bilas Adhikari Tar Tad 
44 Badri Nath Adlukari Barlemani Tad 
45 Durga Narh Adhikari Birauto.Tardash.Tar Middle 
46 Ram Bdr. Nepali Tar Tail 
47 Dhan Bd. Nepali Tar Tail 
48 Dfl Bdr. Nepali Tar Tad 
49 Man Bdr. Nepali Tar Tad 
51 Gopal Bdr. Nepali ChebteTar Tad 
52 Krishna Bdr. Nepali Tar Tad 
53 Padam Bdr. Nepali Tar Tad 
54 Jwala Pd. Adhikari Barlemani &Tar Tad 
55 Udaya Raj Adhikari Tar Tad 
56 Suman Adhikari Purtari Middle 
57 Bosonta Bdr. Adhikari Barlemani Tad 
58 Gyanahali Adliikari TaHo Kole Tad 
59 Sunder Adhikari Char Ghare+TaDo Kole Tad 
60 Bishnu Maya Nepali Tar Tad 
61 Ganesh Bdr. Adhikari Birauto Middle 
62 Bishnu Hari Adhikari Birauto Middle 
63 Sita Ram Adlukari Banse Middle 
64 NdKantha Adlukari Barlemani Tail 
65 Lok Nath Adhikari Barierrrani, Tarpandhra Tad 
66 Krishna Murari Adhikari Birauto, Tarpandhra Middle 
67 Ham Ram Adhikari Birauto Middle 
68 Lalit Bdr. B. K. Tar Tad 
69 Sita Ram Adhikari Bansetar Tad 
71 Cbiranjibee Adhikari Chalise Head 
74 Damodar Adhikari Tar Tad 
75 Babu Ram Pandit Tar Tad 
76 Ganesh B.K. Tot Tad 
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ANNEX XIII Some Relevant Socio-Economie Data of Népal and Tanahun. 
Table 1 Population by reUsion In Nepal and Tanahun (1991). 
Place Total Hindu B u d h a Islam J a i n Christian Klratl Others Not Stated 
Nepal 18491097 15996953 1439142 653218 7561 31280 318389 26416 18138 
Tanahrm 268073 251596 13518 2206 129 491 8 70 55 
Source: CBS/Nepal 1997 (P13) . 
Table 2 Landholdings (ha) In Nepal and Tanahun ( 1 9 9 1 / 9 2 ) . 
Place Total A r e a Total Holders Avg. Holding W e t Avg. Dry Avg. 
Nepal 2568970.9 2736050 0,9499 0,5745 0,3753 
Tanahun 33901,3 45303 0,7483 0,2298 0,5185 
Source: CBS/Nepal 1997 (Pp 43-44). 
Table 3 Population In Nepal and Tanahun by m o t h e r tongue (language) ( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
Place 
Nepal 
Tanahun 
Total 
18491097 
268073 
Nepali 
9302880 
168943 
Matthili 
2191900 
271 
Bhojpuri 
1379717 
319 
Newari 
690007 
13778 
Gurung 
227918 
25872 
T a m a n g Abadhl 
904456 374638 
T h a r u 
993388 
253 
Place 
Nepal 
Tanahun 
M a g a r 
430264 
46514 
Limbu 
254088 
24 
Rai/Kiratl Sherpa 
439312 121819 
4707 26 
Thakall Rajbanshi Satar Danmvar Santhal 
7113 85558 25302 23721 8030 
190 54 75 7 4 
Place 
Nepal 
Tanahun 
Hindi 
170997 
251 
Urdu 
202208 
1298 
Chepang 
25097 
0 
Thami 
254088 
24 
Bengali 
27712 
6 
Majlii 
11322 
6 
Dhlmal 
15014 
3 
J h a n g a r 
15175 
1 
Marwadi 
16514 
2 
Place 
Nepal 
Tanahun 
Kumhale 
1413 
0 
Source: 
6520 
2246 
CBS/Nepal 
J l re l 
4229 
5 
1997 
Byanshi 
1314 
6 
(P 18). 
Raji 
2959 
28 
English 
2784 
26 
Other L o O t h e r F o r 
cal Lang, eign L a n g 
495462 8309 
1416 480 
Not Stated 
9157 
50 
Population o f six years o f age and above by literacy in Nepal and Tanahun, ( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
Place 
Nepal 
Tanahun 
Total Population 
15145071 
220755 
Source: CBS/Nepal 
Illiterate Population 
Number % a g e 
9073370 59,91 
108616 49,2 
1997 (P 33). 
Literate 
Number 
5958748 
110302 
Population 
% a g e 
39,34 
49,96 
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Table 5 Population o f ten years o f age and above by m a j o r occupation in Nepal and Tanahun, ( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
Place Total Popn P r o m / T e c n l Aduui. Clerical Sales Service F a r m Prodn. 
W o r k e r s W o r k e r s W o r k e r s W o r k e r s W o r k e r s W o r k e r s L a b o r s 
Nepal 7 3 3 9 5 8 6 130653 2 1 9 4 2 7 7 6 9 7 2 1 8 4 9 6 4 5 3 7 3 9 5 9 5 2 0 4 7 3 1 0 4 1 4 
Tanahun 1 1 3 5 9 4 2 2 6 9 2 8 6 525 2 6 2 0 2 8 3 5 9 9 5 1 4 3 0 3 3 
Source: CBS/Nepal 1 9 9 7 (P38) 
Others 
1 5 3 7 2 8 
2 2 0 8 
Table 6 Paddy a r e a (ha) in Nepal and Tanahun. 
Place 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 8 8 / 8 9 8 9 / 9 0 90 /91 
Nepal 1 4 2 3 2 9 0 1 4 5 0 4 7 0 1 4 3 2 8 5 0 1 4 5 5 1 7 0 
Tanahun 1 3 6 9 0 1 4 7 5 0 1 3 4 5 0 1420 
Source: CBS/Nepal 1997 ( P 5 5 ) 
91 /92 9 2 / 9 3 
1 4 1 1 8 1 0 1 2 6 2 1 1 0 
1 2 6 0 0 12650 
9 3 / 9 4 
1 4 5 3 8 5 0 
1 3 0 0 0 
9 4 / 9 5 
1 4 2 0 9 2 0 
1 2 5 0 0 
1 9 6 5 / 9 6 
1 4 9 6 7 9 0 
1 4 1 0 0 
Table 7 Number o f P r i m a r y Schools in Nepal and Tanahun. 
Place 1990 /91 1 9 9 1 / 9 2 
Nepal 1 8 6 9 4 1 9 4 9 8 
Tanahun 4 0 3 4 5 4 
Source: CBS/Nepal 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 1 9 9 3 / 9 4 
2 0 2 1 7 2 1 1 0 2 
4 6 0 471 
1997 ( P 2 3 1 ) . 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
2 0 7 1 5 
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Table 8 N u m b e r o f L o w e r Secondary Schools in Nepal and Tanahun. 
Place 
Nepal 
Tanahun 
1 9 9 0 / 9 1 
4 0 4 5 
83 
Source: 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 
4 2 3 0 
8 4 
CBS/Nepal 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 
4 3 7 6 
8 8 
1 9 9 7 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 
4 7 3 9 
102 
(P 2 3 6 ) . 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
4 9 4 7 
108 
Table 9 Number o f Secondary Schools In Nepal and Tanahun. 
Place 1 9 9 0 / 9 1 1 9 9 1 / 9 2 1 9 9 2 / 9 3 1 9 9 3 / 9 4 1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
Nepal 2 0 7 9 2 3 0 9 2 2 4 2 2 4 8 2 2 6 1 3 
Tanahun 53 5 7 61 6 4 6 7 
Source: CBS/Nepal 1997 ( P 2 4 1 ) . 
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Table 1 0 N u m b e r o f P r i m a r y students enrollment In Nepal and Tanahun. 
Place 
Nepal 
Tanahun 
1 9 9 0 / 9 1 
2 8 8 4 2 7 5 
6 9 6 7 2 
Source: 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 
3 0 3 4 7 1 0 
6 9 7 9 3 
CBS/Nepal 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 
3 0 9 1 6 8 4 
6 6 8 3 7 
1 9 9 7 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 
3 1 9 1 6 1 4 
6 6 9 9 6 
( P 2 6 1 ) . 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
3 2 3 4 1 6 5 
6 9 0 1 8 
Table 11 Number o f Lower Secondary student enrollment in Nepal 
and Tanahun. 
Place 1990 /91 
Nepal 3 7 8 4 7 8 
Tanahun 8 6 4 0 
Source: 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 1 9 9 2 / 9 3 
4 3 3 4 2 8 6 3 7 3 6 7 
8 8 6 9 1 4 5 4 8 
CBS/Nepal 1997 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
6 7 0 1 8 2 7 2 2 4 4 0 
1 5 5 5 4 16570 
(P 2 6 6 ) . 
Table 1 2 Number o f secondary school students enrollment in Nepal and Tanahun. 
Place 
Nepal 
Tanahun 
1 9 9 0 / 9 1 
3 9 5 3 3 0 
9641 
Source: 
1991/92 
4 2 1 7 0 9 
9641 
CBS/Nepal 
1992 /93 1 9 9 3 / 9 4 
2 7 2 7 4 7 2 7 4 3 2 7 
5 0 6 8 5 4 0 7 
1997 ( P 2 7 1 ) . 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
2 8 8 8 4 5 
5 3 8 8 
Table 13 Some econo Some economic and demographic indicators o f South-Asian and East Asian Nations ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
Countries G N P Percapita Life Expectancy Popn. Growth 
( U S S ) at Birth Rate ( 1 9 9 8 - 9 5 ) 
Nepal 2 0 0 55 2.5 
India 3 4 0 6 2 1.9 
China 6 2 0 69 1.3 
Bangladesh 2 4 0 5 8 2 
Bhutan 4 2 0 NA 2,6 
Pakistan 4 6 0 60 3 
Mynmar N A 5 9 1,8 
Source: CBS/Nepal 1997 (P 3 8 6 ) . 
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Table 1 4 Total irrigated area in Nepal (ha) . 
Y e a r s 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 
A r e a 2 0 8 1 0 3 3 8 3 3 5 9 6 3 2 5 7 8 0 6 4 9 7 8 4 4 8 5 3 0 
Source: CBS/Nepal 1 9 9 7 ( P 3 8 6 ) . 
T a b l e 1 5 T h e a v e r a g e yields o f Agronomical c rops in Nepal (ton/ha). 
C r o p s 0 3 8 / 3 9 0 3 9 / 4 0 040 /41 
Rice 1,97 1,45 2 ,07 
Maize 1,58 1,41 1,51 
Wheat 1,32 1,36 1.34 
Potato 6 , 1 7 6,3 6,51 
Oilseeds 0,7 0 ,63 0 ,66 
Source: M O F . 2 0 5 1 . 
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ANNEX-XIV. The Agreement Paper of Thulotar Kulo and Ghartiswara Kulo 
About the Resolution of Their Inter-System Dispute1. 
We, the following two parties among the citizens of Tanahun, Jyamruk, Rupakot, and West No. 3 Khalte 
are here by understood that traditionally, we had a common understanding of sharing the source of water 
of Sabadi Khola (including water from the creek of Dharapani) by half to irrigate Ghartiswara Khet and 
Thulotar (also known by Egharhasayatar). Although the long drought inspired developing a 
misunderstanding among us this year, now, we are agreed to share the specified sources of water for the 
whole future by half. The non-compliance to this condition will be punishable according to the then 
prevailing rules and regulations. We have written this paper with the joint agreement of both parties and 
kept a copy by each. The paper is written at Charkune Chautaro of Rupakot Beshi in Tanahun Jyamruk 
in the presence of the following witnesses." 
Enclosure: 
(i) Water-Users of Ghartiswara: 
S -No. Name Age (vrs) Add re •ss No. Signature 
1 Shiva Ram Joshi 20 West No. 3 Khalte 1 (Signed) 
2 Him Mani Joshi 25 West No. 3 Nibuwaswara 1 (Signed) 
3 Shambhu Ram Joshi 21 Do 1 (Signed) 
4 Giri Ram Joshi 20 West No. 3 Chok, Khalte 1 (Signed) 
5 Shatnsher Bahadur Gurung 18 Do 1 (Signed) 
(ii) Water-Users of Thulotar (Egharhasayatar): 
S . N o . Name Aeefvrs) Address No. Signature 
1 Jimmuwat, Radha Krishna Upadhyaya 66 Tanahun, Jyamruk, 1 (Signed) 
Rupakot 
2 Pandit, Lok Nath Upadhyaya 40 Do 1 (Signed 
3 Ram Nath Padhyaya 30 Do 1 (Signed 
4 Raghu Nath Padhyaya 24 Do 1 (Signed 
5 Writer, Dandapani Padhyaya 36 Do 1 (Signed 
6 Subedar, Tek Nath Upadhyaya 33 Do 1 (Signed 
7 Kaladhar Padhyaya 36 Do 1 (Signed 
g Rudra Nath Upadhyaya 36 Do 1 (Signed 
9 Gadclhe Kami 18 Do 1 (Signed 
10 Sungure Kami Do 1 (Signed 
11 Devi Prasad Do 1 (Signed 
12 Krishna Prasad - Do 1 (Signed 
13 SitaRam - Do 1 (Signed 
14 Horn Nath Padhyaya Poudel - Do 1 (Signed 
15 Maya Nath - Do 1 (Signed 
16 Mandhoj Chhetri - Do 1 (Signed 
17 Shridhar Poudel Padhyaya 58 Do 1 (Signed 
(iii) Witnesses: 
8. No. Name Age Address No. Signature 
(vrs) 
1 Bichari, Ammar Raj Joshi 57 West No. 3, Tanahun, Chok Khalte 1 (Signed) 
2 Shritnan Gurung - West No. 3, Tanahun, Jyamruk Rupakot 1 (Signed) 
3 Hem Raj Joshi - Do 1 (Signed) 
4 Ram Chandra padhyaya - Do 1 (Signed) 
5 Writer, Tirtha Raj Padhyaya 46 Do 1 (Signed) 
6 Writer. Bltig Mani Joshi 24 Khalte, Hanumandanda 1 (Signed) 
Date: 2017, Shrawan 31, Monday. 
Translation of the true copy. 
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ANNEX-XV Financial Participatory Irrigation Policies in Nepal. 
Table 1. Provision for cost sharing for irrigation rehabilitation projects. 
Zones in Nepal Minimum Share for W I I C M a x i m u m Share for H M G / N 
Hffl (surface irrigation) 12 8 8 
High hill 7 9 3 
T e r a ! (surface and ground water 15 85 
Irigation) 
All personal (surface Irrigation systems) 4 0 6 0 
Source: M O W R , 1996. 
Table 2. Provision for irrigation service fee. 
Type o f Participation Management o f Irrigation F e e 
Share o f H M G / N Share o f W U C 
W U C manages all systems and s tructures except the headwork 10 9 0 
W U C manages all systems and structures except the headwork 25 7 5 
and main canal 
W U C manages all systems and structures Including the 5 0 50 
assigned blocks except the headwork and main canal 
W U C manages only ter t iary and Held channels 7 5 25 
Source: M O W R , 1996. 
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ANNEX - XVI The Patterns of Crop Rotations within the Service Area of 
Thulotar Kulo. 
Head Section: 
• Paddy-Mow-Mow 
• Paddy+soybean-Mow-fallow 
• rjaddy+bteckgram-fallow-lallow 
Middle Section: 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean-fallow-fallow 
Paddy-fallow-fallow 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean-potato-maize 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean-wheat-fallow 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean-mustard-maize 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean-lentil-fallow 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean-wheat-maize 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean-potato+radish-maize 
Paddy-fallow-maize+cowpea 
Paddy-fallow-maize 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean-potato-maize+cowpea 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean-mustard-maize+cowpea 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean-wheat-maize+cowpea 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean-potato+radish-maize+cowpea 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean or cowpea-potato+radish-maize+cowpea 
Paddy+blackgram or soybean or cowpea-potato or any winter crop -maize or fallow or maize+cowpea 
Tail Section: 
Paddy-fallow-fallow 
Paddy+blackgram-fallow-fallow 
Paddy+blackgram-fallow-maize 
Paddy+blackgram-fallow-&s6aw'a aculeata 
Paddy+blackgram-fallow-maize+cowpea 
Paddy+SesAow/'oaca/eoto-fallow-fallow 
Paddy+soybean-fallow-maize or maize+cowpea or Sesbania aculeata or fallow 
2 3 3 
About the Author 
Born in a remote mountainous village of Nepal in 1959,1 changed schools six times 
before I was able to complete my elementary education. Fortunately, it was not the 
same story for high school. I was also fortunate to gain admittance to an agricultural 
college in my home district in 1976, immediately after graduating high school. 
I first had the chance to learn something about irrigation as a student of agriculture in 
1976. This was when I began studying for my Intermediate Science in Agriculture (L 
Sc. Ag.) certification. Although there were no separate courses on irrigation 
management, the importance of irrigation and its management in relation to 
agricultural crops was some of the most important information I was exposed to 
through the courses on crop sciences. 
I began working toward my Bachelor of Science in Agriculture (B Sc. Ag.) in 1978 
and had the opportunity to take courses on farm irrigation, soil and water conservation, 
and irrigation engineering. Knowledge about crop-water relationships, requirements, 
and management was linked to the disciplines of agronomy, horticulture and forage 
production. Immediately after graduating with my undergraduate degree in agriculture 
from (B. Sc. Ag.) Tribhuvan University, Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science 
(IAAS), Rampur, Nepal, I had the chance to serve at the same institute as an Assistant 
Lecturer of Crop Science in 1981. 
I started my professional career in the institutional aspects of irrigation management 
studies in 1988 when I was admitted in the University of Philippines at Los Banos 
(UPLB) as a graduate student of Rural Sociology. Before being admitted to UPLB, I 
had decided to work on irrigation management for my Masters Degree thesis. My 
particular interest was farmer managed irrigation systems (FMLS). 
FMISs in the Philippines are commonly known as communal irrigation systems (CIS). 
The Philippines has the highest number of communal irrigation systems in the world, 
demonstrating the popularity of OS's and the farmer groups' commitment to irrigation 
management. The institutionalization of the norm and process of amortization of the 
total cost of development and rehabilitation of irrigation facilities and its acceptance 
by the Farmer's Irrigator Groups (FIGs) and Farmer's Irrigators Associations (FIAs) 
are very important traditions. The rest of the world could learn from the Philippines. 
The title of my Master's Thesis was "Factors Affecting Performance of Communal 
Irrigation System Members". For this study, I had a chance to work with Filipino 
farmers in Bugaan Barangay of Batangas for about a year. 
After the completion of my M.Sc. program in January, 1991,1 had the chance to work 
as a member of the new Irrigation Management System Study Group (LMSSG) at 
IAAS. This was a team of multi-disciplinary faculty representatives of IAAS from the 
social sciences, agricultural economics, agricultural engineering, soil science, and crop 
sciences studying irrigation management since 1985. LMSSG's major activities 
include the development an irrigation resource inventory, an external need assessment 
of farmer-managed irrigation systems, process documentation of irrigation 
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rehabilitation projects, the study and impact assessment of irrigation management 
transfer projects, research on water rights and water dispute management, farmer 
training, arrangement of national and international workshops and seminars, 
curriculum development in irrigation management, and writing and reporting of 
research reports and technical papers. In the course of its activities, MSSG has 
established working relationships with various governmental and non-governmental 
organizations in Nepal and abroad. These organizations include the Ford Foundation, 
the International Water Management Institute, UNDP, FAO, Wageningen University 
Research Center, Indiana University, Department of Irrigation/Nepal, Legal Research 
and Development Foram/Kathmandu, and so on. 1MSSG was recently promoted as 
one of the mandatory organizations within IAAS in the form of a Water Management 
Study Program (WMSP). 
As a member of MSSG and WMSP, I had also tremendous opportunities to work and 
learn about different aspects of water management. I have been involved in studying 
property rights and dispute management in natural resources management since 1995. 
I was given the opportunity to pursue a Ph. D. degree at Wageningen Agricultural 
University in Legal Anthropology and Development Studies beginning in December 
1996. This document is the output of my Ph.D. thesis research on one of the FMLSs in 
the Hills of Nepal. Water rights and dispute management are the core of my study and 
research in my Ph.D. program. 
As a member of the Faculty of Agriculture and Rural Sociology, I have been teaching 
Sociology of Rural Development, Rural Sociology, and some courses in Agricultural 
Economics, Agriculture Extension, and Crop Sciences on three different agriculture 
campuses in Nepal. At the same time, I also had the opportunity to gain experience in 
academic administration for the last 18 years. 
Rabi Poudel 
June, 2000 
e-mail: rabipoudel@usa.com 
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